According to the expertise defense, practitioners of the method of cases need not worry about findings that ordinary people’s philosophical intuitions depend on epistemically irrelevant factors. This is because, honed by years of training, the intuitions of professional philosophers likely surpass those of the folk. To investigate this, we conducted a controlled longitudinal study of a broad range of intuitions in undergraduate students of philosophy (n = 226), whose case judgments we sampled after each semester throughout their studies. Under the (...) assumption, made by proponents of the expertise defense, that formal training in philosophy gives rise to the kind of expertise that accounts for changes in the students’ responses to philosophically puzzling cases, our data suggest that the acquired cognitive skills only affect single case judgments at a time. There does not seem to exist either a general expertise that informs case judgments in all areas of philosophy, or an expertise specific to particular subfields. In fact, we argue that available evidence, including the results of cross-sectional research, is best explained in terms of differences in adopted beliefs about specific cases, rather than acquired cognitive skills. We also investigated whether individuals who choose to study philosophy have atypical intuitions compared to the general population and whether students whose intuitions are at odds with textbook consensus are more likely than others to drop out of the philosophy program. (shrink)

Beebe and Buckwalter made the surprising discovery that people are more inclined to attribute knowledge when norms are violated than when they are conformed to. The epistemic side-effect effect is the analogue of the Knobe effect. ESEE was replicated in a number of experiments. It was also studied under various conditions. We have carried out a meta-analysis of research on ESEE. The results suggest that ESEE is a robust finding but its magnitude is highly variable. Two study-level covariates influence its (...) size: the subject of the knowledge attribution and the type of norm that is violated or complied with. The effect size is not influenced, however, by the manipulation of chances, by whether the story is about a side effect or not, by language or by question phrasing. The impact of the Gettierization of the story is marginally significant. (shrink)

Clinical Ethics Consultations are an important tool for physicians in solving difficult cases. They are extremely common in North America and to a lesser extent also present in Europe. However, there is little data on this practice in Poland. We present results of a survey of 521 physicians practising in Poland concerning their opinion on CECs and related practices. We analysed the data looking at such issues as CECs’ perceived availability, use of CECs, and perceived usefulness of such support. Physicians (...) in our study generally encounter hard ethics cases, even—surprisingly—those who do not work in hospitals. Most physicians have no CEC access, and those that do still do not employ CECs. However, physicians perceive this form of support as useful—even more so among actual users of CECs. We compared these findings with similar studies from other European countries and the North America. We point out peculiarities of our results as compared to those in other countries, with some possible explanations. We hope the results may encourage regulatory debate on the need to formally introduce CECs into the Polish healthcare system. (shrink)

Several experimental studies on moral judgment and moral decision-making show that in virtual reality people tend to make more “characteristically utilitarian” decisions than when responding to standard questionnaires. An explanation of this phenomenon that has been considered by many authors states that the feature of VR studies that is responsible for this effect is the visual salience of the harmful consequences of “deontological” decisions. The present paper makes three points, the first of which is theoretical: we argue that this explanation, (...) which draws from Cushman’s dual-process account of moral judgment, is in fact not coherent with this account’s predictions with respect to behavior in VR. The second point is that this explanation does not sufficiently explain the existing empirical findings concerning the footbridge dilemma because these studies differ in important aspects of experimental design from studies on the switch dilemma. The third point is empirical: we present two original VR studies that were designed to check the robustness of the increased “utilitarian” tendency and directly test the explanation that is based on the visual salience of harmful consequences. The results of the experiments provide evidence that the effect is quite robust but the proposed explanation is inadequate. (shrink)

In this paper, we present two experimental studies on reference of complex demonstratives. The results of our experiments challenge the dominant view in philosophy of language, according to which demonstrative reference is determined by the speaker's intentions. The first experiment shows that in a context where there are two candidates for the referent—one determined by the speaker’s intention, the other by some “external” factors—people prefer to identify the referent of a demonstrative with the latter object. The external factors for which (...) this prediction has been confirmed include the speaker’s demonstration and the descriptive content of a demonstrative. The second experiment shows that while this preference can be explained in terms of the speakers’ having different sorts of referential intentions, the relevant kind of intentions are fully opaque to the subjects. At the end of our paper, we point to some alternative accounts of demonstrative reference, including a pluralistic and hybrid approach, which can accommodate our experimental results. (shrink)

Surveys are the most widely used research tool in experimental philosophy. In this paper, I analyze two types of criticism of the questionnaire method put forward in the literature. The first type is metaphilosophical. It asserts that the surveys used by experimental philosophers are based on a flawed and unproductive method of cases. The second type is methodological. It argues that currently used questionnaires are unfit to measure philosophically relevant phenomena. I show that these objections can be met by a) (...) improving questionnaires used in research practice and b) expanding the methodological repertoire of experimental philosophy. (shrink)

The chapter discusses potential benefits of corpus analysis in philosophical investigations, in particular in experimental philosophy. Philosophers often assume that what happens in language is crucial for the analysis of concepts of philosophical interest. In doing so, they commonly appeal to their own linguistic intuitions, which has been claimed to be methodologically dubious (Bluhm 2013, 2016). Bluhm’s own model of philosophical research has a place for corpus analysis. However, the model has some limitations. I present an alternative model for the (...) use of corpus analysis in philosophical research that can be especially useful for experimental philosophy. As an example, I examine Shepard and Wolf (2013) study on the causal structure of Knobe scenarios. Corpus analysis can be used to show that the verb “cause” used in their scenarios has a negative aura. I discuss the implications of this fact for the design of further studies. (shrink)

Barcz and Zaręba (2021) argue that depending on the shape and the size of the asymmetry in attributions of intentional actions one can distinguish various interpretations of the Knobe effect. Their classification of these interpretations can be used to compare judgments of intentional action across different languages and cultures. Our study in three languages (Polish, English and Italian) indicates that there is some cross-cultural variation both in the ascription of intentionality to an action and in the ascription of actions to (...) the agent. (shrink)

Truth conditions of sentences ascribing non-doxastic propositional attitudes seem to depend on the information structure of the embedded clause. In this paper, we argue that this kind of sensitivity is a semantic phenomenon rather than a pragmatic one. We report four questionnaire studies which explore the impact of the information structure on the truth conditions of non-doxastic attitude ascriptions from different perspectives. The results of the first two studies show that the acceptability of those ascriptions can be affected by some (...) structural modifications of the embedded clause, in particular, when we replace a simple form by an equivalent complex _conjunctional_ form (‘_p_ and _q_’). However, it is possible that different evaluations of such ascriptions have a pragmatic source, namely, the ascriptions with embedded conjunction _imply_ that the agent’s attitude transfers to both conjuncts. In the second pair of studies, we further investigate the nature of this implication which can be classified as ‘Conjunction Elimination’ (CE) in the scope of an attitude verb. The results show that CE-inferences in the context of non-factive non-doxastic attitude ascriptions are not easily cancellable and hence of a semantic rather than pragmatic nature. The results are not conclusive when it comes to the factive non-doxastic attitudes. We conclude our findings by some considerations about a potential source of the observed difference between non-factive and factive attitude verbs and the significance of our general findings to the semantic theory of non-doxastic attitude ascriptions. (shrink)

We discuss two philosophical explanations of the epistemic side-effect effect: the doxastic heuristic account (Alfano et al. The Monist 95 (2): 264–289, 2012) and the consequence account (Paprzycka-Hausman Synthese 197: 5457–5490, 2020). We argue that the doxastic heuristic account has problems with explaining knowledge attributions in cases where the probability that the side effect will occur is low and where the side effect does not ultimately occur. It can explain why there is a difference between the harm and the help (...) cases but it cannot explain why people are willing to attribute knowledge in the harm cases. Such attributions can be explained on the consequence account, which takes knowledge attributions in norm-violation cases to be due to the increased salience of a consequence-awareness claim (knowledge that a possible consequence of the chairman’s action is that the environment would be harmed). We report the results of a new study that tests the predictions of both accounts. In some conditions, people attribute knowledge of the side effect even in cases where the chairman does not have the relevant belief. This result directly contradicts the central tenet of the doxastic heuristic account. Linear regression models of knowledge attribution that correspond to the two accounts were compared. The addition of different justification options significantly contributes to the predictive power of the statistical model. The consequence account can explain the pattern of justifications better than the doxastic heuristic account. Our findings support the consequence account and pose a challenge to the proponents of the doxastic heuristic account. (shrink)

According to the New Angle, any explanation of the Knobe effect must be gradable and asymmetric. It has been argued that only Hindriks’ approach meets both criteria. First, we argue that Holton’s hypothesis also meets the criteria. Second, we show that the authors are not justified in taking the criteria to be empirically justified. We have failed to replicate the asymmetry result in two experiments. Moreover, gradability can be objective or epistemic. We show that the New Angle presupposes objective gradability. (...) In our experiments, the patterns of responses to questions about epistemic and objective gradability are the same, irrespective of whether the feature is objectively gradable (e.g., blameworthiness) or not (e.g., intentionality). Our results thus question the extent to which the New Angle is empirically grounded. Moreover, they raise doubt whether the answers to questions about epistemic and objective gradability can be taken at face value at all. (shrink)

The paper reports results of the very first survey-based study on the prevalence, frequency and nature of ethical or other non-medical difficulties faced by Polish physicians in their everyday clinical practice. The study involved 521 physicians of various medical specialties, practicing mainly in inpatient healthcare. The study showed that the majority of Polish physicians encounter ethical and other non-medical difficulties in making clinical decisions. However, they confront such difficulties less frequently than their foreign peers. Moreover, Polish doctors indicate different circumstances (...) as a source of the experienced problems. The difficulties most often reported relate to (i) patients (or their proxies) requests for medically non-indicated interventions; (ii) problems with communication with patients (or their proxies) due to the patients’ negative attitude, unwillingness to cooperate, or aggression; and (iii) various difficulties with obtaining informed consent. Polish physicians report difficulties associated with disagreements among care givers or scarcity of resources less frequently than doctors from other countries. The study’s findings provide support for the thesis that a significant portion of Polish physicians still follow a traditional, paternalistic, and hierarchical model of healthcare practice. Instead of promoting patient’s empowerment, engagement, and rights, they often consider these ideas as a threat to physicians’ professional authority and autonomy. The study leads to the conclusion that due to insufficient training in medical ethics, communication skills, and medical law, many Polish physicians lack the knowledge and competence necessary to adequately respond to challenges posed by modern healthcare practice. (shrink)

The history of the research on peptic ulcer disease is characterized by a premature abandonment of the bacterial hypothesis, which subsequently had its comeback, leading to the discovery of Helicobacter pylori – the major cause of the disease. In this paper we examine the received view on this case, according to which the primary reason for the abandonment of the bacterial hypothesis in the mid-twentieth century was a large-scale study by a prominent gastroenterologist Palmer, which suggested no bacteria could be (...) found in the human stomach. To this end, we employ the methodof digital textual analysis and study the literature on the etiology of PUD published in the decade prior to Palmer’s article. Our findings suggest that the bacterial hypothesis had already been abandoned before the publication of Palmer’s paper, which challenges the widely held view that his study played a crucial role in the development of this episode. In view of this result, we argue that the PUD case does not illustrate harmful effects of a high degree of information flow, as it has frequently been claimed in the literature on network epistemology. Moreover, we argue that alternative examples of harmful effects of a high degree of information flow may be hard to find in the history of science. (shrink)

Brandom (Citation1994) made inferentialism an intensely debated idea in the philosophy of language in the last three decades. Inferentialism is a view that associates the meaning of linguistic expression with the role said expression plays in inferences. It seems rather uncontroversial that the correct theory of meaning should distinguish between linguistic correctness and factual correctness. For instance, speaker S can be wrong in saying ‘I have arthritis’ in two distinct ways: (i) S fails to apply a word correctly to make (...) a true statement due to having made a factual error, and (ii) S uses an expression incorrectly because they are wrong about its meaning. In this paper, I show that properly understood normative inferentialism can make room for such a distinction. I propose that linguistic correctness is a structural issue: linguistic mistakes stem from the improper or insufficient acquisition of an inferential role. Factual correctness, on the other hand, is a one-off issue of the correct application of inferential rules to a particular situation. I argue that, by tying the issue of correctness to the game of giving and asking for reasons, inferentialism can establish a reliable method for distinguishing between two types of correctness (and mistakes). (shrink)

This paper addresses the black-box problem in artificial intelligence (AI), and the related problem of explainability of AI in the legal context. We argue, first, that the black box problem is, in fact, a superficial one as it results from an overlap of four different – albeit interconnected – issues: the opacity problem, the strangeness problem, the unpredictability problem, and the justification problem. Thus, we propose a framework for discussing both the black box problem and the explainability of AI. We (...) argue further that contrary to often defended claims the opacity issue is not a genuine problem. We also dismiss the justification problem. Further, we describe the tensions involved in the strangeness and unpredictability problems and suggest some ways to alleviate them. (shrink)

Boreal forests store a globally significant pool of carbon (C), mainly in tree biomass and soil organic matter (SOM). Although crucial for future climate change predictions, the mechanisms underlying C stabilization are not well understood. Here, recently discovered mechanisms behind SOM stabilization, their level of understanding, interrelations, and future directions in the field are provided. A recently unraveled mechanism behind C stabilization via interaction of root‐derived tannins with fungal necromass emphasizing fungal necromass chemistry is brought forth. The long‐lasting dogma of (...) the stability of SOM on minerals is challenged and the newest insights from the field of soil fauna and their influence on SOM stabilization are provided. In conclusion, mechanisms unraveled during the last decade are crucial steps forward to draw a holistic view of the main drivers of SOM stabilization. (shrink)

The history of the research on peptic ulcer disease is characterized by a premature abandonment of the bacterial hypothesis, which subsequently had its comeback, leading to the discovery of Helicobacter pylori—the major cause of the disease. In this paper we examine the received view on this case, according to which the primary reason for the abandonment of the bacterial hypothesis in the mid-twentieth century was a large-scale study by a prominent gastroenterologist Palmer, which suggested no bacteria could be found in (...) the human stomach. To this end, we employ the method of digital textual analysis and study the literature on the etiology of PUD published in the decade prior to Palmer’s article. Our findings suggest that the bacterial hypothesis had already been abandoned before the publication of Palmer’s paper, which challenges the widely held view that his study played a crucial role in the development of this episode. In view of this result, we argue that the PUD case does not illustrate harmful effects of a high degree of information flow, as it has frequently been claimed in the literature on network epistemology. Moreover, we argue that alternative examples of harmful effects of a high degree of information flow may be hard to find in the history of science. (shrink)

This article outlines the contributions of the Kraków School to the field of science and religion. The Kraków School is a group of philosophers, scientists, and theologians who belong to the milieu of the Copernicus Center for Interdisciplinary Studies. The members of the group are engaged in inquiries pertaining to the relationship between theology and various sciences, in particular cosmology, evolutionary theory, and neuroscience. The article includes a presentation of the historical background of the School, as well as its main (...) original contributions pertaining to the history of the interactions between science and religion, the rationality and mathematicity of the universe, theology of science, and the role of logic in theology. (shrink)

In the presented article, I consider what the process of designing the future can be. In detail, I am interested in what role touch plays in this process, combined with the practice of speculative imagination. In order to better understand this phenomenon, I use the transdisciplinary model of knowledge production, whose specific feature is the crossing and blurring of boundaries between fields of knowledge. The goal of this activity is to produce new forms of knowledge by combining methods and cognitive (...) tools derived from science, art, humanities, and crafts. In such a context, I am interested in how discursive practices and body practices are complementary. As a research perspective, I adopt the currents of posthumanism and new materialism oriented toward the analysis of human and nonhuman expressions of agency and processes of self-organization of matter. The starting point for the considerations presented here is a critical analysis of the vision of the future in the form of the absence of any future inscribed in the concept of the Anthropocene. Referring to the considerations of feminist thinkers such as Rosi Braidotti, Donna Haraway, and Karen Barad, I analyze what the future, understood as the commonality of the human and nonhuman, in the perspective of planetary changes, can be. (shrink)

We have taken a look at the rules of games in order to acquire some knowledge concerning constitutive rules and, probably, institutional phenomena in general. In this paper we tried to elaborate a system account of constitutive rules. We claim that all accounts that put emphasis on the form of rules are vulnerable. It appears that constitutive rules are interconnected and always form a system that can be internally differentiated. Thanks to adopting certain qualitative criterion we were able to distinguish (...) central and peripheral constitutive rules. Moreover, that very account makes it possible to distinguish between different types of practices that are determined by types of systems of rules. Secondly, it appears there are three “layers” of games that should not be confused: deep conventions, constitutive rules that establish the game and determine games’ identities, and “rules of efficiency” that are some sort of recommendations as to how to play well. (shrink)

Despite the great expansion and many benefits of information and communication technologies in healthcare, the attitudes of Polish general practitioners to e-health have not been explored. The aim of this study was to determine the GPs’ perception of ICT use in healthcare and to identify barriers to the adoption of EMR in the Podlaskie Voivodeship. Online and telephone surveys were conducted between April and May 2013. Responses from 103 GP practices, 43% of all practices in the region, were analysed. The (...) results showed that 67% of the respondents agreed that IT systems improve quality of healthcare services. In the GP group who declared at least partial EMR implementation, 71.4% see the positive impact of IT on practice staff processes and 66.1% on personal working processes. In this group, more than three-quarters of GPs did not see any positive impact of ICT on the average number of patients treated per day, number of patients within the practice or scope of services. The four most common barriers to EMR implementation were: lack of funds, risk of a malfunction in the system, resistance to change, and lack of training and proper information. Although the use of ICT by Polish GPs is limited, their attitude to e-health is generally positive or neutral and resembles the overall pattern in Europe. Barriers identified by GPs need to be taken into account to ensure the effective implementation of e-health across the country. (shrink)

In this paper I present how the normative inferentialist can make the distinction between sentence meaning and content of the utterance. The inferentialist can understand sentence meaning as a role conferred to that sentence by the rules governing inferential transitions and content of the utterance as just a part of sentence meaning. I attempt to show how such a framework can account for prominent scenarios presented by contextualists as a challenge to semantic minimalism/literalism. I argue that inferentialism can address contextualist (...) challenges in a simple and effective manner by understanding sentence meaning as broad, but invariant. (shrink)

The idea for this volume stems from the symposium held in New York City in autumn 2016. The book consists of 11 chapters—the last one being an afterword of the editor—, a bibliography, and an index. The papers are preceded by the introduction of J.J. Peradotto. There are no internal divisions in the volume and the texts are presented in chronological order, ranging from Archaic and Classical to Roman period, focusing heavily on the former (8 out of 11 chapters). Literary (...) sources form the basi... (shrink)

The paper concerns the problem of the legal responsibility of autonomous machines. In our opinion it boils down to the question of whether such machines can be seen as real agents through the prism of folk-psychology. We argue that autonomous machines cannot be granted the status of legal agents. Although this is quite possible from purely technical point of view, since the law is a conventional tool of regulating social interactions and as such can accommodate various legislative constructs, including legal (...) responsibility of autonomous artificial agents, we believe that it would remain a mere ‘law in books’, never materializing as ‘law in action’. It is not impossible to imagine that the evolution of our conceptual apparatus will reach a stage, when autonomous robots become full-blooded moral and legal agents. However, today at least, we seem to be far from this point. (shrink)

This paper is an attempt to examine Mattias Kiesselbach’s account of the thesis that meaning is normative that was presented in his recently published article titled “The normativity of meaning: from constitutive norms to prescriptions.” Kiesselbach’s account has three crucial points: the applicability of norms, the transtemporal character of the constitutive norms and commitments incurred by or attributed to the speaker within the scorekeeping practice. I will discuss all these crucial points, and I will argue that his account raises many (...) questions and the anti-prescriptivist about meaning can have reasonable doubts about all of them. (shrink)

One of the major objectives in a democratic state is ensuring health security of the citizens including combating epidemic diseases. The subject matter of this article is the presentation and analysis of legal regulations regarding preventive vaccination in Poland, in particular the aspect of imposing a legal obligation and restricting parents’ right to express consent for medical intervention. The reflections made herein are aimed at finding an answer to the question whether the adopted legal solutions are admissible in a democratic (...) state with regard to ensuring health security. The purpose of the analysis is also to assess whether the abovementioned legal regulations have been formulated in a clear way and do not raise interpretation doubts and, consequently, whether they are comprehensible to the parents obliged to comply with them. As it follows from analysis of the legal provisions, parents must not refuse to subject a child to obligatory preventive vaccination and their consent is not required by law, both as regards the medical qualifying examination to exclude contraindications to performing vaccination and the vaccination itself. It is a legal obligation, from which exemption is only possible on grounds of certain medical conditions that would render vaccination inadvisable. The legal provisions that concern obligatory preventive vaccination in Poland, including in particular those referring to its enforceability, have not been formulated in a way that is sufficiently comprehensible to parents who are under the obligation of complying with them, irrespective of the fact that the language of the provisions of law should be clear and raise no interpretative doubts. In a democratic state the protection of public health against epidemic hazards justifies the implementation of legal solutions that restrict an individual’s freedom of self-determination, thus limiting the right of patients or their statutory representatives to grant or refuse consent for a medical intervention in the form of preventive vaccination – the purpose of this legal solution being to prioritize the safeguarding of state health security. It is vitally important to engage in a social dialogue with the purpose of convincing the public of the need for vaccination, its significance and its implementation for the better good. (shrink)