What is the ethical impact of artificial intelligence assistants on human lives, and specifically how much do they threaten our individual autonomy? Recently, as part of forming an ethical framework for thinking about the impact of AI assistants on our lives, John Danaher claims that if the external automaticity generated by the use of AI assistants threatens our autonomy and is therefore ethically problematic, then the internal automaticity we already live with should be viewed in the same way. He takes (...) advantage of this paradox of internal automaticity to downplay the threats of external automaticity to our autonomy. We respond in this paper by challenging the legitimacy of the paradox. While Danaher assumes that internal and external automaticity are roughly equivalent, we argue that there are reasons why we should accept a large degree of internal automaticity, that it is actually essential to our sense of autonomy, and as such it is ethically good; however, the same does not go for external automaticity. Therefore, the similarity between the two is not as powerful as the paradox presumes. In conclusion, we make practical recommendations for how to better manage the integration of AI assistants into society. (shrink)

Although former Yugoslavia constituted what was widely held to be the most "promising" communist country in terms of potentials for economic reform and political democratization, Serbia remained the only East European country in which the former communist elite managed to defeat its opponents in a series of elections and preserve important elements of institutional and ideological continuity with the old system. Moreover, its regime played a conspicuous role in Yugoslavia's violent collapse. In the specialist literature, the "Serbian exceptionalism" thesis has (...) been elaborated in a number of forms. These are critically reviewed in the first part of the paper, classifying the paradigms according to whether they emphasize: 1) Serbian traditionalist, authoritarian, and collectivist political culture, 2) the affinity between traditional Serbian national populism, Russophile anti-Westernism, and communism, 3) the exclusivist and assimilating character of Serbian nationalism, or 4) the appeals of the contemporary Serbian political elite led by S. Milosevic. In the second part of the paper an alternative explanation is presented that seeks to be both interpretively adequate and causally plausible. It rests on five basic factors: 1) historical legacy ; 2) institutional analysis ; 3) ideology ; 4) leadership and social base ; and 5) the role of the Diaspora.. Iako se pre 1990. smatralo da bivsa Jugoslavija medju svim komunistickim zemljama ima najbolje potencijale za ekonomsku reformu i politicku demokratizaciju, Srbija je ostala jedina istocnoevropska zemlja u kojoj je nekadasnjoj komunistickoj eliti poslo za rukom da porazi svoje protivnike u nekoliko uzastopnih izbornih nadmetanja i da ocuva znacajne elemente institucionalnog i ideoloskog kontinuiteta sa starim sistemom. Stavise, taj je rezim igrao krupnu ulogu u nasilnom raspadu SFRJ. U specijalistickoj literaturi, teza o "srpskoj izuzetnosti" razvijana je u razlicitim formama, cijem kritickom razmatranju je posvecen prvi deo rada. Identifikovano je nekoliko paradigmi, u zavisnosti od toga da li osnovni naglasak stavljaju na: 1) tradicionalisticku, autoritarnu i kolektivisticku politicku kulturu Srba, 2) afinitet izmedju tradicionalnog srpskog nacionalnog populizma, rusofilskog antizapadnjastva i komunizma, 3) ekskluzivisticku i asimilacionisticku prirodu srpskog nacionalizma, ili pak 4) odlike savremene srpske politicke elite na celu sa S. Milosevicem. U drugom delu rada izlozio je alternativno objasnjenje, ciji su glavni oslonci: 1) istorijsko nasledje, 2) institucionalna analiza, 3) ideologija, 4) osobine vodja i drustvena baza i 5) uloga dijaspore.. (shrink)

In the article “Nudging and Informed Consent”, Cohen argues that the use of “nudging” by physicians in the clinical encounter may be ethically warranted because it results in an informed consent where obligations for beneficence and respect for autonomy are both met. However, the author's overenthusiastic support for nudging and his quick dismissal of shared decision-making leads him to assume that “soft” manipulation is un-problematic and that “wisdom” on the side of medical professionals will suffice to guard against abuse. Opposing (...) this view, we propose that: 1) patient preferences and values should not be boiled down to rational or irrational decisions based on cognitive reasoning alone, 2) potential threats to the physician-patient must be mitigated and could be minimized by employing alternative strategies that acknowledge the impact of cognitive heuristics in shaping decision-making but maintain transparency and trust, and 3) patient preferences and values can be legitimately influenced only under specific circumstances. The latter include: (1) exhaustion of other means; (2) evidence that nudging is effective in a specific context; (3) evidence of clear and active public misinformation (e.g., industry promoting smoking); (4) explicit pubic dialogue between various stakeholders including medical professional societies about nudging; (5) upholding shared decision-making as a preferred approach; and (6) a rich understanding of clinical reality beyond the simple dichotomy of beneficence-autonomy. (shrink)

O mistério das relações divinas com o homem, no pensamento do teólogo Suiço Hans Urs von Balthasar, sempre focou a kenosis de Deus como uma renúncia a Sua divindade. Mas o sofrimento do homem comum e a injustiça que a sociedade lhe impôs, em tantos momentos da história, obrigam a ir mais além. A personali-dade do homem Jesus não apenas revela o mistério das relações trinitárias, mas no assu-mir a dor humana, e o risco da própria vida em favor da (...) justiça, Jesus revela também o verda-deiro homem contido no sonho da criação e chamado à vida plena no mundo. (shrink)

An increasing amount of very diverse scholarship self-identifies as belonging to the field of neuroethics, illuminating a need to provide some reference points for what that field actually entails. We argue that neuroethics is a single field with distinct perspectives, roles, and subspecialties. We propose that—in addition to the three traditional perspectives delineated by Eric Racine—a fourth, socio-political perspective, must be recognized in neuroethics. The socio-political perspective in neuroethics focuses on the interplay between the behavioral as well as the brain (...) sciences and the socio-political system; this interplay includes social regulation in addition to all other realistic elements of social and political neurodiscourses. Thus, defining what—if any—roles the socio-political perspective in neuroethics might have is a pressing issue. Doing so could provide guidance for defining the criteria for prospective ethical evaluations in neuroethics. A promising approach to doing this could be by describing the roles of neuroethics in terms of the more concrete examples of the roles of political philosophy in general, as in the tradition of John Rawls. We take klotho, the supposed “longevity protein,” as a modern neuroethics case to exemplify the obstacles faced in securing neuroethics’ legitimacy and how the Rawlsian framework we propose may be applied to handle cases such as this. Ultimately, the socio-political perspective in neuroethics should not be swayed by the media hype and ought to offer useful ethical guidance and articulation of genuine ethical concerns to policy makers and the public alike. (shrink)

This book explicitly addresses policy options in a democratic society regarding cognitive enhancement drugs and devices. The book offers an in-depth case by case analysis of existing and emerging cognitive neuroenhancement technologies and canvasses a distinct political neuroethics approach. The author provides an argument on the much debated issue of fairness of cognitive enhancement practices and tackles the tricky issue of how to respect preferences of citizens opposing and those preferring enhancement. The author persuasively argues the necessity of a laws (...) and regulations regarding the use of cognitive enhancers. He also argues that the funds for those who seek cognitive enhancement should be allocated free of charge to the least advantaged. The work argues that the notion of autonomy has been mistakenly associated with the metaphysical concept of free will, and offers a political definition of autonomy to clarify how responsibility is implicitly grounded in the legal and political system. As such, this book is an essential read for everyone interested in neuroethics, and a valuable resource for policy makers, as well as scholars and students in philosophy, law, psychiatry and neuroscience. (shrink)

Moral enhancement refers to the possibility of making individuals and societies better from a moral standpoint. A fierce debate has emerged about the ethical aspects of moral enhancement, notably because steering moral enhancement in a particular direction involves choosing amongst a wide array of competing options, and these options entail deciding which moral theory or attributes of the moral agent would benefit from enhancement. Furthermore, the ability and effectiveness of different neurotechnologies to enhance morality have not been carefully examined. In (...) this paper, we assess the practical feasibility of moral enhancement neurotechnologies. We reviewed the literature on neuroscience and cognitive science models of moral judgment and analyzed their implications for the specific target of intervention in moral enhancement. We also reviewed and compared evidence on available neurotechnologies that could serve as tools of moral enhancement. We conclude that the predictions of rationalist, emotivist, and dual process models are at odds with evidence, while different intuitionist models of moral judgment are more likely to be aligned with it. Furthermore, the project of moral enhancement is not feasible in the near future as it rests on the use of neurointerventions, which have no moral enhancement effects or, worse, negative effects. (shrink)

Ethical analyses of biomedical human enhancement often consider the issue of authenticity — to what degree can the accomplishments of those utilizing biomedical enhancements be considered authentic or worthy of praise? As research into Brain-Computer Interface technology progresses, it may soon be feasible to create a BCI device that enhances or augments natural human intelligence through some invasive or noninvasive biomedical means. In this article we will review currently existing BCI technologies and to what extent these can be said to (...) enhance or augment the capabilities of the respective users, describe one hypothetical type of BCI device that could augment or enhance a specific aspect of human knowledge — namely, mathematical ability, and relate these concepts to the active externalism view of the extended mind as espoused by Clark and Chalmers in order to argue that knowledge of mathematics derived from the usage of a BCI and the application thereof constitutes authentic knowledge and achievement. (shrink)

Autonomous vehicles —and accidents they are involved in—attest to the urgent need to consider the ethics of artificial intelligence. The question dominating the discussion so far has been whether we want AVs to behave in a ‘selfish’ or utilitarian manner. Rather than considering modeling self-driving cars on a single moral system like utilitarianism, one possible way to approach programming for AI would be to reflect recent work in neuroethics. The agent–deed–consequence model :3–20, 2014a, Behav Brain Sci 37:487–488, 2014b) provides a (...) promising descriptive and normative account while also lending itself well to implementation in AI. The ADC model explains moral judgments by breaking them down into positive or negative intuitive evaluations of the agent, deed, and consequence in any given situation. These intuitive evaluations combine to produce a positive or negative judgment of moral acceptability. For example, the overall judgment of moral acceptability in a situation in which someone committed a deed that is judged as negative would be mitigated if the agent had good intentions and the action had a good consequence. This explains the considerable flexibility and stability of human moral judgment that has yet to be replicated in AI. This paper examines the advantages and disadvantages of implementing the ADC model and how the model could inform future work on ethics of AI in general. (shrink)

This article analyzes appropriate public policies for enhancement use of two most important stimulant drugs: Ritalin (methylphenidate) and Adderall (mixed amphetamine salts). The author argues that appropriate regulation of cognition enhancement drugs cannot be a result of a general discussion on cognitive enhancements as such, but has to be made on a case-by-case basis. Starting from the recently proposed taxation approach to cognition enhancement drugs, the author analyzes available, moderately permissive models of regulation. After a thorough analysis of relevant characteristics (...) of methylphenidate and amphetamine, the author concludes that a moderately liberal permissive regulation of enhancement use by healthy adults might be appropriate for extended release forms of methylphenidate. However, due to their danger profile, amphetamine and instant release forms of methylphenidate should not be made readily available to healthy adults and would need to be prohibited. (shrink)

This article proposes a novel integrative approach to moral judgment and a related model that could explain how unconscious heuristic processes are transformed into consciously accessible moral intuitions. Different hypothetical cases have been tested empirically to evoke moral intuitions that support principles from competing moral theories. We define and analyze the types of intuitions that moral theories and studies capture: those focusing on agents (A), deeds (D), and consequences (C). The integrative ADC approach uses the heuristic principle of “attribute substitution” (...) to explain how people make intuitive judgments. The target attributes of moral judgments are moral blameworthiness and praiseworthiness, which are substituted with more accessible and computable information about an agent's virtues and vices, right/wrong deeds, and good/bad consequences. The processes computing this information are unconscious and inaccessible, and therefore explaining how they provide input for moral intuitions is a key problem. We analyze social heuristics identified in the literature and offer an outline for a new model of moral judgment. Simple social heuristics triggered by morally salient cues rely on three distinct processes (role-model entity, action analysis, and consequence tallying—REACT) in order to compute the moral valence of specific intuitive responses (A, D, and C). These are then rapidly combined to form an intuitive judgment that could guide quick decision making. The ADC approach and REACT model can clarify a wide set of data from empirical moral psychology and could inform future studies on moral judgment, as well as case assessments and discussions about issues causing “deadlocked” moral intuitions. (shrink)

Recent research in empirical moral psychology attempts to understand (rather than place judgment on) the salient normative differences that laypeople have when making moral decisions by using survey methodology that is based on the operationalized principles from moral theories. The PPIMT is the first measure designed to assess respondents’ preference for the precepts implied in the three dominant moral theories: virtue ethics, deontology, and consequentialism. The current study used a latent modeling approach to determine the most theoretically and psychometrically-sound model (...) for the PPIMT using a combined sample of college students from a southeastern university in U.S. and MTurk respondents. The PPIMT model fit was acceptable (χ2 = 84.125, df = 40, p = 0.001; RMSEA = 0.052, 90%CI = 0.037 to 0.068; CFI = 0.980; SRMR = 0.035) with four items for Virtue, four items for Deontology, and three items for Consequentialism. (shrink)

There is a growing literature in neuroethics dealing with the problem of cognitive neuroenhancement for healthy adults. However, discussions on this topic have tended to focus on abstract theoretical positions while concrete policy proposals and detailed models are scarce. Furthermore, discussions tend to rely solely on data from the US, while international perspectives are mostly neglected. Therefore, there is a need for a volume that deals with cognitive enhancement comprehensively in three important ways: a) with conceptual implications stemming from different (...) points of view; b) with ethical, social and legal perspectives that would not be limited to one part of the world but reflect on the current situation in countries in Africa, Asia, Australia, Europe, North America and South America; and c) with discussions of concrete law and policy options. Contributors for the conceptual implications section will elaborate an important general issue (e.g. ethical acceptability of direct-to-consumer-marketing in case of cognitive enhancement drugs). Contributors for international perspectives section will provide a clear discussion on normative issues and cultural values, along with an analysis of empirical data on public attitudes on cognitive enhancement and/or prevalence (specific to the country in question). Contributors for law and policy section will offer a justification for the general policy type they argue for (1. prohibition, 2. discourage use, 3. laissez-faire, 4. encourage use, and 5. mandatory use) in the case of specific cognitive enhancement measure. Furthermore, they would evaluate the possible impact of a detailed regulatory model on consumption and demand, fairness in competitive settings and the social pressure to enhance. (shrink)

In their paper “Algorithms for Ethical Decision-Making in the Clinic: A Proof of Concept,” Meier et al. present the design and preliminary results of a proof-of-concept clinical ethics algor...

Behavioural variant frontotemporal dementia (bvFTD) is characterized by an absence of obvious cognitive impairment and presence of symptoms such as disinhibition, social inappropriateness, personality changes, hyper-sexuality, and hyper-orality. Affected individuals do not feel concerned enough about their actions to be deterred from violating social norms, and their antisocial behaviours are most likely caused by the neurodegenerative processes in the frontal and anterior temporal lobes. BvFTD patients present a challenge for the traditional notion of autonomy and the medical and criminal justice (...) systems. Antisocial behaviour is often the earliest recognized manifestation of bvFTD. Given that the symptoms are not specific and that atrophy of the frontal lobes is only observable with structural neuroimaging in the later stages of the disease, it is hard to ascertain their autonomy. Recently proposed re-conceptualizations of autonomy (Dworkin’s, Jaworska’s, and Dubljević’s) can, however, be sufficiently redefined to provide explicit rules and offer nuanced guidance in such cases. A combination of notions of autonomy gives the most nuanced guidance with three modifications: 1) including socio-moral judgement in the notion of “normal cognitive competence,” 2) excluding in-principle un-endorsable ideals from the notion of “capacity to value,” and 3) redefining ideal-typical degrees of compulsion (mild, severe, and total). (shrink)

This article proposes a model for regulating use of cognition enhancement drugs for nontherapeutic purposes. Using the method of reflective equilibrium, the author starts from the considered judgment of many citizens that treatments are obligatory and permissible while enhancements are not, and with the application of general principles of justice explains why this is the case. The author further analyzes and refutes three reasons that some influential authors in the field of neuroethics might have for downplaying the importance of justice: (...) (1) Justice applies only to public funds and state action—not to individual choice or corporate actors. (2) “Performance enhancement” does imply questions of justice, while “performance maintenance” does not. (3) There is no sufficient difference between cognition-enhancement drugs and other technologies to warrant the importance of justice for the debate. The challenges are refuted by taking into account the difference between consumption and tool use, and the influence of socioeconomic pressure for widespread use that existing drugs could have on the basic structure of society and equal autonomy of citizens. The analysis of requirements of justice points to a conclusion that introducing economic disincentives for the use of cognition-enhancement drugs would be the most legitimate public policy. With the imposition of taxes, fees, and requirements of additional insurance, the use and indirect coercion to use would be less profitable and less widespread, while additional funds thus created could be allocated to meet basic medical needs and/or education. (shrink)

Neuroethics is an interdisciplinary field that arose in response to novel ethical challenges posed by advances in neuroscience. Historically, neuroethics has provided an opportunity to synergize different disciplines, notably proposing a two-way dialogue between an ‘ethics of neuroscience’ and a ‘neuroscience of ethics’. However, questions surface as to whether a ‘neuroscience of ethics’ is a useful and unified branch of research and whether it can actually inform or lead to theoretical insights and transferable practical knowledge to help resolve ethical questions. (...) In this article, we examine why the neuroscience of ethics is a promising area of research and summarize what we have learned so far regarding its most promising goals and contributions. We then review some of the key methodological challenges which may have hindered the use of results generated thus far by the neuroscience of ethics. Strategies are suggested to address these challenges and improve the quality of research and increase neuroscience's usefulness for applied ethics and society at large. Finally, we reflect on potential outcomes of a neuroscience of ethics and discuss the different strategies that could be used to support knowledge transfer to help different stakeholders integrate knowledge from the neuroscience of ethics. (shrink)

This paper examines the claims in the debate on cognitive enhancement in neuroethics that society wide pressure to enhance can be expected in the near future. The author uses rational choice modeling to test these claims and proceeds with the analysis of proposed types of solutions. The discourage use, laissez-faire and prohibition types of policy are scrutinized for effectiveness, legitimacy and associated costs. Special attention is given to the moderately liberal discourage use policy (and the gate-keeper and taxation approaches within (...) this framework), as many authors presuppose that this type of policy would best serve public interest. Different more or less articulated models in the taxation approach (Tobacco regulation analogy, Coffee-shop system, Regulatory Authority for Cognitive Enhancements and Economic Disincentives Model) are analyzed from the point of view of justificatory liberalism. The author concludes that prohibition and laissez-faire types of policy would neither be effective nor justified. A moderately liberal public policy shows more promise, but not all approaches within this type of policy would be legitimate and effective. The “gate-keeper” approach and related models could not be justified whereas approach based on taxation with suitable models might be legitimate and effective. (shrink)

We investigated the acceptability and frequency of the use of cognitive enhancement (CE) drugs and three different types of academic misconduct (plagiarism, cheating in exams, and falsifying/fabricating data). Data from a web-based survey among German university students were used. Moral acceptability was relatively low for CE drug use and moderate for academic misconduct, while the correlation of their respective acceptability was moderately weak. Prevalence of CE drug use was lower than for academic misconduct and (very) lightly correlated with the prevalence (...) of plagiarism and fabrication/falsification. Acceptability of the investigated behaviors was associated with higher prevalence rates of each behavior. (shrink)

There is mounting evidence that non-invasive brain stimulation devices - transcranial direct current stimulation and transcranial magnetic stimulation could be used for cognitive enhancement. However, the regulatory environment surrounding such uses of stimulation devices is less clear than for stimulant drugs—a fact that has already been commercially exploited by several companies. In this paper, the mechanism of action, uses and adverse effects of non-invasive neurostimulation devices are reviewed, along with social and ethical challenges pertaining to their use as cognitive enhancements. (...) Two regulatory approaches that could be used to facilitate responsible use of these devices as products and services are outlined. Apart from establishing the urgently needed comprehensive regulatory framework, they might provide a starting point for establishing long term physiological and social effects of enhancement uses of tDCS and TMS. (shrink)

BackgroundTranscranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) is an FDA approved treatment for major depression, migraine, obsessive compulsive disorder, and smoking addiction. TMS has gained popular media support, but media coverage and commercial reporting of TMS services may be contributing to the landscape of ethical issues.MethodsWe explore the differences between the academic and print media literature portrayals of TMS to evaluate their ethical impact for the public. We performed a comprehensive literature review using PubMed and NexisUni databases to evaluate the literature available on (...) TMS from 2014 to 2019. Our sample consisted of 1632 academic articles and 468 print media articles for a total of 2100 articles. We then coded each article for seven specific top-level codes: (1) type of source, (2) year of publication, (3) purpose of TMS application, (4) age of subjects, (5) population, (6) overall tone, and (7) specification of TMS parameters. We also made some additional notes of the TMS parameters where specified and the breakdown of mental health applications.ResultsOur results indicated several discrepancies between the academic and the print media reporting about TMS technology, particularly with regards to tone and specificity. Namely, the academic sample was largely neutral and specific about the parameters under which TMS was being applied, while the print media sample was heavily optimistic and presented the application of TMS with far less specificity. There was some convergence between the two samples, such as the focus of both on therapy as the predominant TMS application.ConclusionsWe call upon the academic community to increase scrutiny of TMS services in order to ensure that people’s knowledge of health technologies is not unduly influenced by sensational claims and a general lack of adequate information. (shrink)

The inherence heuristic offers modest insights into the complex nature of both the is–oughttension in moral reasoning and moral reasoning per se, and does not reflect the complexity of domain-specific moral heuristics. Formal and general in nature, we contextualize the process described as “inherence heuristic” in a web of domain-specific heuristics.

As the new Editor-in-Chief (EiC) of the AJOB Neuroscience, I am aware that I have some very large shoes to fill. Paul Root Wolpe, who established the quality of the journal and served in that posit...

The authors interpret the data to mean that patients think that their physicians should make relevant decisions in Learning Health System based trials, and label that as being of 'utmost importance'. However, the patients themselves (in the excerpts provided) emphasize that trust in physicians is instrumental for obtaining protection of patient's bests interests (which seems to be of utmost importance for patients). Furthermore, the perceived bias regarding outcome certainty deserves more discussion. Namely, the decision to defer to physician's opinion is (...) linked to perceived certainty of best clinical outcomes and instrumental for protection of best interest, while it lacks appreciation of the level of uncertainty that exists in clinical decision-making. Finally, a discussion on what are the implications of patient perspectives for individual, vs. relational autonomy is something the authors don't pursue, but instead use "physician-patient autonomy" throughout the paper. (shrink)

As artificial intelligence technologies become increasingly prominent in our daily lives, media coverage of the ethical considerations of these technologies has followed suit. Since previous research has shown that media coverage can drive public discourse about novel technologies, studying how the ethical issues of AI are portrayed in the media may lead to greater insight into the potential ramifications of this public discourse, particularly with regard to development and regulation of AI. This paper expands upon previous research by systematically analyzing (...) and categorizing the media portrayal of the ethical issues of AI to better understand how media coverage of these issues may shape public debate about AI. Our results suggest that the media has a fairly realistic and practical focus in its coverage of the ethics of AI, but that the coverage is still shallow. A multifaceted approach to handling the social, ethical and policy issues of AI technology is needed, including increasing the accessibility of correct information to the public in the form of fact sheets and ethical value statements on trusted webpages, collaboration and inclusion of ethics and AI experts in both research and public debate, and consistent government policies or regulatory frameworks for AI technology. (shrink)

Many new scholars have emerged and started to explore novel directions of research in neuroethics. Last year, we hosted the Montreal Neuroethics Conference for Young Researchers to highlight the development of these new scholars and to honour the evolving complexity of the field. As part of this conference, we invited young researchers involved in neuroethics all around the world to submit their work for consideration in an essay contest. Here, we proudly introduce the three best essays we received for this (...) competition and a collection of 21 top-ranked abstracts for the poster contest. (shrink)

O comentário de Ludger apresenta uma originalidade: descortina o caminho de Jó, versículo a versículo, como o caminho da contemplação. Nas aflições a que é sujeito, Jó somente lentamente vai se conscientizando da extensão de sua miséria - e cai em profunda solidão e abandono da parte de Deus. No entanto, todos esses contratempos, no início, vão conduzindo Jó por um caminho inesperado.

Empirical neuroethics models have always had normative ambitions. Older models attempted to debunk traditional moral theories, whereas newer models attempt to fit their empirical and normative claims with them. The issue of normative significance as it pertains to the use of social science methodology on moral intuitions remains open. This paper analyzes the Is/Ought gap and the empirical underpinnings of influential constructivist approaches in order to argue that the normative ambitions of empirical neuroethics models are not necessarily always misguided. The (...) author clarifies how legitimate normative implications can be dissociated from overreaches and argues that moral intuitions could be used as the factual basis for ethics by employing the distinction between natural facts, social facts, and social constructs. Ultimately, morality can be fruitfully studied and informed by natural and social sciences and, thorough ethical reflection, ought also to inform empirical research. (shrink)

The debate on “cognitive enhancement” has moved from discussions about enhancement in adults to enhancement in children and adolescents. Similar to positions expressed in the adult context, some have argued that pediatric cognitive enhancement is acceptable and even laudable. However, the implications differ between the adult and the pediatric contexts. For example, in the debate over cognitive enhancement in adults, i.e., those who have legal majority, respect for autonomy demands that personal preferences not be overridden in absence of strong arguments (...) because competent adults are in the best position to recognize and protect their own interests. However, the concepts of best interest and autonomy provide a different picture in the case of pediatric enhancement. In the context of decision-making involving minors, it is assumed that the parents are in the best position to promote and protect the interests of their children and this is chiefly why they are granted the authority to make decisions on their behalf. However, we argue in favor of guarding the physical integrity of children from intrusive medical interventions without medical need and with clear and detrimental effects. We also support leaving open other legitimate life trajectory and career choices, as this is in the best interest of the child, even if they are less in line with the expectations of parents or success in educational settings. In addition, parental decision-making in favor of cognitive enhancement suffers from a lack of information about cognitive enhancers and potential biases. Thus, bearing in mind these issues and the development of volitional capacities of children, we argue that pediatric enhancement is not a morally acceptable practice and “inevitability” can be curbed with clear and fair rules that establish duties of state representatives, physicians, and public institutions. We conclude by canvassing evidence-based policy options that could protect the open future of minors and define the parameters of parental decision-making analogous to the cases of nicotine and alcohol. (shrink)

In my target article, I analyzed available information and policy options for the two of the most commonly used cognitive enhancement (CE) drugs: Adderall and Ritalin. I concluded that for all forms of amphetamine, including Adderall, and for instant-release forms of methylphenidate, any form of sale beyond prescription for therapeutic purposes needs to be prohibited, while some form of a taxation approach and the economic disincentives model (EDM) in particular could be an option for public policy on extended-release forms of (...) methylphenidate . However, there has been a considerable amount of constructive criticism regarding my proposal. Some neuroethicists objected to my favoring prohibitive policies to dangerous CE drugs such as amphetamine and argued for laissez-faire or even mandatory use of enhancements. Others took issue with the conclusion that the economic disincentives model (EDM) could be an option for public policy on extended release forms of methylphenidate. Furthermore, there are those that think my argument in general and EDM in particular are failing to address the relevant issues in regulation of CE, such as social justice and real autonomy. Finally, there are those who offer suggestions on how the argument and the model of public policy for CE drugs can be improved. These comments are greatly appreciated, and I hope that my responses have captured the issues they were concerned with. (shrink)

The organizers and members of the international abstract review committee conducted anonymous review of all abstracts from the conference for merit based on relevance, originality, strength and clarity of methods and analyses, and overall contribution to the field of neuroethics. Here, we proudly introduce the collection of 21 top-ranked abstracts for the poster contest.