STUDYING RELIGION in its many aspects is profoundly important to understanding our cultural diversity, our history, and our values. If religion is at the heart of every culture, it is imperative that we seek to know more about its influence in our lives and its place in our world. These six inaugural lectures, delivered by Sterling McMurrin from 1992 to 1994, introduce and discuss religion in various aspects. Subsequent volumes featuring the work of invited lecturers will continue to present (...) the very best scholarship on religion. (shrink)

For more than fifty years, Sterling M. McMurrin served as one of the preeminent intellectual voices of the LDS community. From his beginnings as an Institute of Religion instructor to U.S. Commissioner of Education, and from a professor of philosophy to U.S. Envoy to Iran, he showed by example how personal and institutional morality can be defended.In a series of candid discussions with Jack Newell, McMurrin reveals his ability to reconcile freedom and conscience. In a spirit of repartee and (...) friendship, writes Boyer Jarvis in the foreword, Newell probes, challenges, and constantly draws McMurrin out as he... reflects upon his wide-ranging ideas and experiences. Rich in insight and humor, this remarkable dialogue captures the sweep and depth of McMurrin's thoughts as Newell engages him in discussing his approaches to philosophy, education, and religion.Among the qualities that characterized McMurrin's life and mind, explains Newell, perhaps the most notable is the freedom with which he has spoken his views on both the sacred and the profane. His intellectual integrity -- coupled as it almost always is with his humane instincts and innate fairness -- has simultaneously confounded and earned the respect of critics. (shrink)

Democracy has been a flawed hegemony since the fall of communism. Its flexibility, its commitment to equality of representation, and its recognition of the legitimacy of opposition politics are all positive features for political institutions. But democracy has many deficiencies: it is all too easily held hostage by powerful interests; it often fails to advance social justice; and it does not cope well with a number of features of the political landscape, such as political identities, boundary disputes, and environmental crises. (...) Although democracy is valuable it fits uneasily with other political values and is in many respects less than equal to the demands it confronts. In this volume prominent political theorists and social scientists present original discussions of such central issues. Democracy's Values deals with the nature and value of democracy, particularly the tensions between it and such goods as justice, equality, efficiency, and freedom. (shrink)

Beginning with an exploration into the question of what war is, War and Warfare Since 1945 provides a chronological analysis of military history since the end of World War II extending through to an analysis of the limits of modern warfare in the nuclear age with the purpose of examining why war occurs and how it is carried out. The book concludes with an investigation into modern war and speculation on the changing face of warfare."--Provided by publisher.

From birth to 15 months infants and caregivers form a fundamentally intersubjective, dyadic unit within which the infant’s ability to recognize gender/sex in the world develops. Between about 18 and 36 months the infant accumulates an increasingly clear and subjective sense of self as female or male. We know little about how the precursors to gender/sex identity form during the intersubjective period, nor how they transform into an independent sense of self by 3 years of age. In this Theory and (...) Hypothesis article I offer a general framework for thinking about this problem. I propose that through repetition and patterning, the dyadic interactions in which infants and caregivers engage imbue the infant with an embodied, i.e., sensori-motor understanding of gender/sex. During this developmental period (which I label Phase 1) gender/sex is primarily an intersubjective project. From 15 to 18 months (which I label Phase 2) there are few reports of newly appearing gender/sex behavioral differences, and I hypothesize that this absence reflects a period of developmental instability during which there is a transition from gender/sex as primarily inter-subjective to gender/sex as primarily subjective. Beginning at 18 months (i.e., the start of Phase 3), a toddler’s subjective sense of self as having a gender/sex emerges, and it solidifies by 3 years of age. I propose a dynamic systems perspective to track how infants first assimilate gender/sex information during the intersubjective period (birth to 15 months); then explore what changes might occur during a hypothesized phase transition (15 to 18 months), and finally, review the emergence and initial stabilization of individual subjectivity-the period from 18 to 36 months. The critical questions explored focus on how to model and translate data from very different experimental disciplines, especially neuroscience, physiology, developmental psychology and cognitive development. I close by proposing the formation of a research consortium on gender/sex development during the first 3 years after birth. (shrink)

DNA topoisomerases, capable of manipulating DNA topology, are ubiquitous and indispensable for cellular survival due to the numerous roles they play during DNA metabolism. As we review here, current structural approaches have revealed unprecedented insights into the complex DNA‐topoisomerase interaction and strand passage mechanism, helping to advance our understanding of their activities in vivo. This has been complemented by single‐molecule techniques, which have facilitated the detailed dissection of the various topoisomerase reactions. Recent work has also revealed the importance of topoisomerase (...) interactions with accessory proteins and other DNA‐associated proteins, supporting the idea that they often function as part of multi‐enzyme assemblies in vivo. In addition, novel topoisomerases have been identified and explored, such as topo VIII and Mini‐A. These new findings are advancing our understanding of DNA‐related processes and the vital functions topos fulfil, demonstrating their indispensability in virtually every aspect of DNA metabolism. (shrink)

RESUMEN Este artículo propone reinterpretar la noción de cuerpo en la filosofia de Nietzsche contrastada con dos perspectivas relevantes de los estudios nietzscheanos en habla hispana: primero, la idea de que el cuerpo es sinónimo de naturaleza; y segundo, la idea de que el cuerpo es causa del sujeto. Pasando la mirada sobre una parte de la obra -publicada e inédita- de Nietzsche posterior al año 1885, se observa que la noción de cuerpo funge el papel de una metodologia que (...) permite llevar a cabalidad una renovada tarea de su filosofia, a saber, la tarea de conocerse a si mismo. Asi, la noción de cuerpo en Nietzsche, más allá de ser un concepto innovador o reivindicado, es una herramienta interpretante que le permite al autor establecer nuevas dimensiones "entre" el conocer y la experimentación corporal. ABSTRACT This paper proposes a re-interpretation of the idea of Body in Nietzsche's philosophy to distinguish it from two important perspectives of Nietzsche-studies in Spanish: The first one maintains that the Body is comparable with Nature, and the second one, states that the Body is a cause of subjectivity. Analyzing part of Nietzsche's work after 1885 -published and unpublished- shows that the idea of the Body works as a methodology that allows Nietzsche to accomplish a new task of his philosophy, such as the task of self-knowledge. In this way, the Body in Nietzsche's philosophy, besides being an innovative and redeemable concept, is a performative tool that establishes new dimensions "in-between" human knowing and bodily experimentation. (shrink)

The Confucian tradition, which places the virtue of ren or fellow feeling at its heart as a ‘gateway’ to the more concrete virtues of common Western parlance, offers a potential antidote to the excesses of a Western business ethics which, even after its recent academic reembrace of the Aristotelian tradition, in practice still too often instrumentalises virtue in the service of a ‘rational’ or ‘reasonable’ constraining of the profit motive. The deeper, intrinsic ‘ethos’ promised by a Confucian approach also finds (...) its echo in the West in the work of Hans Küng’s Weltethos project, led today on the business ethics front by Klaus Leisinger and Claus Dierksmeier. This paper explores a dilemma at the heart of the World Ethos movement seen from the twin peaks of the World Ethics Institute at Peking University and the Weltethos Institut at the University of Tübingen: namely, whether a business ethics culture accustomed to thinking in terms of CSR-esque lists of corporate values, virtues or principles can best be reformed via documents like the UN Global Compact, the 2010 Global Economic Ethic Manifesto, or even the UN Sustainable Development Goals, or whether a more radical, revolutionary quest for an inner ‘ethos’, to be lived and experienced by self-cultivating individuals engaged in business all over the world regardless of background, ought somehow to be undertaken parallel to these endeavours. The authors outline possible steps towards such a transformation of the management community’s understanding of virtue, without, however, dismissing the contribution of traditional, dilemma-oriented Western thinking about applied ethics in general, and business ethics in particular. (shrink)

Ch. 1 defines activism as involving four judicial practices: refusing to take an attitude of deference for legislative or executive power or judgment; relaxing requirements for justiciability; breaking precedent; and loosely or controversially construing constitutions, statutes or precedents. I defend each element, through , in later chapters. I defend primarily in Ch. 2A-B, primarily in Ch. 2C, primarily in Ch. 3 and in Chs. 2 and 4. Ch. 1 concludes that - seem to have knowing change of the law in (...) common. Ch. 1 considers and rejects different definitions of activism. My definition explains what I call The Crossover Thesis, which says that two types of activism, and , are quite distinct, and what I call The Political Neutrality Thesis, which says activism and passivism are politically neutral in that neither is necessarily conservative or liberal, and neither is necessarily politically superior to the other. ;Ch. 2 defends activism against objections based on democracy by reconciling activism with democracy somewhat and by supporting some activism based on the Constitution's supreme legal authority. I give what I call The Ashwander Defense and the Carolene Defense of activism, which are named after famous judicial opinions I use to defend activism. ;Ch. 3 argues against stare decisis, which requires following precedent. The passivists' version of stare decisis is inadequately supported by arguments that stare decisis increases: the fairness of treating like cases alike; the predictability of the law; thereby the efficiency of judges in making decisions. ;Ch. 4 argues that courts should use due process more to support activism which clarifies the law. I show how much activism is justified by the vagueness doctrine, which constitutionally requires law's meaning to be reasonably accessible to ordinary people. ;Ch. 5 summarizes earlier chapters and shows how my defense of activism is restrained. (shrink)

The Tanner Lectures on Human Values is the annual publication of the Tanner lectures given at Clare Hall, Cambridge University; Brasenose College, Oxford University; Harvard University; Yale University, the University of California; Stanford University, the University of Michigan; and the University of Utah and other locations. Established to reflect upon the scholarly and scientific learning relating to human values, the lectureships are international and intercultural, and transcend ethnic, national, religious, and ideological distinctions. Appointment as a Tanner lecturer is a recognition (...) of uncommon capabilities and outstanding scholarly or leadership achievement in the field of human values. This first volume of lectures, originally published in 1980, explores valuation on many levels of our physical and intellectual environments. (shrink)

The confusion of purpose that currently obtains in academic philosophy and the confusion in educational thought and practice are compounded in the philosophy of education. The last quarter century has been comparatively lean and unproductive, but fortunately there is some indication now that the philosophy of education is achieving a new vitality. There is no shortage of philosophic talent. It is simply a question of effectively involving that talent in educational issues, and this can be good for philosophy as well (...) as for education. It is good for education, because in its present condition of tension and excitement, education quite desperately needs the insight and clarity of thought which philosophic discussion should provide; it is good for philosophy, because for its own health, academic philosophy desperately needs to fasten itself upon living issues of genuine importance. (shrink)

Historically, views and measurements of biodiversity have had a narrow focus, for instance, characterizing the attributes of observable patterns but affording less attention to processes. Here, we explore the question: how does a systems thinking view – one where the world is seen as elements and processes that connect and interact in dynamic ways to form a whole – affect the way we understand biodiversity and practice conservation? We answer this question by illustrating the systemic properties of biodiversity at multiple (...) levels, and show that biodiversity is a collection of dynamic systems linking seemingly disparate biological and cultural components and requiring an understanding of the system as a whole. We conclude that systems thinking calls traditional views of species, ecosystem function, and human relationships with the rest of biodiversity into question. Finally, we suggest some of the ways in which this view can impact the science and practice of conservation, particularly through affecting our conservation targets and strategies. (shrink)