Distinguishes two senses of 'judgment' on the one hand as meaning a state of 'conviction' or 'belief', and on the other hand as meaning an act of 'affirmation' or 'assertion'. Certainly conviction and assertion stand in close relation to each other, but they delineate two heterogeneous logical spheres, and thereby divide the total field of the theory of judgment into two neighbouring but separate sub-fields. Once this is done it is shown to have implications for our understanding especially of the (...) phenomenon of negation, and of the distinction between negation as affirmation of a negative state of affairs, and negation as act of contradicting the judgment someone else has made. (shrink)

Cette traduction inedite de l'oeuvre principale d'Adolf Reinach (1883-1917) apporte des contributions fondamentales a divers champs de la connaissance. Disciple de Husserl, Reinach propose une interpretation du monde social qui engage la phenomenologie sur le terrain des actes sociaux et des experiences individuelles qui les accompagnent, afin d'isoler les structures a priori qui sont au principe meme du droit positif. Le travail de Reinach s'inscrit egalement dans un champ d'analyse philosophique et linguistique centre sur les enonces (...) dits performatifs, baptises tels par Austin quelques decennies plustard. (shrink)

The last decade has witnessed the beginnings of a remarkable convergence of Husserlian phenonenology and analytic philosophy of language, and the present volumes provide original and important texts of the phenomenological philosophy of language. Powerfully influenced by the writings of the early Husserl, Reinach fashioned Husserl’s ideas into a rigorous analytical methodology of his own, which he applied in particular to problems in logic and the theory of knowledge, and to the philosophies of law and psychology. The central role (...) of the concept of state of affairs in Reinach’s philosophy will bring to mind immediately the formal ontology of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. Reinach’s most significant contribution, however, is contained in his The a priori foundations of civil law (1913), above all in the detailed analysis of the a priori structure of the act of promising. This amounts to an elaborate phenomenological theory of speech acts which anticipates, and in some respects goes beyond, the later theories of Austin and Searle. The present edition is in two volumes. Volume 1, which includes a biographical and thematic introduction by the editors, contains critical editions of those pieces published by Reinach himself. Volume II is a collection of all those items in Reinach’s surviving Nachlass which are in publishable form, including a number of important pieces not hitherto obtainable on such themes as ethical predicates, speech acts (“soziale Akte”), perception and the theory of number, together with a comprehensive sketch of the problems in the theory of knowledge, logic and ethics. Appended to this is a text-critical apparatus which also contains extensive discussions of the origins and sources of the materials in question. (shrink)

Includes both German and English texts of "The Basic Concepts of Ethics", "The Basic Features of Ethics", "Reflection: Its Ethical and Legal Significance", with an introduction by James Smith.

Adolf Reinach was a German phenomenologist and legal theorist. This is a previously-unpublished translation of Reinach’s 1905 dissertation for his PhD earned under Theodor Lipps at the University of Munich, which was published as “Über den Ursachenbegriff im geltenden Strafrecht” , and reprinted in Adolf Reinach, Sämtliche Werke. Textkritische Ausgabe [Collected Works: Critical Edition], Karl Schuhmann & Barry Smith, eds., 2 vols. , pp. 1–43.

O texto a seguir corresponde ao §3, pp. 705–718, do livro “Die apriorischen Grundlagen des bürgerlichen Rechts” (“Os Fundamentos a priori do Direito Civil”), originalmente publicado em 1913 no Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung, pp. 685–847. A numeração inserida entre colchetes no corpo do texto, destacada em negrito, refere-se à paginação desta edição. As palavras destacadas em negrito pelos tradutores remetem a um glossário que acompanha a presente tradução. Os itálicos, porém, são do próprio Reinach. A marca de (...) intercalação “ ” foi usada para introduzir expressões que estão apenas implícitas no texto original. Existem ainda as seguintes reedições desse livro: 1921 Gesammelte Schriften. Halle, Niemeyer, pp. 166–350. 1953 Zur Phänomenologie des Rechts. Munich: Kose t, 215 pp. 1989 Sämtliche Werke, vol. 1: Die Werke. Munique: Philosophia, 1989, pp. 141–278. (shrink)

English summary: Adolf Reinach (1883-1917) was one of the most outstanding disciples of Husserl. In contrast to the idealistic phenomenology of transcendental constitution developed and expounded by Husserl in Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology, he endeavored to develop and establish the principles of a realistic phenomenology. This volume makes it possible to access the theoretical side of his thought, presenting both published and posthumous texts. French text. French description: Adolf Reinach (1883-1917) fut l'un des disciples (...) les plus remarquables de Husserl, dont il fut le collegue a Gottingen, et l'un des plus notables representants de la phenomenologie munichoise avec Johannes Daubert. A l'encontre de la phenomenologie idealiste de la constitution transcendantale elaboree puis exposee par Husserl dans les Idees directrices de 1913, il suivit la voie frayee par les Recherches logiques pour developper et fixer les principes d'une phenomenologie realiste. Le foyer principal en est le concept d'etat de choses (Sachverhalt), correlat objectuel du jugement dont il tente de caracteriser le statut ontologique et d'elucider le mode de donation a la conscience--a savoir l'acte de visee et l'evidence. La methode en est exclusivement l'intuition des essences--consideree comme un passage de la realite effective a la pure possibilite -, a l'exclusion de toute reduction conduisant a la sphere transcendantale. Enfin, il procede a une desubjectivation de la notion kantienne d'a priori, qu'il arrache aux structures de la subjectivite pour l'ancrer dans les etats de choses eidetiques. Il contribue ainsi a situer la phenomenologie vis-a-vis de la philosophie medievale et des premices de la philosophie analytique, lui assignant une place dans une lignee qui part de Gregoire de Rimini pour aboutir a Meinong, Frege et Russell. Le present volume, Phenomenologie realiste, est un recueil visant a rendre accessible aux lecteurs francais le versant theoretique de sa pensee, et se compose a la fois de textes publies et posthumes--presentes ici dans un ordre thematique, et non chronologique. (shrink)

In these 1910 summer semester lectures, Adolf Reinach uses the concept of arché as a guiding thread to sketch out a history of Platonic philosophy and to trace it back to the Presocratics. More precisely, by means of this philosophical attempt to offer a historical account, Reinach intends to flesh out what he thinks is the main contribution of Plato to philosophy, and which, at the same time, turns out to be the roots of his own philosophy, (...) namely: to consider ideal objects as the arché of philosophy; to use the phenomenological method; and, last but not least, to devote his research to the study of the things themselves, rather than to the elucidation of the main subjective opinions of his time. Thus, this is Reinach’s Plato that we finally see emerging from a reading of his lectures—a Plato who, in spite of being “non-historical,” “non-true,” appears as the figure who nonetheless motivated him to follow his own philosophical path. (shrink)

I have not set myself the task of telling you what Phenomenology is. Rather, I would like to try to think with you in the phenomenological manner. To talk about phenomenology is the most useless thing in the world so long as that is lacking which alone can give any talk concrete fullness and intuitiveness: the phenomenological way of seeing and the phenomenological attitude. For the essential point is this, that phenomenology is not a matter of a system of philosophical (...) propositions and truths - a system of propositions in which all who call themselves "Phenomenologists" must believe, and which I could here prove to you - but rather it is a method of philosophizing which is required by the problems of philosophy: one which is very different from the manner of viewing and verifying in life, and which is even more different from the way in which one does and must work in most of the sciences. And so today my aim is to touch upon a series of philosophical problems with you, in the hope that, at this or that point, it will become clear to you what the peculiarity of the phenomenological attitude is. Only then is the basis for further discussions given. (shrink)

Contemporary scholars have generally labelled Adolf Reinach, a founding member of early phenomenology’s Göttingen Circle, a Platonist. Because Reinach conceives of states of affairs as neither real nor ideal, as involved with timeless essences and necessary logical laws, many have hastily concluded that states of affairs are Platonic entities. In this essay, I analyse Barry Smith’s argument that Reinach is a Platonist. Smith’s widely accepted argument often becomes utilised to show that Reinach and other phenomenologists, (...) including Husserl, are Platonic realists (or, simply, Platonists). A closer look at Reinach’s text indicates, however, that he is notcommitted to Platonic realism. (shrink)

Reinach is principally known for his anticipation in 1913 of many ideas subsequently developed by Austin, Searle and others under the heading of 'speech act theory'. This bibliography of primary and secondary literature by and on Reinach shows that his influenced extended more broadly into areas such as the theory of judgment, the ontology of states of affairs, and the philosophy of law.

"Reinach's importance for the development of early phenomenology is particularly remarkable considering the brief life span of 34 years granted him for the development of his ideas and his influence. It was his death in action in 1917 rather than Husserl's going to Freiburg which cut short not only his own promise but that of the Gottingen phenomenological Circle. It is therefore not surprising that Reinach never found the time to formulate a comprehensive plan of a philosophy in (...) which the place of phenomenology was clearly defined." One can only extrapolate such a plan from his essays and fragments - for he never published a book. His conception would have.. (shrink)

The theory of speech acts put forward by Adolf Reinach in his "The A Priori Foundations of the Civil Law" of 1913 rests on a systematic account of the ontological structures associated with various different sorts of language use. One of the most original features of Reinach's account lies in hIs demonstration of how the ontological structure of, say, an action of promising or of commanding, may be modified in different ways, yielding different sorts of non-standard instances (...) of the corresponding speech act varieties. The present paper is an attempt to apply this idea of standard and modified instances of ontological structures to the realm of judgement and cognition, and thereby to develop a Reinachian theory of how intentionality is mediated through language in acts of thinking and speaking. (shrink)

Ever since its appearance in 1913, Reinach's work on a The A Priori Foundations of the Civil Law has served as the principal representative of phenomenological, aprioristic and ontological/realist approaches to the philosophy of law. This annotated bibliography provides an overview of the reception of Reinach's thinking, which has been of influence also in the realm of speech act theory.

The theory of speech acts put forward by Adolf Reinach in his "The A Priori Foundations of the Civil Law" of 1913 rests on a systematic account of the ontological structures associated with various different sorts of language use. One of the most original features of Reinach's account lies in hIs demonstration of how the ontological structure of, say, an action of promising or of commanding, may be modified in different ways, yielding different sorts of non-standard instances (...) of the corresponding speech act varieties. The present paper is an attempt to apply this idea of standard and modified instances of ontological structures to the realm of judgement and cognition, and thereby to develop a Reinachian theory of how intentionality is mediated through language in acts of thinking and speaking. (shrink)

The essay provides an account of the development of Reinach’s philosophy of “Sachverhalte” (states of affairs) and on problems in the philosophy of law, leading up to his discovery of the theory of speech acts in 1913. Reinach’s relations to Edmund Husserl and to the Munich phenomenologists are also dealt with.

El objetivo del artículo es describir la fenomenología jurídica de Adolf Reinach, apuntar algunos posibles desarrollos de la misma y esclarecer su contribución a la filosofía del derecho contemporánea. En primer lugar, se traza una breve biografía intelectual de su autor, para pasar, tras un breve análisis de su obra sobre La Premeditación, al análisis de la teoría de los actos sociales y la exposición de la necesidad y posibilidad de una ciencia jurídica cuyas proposiciones sean sintéticas y (...) a priori. Por último, se analiza la relación de esta ciencia que describe los estados de cosas jurídicos, con la ciencia jurídica empírica y las disposiciones del derecho positivo. Para terminar, se analiza la contribución de estas investigaciones al desarrollo de la filosofía del derecho actual. (shrink)