El artículo analiza el proyecto de una fenomenología de la sociedad y lo coteja con el marco lógico epistemológico de la metodología de los programas de investigación científica (Lakatos). En lo atinente examina el aporte fundacional de Edmund Husserl y explicita el giro neo-praxeológico que Alfred ..
El presente artículo postula que la Metodología de los Programas de Investigación esclarece la racionalidad del conocimiento científico-social dando cuenta adecuada del carácter plural de las teorías. Cada programa de investigación progresa si desarrolla más contenido teórico y empírico que sus comp..
La epistemología de Feyerabend desplaza la atención centrada en la dimensión racional de la ciencia para enfocarla en el contexto histórico y sociocultural. Su trabajo da a veces la impresión de un análisis ejecutado por un etnógrafo que se afana en comprender los elementos simbólicos y, en gene..
En este ensayo se revisan algunos de los planteamientos de Imre Lakatos. El examen historiográfico, nos dice Lakatos, ha permitido comprobar que la comunidad científica, ha evaluado como importantes progresos del conocimiento y la investigación a programas que presentaban serias inconsistencias ..
The ideal-type is an empirical generalization of the axiological must-be. Its validity rests on an analysis matrix of society which in this article is applied to certain style of action considered as enterprising. This article examines the emergence of the enterprising type, after grounding th..
In the scope of social sciences (and particularly in the field of sociology) from the Sixties of the last century a series of theories and practices of investigation has arisen with force -these last ones, identified generally like qualitative- that declare to be inspired by the phenomenology (al..
El pensador napolitano Giambattista Vico (16681744) de reconocida autoridad en el campo de la investigación histórica es considerado, también, el inaugurador de la Filosofía de la Historia en una época en la cual aún no existía una denominación específica para designar ese tipo de estudio. No o..
In the last decades, it has been argued extensively about the possibilities and merits of Social Work to apply at the recognition of its disciplinary character, which -in mind of his defenders- it would overcame the technological and ideological arguments. At the same time, it has been in play h..
The Multiple Reality theory represents a key piece to understand the socio-phenomenology. It is sustained by a triangulation of the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl, the vitalism of Henry Bergson and the pragmatism of William James (and it has as a background the praxeology of Ludwig Von Mises and ..
_The Poetry of the Possible _challenges the conventional image of modernism as a socially phobic formation, arguing that modernism’s abstractions and difficulties are ways of imagining unrealized powers of collective self-organization. Establishing a conceptual continuum between modernism and contemporary theorists such as Paulo Virno, Michael Hardt, Antonio Negri, and Alain Badiou, Joel Nickels rediscovers modernism’s attempts to document the creative _potenza_ of the multitude. By examining scenes of collective life in works by William Carlos Williams, Wyndham Lewis, Laura Riding, (...) and Wallace Stevens, Nickels resurrects modernism’s obsession with _constituent power_: the raw, indeterminate capacity for reciprocal counsel that continually constitutes and reconstitutes established political regimes. In doing so, he reminds us that our own attempts to imagine leaderless networks of collective initiative are not so much breaks with modernist forms of knowledge as restagings of some of modernism’s most radical moments of political speculation. Setting modernism’s individual and collective models of spontaneity in dialogue with theorists of political spontaneity such as Antonio Gramsci, Herbert Marcuse, and Theodor Adorno, Nickels retells the story of modernism as the struggle to represent powers of collective self-organization that lie outside established regimes of political representation. (shrink)
In this paper I propose clearly to distinguish four fundamental types of intertheoretical relations that may be used to represent different types of theoretical change in empirical science. These four types can be represented formally through a refined version of the set-theoretical apparatus of structuralism. They may be described as: crystallization, theory-evolution, embedding, and replacement with partial incommensurability. They will be first explicated in intuitive, informal terms, and some historical examples will be suggested for each type. In the second part (...) of the paper, the four types are characterized in structuralistic terms; the notions of a partial substructure and of a diachronic theory-net will play a central role. (shrink)
In a scientific context, ontological commitments should be considered as supervenient over accepted scientific theories. This implies that the primarily ontological notions of reduction and emergence of entities of different kinds should be reformulated in terms of relations between existing empirical theories. For this, in turn, it is most convenient to employ a model-theoretic view of scientific theories: the identity criterion of a scientific theory is essentially given by a class of models. Accordingly, reduction and emergence are to be seen (...) as particular kinds of relations between models of different theories that subsume the same "experiential field". The set-theoretical notion of an echelon-set proves to be crucial for this purpose: The domains in the models of the reduced theory are echelon-sets over the domains of the reducing theory. Finally, it is argued that emergence may plausibly be interpreted as akin to but weaker than reduction. (shrink)
Chalmers e Dennett se encontram em lados opostos da discussão do problema da consciência. Para Chalmers, ela é um dado indubitável que não pode ser explicada em termos de outra coisa. Para Dennett, o que existe verdadeiramente são múltiplos julgamentos sobre nossa consciência. Cada um acusa o outro de circularidade. Isto só é possível porque a diferença entre estas duas teorias é verdadeiramente uma diferença de princípios. A mesma oposição que encontramos no aparato teórico encontramos também em suas pressuposições mais (...) básicas e fundamentais. Este fato torna extremamente difícil escolher entre as duas ao mesmo tempo em que radicaliza a diferença entre elas. De um lado temos que argumentos podem refutar intuições, de outro temos que é preciso primeiro sondar nossas intuições para depois criar argumentos a partir delas. Entre um extremo e outro nos encontramos com o velho dilema de “o que vem primeiro?”. No entanto, mais importante do que escolher lados é mostrar o quanto é difícil escolher. (shrink)
Chalmers and Dennett are at opposite sides of the debate on the problem of conciousness. For Chalmres, conciousness is an unquestionable fact that cannot be explained by something else. For Dennett, what exists is really multiple judgements about our conciousness. Each author accuses the other of circularity. This is only possible because the difference between the two theories is actually a difference of principles. The same opposition that we find in their theoretical apparatus we also find on their more fundamental (...) and basic premises. This feature .makes it very difficult to choose one of the two theories, while it also radicalizes the difference bewteen them. On one side we have arguments that can refute intuitions, on the other we find that that one must first scrutinize our intuitions to then create arguments based on them. Between the two extreems we meet with the old dilemma of "what came first?". However, more important than to choose sides is to show how difficult the choice is.Chalmers e Dennett se encontram em lados opostos da discussão do problema da consciência. Para Chalmers, ela é um dado indubitável que não pode ser explicada em termos de outra coisa. Para Dennett, o que existe verdadeiramente são múltiplos julgamentos sobre nossa consciência. Cada um acusa o outro de circularidade. Isto só é possível porque a diferença entre estas duas teorias é verdadeiramente uma diferença de princípios. A mesma oposição que encontramos no aparato teórico encontramos também em suas pressuposições mais básicas e fundamentais. Este fato torna extremamente difícil escolher entre as duas ao mesmo tempo em que radicaliza a diferença entre elas. De um lado temos que argumentos podem refutar intuições, de outro temos que é preciso primeiro sondar nossas intuições para depois criar argumentos a partir delas. Entre um extremo e outro nos encontramos com o velho dilema de "o que vem primeiro?". No entanto, mais importante do que escolher lados é mostrar o quanto é difícil escolher. (shrink)
En este trabajo sc presenta un marco general en el que desarrollar una “ontoepistemo-semántica” para las teodas científicas y sus terminos característicos. En primer lugar, se defiende la esencialidad de los aspectos ontologicos y epistemológicos para la semantica y se hacen explícitos los principios generales que constituyen dicho marco. A continuación, se aplican estos principios al análisis ontoepistemosemántico de cada uno de los tres tipos principales de términos científicos: términos relacionales y funcionales con contenido empírico, términos matemáticos puros y términos (...) para los dominios ontológicos básicos.In this paper I offer a general framework for all “ontoepistenlosemantics” of scientific theories and scientific terms. First, I argue for the essential dependence of semantics on ontological and epistemological aspects and I make explicit the general principIes that make up this frame. Then, I apply these principles to the ontoepistemosmantical analysis of the three main kinds of scientific terms: relational and functional term with empirical content, purely mathematical terms and terms for basic ontological domains. (shrink)
En este trabajo sc presenta un marco general en el que desarrollar una “ontoepistemo-semántica” para las teodas científicas y sus terminos característicos. En primer lugar, se defiende la esencialidad de los aspectos ontologicos y epistemológicos para la semantica y se hacen explícitos los principios generales que constituyen dicho marco. A continuación, se aplican estos principios al análisis ontoepistemosemántico de cada uno de los tres tipos principales de términos científicos: términos relacionales y funcionales con contenido empírico, términos matemáticos puros y términos (...) para los dominios ontológicos básicos.In this paper I offer a general framework for all “ontoepistenlosemantics” of scientific theories and scientific terms. First, I argue for the essential dependence of semantics on ontological and epistemological aspects and I make explicit the general principIes that make up this frame. Then, I apply these principles to the ontoepistemosmantical analysis of the three main kinds of scientific terms: relational and functional term with empirical content, purely mathematical terms and terms for basic ontological domains. (shrink)
Ontology should be conceived as supervenient on scientific theories. They tell us what categories of things there really are. Thus, we would have a unique system of ontology if we would attain the unity of science through a reductionist program. For this, it should be clear how a relation of intertheoretical reduction (with ontological implications) is to be conceived. A formal proposal is laid out in this paper. This allows us also to define the notion of a fundamental theory. Now, (...) it appears that, considering the state of really existing science, the idea of reductionism as based on this explication is highly implausible. However, even if this is the case, the question whether it is possible to build up a unique ontological system remains open. Its resolution depends on the notion of compatibility between fundamental theories, and its application to existing theories and their empirical bases. (shrink)
