Despite its imperative to include all gendered positions under one umbrella, ‘trans’ is continually riven by intramural confrontation over the differences between its masculine and feminine iterations. Whether in political organizing, on social media or in the pages of academic trans theory, it sometimes seems like ‘trans’ is subject to an interminable and gendered custody battle. Dissatisfied with the terms of masc–femme antagonism, this essay uses the gendered interfaces of critique and autotheory to enmesh the work of Jules Gill-Peterson and (...) Paul B. Preciado. Reading into the interdependence of Gill-Peterson’s and Preciado’s texts yields a different theory: trans as an auto-antonym, a word that produces opposite meanings depending on context. Treating trans as auto-antonymic conjures a relational and even erotic escape from the naturalization of gendered antagonism in trans theory, affirming the unexpected bridges, reversals or ‘sex changes’ of specifically trans writing. (shrink)

Systems evolve in order to adjust and survive. The paper’s contribution is that this evolvement is inadequate without an evolutionary telos. It is argued that without the presence of self-destruction in multiple levels of our existence and surroundings, our survival would have been impossible. This paper recognises an appreciation of auto-catastrophe at the cell level, in human attitudes (both as an individual and in societies), and extended to Earth and out to galaxies. Auto-Catastrophic Theory combines evolution with (...) class='Hi'>auto-catastrophic behaviours and innovative machinery by offering new themes of understanding their merging such as (a) protogenic and deuterogenic auto-catastrophic processes, (b) protogenic and deuterogenic survival processes, and (c) ‘alive’, partially ‘alive’, and non-‘alive’ systems. The value of self-destruction relies on a numerical stability within a system and correlational relationships between systems. Auto-Catastrophic Theory provides novel justifications why artificial intelligence: (a) is crucial to overcome the extinction of humanity (via H+), (b) is crucial to offer indirect survival of humanity (by saving its history), and (c) is at the same time a threat for humanity. These novel justifications and themes, developed by combining evolution with catastrophe as well as innovative machinery, expand our knowledge of how best to handle fresh challenges ahead. (shrink)

El prefijo “auto” en autoorganización y autopoiesis se refiere a la existencia de una identidad o agencialidad implicada en el orden, organización o producción de un sistema que se corresponde con el sistema mismo, en contraste con el diseño o la influencia de carácter externo. La autoorganización (AO) estudia la manera en la que los procesos de un sistema alcanzan de forma espontánea un orden u organización complejo, bien como una estructura o patrón emergente, bien como algún tipo de (...) finalidad o identidad autoconstruida. En este trabajo nos ocupamos del concepto de AO en el contexto de la problemática sobre la naturaleza la vida y de los organismos vivientes. Este concepto se elabora en diferentes tradiciones científicas y filosóficas, a partir de su origen en la filosofía kantiana. La cibernética trata de emular la organización de los seres vivos y su teleología mediante la construcción de máquinas; desarrolla una perspectiva centrada en la regulación y en la causalidad mutua entre componentes del sistema. Estos trabajos, a veces complementados con la teoría de sistemas y la teoría de la información, son fundamentales para el desarrollo de la ciencia del siglo XX, especialmente las ciencias computacionales y la biología. Una segunda corriente surge desde la termodinámica de los procesos irreversibles alejados del equilibrio a partir, entre otros, de los trabajos de la escuela de Bruselas, en la que la AO se explora como la formación espontánea de estructuras de orden disipativo. Una tercera tradición, tal vez la más profundamente kantiana, se desarrolla en el contexto de la biología del desarrollo e integra a las dos mencionadas previamente, pues combina aspectos de las dos previas en el desarrollo ontogenético. Podemos decir que cada una de estas concepciones de la AO se relaciona con modelos paradigmáticos diferentes. La noción de autopoiesis (AP), por su parte, fue propuesta en los años 70 por los biólogos chilenos Humberto Maturana y Francisco Varela para explicar la organización individual de los seres vivos como un proceso dinámico que genera una identidad desde las operaciones del sistema (Maturana y Varela 1973). Puede decirse que hereda y reorganiza ideas de la tradición de la AO, especialmente la kantiana y la cibernética, para proponer una teoría biológica alternativa. El enfoque autopoiético concibe el fenómeno de la vida y a los seres vivos de forma muy diferente a la teoría de la evolución o la biología molecular que constituían las líneas de investigación predominantes en la biología de su tiempo. La teoría subraya como propiedad básica de un sistema viviente su autoconstitución dinámica como unidad dotada de identidad a partir de interacciones entre sus componentes. Sin embargo, aquellas propiedades de la vida consideradas primordiales en el enfoque darwiniano, como la reproducción o la evolución, se ven como secundarias, pues requieren de la existencia previa de sistemas autopoiéticos. El objetivo de esta voz es examinar diferentes aspectos que configuran las tradiciones autoorganizativa y autopoiética, en especial las tensiones conceptuales internas que permiten comprender los desafíos a los que se enfrentan ambas en el marco de la filosofía y la teoría de la biología, así como la forma en que sus posiciones e intuiciones contrastan con otras perspectivas en biología. (shrink)

Despite the prevalence of post-colonial theory in the humanities and social sciences, why is it that the two main secular formations in the study of religion(s), as philosophy of religion and history of religions, continue to deploy very similar mechanisms that reconstitute past imperialisms such as the hegemony of theory as specifically Western and/or the division of labor between universal and particular knowledge formations? To answer this question this paper stages an oblique engagement between the seemingly divergent discourses: (i) philosophy (...) of religion, (ii) history of religion—more specifically the area specialism called South Asian religions, and (iii) post-colonial theory especially where these discourses intersect with the discipline of Indology and the representation of Indic phenomena. A different version of this engagement occurs in Hegel’s Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion (LPR). A post-colonial reading of the LPR reveals closer and often unacknowledged connections between the birth of these two disciplines. More importantly the LPR anticipates the auto-immunizing mechanism that underpins the continued lack of engagement between the various disciplines of contemporary religions. Ironically, this mechanism, it will be argued, is located in the very heart of the comparative enterprise itself. (shrink)

Feminist Auto/biography as a Means of Empowering Women: A Case Study of Sylvia Plath's The Bell Jar and Janet Frame's Faces in the Water Feminism, as a political, social and cultural movement, pays much attention to the importance of text. Text is the carrier of important thoughts, truths, ideas. It becomes a means of empowering women, a support in their fight for free expression, equality, intellectual emancipation. By "text" one should understand not only official documents, manifestos or articles. The (...) term also refers to a wide range of literary products—poetry, novels, diaries. The language of literature enables female authors to omit obstacles and constraints imposed by the phallogocentric world, a world dominated by masculine propaganda. Through writing, female authors have an opportunity to liberate their creative potential and regain the territory for unlimited expression. In order to produce a truly powerful text, they resort to a variety of writing styles and techniques. Here the notions of a situated knowledge and context sensitivity prove useful. There are three methodologies working within situated knowledge, namely, the politics of location, self-reflexivity and feminist auto/biography. All of them regard text as a fundamental tool to signify one's authority, yet feminist auto/biography, a concept widely discussed by the British theorist Liz Stanley, appears to be the most empowering mode of writing. It challenges the overused genre of auto/biography and reconstructs its role within feminist epistemologies, thus creating a favourable environment for text production. The works by Sylvia Plath and Janet Frame can be analyzed from the point of view of auto/biographical empowerment, even though their auto/biographical potential is mainly instinctive. Nevertheless, they help to comprehend the strength of the auto/biographical.The aim of this article is to "investigate" two novels by these authors, The Bell Jar by Sylvia Plath and Faces in the Water by Janet Frame, and their compatibility with Stanley's concept. The paper attempts to answer several questions. Are these novels actual feminist auto/biographies or rather fictional auto/biographies with feminist undertones? What kind of narrative strategy is used to achieve the effect of authority over the text? Last but not least, what is the function of auto/biographical narration in the case of these two novels? The article also explores the idea of writing as a means of regaining control over one's life. (shrink)

La sociedad mundial moderna se caracteriza por su alta complejidad, es decir, por la continuamente cambiante interrelación de sus elementos. El resultado de ello es una constante diferenciación y especialización de espacios sociales orientada a manejar la incertidumbre que esa complejidad genera. Pa..

Trust has been widely investigated both theoretically and empirically. Whether thought of as the result of a calculation of costs/benefits, a shared identity, or a leap of faith, there always seems to be an ‘as if’ rhetorical gesture which is ultimately needed to explain how actors move from the base of trust to expectations of trust via suspending judgment on uncertainty and fear of vulnerability to betrayal and exploitation — the actors ultimately act ‘as if’ they do not fear uncertainty (...) and vulnerability to betrayal. Yet this ‘as if’ element has remained seriously under-theorised. Drawing on Derrida's deconstruction, I propose a way of thinking this ‘as if’ element of trust. I thus argue that the decision to trust occurs in a terrain of structural undecidability. The latter is thought of as the possibility condition of trust as well as the subject of trust and a sense of responsibility for this trust. The aporiatic nature of undecidability makes this trust an auto-immune trust which obeys the tripartite logic of ‘without’ which both negates and affirms trust. (shrink)

Une relecture des lettres Sur l’esprit et la lettre en philosophie de 1795 permet de réévaluer le rôle de la pulsion esthétique comme agent d’historicisation du Moi. La méthode philosophique de la lettre, axée sur la réception passive d’un objet, s’oppose à celle de l’esprit qui s’intéresse à la relation pulsionnelle du sujet à son objet. Cette distinction s’articule sur la structure anthropologique de la pulsion fichtéenne qui différencie les pulsions théorique, pratique et esthétique. La pulsion esthétique joue une fonction (...) primordiale dans le passage d’une activité idéelle du Moi à sa réalisation matérielle. Cette démonstration explique le rôle particulier de la création dans le système du jeune Fichte comme l’acte qui permet l’éveil de ces pulsions chez le récepteur ouvrant ainsi la voie à la formation de son esprit. (shrink)

To protect energy resources and alleviate environmental pollution, many countries attach great importance to the transformation of traditional industries into clean energy industries. In this paper, fuel vehicles, hybrid vehicles, and electric vehicles are included in the research. Then, based on the aging chain and coflow theory of SDs, we construct a dynamic matching model of the auto industry upgrade process and its energy consumption attributes. The simulation results of China’s auto industry show that the upgrading of the (...) auto industry is an evolutionary process from high energy consumption and high pollution to low energy consumption and no pollution and the transition from FVs and HVs to EVs will undergo two adjustments; simply reducing energy supply does not have the expected impact on vehicle size and vehicle energy consumption intensity and only by adjusting the energy supply and upgrade ratios together, energy utilization efficiency can be improved; market screening time has an impact on auto industry upgrade speed by affecting vehicle market share and dwell time; China’s auto industry upgrade process should adhere to “problem-oriented” and strengthen consumer guidance, technology innovation, and infrastructure construction. The conclusions can provide references for industrial policy adjustment and industrial structure optimization. (shrink)

THE PROBLEM: MOTORCAR MORALITY AND AUTOMOBILE AGEINGAdvances in modern technology mean that cars are living longer than ever before. This raises important end-of-road-life issues, as it becomes increasingly difficult to provide leaded fuel and shelter for our hydraulically challenged, ageing automobile population. The garage is full, and off-street parking is beyond the financial scope of most low and middle income families. It is a case of rust or bust.NATURAL LAW THEORY, TRAFFIC, AND THE TRUTHSociety has long been reluctant to countenance (...) the concept of actively ending the road-life of motor vehicles, preferring to allow Nature to take its course. Simpler to let the natural phenomena of corrosion and inbuilt obsolescence take their inevitable toll, until the head gasket blows and the piston rods seize up for the last time.But can we afford to allow elderly cars to simply choke and splutter as our roads become increasingly over populated and our atmosphere ever more polluted? Old bangers demand our attention, as their paint peels, their balding tyres leave their tread at every T-junction, their suspension sags, and their chrome corrodes. Is there an alternative to the ailing alternator and the carbonised carburettor?EQUAL ROAD RIGHTSPrinciples of distributive …. (shrink)

Segundo Bernard Lonergan, a possibilidade de objectivarmos a estrutura imanente do sujeito cognoscente e agente exige um percurso de auto-transcendência cognitiva e de auto-transcendência moral. Esse dinamismo de "auto-apropriação da auto-consciência intelectual e racional começa por uma teoria do conhecimento, estende-se até uma metafísica e uma ética e ascende até uma concepção e uma afirmação de Deus, a qual é confrontada finalmente pelo problema do mal, exigindo a transformação de uma inteligência que confia em si mesma (...) num intellectus quaerens idem". Assim, o presente artigo pretende ser uma introdução ao reconhecimento do alcance e do impacto atribuído por Bernard Lonergan quer à gnosiologia quer à ontologia. Para tal, procede-se a uma apresentação do significado próprio do "acto de intelecção" e do sentido dos diferentes modos de operação consciente do sujeito, bem como a uma identificação das diversas configurações da experiência que essa compreensão revela, nomeadamente em ordem a uma explicitação das noções concretas, irrestritas e dinâmicas de "ser proporcionado" e de "ser transcendente". /// Taking into account that for Bernard Lonergan, the immanent structure of the human being as an agent and as a subject requires a process of cognitional and moral self-transcendence, the article intends to show how for Lonergan this dynamism of self-appropriation of one's own intellectual and rational self-consciousness begins as cognitional theory, expands into a metaphysics and an ethics, mounts to a conception and an affirmation of God, only to be confronted with the problem of evil and its inevitable demand for the transformation of the self-reliant intelligence into anintellectus quaerens fidem. The article, therefore, explores the relationship between the several meanings of "insight", the different modes of conscious operations of the subject, and the diverse configurations of experience, as disclosed by the dynamic, concrete, and irrestricted notions of "proportionate being" and "transcendent being". (shrink)

The automobile has figured as an important issue of concern and a profound source of fascination for a wide range of intellectuals in France since the 1950s. The car has been understood variously as a covert vehicle of creeping Americanization and consumerization, a threatening object that obliterates nature, a harbinger of hyper-modern futures, and as a constitutive element of everyday practices. This article traces out the diverse ways in which the car has been ‘good to think with’ for a range (...) of French intellectuals in the period spanning roughly from 1950 through to the 1970s. It seeks to demonstrate the richness of those currents of thought in post-war France which were concerned to comprehend the nature of car cultures. It is argued that these ways of thinking can be drawn upon in the present day by those wishing to analyse contemporary features of automobility. (shrink)

This article proposes that the prime ideals of the university - those of truth, knowledge, justice, and emancipation - are also those that currently produce unjust practices "outside" and "within". Using the work of Jacques Derrida and Paul Virilio, the article argues that the central problem of the university today consists not so much of a neo-liberalisation, but of the speeding-up of these ideals through their enmeshment with techniques of calculation, vision, and prediction. The current university therefore suffers from what (...) it with Derrida identifies as an "auto-immune disease," in which the acceleration of its foundational aspirations have led to a near-total subjugation of all and everything to an oppressive quest for transparency. However, the article proposes via Virilio that this totalising transparency paradoxically also produces more blindness, accidents, and unknowability. It hopes to illustrate this with some examples in the teaching scene as well by working through some of its own conceptual tensions. The other logic of the university today, the article finally proposes, consists of a "dark" or stealth functionality, opening up the promise of a radically different future and unanticipated resistance despite itself. (shrink)

M. Henry voit à tort chez Maine de Biran la distinction entre trois figures du corps propre: corps objectif (extérieur et mondain), corps organique (terme résistant de l'effort), et corps subjectif (confondu avec l'ego). Maine de Biran distingue bien trois corps, mais le troisième, loin d'être confondu avec l'ego, est un corps de pure passivité duquel l'ego est absent. Cet état d'affectivité pure étudié par Biran répond à la critique par M. Henry de sa théorie de la passivité, et (...) corrige la théorie de l'auto-affection. M. Henry misunderstands Maine de Biran's distinction between three dimensions of the body: while the former makes a difference between the objective body (in the external world), the organic body (resistant term of the effort), and the subjective body (identified with the ego), the latter considers the third to be a body of mere passivity from which the ego is absent. The description Biran makes of this state of pure sensitivity answers M. Henry's critique of his theory of passivity, and modifies the theory of « auto-affection ». (shrink)

En 1893, « physicien-ingénieur » André Blondel invente l’oscillographe bifilaire permettant de visualiser les tensions et courants variables. À l’aide de ce puissant moyen d’investigation, il entreprend tout d’abord l’étude des phénomènes de l’arc électrique alors utilisé pour l’éclairage côtier et urbain puis de l’arc chantant employé comme émetteur d’ondes radioélectriques en T.S.F. En 1905, il met en évidence un nouveau type d’oscillations non-sinusoïdales au sein de l’arc chantant. Vingt ans plus tard, Balthasar Van der Pol reconnaitra qu’il s’agissait en (...) réalité d’oscillations de relaxation. Pour expliquer ce phénomène, il fait appel à une representation dans le plan de phase et montre que son évolution prend la forme de petits cycles. Pendant le premier conflit mondial la triode remplace peu à peu l’arc chantant dans les systèmes de transmission. Au sortir de la guerre, Blondel transpose à la triode la plupart de ses résultats par analogie avec l’arc chantant. En avril 1919, il publie un long mémoire dans lequel il introduit la terminologie « oscillations auto- entretenues » et propose d’illustrer ce concept à partir de l’exemple du vase de Tantale qui sera ensuite repris par Van der Pol et par Philippe Le Corbeiller. Il fournit alors une définition d’un système auto-entretenu assez proche de celles qui seront données par la suite par Aleksandr’ Andronov et Van der Pol. Pour étudier la stabilité des oscillations entretenues par la triode et par l’arc chantant il utilise cette fois une représentation dans le plan complexe et explicite l’amplitude en coordonnées polaires. Il justifie alors l’entretien des oscillations par l’existence de cycles qui présentent presque toutes les caractéristiques des cycles limites de Poincaré. Enfin, en novembre 1919, Blondel réalise, un an avant Van der Pol, la mise en équation des oscillations d’une triode. En mars 1926, Blondel établit l’équation différentielle caractérisant les oscillations de l’arc chantant, en tous points similaire à celle qu’obtient concomitamment Van der Pol pour la triode. Ainsi, tout au long de sa carrière, Blondel, a apporté une contribution fondamentale et relativement méconnue à l’élaboration de la théorie des oscillations non linéaires. L’objet de cet article est donc d’analyser ses principaux travaux dans ce domaine et de mesurer leur importance, voire leur influence en les replaçant dans la perspective du développement de cette théorie. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to propose a self-representational theory of phenomenal consciousness from Sartre. For it I will clarify and show the closeness of two ideas. The first of these is the so-called self-representational theory of consciousness, which holds that a mental state is conscious if and only if it represents itself in the right way. The second of these are the descriptions of consciousness from Sartre, which say that all consciousness is self-consciousness of itself, or more precisely: (...) every positional consciousness of an object is at the same time a non-positional consciousness of itself. With the above, the phenomenal consciousness would be self-consciousness of itself and the self-consciousness of itself would be self-representation. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThis article explores how issues of race and prejudice permeate knowledge production. By way of theory-driven processing, this article examines how traditional positivist practices, entrenc...

Dissociative Identity Disorder is an uncommon disorder that has long been associated with exposure to traumatic stressors exceeding manageable levels commonly encompassing physical, psychological and sexual abuse in childhood that is prolonged and severe in nature. In DID, dissociation continues after the traumatic experience and produces a disruption in identity where distinct personality states develop. These personalities are accompanied by variations in behaviour, emotions, memory, perception and cognition. The use of literature in psychiatry can enrich comprehension over the subjective experience (...) of a disorder, and the utilisation of 'illness narratives' in nursing research have been considered a way of improving knowledge about nursing care and theory development. This research explores experiences of DID through close textual reading and thematic analysis of five biographical and autobiographical texts, discussing the lived experience of the disorder. This narrative approach aims to inform empathetic understanding and support the facilitation of therapeutic alliances in mental healthcare for those experiencing the potentially debilitating and distressing symptoms of DID. Although controversies surrounding the biomedical diagnosis of DID are important to consider, the lived experiences of those who mental health nurses encounter should be priority. (shrink)

In this paper we argue that Pareyson’s notion of formativity is germane to the notion of self–transcendence recently put forward in the vast domain of the sciences of the self–organization of complex systems. Following Jean–Pierre Dupuy’s approach, we will not apply this notion to the analysis of Pareyson’s theory; we will, instead, show— by referring to thenumerous topoi where often surprisingly precise parallelisms, onvergences and semantic identities are to be found—that, though being largely independent in their genesis, the logics of (...) the two notions are already consistent with each–other. As a result, we will claim that Pareyson’s theory of the work of art is best understood as a study on the integration of different layers of organizational closures. (shrink)

Existe em Friedrich von Hayek, e isso mais do que em outros economistas contemporâneos, uma teoria completa da "mão invisível" do mercado, teoria essa que Hayek formula de acordo com o vocabulárìo da moderna teoria dos sistemas. Para o teórico da economia, com efeito, o mercado constitui uma ordem auto-organizada que funciona segundo um sistema de comunicação cujas duas faces, inseparáveis uma da outra, são o direito e os preços. Cada um destes canais do processo comunicativo é portador de (...) comunicação efectiva, sendo, por isso, capaz de exercer um efeito real no comportamento dos agentes económicos individuais, ou seja, de fazer com que estes se insiram de forma exacta e efectiva no sistema económico global, e isso apesar de, por motivo da enorme complexidade da economia, nenhum deles, por si só, poder ter um conhecimento global do sistema. Por outro lado, o artigo mostra também de que modo os mesmos canais de comunicação permitem que a economia global se adapte a cada acção livremente decidida pelos agentes económicos individuais. Em suma, o autor do artigo mostra-nos de que modo a teoria de Hayek, de facto, constitui uma "explicação de prìncípio", nova sobretudo pela clareza e pela nitidez da sua formulação, daquilo que continua a ser um estranho paradoxo, a saber, que a liberdade económica possa, sob determinadas condições de estrutura, produzir, não anarquia nem desorganização, mas sim, bem pelo contrário, uma forma de ordem social altamente sofisticada e que, de outra forma, ninguém saberia criar: a divisão mundial do trabalho. There is in Fríedrích von Hayek, more than in any other contemporary economist, a complete theory of the market "invisible hand"; a theory which Hayek formulates in accordance with the vocabulary of the modern theory of systems. As a matter of fact, to the theoretician of economics the market constitutes a self-organized order, which functions in terms of a communication system, the two faces of which are law and prices, and which, as such, are inseparable one from the other. Each one of these channels of the communicative process carries effective communication, thus being able to exert a real effect upon the behavior of individual economic agents, that is, of inserting these ones, in exact and effective form, in the global economic system, something that happens in spite of the fact that neither of them, by themselves, are able to get a global knowledge of the system, something that must be expected due to the enormous complexity of the economy. On the other hand, the article also demonstrates in which way the same channels of communication permit the global economy to adapt to each action freely decided by the individual economic agent. In short, the article demonstrates in which way Hayek's theory, chiefly new because of the clarity and sharpness of its formulation, in fact, constitutes an "explanation of principle" of that which continues to be a strange paradox, namely that economic freedom can, under certain structural conditions, originate neither anarchy nor disorganization, but, on the contrary, a highly sophisticated form of social order, which nobody in any other way would know how to create: the world division of labor. (shrink)

Timothy Williamson is mainly right, I think. He defends armchair philosophy as a variety of armchair science, like mathematics, or computer modeling in evolutionary theory, economics, statistics, and I agree that this is precisely what philosophy is, at its best: working out the assumptions and implications of any serious body of thought, helping everyone formulate the best questions to ask, and then leaving the empirical work to the other sciences. Philosophy – at its best – is to other inquiries roughly (...) as theoretical physics is to experimental physics. You can do it in the armchair, but you need to know a lot about the phenomena with which the inquiry deals. (shrink)

Over the last 102 years, a lot of discussion was being held about the psychoanalytic conception of the “death drive,” but still with inconclusive results. In this paper, we start with a brief review of Freud’s conception, followed by a comprised overview of its subsequent support or criticisms. The core of our argument is a systematic review of current biochemical research about two proposed manifestations of the “death drive,” which could hopefully move the discussion to the realm of science. It (...) was already established that drive satisfaction leads to the secretion of beta-endorphins, and research evidence also shows that the same biochemical mechanisms get activated in the case of masochism and the gambling disorder but only if they are preceded by chronic frustration of the essential drives. We conclude that the actual situation is more complex than Freud hypothesized, and that a fundamental revision of the psychoanalytic drive theory is necessary. (shrink)

A fresh interpretation of Jeremy Bentham, finding that his “radical foolery” embodied a social ethics that was revolutionary for its time. Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832) is best remembered today as the founder of utilitarianism (a philosophy infamously abused by the Victorians) and the conceiver of the Panopticon, the circular prison house in which all prisoners could be seen by an unseen observer—later seized upon by Michel Foucault as the apotheosis of the neoliberal control society. In this volume in the Untimely Meditation (...) series, Christian Welzbacher offers a new interpretation of Bentham, arguing that his “radical foolery” (paraphrasing Goethe's characterization of Bentham) actually embodied a social ethics that was new for its time and demands proper historical contextualization rather than retroactive analysis from the vantage point of late capitalism. Welzbacher provides just such an analysis, offering an account of the two great utilitarian projects that occupied Bentham all his life: the Panopticon and the Auto-Icon. Welzbacher rescues the Panopticon from the misapprehensions of Foucault, Orwell, and Lacan, arguing that Bentham saw the Panopticon as a pedagogical instrument incorporating the tenets of reason; construction and function, plan and influence, architecture and politics are brought into alignment. Bentham extolled the discovery in words that could easily be ascribed to Le Corbusier, Bruno Taut, or any other modernist architect. The Auto-Icon expressed Bentham's theories that the dead should benefit later generations; these theories were effectively sealed when Bentham decided to have his body preserved and put on display. (It can be seen today in a cabinet at University College London.) He also donated his inner organs to science—a practice outlawed at the time—and posthumously stage-managed his own ceremonial autopsy. Welzbacher reveals a Bentham who raised questions that feel familiar and current, invoking topoi that would come to define the modern era and that reverberate to this day. (shrink)

In a new book titled Wild Things: Queer Theory After Nature, I develop a new critical vocabulary to access different, transdisciplinary ways of thinking about race, sexuality, alternative political imaginaries and queer futurity and extinction. Wildness in no way signals the untamed frontier, or the absence of modernity, the barbarian, the animalistic or the opposite of civilization. Rather, in a post-colonial and even de-colonizing vein, it has emerged in the last few years as a marker of a desire to return (...) queerness to the disorder of an unsorted field of desires and drives; to the disorienting and disquieting signifying functions it once named and held in place; and to a set of activist and even pedagogical strategies that depend upon chance, randomness, surprise, entropy and that seek to counter the organizing and bureaucratic logics of the state with potential sites of ungovernability and abjection. Wildness signifies in my project in a number of different ways, but here I use the framework of “abjection” to explain some of the appeal of wildness and a few of the ways in which it expresses relations between the unnamable, the excessive, horror and death. Later on, I will turn to a set of performances and art projects that are deliberately auto destructive and that collectively imagine the end of the human. (shrink)

There is a thesis that assure the computability between externalize about mental content and self-knowledge (BURGE, 1988). However, this theses, that explore the auto-verification property of claims of the type “I think that p”, works only for assertive claims that are express in the simple present tense. Among the problematic cases are the claims in the past tense and claims about specific propositional attitude. This fails about the thesis of the compatibility is pointed by Boghossian (1992) as a prove (...) of the incompatibility between externalism and self-knowledge. There is a wide bibliography that try to manage the claims in past tense. In these articles (BURGE, 1995), It's argued that the preservative function of memory assure the veracity of the claims in past tense (at last in normal situations). However, there isn't a lot of work about the problem of the claims about specific propositional attitude. This article propose a expanse the preservative memory theory, with the purpose that It manages the self-knowledge of past propositional attitudes. We propose some criteria that define when a claim of this type is true, mainly in the cases that the content of the attitude of the past thought is not identical with the actual thought. The criterion about the similarity of content is the Bernecker's one (2009). The criterion about similarity of attitudes is new: the attitude that S thinks in t1 as if he have had in t2 is similar with the attitude that he had in t 1 iff the actual attitude is entailed by the former. (shrink)

Les écrits du dernier Husserl développent une théorie du monde de la vie qui s’expose dans la Krisis de 1936 et dans les nombreux textes inédits qui lui font cortège. Si cette théorie du monde de la vie ne se présente pas, à première vue, comme une éthique ou une théorie de l’éthique, elle demeure marquée par une préoccupation éthique qui scelle l’unité des analyses husserliennes. Dans cet article, on cherchera à préciser les contours et la portée (...) de cette ultime éthique husserlienne, en revenant en particulier sur le motif de l’auto-méditation que Hus-serl érige en principe de la responsabilité individuelle et sociale. (shrink)

This chapter tracks the development of the concept of self-awareness (jikaku, 自覚) in the thought of the Japanese modern philosopher Nishida Kitarō (西田幾多郎) (Kitarō Nishida) (1870–1945), founder of the Kyoto School. Nishida’s oeuvre can be divided into distinct periods, from the 1910s to the 1940s until his passing, during which he thematized and focused on different issues. Nevertheless, self-awareness is a unifying theme throughout. In the chapter we trace how Nishida develops this concept through distinct periods in his career. His (...) initial focus upon pure experience gives way to his focus upon its articulation in reflection vis-à-vis intuition as the unfolding of the will. This then leads to his thematization of the place wherein judgment or propositional thought unfolds and the broader contextual place wherein that place is situated. That thematization of place, in turn, develops into a look at the world where we interact as historical and social bodies with others (nature, other people, etc.). Nishida understands self-awareness in accordance with each of these themes in the respective periods of his oeuvre. But common to all of them is how Nishida understands self-awareness as a self-mirroring – self-reflection as reflexivity – founded upon the premise assumed by the articulated image or object of awareness, a premise necessarily irreducible to, and in excess of, the image or object. This is the a priori that Nishida for the most part calls the “absolute nothing” (zettai mu, 絶対無). To explain this Nishida makes use of Josiah Royce’s notion of a self-representative system as well as Richard Dedekind’s notion of an infinite system in his set theory. On the basis of Nishida’s references to the mathematics of set theory, I further compare his understanding of self-awareness to Kurt Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorems as well as to more recent mathematical theorists, influenced by Gödel, whose understanding of the infinite resonates with Nishida’s understanding of the absolute nothing as assumed by self-awareness. (shrink)

The following article attempts to be a contribution to the reflection on the lines of continuity, proximity relations and possibles elements of differentiationon two theoretical fields of growing importance within the social sciences: theory of systems of Niklas Luhmann and the deconstruction of Jacques Derrida. Along with accounting for the extent of both theories for reflection on the foundations of the social sciences, this article tries to install some useful questions for self-observation of the epistemological foundations of this field of (...) knowledge. El siguiente artículo reflexiona en torno a las líneas de continuidad, relaciones de proximidad y elementos de diferenciación posibles de detectar en dos campos teóricos de creciente protagonismo al interior de las ciencias sociales: la teoría de sistemas de Niklas Luhmann y la deconstrucción de Jacques Derrida. Junto con dar cuenta de los alcances de ambas teorías para la reflexión relativa a los fundamentos de las ciencias sociales, el artículo pretende instalar algunas interrogantes de utilidad para la auto-observación de los fundamentos epistemológicos de dicho campo del conocimiento. (shrink)

Cet article porte sur les pratiques contemporaines d’écriture qui mêlent récit de soi et théorie. Je m’emploie à montrer qu’une intelligence du monde social (des rapports de classe, de genre, de race et d’autres formes de domination) s’exerce à l’étage des vécus singuliers. Ce n’est pas seulement que les gens sont différents les unes des autres – encore que j’insiste sur la vérité et la force d’une affirmation à première vue si banale –, mais aussi qu’un sens renouvelé de (...) l’objectivité s’obtient lorsque la production d’un savoir est réfléchie depuis la position particulière de celui qui l’énonce. Sans doute est-ce l’une des leçons fondamentales des épistémologies féministes. (shrink)

In “The Brokenness of Being,” Mari Ruti investigates the impact that trauma can have on being. Informed by her own experience of breast cancer, Ruti argues that there are some traumatic experiences that entirely change one’s symbolic coordinates. She calls these types of experiences benchmark traumas. Diagnosed with terminal cancer, Ruti boldly explores how encountering a benchmark trauma forced her to recognize the brokenness of her being. She theorizes that this recognition reveals the split in the subject. Encountering this brokenness, (...) as she calls it, at the heart of being can be completely debilitating. However, Ruti argues, there is a way to engage rather than repress this impossible reality. She theorizes that creativity is the one human expression that can grapple authentically with the split in the subject. To explore this idea, she collaborates with painter Dwight Smith. Smith’s twenty-two paintings respond to the benchmark trauma of the death of his twenty-two-year-old daughter. The twenty-two paintings are positioned throughout the manuscript and are in conversation with Ruti’s theory. Ruti is fascinated by both the paintings and Smith’s process, which is similar to her own. For Ruti and Smith, their creativity is how existential engagement takes shape. (shrink)

This article argues that Durkheim’s founding insight – uniquely social phenomena – presents us with both a foundation for the discipline of sociology and the risk that the discipline will become isolated. This, we argue, has happened. Our contention is that the emergent social phenomena need to be understood in relation to, but not reduced to, their biological and psychological substrates. Similarly, there are a number of other characteristics, notably of self-organization, which are distinguishing properties of social phenomena but also (...) of quite different phenomena. The comparison is instructive. We therefore argue for an ecological approach to sociological theory, which has important relationships to the general theories and philosophy of ecology and biology. We explore a number of terminological and conceptual parallels that may inform our understanding of the relation of social theory to these and other disciplines. (shrink)

How does Sylvia Wynter’s theory of the human depart from Western bio-centric and teleological accounts of the human? To grapple with this question I clarify five key concepts in her theory: the Third Emergence, auto- and socio-poiesis, the autopoietic overturn, the human as hybrid, and sociogenesis. I draw on parts of Wynter’s oeuvre, texts she works with and my conversations with Anthony Bogues. Wynter invents a Third Emergence of the world to mark the advent of the human as a (...) hybrid being. She challenges Western conceptions that reduce the human to biological properties. In opposition to Western teleology, her counter-cartography of a history of human life offers a relational conception of human existence which pivots around Frantz Fanon’s theory of sociogeny. She draws on Aimé Césaire’s call for a conception of the human made to the measure of the world, not to the measure of ‘Man’. This makes Wynter’s theory counter-, not post-humanist. (shrink)

Global Literary Theory: An Anthology comprises a selection of classic, must-read essays alongside contemporary and global extracts, providing an engaging and timely overview of literary theory. The volume is thoroughly introduced in the General Introduction and Section Introductions and each piece is contextualised within the wider sphere of global theory. Each section also includes annotated suggestions for further reading to help the reader navigate the extensive literature on each topic. The volume engages with the 'internationalising' of the curriculum as well (...) as the globalization of literature and theory. Alongside these key themes, the volume also extends its coverage to include: The core topics and theorists from formalism and structuralism to post-modernism and deconstruction Digital humanities and humanities computing and their relevance to globalization and literary theory The religious turn in literary theory and philosophy New textualities such as auto/biography, travel writing and ecocritcism Oppositional texts which 'write back' against the canon In addition, the book's Companion Website features an interactive world map incorporating biographies of every theorist in the book, as well as biographies of additional influential theorists. Crucially, this anthology shows that ethnic, postcolonial studies and globalization are not simply niche areas of literary study but are of concern across the contemporary humanities and that new voices are always emerging, and being discovered, from around the globe. As such, this volume offers a refocusing of essential literary theory, extending the canon in line with ongoing debates concerning contemporary cultural and geographic borders. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to propose a self-representational theory of phenomenal consciousness from Sartre. For it I will clarify and show the closeness of two ideas. The first of these is the so-called self-representational theory of consciousness, which holds that a mental state is conscious if and only if it represents itself in the right way. The second of these are the descriptions of consciousness from Sartre, which say that all consciousness is self-consciousness of itself, or more precisely: (...) every positional consciousness of an object is at the same time a non-positional consciousness of itself. With the above, the phenomenal consciousness would be self-consciousness of itself and the self-consciousness of itself would be self-representation. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to propose a self-representational theory of phenomenal consciousness from Sartre. For it I will clarify and show the closeness of two ideas. The first of these is the so-called self-representational theory of consciousness, which holds that a mental state is conscious if and only if it represents itself in the right way. The second of these are the descriptions of consciousness from Sartre, which say that all consciousness is self-consciousness of itself, or more precisely: (...) every positional consciousness of an object is at the same time a non-positional consciousness of itself. With the above, the phenomenal consciousness would be self-consciousness of itself and the self-consciousness of itself would be self-representation. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Archive Feelings: A Theory of Greek Tragedy by Mario TelòSean LambertTelò, Mario. Archive Feelings: A Theory of Greek Tragedy. Ohio State University Press, 2020. 344pp.In Archive Feelings: A Theory of Greek Tragedy, Mario Telò takes aim at one of the most canonical (if also one of the most contested) features of Greek tragedy: its potential to deliver catharsis (12).1 Through careful close readings of Greek tragedies informed by (...) psychoanalytic theory and deconstruction, Telò makes a persuasive case that tragedy is anti-cathartic. “The Freudian take on catharsis is complicated, or even undercut,” he writes in the introduction, “by its own anti-cathartic latencies… We can accordingly look at tragedy as a form of dramatic poetry that finds its affective raison d’être… in these anti-cathartic feelings” (34).Telò states that the intent of Archive Feelings is mainly to intervene in the age-old debate, asking: “why do human beings enjoy tragedy?” (14). He suggests that the pleasure of tragedy is, in fact, a masochistic one: a denial of release or pleasure (such as would come from catharsis) that an audience or reader enjoys in its specifically joyless jouissance. At stake is “feeling material,” a “fantasy” of “merging into the impersonal, anorganic, universal matter of elemental life” (44) evoked in tragedy’s death-driven withdrawal from action. With this concept in mind, Telò goes beyond even his own ambitions for his project. More than merely intervening in debates about the pleasures of tragedy, he argues powerfully for the continuing relevance of Greek tragedy for critical theory today, particularly in light of the so-called “affective” and “material” turns in the humanities. Archive Feelings is thus a useful book for classicists conducting interdisciplinary and/or trans-historical research, but even more so for any scholar working within the constellation of psychoanalysis, deconstruction, queer theory, affect theory or critical race theory. Telò makes a persuasive case for tragedy as a lodestar within this firmament–a vital tool for thinking through problems within and across disciplines.In striking contradistinction to previous theorists of Greek tragedy, including Aristotle and Nietzsche, Telò locates the engine of Greek tragedy in the death drive. In so doing, he reads in ancient narratives a number of experiences such as “acceleration, hoarding, vertiginous suspension, [End Page 113] breathless looping, affective bulimia or binge-eating, serial cutting, trying to enter or fold in upon oneself, auto-immune inflammation” (14), and finds in “the orgasm as an unfinished, non-teleological pleasure,” a desire to return to a state of “inert matter” (13).2 Noting that the original meaning of the Greek word archê is “origin,” Telò connects this impulse to once again become “inert” with the desire to create archives. Thus, Telò sees Greek tragedies as both a model for projects of archival reconstruction as well as archival projects themselves: they are “anxious and debilitating” attempts to “re-create the past as it was” (13).3Telò’s study is divided into three parts: Archival Time, Archival Space, and Archival Endings, which attempt to “structurally reproduce the psychological temporalities of the archive” (49). In each of his five chapters, Telò elaborates the diverse narrative masochisms of Greek tragedy, exploring the various stakes and species of tragic anti-catharsis. In Chapter 1, Telò reads the “archive fever” of Sophocles’ Oedipus at Colonus against the “archive fatigue” of Euripides’ Phoenissae, finding in both of these plays—near the end of the epoch of ancient tragedy—an impulse toward “textual hoarding” (76) that both undermines the possibility of catharsis and “exhausts” (106) the possibilities of the genre (107). In both the “synchronic gathering of disparate fragments of experience” into the body of Oedipus before his death and the aesthetics of boredom, fatigue, and inertia that suffuse the Phoenissae, Telò locates a desire to store up, rather than purge, emotions such as pity and fear, in a flouting of the normal formula for catharsis (73).In Chapter 2, Telò looks at the figures of Heracles and Medea in their original myths and tragic incarnations, seeing in both the compulsion to recircle around scenes of their respective “primordial traumas” (145). In Euripides’s Medea, this move manifests in repeated references... (shrink)

RésuméMullā Ṣadrā explique la connaissance de soi avec la notion de connaissance par la présence, qui fait référence à la présence immédiate du connu avant le connaissant. L'une des composantes énigmatiques de cette connaissance est que le connaissant et le connu sont l'un avec l'autre dans une relation d'unité. Nous pouvons découvrir la motivation de Ṣadrā à évoquer cette idée énigmatique en réfléchissant au point de vue de Sydney Shoemaker sur la connaissance de soi. Nous montrerons que la motivation de (...) Ṣadrā était sa prise de conscience du concept important d'auto-cécité, une notion introduite dans la philosophie contemporaine par Shoemaker. (shrink)

Autopoiesis oder Autopoiese (altgriech. autos „selbst“ und poiein „schaffen, bauen“) ist der Prozess der Selbsterschaffung und -erhaltung eines Systems. In der Biologie stellt das Konzept der Autopoiesis einen Versuch dar, das charakteristische Organisationsmerkmal von Lebewesen oder lebenden Systemen mit den Mitteln der Systemtheorie zu definieren. Der vom chilenischen Neurobiologen Humberto Maturana geprägte Begriff wurde in der Folge seiner Veröffentlichungen aufgebrochen und für verschiedene andere Gebiete wissenschaftlichen Schaffens abgewandelt und fruchtbar gemacht.

Dans cet article, Tanabe reprend une question kantienne : quelle place la liberté, entendue comme « volonté auto-législatrice », peut-elle avoir dans un monde régi par les lois nécessaires de la causalité? Tanabe rappelle, avec Kant, que, comme noumène, ayant une cause spontanée, la liberté est « théoriquement possible », mais soutient que pour qu’elle soit concrètement réalisée, est nécessaire un dépassement de toutes les « limitations individuelles » à travers l’unification du sujet moral agissant avec la « valeur (...) absolue » qu’est. (shrink)

This article consists of a tentative exploration regarding the Buddhist portrayal and critique of Sāṃkhya epistemology and the theory of reflection (pratibimbavāda) as expressed in the Sāṃkhyatattvāvatāraḥ chapter of Bhāviveka’s 6th century Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā, and its auto-commentary the Tarkajvālā; and the Jain portrayal and critique of Sāṃkhya epistemology and the theory of reflection as expressed in Haribhadrasūri’s 8th century Śātravārtāsamuccaya (ŚVS) and Yogabindu. The article includes a translation of the Yogabindu, verses 444–457.

Arthur Kaufmann is one of the most prominent figures among the contemporary philosophers of law in German speaking countries. For many years he was a director of the Institute of Philosophy of Law and Computer Sciences for Law at the University in Munich. Presently, he is a retired professor of this university. Rare in the contemporary legal thought, Arthur Kaufmann's philosophy of law is one with the highest ambitions — it aspires to pinpoint the ultimate foundations of law by explicitly (...) proposing an ontology, a general theory of knowledge and concept of a person. Kaufmann's work derives, first of all, from the thinking of Gustav Radburch, his teacher, and then from ideas of Karl Engish and Hans-Georg Gadamer. The philosophy undertakes to pursue the ultimate foundation of law, law which is understood by Kaufmann, first of all, as a "concrete judgement" that is, what is right in a concrete situation. Justice belongs to the essence of law and "unjust law" is contradictio in adiectio. Kaufmann opposes all those theories, which as the only foundation for establishing just law (Recht) adopt legal norms (Gesetz). In Kaufmann's opinion , such theories are powerless in the face of all types of distortions of law rendered by political forces. He suggests that the basic phenomenon which needs to be explained and which cannot be disregarded by a philosopher of law is so-called "legal lawlessness" ("Gestzliches Unrecht"). "Legal lawlessness" which forms a part of life experience for the people of twentieth century totalitarian states. It proved "with the accuracy of scientific experiment" that the reality of law consists of something more than bare conformity with legal norms. The existence of lex corrupta indicates that law contains something "non-dispositive" which requires acknowledgment of both law-maker and judge. Kaufmann, accepting the convergent concept of truth and cognition, assumes that "non-dispositive" content, emerging as the conformity of a number of cognitive acts of different subjects (inter-subjective communicativeness and verifiability), indicates the presence of being in this cognition. The questions "What is law?" and "What are the principles of a just solution?" lead straight to the ontology of law, to the question about the ontological foundations of law. Kaufmann discerns the ontological foundations of law in the specifically understood "nature of things" and, ultimately, in a "person". He proposes a procedural theory of justice, founded on a "person". In my work, I undertake to reconstruct the train of thought which led Kaufmann to the recognition of a "person" as the ontological foundation of law. In the first part, the conception of philosophy adopted by Kaufmann, initial characteristics of law — of reality which is the subject of analysis, as well as, the requirements for proper philosophical explanation of law posed by Kaufmann are introduced. In the second, Kaufmann's reconstruction of the process of the realisation of law is presented. Next, the conception of analogy which Kaufmann uses when explaining law is analyzed. In the fourth part, Kaufmann's conception of ontological foundations of law is discussed. A critical analysis is carried out in which I demonstrate that the theory of the ontological foundation of law proposed by Kaufmann and the concept of a person included in it do not allow a satisfac¬tory explanation of the phenomenon of "legal lawlessness" and lead to a number of difficulties in the philosophical explanation of law. Finally, the perspectives of a proper formulation of the issue of the ontological foundations of law are drafted in the context of the analyzed theory. My interest is centered on the conception of philosophy adopted by Kaufmann, according to which the existence of the reality is inferred on the basis of a certain configuration of the content of consciousness, whereas at the point of departure of philosophy of law, the data to be explained is a certain process, which is, basically, a process of cognition, while the reality appears only as a condition for the possibility of the occurrence of the process. I wish to argue that the difficulties which appear in the explanation of law are a consequence of the assumed fundamental philosophical solu¬tions, which seem to be characteristic, though usually not assumed explicitly, in philoso¬phy and theory of law dominant at present in continental Europe. Thereby, I wish to show the significance of ontological and epistemological solutions to the possibility of a proper formulation of the problems posed by philosophy and theory of law. Kaufmann proclaims himself in favour of a philosophy which poses questions about the ultimate foundations of understanding of the reality. In epistemology, he assumes that answers to the questions "What is reality like?" and ultimately "What is real?" are inferred on the basis of uniformity of a cognitive acts of different subjects. Cognition of the reality is accomplished exclusively through the content of conceptual material. The two fundamental questions posed by philosophy of law are "What is just law?" and "How is the just law enacted?" The latter is a question about the process of achieving a solution to a concrete case. Since, in Kaufmann's opinion, law does not exist apart from the process of its realisation, an answer to the question about the manner of realisation of law is of fundamental significance to answering the question: "What is law?" and to the explanation of the question about the ontological grounding of law, which is, as well, the foundation of justice. The proper solution has to take into account the moment of "non-dispositive" content of law; its positiveness understood as the reality and, at the same time, it has to point to the principles of the historical transformation of the content. Law, in the primary meaning of the word, always pertains, in Kaufmann's opinion, to a concrete case. A legal norm is solely the "possibility" of law and the entirely real law is ipsa res iusta, that which is just in a given situation. Determination of what is just takes place in a certain type of process performed by a judge (or by man confronted with a choice). Kaufmann aims to reconstruct this process. A question about the ontological foundation of law is a question about the ontological foundations of this process. In the analyzed theory it is formulated as a question about the transcendental conditions, necessary for the possibility of the occurrence of the process: how the reality should be thought to make possible the reconstructed process of the realisation of law. Kaufmann rejects the model for finding a concrete solution based on simple subsump¬tion and proposes a model in which concrete law ensues, based on inference by analogy, through the process of "bringing to conformity" that which is normative with that which is factual. Kaufmann distinguishes three levels in the process of the realisation of law. On the highest level, there are the fundamental legal principles, on the second legal norms, on the third — concrete solutions. The fundamental principles of law are general inasmuch as they cannot be "applied" directly to concrete conditions of life, however, they play an important part in establishing norms. A judge encounters a concrete situation and a system of legal norms. A life situation and norms are situated on inherently different levels of factuality and normativeness. In order to acquire a definite law both a norm (system of norms) and a life situation (Lebenssachverhalt) should undergo a kind of "treatment" which would allow a mutual conformity to be brought to them. Legal norms and definite conditions of life come together in the process of analogical inference in which the "factual state" ("Tatbestand") — which represents a norm, and in the "state of things" ("Sachverhalt") — which represents a specific situation are constructed. A "factual state" is a sense interpreted from a norm with respect to specific conditions of life. The "state of things" is a sense constructed on the basis of concrete conditions of life with respect to norms (system of norms). Legal norms and concrete conditions of life meet in one common sense established during the process of realisation of law. Mutatis mutandis the same refers to the process of composition of legal norms: as the acquisition of concrete law consists in a mutual "synchronization" of norms and concrete conditions of life, so acquisition of legal norms consists of bringing to conformity fundamental principles and possible conditions of life. According to Kaufmann, both of these processes are based on inference through analogy. As this inference is the heart of these processes it is simultaneously a foundation finding just law and justice. How does Kaufmann understand such an inference? As the basis for all justice he assumes a specifically interpreted distributive justice grounded on proportionality. Equality of relations is required between life conditions and their normative qualification. Concrete conditions of life are ascribed normative qualification not through simple application of a general norm. More likely, when we look for a solution we go from one concrete normative qualified case to another, through already known "applications" of norms to a new "application". The relation between life conditions and their normative qualifica¬tion has to be proportional to other, earlier or possible (thought of) assignments of that which is factual to that which is normative. Law as a whole does not consist of a set of norms, but only of a unity of relations. Since law is a, based on proportion, relative unity of a norm and conditions of life, in order to explain law in philosophical manner, the question about ontological base of this unity has to be asked. What is it that makes the relation between a norm and conditions of life "non-dispositive"? What is the basis for such an interpretation of a norm and case which makes it possible to bring a norm and conditions of life into mutual "conformity"? This is a question about a third thing (next to norms and conditions of life), with respect to which the relative identity between a norm and conditions of life occurs, about the intermediary between that which is normative and that which is factual and which provides for the process of establishing of norms, as well as, finding solutions. It is the "sense" in which the idea of law or legal norm and conditions of life have to be identical to be brought to mutual "conformity". In Kaufmann's opinion such a sense is nothing else but the "nature of things" which determines the normative qualification of the reality. Since establishment of this "sense" appears to be "non-dispositive" and controlled inter-subjectively (namely, other subjects will reach a similar result) so, in conformity with the convergent concept of truth, the "nature of things" must be assigned a certain ontological status. According to Kaufmann this is a real relation which occurs between being and obligation, between the conditions of life and normative quality. However, it should be underlined that from the point of view of the analyzed system the "nature of things" is a correlate of constructed sense, a result of a construction which is based on the principle of consistent understanding of senses ("non-normative" and "normative") and is not a reality which is transcendent against the arrangement of senses. In Kaufmann's theory, inference from analogy appears to be a process of reshaping the concepts (senses) governed by tendency to understand the contents appearing in relations between that which is factual and that which is normative in a consistent way. The analogical structure of language (concepts) and recognition of being as composed of an essence and existence is an indispensable requirement for the possibility of the realisation of law, based on specifically understood inference from analogy. It is necessary to assume a moment of existence without content which ensures unity of cognition. Existence emerges thus as a condition of the possibility of cognition. According to Kaufmann, the "nature of things" is the heart of inference through analogy and the basis for establishment of finding of law. Inference from the "state of things" to a norm or from a norm to the "state of things" always means inference through the "nature of things". The "nature of things" is the proper medium of objective legal sense sought in every cognition of law. In Kaufmann's view, the question whether the "nature of things" is ultima ratio of interpretation of law or is only a means of supplement gaps in law or whether it is one of the sources of law, is posed wrongly. The "nature of things" serves neither to supplement the gaps nor is it a source of law as, for example, a legal norm may be. It is a certain kind of "catalyst" necessary in every act of making law and solving a concrete case. Owing to "nature of things" it is possible to bring to a mutual conformity the idea of law and possible conditions of life or legal norms and concrete conditions of life. In Kaufmann's conception the "nature of things" is not yet the ultimate basis for understanding the "non-dispositiveness" of law. The relation between obligation and being is determined in the process of the realisation of law. Both the process itself and that which is transformed in this process are given. A question about the ontological bases of "material" contents undergoing "treatment" in the process of the realisation of law and about being which is the basis of regularity of the occurrence of the process arises. Only this will allow an explanation that the result of the process is not optional. Thus, a question about reality to which law refers and about the subject realising the law has to be formed. To this, Kaufmann gives the following answer: that which is missing is man but not "empirical man" but man as a "person". A "person" understood as a set of relations between man and other people and things. A "person" is the intermediary between those things which are different — norm and case are brought to conformity. A "person" is that which is given and permanent in the process of the realisation of law. It determines the content of law, is "subject" of law; this aspect is described by Kaufmann as the "what" of the process of realisation of law. A "person" consists of precisely just these relations which undergo "treatment" in the process. On the other hand, a "person" is "a place" in which the processes of realisation of law occur, it is the "how" of normative discourse, a "person" is that which determines the procedure of the process, being "outside" of it. This aspect of a "person" is connected with the formal moment of law. A "person" being, at the same time, the "how" and the "what" of the process of the realisation of law, is also, to put it differently, a structural unity of relation and that which constitutes this relation (unity of relatio and relata). According to this approach a "person" is neither an object nor a subject. It exists only "in between". It is not substance. Law is the relation between being and obligation. That which is obligatory is connected with that which is general. That which is general does not exist on its own, it is not completely real. Accordingly, a "person" as such is also not real. It is relational, dynamic and historical. A "person" is not a state but an event. In Kaufmann's opinion, such a concept of a "person" helps to avoid the difficulties connected with the fungibility of law in classical legal positivism. A "person" is that which is given, which is not at free disposal and secures the moment of "non-dispositiveness" of law. Kaufmann concludes: "The idea (»nature«) of law is either the idea of a personal man or is nothing". Theory points at the structure of realising law and explains the process of adoption of general legal norms for a concrete situation. The analysis has shown however, that in this theory a satisfactory answer to the question about the ultimate foundations of law is not given. It seems that in the analyzed theory the understanding of human being takes place through understanding of law. What is good for man as a "person", what is just, what a "person" deserves may be determined only against the existing system of law. A "per¬son" adopted as a basis of law is the reality postulated in the analysis of the process of the realisation of law. It is a condition of possibility of this process ( explaining, on one hand, its unity and, on the other hand, the non-dispositive moments stated in this process). A "person" in the discussed theory is entirely defined by the structure of law, it can be nothing more than that which is given in law, what law refers to, what law is about. Being, which is a "person", is constituted by relations between people and objects, the relations which are based on fundamental links between norms and conditions of life established in a process of bringing them to conformity. It has to be assumed that man as a "person" is a subject of law only as far as realising law "treats" given senses according to their current configuration. The system of law is a starting point and it describes in content what man is as a "person". Moreover, being a "person" is the condition for entering legal relations. Consistently, Kaufmann writes that "empirical man" is not the subject of law, man is not "out of nature" a "person". People become "persons" due to the fact that they acknowledge each other as "persons" — acknowledging, at the same time, law. This acknowledgement is a con¬dition of existence, of the possibility of the occurrence of process of realisation of law and of constituting legal relations which ultimately constitute a "person". Kaufmann assumes, that law tends towards a moral aim: it may and must create an external freedom, without which the internal freedom to fulfil moral obligations cannot develop. However, this postulate is not based on the necessary structure of human being. From the point of view of his system, it is nothing more than only a condition for the possibility of the occurrence of the process of the realisation of law — lack of freedom would destroy the "how" of this process. Thus, the postulate to protect the freedom of personal acts has to be interpreted, in accordance with the analyzed theory, as a postulate, the fulfilment of which aims ultimately at the accomplishment of the very same process of realisation of law itself and not the realisation of a given man. Kaufmann considers a "person" to be an element which unites the system of law as a whole. Law is a structure of relations, which are interdependent and inter-contingent. Consequently, a "person" which is to form the ontological basis of law has to be entity consisting of all relations. Being also the "how" of the process of realisation of law, if a "person" is to warrant its unity, it has to be a common source for all procedures. Hence, a single "person" would constitute a subject of law. Man appears to be only a moment of a certain entirety, realisation of which should be an aim of his actions. Law, creating a "person" as an object and subject of law becomes a primary entity. In the analyzed theory, the basis for determination of aims which law sets to man is not the allocation of man-subject to something which improves him but rather, such relation is only just constituted by law. A question appears, why should aims set in law also be the aims of "empirical man"? Why is this "empirical man" to be punished in the name of a "person" understood in such a way? If, however, it is assumed that what is man is determined by a system which is superior to him, then man has to be understood only as a part of a whole and there are no grounds to prohibit istrumental treatment of man and so the road to all aspects of totalitarianism might be opened. A problem of the application of created theory to the reality arises, the reality which the theory pretends to explain. Ultimately in his theory Kaufmann does not give any systemic grounds for a radical questioning of the validity of any legal norms. Every new norm becomes an equal part of system of norms. It is only its interpretation and application to given conditions of life that may be disputable, however, this refers to all norms without exception. Cohesive inter-pretation of norms and applications is necessary and sufficient for the acquisition of just law. New norms have to be interpreted in the light of others, correspondingly, the other norms require reinterpretation in the light of the new ones. Contradiction in interpretation of a norm does not form a basis for questioning norms but may serve only to question the manner of their interpretation (understanding). Therefore, no grounds exist to assume any legal norm as criminal or unjust, and in consequence, to question any consistently realised system based on formally, properly established norms, as "legal lawlessness". As law and a "person" do not exist without the process of realisation of law, the role of legal safety becomes crucial as the condition for the possibility of the occurrence of the process of realisation of law. Denying legal safety would be tantamount to negation of law in general (also of moral law) as negation of safety takes away, at the same time, the basis for occurrence of the process of realisation of law. Moreover, any lack of legal safety would also mean lack of a basis for the existence of man as a "person". Kaufmann's thesis, that civil disobedience is legalized only when it has a chance to lead to success, consistent with his concept of the foundations of law, seems to point directly to conclusions which deny the facts taken under consideration and doubtlessly Kaufmann's own intentions, since it would have to be assumed that accordingly there are no grounds to question a legal system in force based on violence which secures its operation. Force finally seems to determine which one of the mutually irreconcilable normative systems constitute law and which does not. A legitimate position is one which leads to success, it is the weaker system which is negated. If so, then basically violent imposition of law is not an act directed against the law in force but, to the contrary, realisation of law. In the context of the new system the former system of law may be talked about as unjust solely in the sense of being incapable of being consistently united with the new. However, at the base, ultimately, lies force which reaffirms differences and excludes from the process of realisation of law certain norms and their interpretations. Kaufmann was aiming at grounding of that which is "non-dispositive" in a certain given framework of interpretation. Nevertheless, he does not provide foundations for the understanding of phenomena, which he undertakes to explain at a point of departure. Instead of explaining them the theory negates the possibility of their existence. The reality postulated in regard to "non-dispositive" moments of the reconstructed process of acquiring law consist of a specifically understood "person", which appears in Kaufmann's conceptions as a condition of the possibility of the realisation of law. According to this approach understanding of a "person" may be only a function of law. To understand "legal lawlessness" and foundations of justice it is necessary to look for such theory of law in which understanding of man as a "person" and being is not a function of understanding of law (in which a "person" is not only a condition for possibility of reconstructed process of realisation of law; for possibility of cognition processes). It seems necessary to start from theory of being and a "person" based on broader experience than the one assumed by Kaufmann and reconstruct the ontological foundations of the process of realisation of law only in such perspective. Kaufmann points out that that to which law refers is ipsa res iusta a concrete relation of man to other people and things. This relation, in his theory, appears to be basically only just constituted by law (normative senses "applied" to conditions of life). Therefore, understanding the relation between a given man and other people and things which constitute the aim of his actions, that is understanding of good, is enacted against the background of constitution of senses; constitution which is a result of a process aiming towards consistent understanding of particular contents (of nor¬mative and non-normative senses). "Being" is secondary towards constructed senses it is only their correlate. The primary relation consists of relation of a man to law (system of norms), while the secondary relation is one of man to something which is the aim of his action (relation between man and good). Considering such approach it is difficult to envision a satisfying answer to the fundamental question: why does law put concrete man under any obligation to obey it? The source of this problem can be seen in reduction of the base for understanding good to content of obligation formulated in auto-reflection. Such reduction seems to be a consequence of Kaufmann's adoption of "convergent concept of truth" and in con¬sequence his recognition of indirect, essentialistic grasp of reality formulated in concepts as the basic and only foundation of theory of being and of law. In view of such an approach, analogy of law, concepts and being is the condition for the possibility of the process of transformation of senses which aims at consistent interpretation of all law. Existence is postulated with respect to the possibility of unity of experience and cognition. However, also a different approach to understanding of the problem of being and good is possible. In spontaneous cognition being is affirmed, first of all, not as a certain, non-contradictory, determined content, but as something existing. Together with a cer¬tain content (passed indirectly through notions) existence of being is co-given. The basis for unity of being is not formed by the consistence of content, as it is in the case of the theories departing from the analysis of cognition processes, but by an act of existence realising content (essence). Such an approach makes it also possible to go beyond the convergent concept of truth. It is worth mentioning that allocation of an agent to good is realised not only by the content of duty. A statement that something is good is primary with respect to determination of this good in content. The recognised good always bears some content, however, there are no reasons to base the concept of good exclusively on indirect, formulated in concepts cognition. As primary, can be adopted the relation of man to good and not of man to law. Determination in content appears to be only an articulation of aspectual cognition of being, as an object of action. In such a case the basis for relative unity of norm and conditions of life is not the "nature of things" understood as correlate of sense but it is relation to good based on internal constitution of man as potential, not self-sufficient being. It does not mean, that the moments of the process of realisation of law singled out by Kaufmann are not important to determination of what is just. He, quite rightly, points to significant role played by norms in the evaluation of concrete situations, in man's search for closer specification in content of good innate to him. The structure of process of determining law for a concrete situation, to a great degree corresponds to the processes of determining law which take place not only in the legal sciences. Kaufmann's analyses of the process of realisation of law show the complexity of the structure of these processes and point towards important moments allowing a better understanding of law and man. Nevertheless, these analyses cannot be a basis for construction of philosophical theory of law, theory which hopes to point out the ultimate, ontological foundations for understanding law. Kaufmann's results may become fully valid only in a more general perspective including broader experience at the point of departure. (shrink)

This text is a set of reflections about a book that had been translated in French, published of late and that collected an article and a book of ethics written by J. Harsanyi. Harsanyi’s aim was to understand and make understood the ethical considerations implied or supposed by game theory; whether its authors were aware of that or not. He does it by the means of a bundle of theses, the ones included in Kant’s works -provided they were criticized enough-, (...) the others in Smith’s works and others again in Bayes, whose way of practicing mathematics is clearly perceived by Harsanyi as linked to an explicitly utilitarian philosophy, but the affinity of which we have recognized as having acquaintance with some considerations of Montaigne in his _ Essays _. So, our own aim was to place Harsinyi’s work in a longer tradition than the Kantian and English-speaking ones as Harsanyi probably believed and suggested to have believed it sufficient with regard to the exclusivity of his references. This c... (shrink)