Online research in philosophy

institutional framework ~ or rather a family of frameworks — for realizing the democratic ideal of giving kmms t0 the demos, power to the people. The distinction between a participatory and a representative system is not one between democracy proper and some faint approximation but a distinction between rival proposals for the implementation of democracy. My focus in this chapter is on representation in this democratic, popularly enabling scnsc. Thus the target of the chapter is narrower than it might have (...) been. As Hcbbcs in particular argues, the idea 0f representation may bc used, not just of representatives who are subject t0 the continuing 0r periodic control 0f the people, but also 0f a hereditary, absolute: monarch. The defenders of parliament in the 1640s tried to give its members a monop01y right on the use 0f thc word (Skinner 2005), but Hobbes argued against them that it was absurd that a monarch who "had the sovcreignty" 0vcr his subjects "from a descent 0f 600 ycars’ should not be "considcrcd as their rcprcsc-:mtativc" (Hobbes 1994: 19.3). His Qwn view, to thc contrary, was that "thc King himself did. . . ever represent the person of the people of Eng12md" (Hobbes 1990: 120). But though my focus is narrower than I-I0bbcs’s, it is broader than the targét t0 which many contcmporary thcorists give their attention. As will appear, I use the notion 0f representation in such a way that any public authorities, and any citizens wh0 assume a legitimate r01e in public.. (shrink)

I respond to Fishkin?s critique of my book The State of Democratic Theory (Princeton University Press 2003). I reiterate my defense of a competitive model of democracy geared to reducing domination, rather than Fishkin?s deliberative model that deploys structured discussion to enlighten mass preferences. In light of the literatures on framing effects and the value of mutually independent judgments, I question whether the procedures Fishkin recommends would produce outcomes that are better informed rather than differently informed. Recognizing that deliberation might (...) sometimes be helpful in reducing domination, I note that sometimes it will not, and I fault Fishkin for his indiscriminate embrace of exceedingly costly deliberative mechanisms that promise dubious benefits ? notably his and Bruce Ackerman?s ?Deliberation Day? (shrink)

More than three decades after its advent in political science, rational choice theory has yet to add appreciably to the stock of knowledge about politics. In Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory we traced this failure to methodological defects rooted in the aspiration to come up with universal theories of politics. After responding to criticisms of our argument, we elaborate on our earlier recommendations about how to improve the quality of rational choice applications. Building on suggestions of contributors to this volume, (...) we lay out an empirically based research program designed to delineate the conditions under which rational choice explanations are likely to be useful. (shrink)

A growing sense of the exhaustion of both liberalism and Marxism has fueled a revival of interest in civic republicanism among historians, political theorists, and social commentators. This turn is evaluated via an examination of the normative implications off. G. A. Pocock's account of civic republicanism. Arguing that what is at issue between liberals and republicans has been misunderstood by both sides in the debate, the author shows that the turn to republicanism fails to address the most vexing problems liberalism (...) confronts in the modern world, and that it is and has been compatible with much of what critics of liberalism dislike. He argues, further, that the civic republican view involves an instrumental attitude to outsiders that cannot be justified in today's world and has other unattractive dimensions of which too little account has been taken by defenders and detractors alike. (shrink)