Effective vaccines for COVID‐19 are already available to humankind. In Peru, 86 million doses were administered to cover the demand for 33 million Peruvian people. Hence, vaccination has been prioritized in groups: health personnel, subjects with pre‐existing health conditions and those over 65 years of age. However, given the social problems and the public health situation in Peru, this work defends that the priority of vaccination should be focused on the population living in extreme poverty. The method used was an (...) ethical argumentation on the distribution of scarce antiSARS‐CoV2 vaccine in Peru. This argument is based on the analysis of the Peruvian population living in extreme poverty, which presents different layers of vulnerability, and that, in the face of an eventual SARS‐CoV2 infection, these would be exacerbated one after the other, through a cascade effect. This scenario would give rise to new vulnerabilities to those already existing, causing greater damage. Vaccination efforts on this key population would give them the opportunity to continue to find ways to bring food to their homes, significantly reducing the risk of contagion in their environment and mitigating the devastating effect of the local diseases to which they are already exposed. Four objections related to this argument are raised with their corresponding responses. Priority access to the vaccine would significantly reduce the humanitarian harm to people living in extreme poverty, prevailing the principles of justice and equity. (shrink)

La humanidad ya dispone de vacunas eficaces contra el COVID‐19. En Perú se administraron 86 millones de dosis para cubrir la demanda de 33 millones de peruanos. Para ello, se ha priorizado la vacunación en grupos clave: personal de salud, sujetos con condiciones de salud preexistentes y mayores de 65 años. Sin embargo, dada la problemática social y la situación de la salud pública en Perú, este trabajo defiende que la prioridad de la vacunación debe centrarse en la población que (...) vive en extrema pobreza. El método utilizado fue una argumentación ética sobre la distribución de la vacuna contra el COVID‐19 en Perú. Esta argumentación se basa en el análisis de la población peruana que vive en extrema pobreza, la cual presenta diferentes estratos de vulnerabilidad, y que, ante una eventual infección por SARS‐CoV‐2, se irían agravando uno tras otro, a través de un efecto en cascada. Este escenario daría lugar a nuevas vulnerabilidades de las ya existentes, causando mayores daños. Los esfuerzos de vacunación en esta población clave les brindaría oportunidad de seguir encontrando formas de llevar alimentos a sus hogares, reduciendo significativamente el riesgo de contagio en su entorno y mitigando el efecto devastador de las enfermedades locales a las que ya está expuesta. Se plantean cuatro objeciones relacionadas con este argumento, con sus correspondientes respuestas. El acceso prioritario a la vacuna reduciría significativamente el daño a las personas que viven en la extrema pobreza, haciendo prevalecer los principios de justicia y equidad. (shrink)

Many of the computing systems programmed using Machine Learning are opaque: it is difficult to know why they do what they do or how they work. Explainable Artificial Intelligence aims to develop analytic techniques that render opaque computing systems transparent, but lacks a normative framework with which to evaluate these techniques’ explanatory successes. The aim of the present discussion is to develop such a framework, paying particular attention to different stakeholders’ distinct explanatory requirements. Building on an analysis of “opacity” from (...) philosophy of science, this framework is modeled after accounts of explanation in cognitive science. The framework distinguishes between the explanation-seeking questions that are likely to be asked by different stakeholders, and specifies the general ways in which these questions should be answered so as to allow these stakeholders to perform their roles in the Machine Learning ecosystem. By applying the normative framework to recently developed techniques such as input heatmapping, feature-detector visualization, and diagnostic classification, it is possible to determine whether and to what extent techniques from Explainable Artificial Intelligence can be used to render opaque computing systems transparent and, thus, whether they can be used to solve the Black Box Problem. (shrink)

The received view of dynamical explanation is that dynamical cognitive science seeks to provide covering law explanations of cognitive phenomena. By analyzing three prominent examples of dynamicist research, I show that the received view is misleading: some dynamical explanations are mechanistic explanations, and in this way resemble computational and connectionist explanations. Interestingly, these dynamical explanations invoke the mathematical framework of dynamical systems theory to describe mechanisms far more complex and distributed than the ones typically considered by philosophers. Therefore, contemporary dynamicist (...) research reveals the need for a more sophisticated account of mechanistic explanation. (shrink)

Models developed using machine learning are increasingly prevalent in scientific research. At the same time, these models are notoriously opaque. Explainable AI aims to mitigate the impact of opacity by rendering opaque models transparent. More than being just the solution to a problem, however, Explainable AI can also play an invaluable role in scientific exploration. This paper describes how post-hoc analytic techniques from Explainable AI can be used to refine target phenomena in medical science, to identify starting points for future (...) investigations of causal relationships, and to generate possible explanations of target phenomena in cognitive science. In this way, this paper describes how Explainable AI—over and above machine learning itself—contributes to the efficiency and scope of data-driven scientific research. (shrink)

In a context of pervasive digitalization of the social world, both before and during the COVID-19 pandemic, the field of education has undergone major changes with the development of digital practices and settings. However, the physical presence of the subjects and the body remain something primordial and irreplaceable in traditional educational processes. Thus, it is often assumed that virtuality is opposed to the corporeal reality of the subjects involved in teaching, learning and studying. In this paper we aim to critically (...) challenge this assumption by addressing the phenomenon of virtuality in a more original sense: as a fundamental dimension of corporeality itself. Drawing on Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological insights, we argue that the experience of the virtual is inherently embodied and fully real. We understand corporeality and virtuality as entangled and multidimensional phenomena. At the same time, this leads us to rethink the digital as only one possible medium in which virtuality can appear as inherent to embodied experience. We develop our phenomenological approach in three instances. First, we question and bracket two common assumptions about corporeality. From our critical perspective, assumptions about a disembodied digitality and a devirtualized corporeality represent extremes within which educational discourses currently move. Second, we address the inherent virtuality of embodied experience. We outline the heuristic concept of the virtual body to describe corporeality and virtuality as entangled and multidimensional phenomena that encompass extension, intercorporeality and intermediality. Finally, we make some remarks on the relationships of corporeality and virtuality considering the challenges of digital education. (shrink)

"Epistola a Memeceo, Maximas capitales, Sentencias vaticanas, fragmentos y testimonios; texto griego y traduccion": p. [87]-161.

This paper discusses the varieties of capitalism in transitional societies in Latin America and Central / Eastern Europe. The intended purpose of these transitions from semi-closed import-substituting economies in the first case and state socialist ones in the second was to institutionalize open-market economies. Twenty or thirty years later, there is a variety of types of capitalism in these countries, which I classify into three: open-market, neo-mercantilist, and anemic. The question for sociology is whether these quite different variants represent temporary (...) stages or distortions in the same process of transition or whether, on the contrary, they may institutionalize as discrete forms of peripheral capitalism. Neither standard “legacy” argu­ments nor institutionalist theories offer satisfactory answers to this question. The multiple modernities approach, on the other hand, is more appropriate as a theoretical perspective, but it has not produced yet specific propositions applicable to this question. My paper makes two claims. First, the successful transfer of institutions depends on the congruence between these institutions and the broader institutional framework of the recipient economies, a point not developed by institutionalist theories. I offer a hypothesis in this regard: Two critical nodes of congruence are the regulatory and extractive capacity of the state and the strength of civil society. Second, market capitalism (as liberal democracy as well) is a complex institution, and some of its components “travel” more easily across societies and institutional frameworks, and therefore are easier to institutionalize. This is the source of the hybrid variants. (shrink)

Bayesian reverse-engineering is a research strategy for developing three-level explanations of behavior and cognition. Starting from a computational-level analysis of behavior and cognition as optimal probabilistic inference, Bayesian reverse-engineers apply numerous tweaks and heuristics to formulate testable hypotheses at the algorithmic and implementational levels. In so doing, they exploit recent technological advances in Bayesian artificial intelligence, machine learning, and statistics, but also consider established principles from cognitive psychology and neuroscience. Although these tweaks and heuristics are highly pragmatic in character and (...) are often deployed unsystematically, Bayesian reverse-engineering avoids several important worries that have been raised about the explanatory credentials of Bayesian cognitive science: the worry that the lower levels of analysis are being ignored altogether; the challenge that the mathematical models being developed are unfalsifiable; and the charge that the terms ‘optimal’ and ‘rational’ have lost their customary normative force. But while Bayesian reverse-engineering is therefore a viable and productive research strategy, it is also no fool-proof recipe for explanatory success. (shrink)

The philosophical conception of mechanistic explanation is grounded on a limited number of canonical examples. These examples provide an overly narrow view of contemporary scientific practice, because they do not reflect the extent to which the heuristic strategies and descriptive practices that contribute to mechanistic explanation have evolved beyond the well-known methods of decomposition, localization, and pictorial representation. Recent examples from evolutionary robotics and network approaches to biology and neuroscience demonstrate the increasingly important role played by computer simulations and mathematical (...) representations in the epistemic practices of mechanism discovery and mechanism description. These examples also indicate that the scope of mechanistic explanation must be re-examined: With new and increasingly powerful methods of discovery and description comes the possibility of describing mechanisms far more complex than traditionally assumed. (shrink)

This chapter subsumes David Marr’s levels of analysis account of explanation in cognitive science under the framework of mechanistic explanation: Answering the questions that define each one of Marr’s three levels is tantamount to describing the component parts and operations of mechanisms, as well as their organization, behavior, and environmental context. By explicating these questions and showing how they are answered in several different cognitive science research programs, this chapter resolves some of the ambiguities that remain in Marr’s account, and (...) shows that many different areas and traditions of cognitive scientific research can be unified under the mechanistic framework. (shrink)

En este artículo me propongo hacer algunos planteamientos sobre la noción de “diversidad” que nos ayuden a situarla en el contexto general de la epistemología y en el particular de las ciencias sociales contemporáneas, sugerir varias estrategias para mejorar nuestra comprensión de algunas discusiones actuales relacionadas con la naturaleza de los múltiples saberes, su estatus epistemológico y sus relaciones y diferencias con la definición clásica de “conocimiento”, examinar el problema de si hay una o varias epistemologías y cuáles son las (...) implicaciones de cada alternativa, ofrecer una caracterización de ciencia empírica (aplicable en el campo de la investigación social) y mostrar sus relaciones con la tesis de la existencia de múltiples saberes. Por último, ofreceré algunos argumentos para ilustrar las razones por las cuáles es preferible usar un enfoque metodológico monista para investigar desde la diversidad. (shrink)

En este artículo se discuten las críticas de John Dupré contra la unidad metodológica de la ciencia. Como se sabe, a partir de la premisa del desorden de las cosas, Dupré rechaza tanto las versiones fuertes como las variantes débiles de unificación, pero construye sus mejores argumentos contra las últimas a partir de la tesis de que no hay una solución satisfactoria del problema de la demarcación. Tras exponer los argumentos de Dupré en favor de la implausibilidad de cualquier formulación (...) débil de la tesis de la unidad de la ciencia (incluyendo aquellas que se enfocan en la unidad metodológica), explicaré su formulación del problema de la demarcación, examinaré su caracterización de la teoría de la falsabilidad de Popper y responderé a sus argumentos en contra de la posición de Popper sobre la cientificidad. Mis argumentos mostrarán la inadecuación del tratamiento que da Dupré a este problema y señalarán una ruta para mostrar que la solución de Popper al problema de la demarcación, por medio del criterio de falsabilidad, permite defender una forma no reduccionista de la unidad de la ciencia. (shrink)

Las discusiones sobre epistemología confiabilista suelen centrarse en elexamen de teorías de proceso confiable, según las cuales una creencia esjustificada syss es producida por procesos que son generalmente confiables.Pero la noción de “proceso-tipo confiable” es muy controvertida. Por ejemplo,autores como Conee y Feldman consideran que las teorías de la justificaciónde proceso confiable son irremediablemente defectuosas, debido al “problemade la generalidad”. En este trabajo me propongo bosquejar la idea central dejustificación en términos confiabilistas, y determinar hasta qué punto sepueden sostener las (...) críticas de Conee y Feldman contra la noción alstonianade confiabilismo de proceso. Finalmente, sugiero una estrategia paraneutralizar las objeciones de Conee y Feldman, y una propuesta esquemáticapara justificar los procesos-tipo que generan las creencias confiables. (shrink)

According to some authors, Popper’s realism is blatantly incoherent mainly because of his commitment with the correspondence theory of truth and due to the fact that in his theory of cience is granted that, though the general aim of science is the search for truth, it might happen that a specific theory reaches that aim without us being able of knowing it. In this paper, I explain, briefly, the particularities of Popper’s realism, his views on truth as a regulative ideal (...) for science, and I show that, regardless the impossibility of establishing in a efinitive way that truth has been reached, there is no incoherence that endangers his project. In this way, I answer Cardenas and others’ criticisms against Popper’s realism and his views on the general aim of science, and I identify the sources from which this kind of misunderstanding springs. (shrink)

En este artículo examino el problema del estatus epistémico de las teorías científicas, a la luz de la epistemología de Popper. A partir del planteamiento controversial “ninguna teoría científica es verdadera” (A) que resulta un buen candidato para expresar de manera sintética una de las implicaciones fundamentales de la teoría popperiana de la verosimilitud, analizo algunas críticas a la concepción falibilista de la ciencia y sugiero formas de desarrollar apropiadamente el sentido de (A), junto con el de otros planteamientos de (...) la misma familia. Argumentaré que sólo mediante estos planteamientos podemos comprender de manera adecuada la empresa de la ciencia, y que ellos no representan el colapso de la epistemología. Por otra parte, mostraré cómo construir estos planteamientos de tal suerte que salgan airosos ante las críticas más comunes. Así mismo, examinaré el sentido de la locución “conocimiento científico” con el fin de mostrar que no es aconsejable interpretarla según el sentido tradicional de la palabra “conocimiento”. Ofreceré razones para concluir que si el enunciado (A) y sus parientes se matizan correctamente, estaremos en una posición mejor para conseguir una representación funcional de la empresa de la ciencia. (shrink)

Resumen: ¿Puede el cine filosofar? ¿Puede la imagen en movimiento ser medio para que la filosofía opere en otra materia expresiva? Este artículo tiene como interés auscultar la capacidad de ciertos cines de hacer filosofía al interior de la gran pantalla. Por eso, se exponen las líneas teóricas que permiten la defensa de un cine filosófico capaz de ofrecer conceptos a través de la dimensión expresiva propia de las imágenes en movimiento. Dicho proceso tiene lugar al interior del trabajo poético (...) que el cine de autor ofrece y que, a razón de su distancia del tono general del cine clásico, supone una crítica a la metafísica en el territorio del séptimo arte. Se realiza el análisis de parte de la obra iniciática del director Wong Kar-Wai y su singular poética del des-encuentro. A razón de su trabajo al filo del cine moderno es posible evidenciar cómo el cine puede darnos qué pensar.: Is it possible for the cinema to philosophize? Can the moving image work as a means for philosophy to operate under a different expressive language? This article discusses the ability of certain cinemas to do philosophy on the big screen. It describes the theoretical approaches that argue for a philosophical cinema capable of offering concepts through the expressive dimension of moving images. This process takes place within the poetic work that an auteur’s cinema offers which, because of its distance from the general tone of classical cinema, implies a critique of metaphysics from within the territory of the seventh art. The article analyzes part of the early work of the director Wong Kar-Wai’s and his unique poetics of dis-encounter. Through his work on the margins of modern cinema, it is possible to show how the seventh art can offer us something to think about. (shrink)

Me complace presentar a la comunidad académica nacional e internacional el fascículo 29 de la revista Discusiones Filosóficas. Como seguramente es conocido por la mayor parte de los lectores, el sistema de indización de revistas colombiano está experimentando una radical transformación, cuyas consecuencias, entre otros aspectos, afectan notablemente el futuro de las ublicaciones científicas periódicas en el área de las humanidades y las ciencias sociales. En efecto, COLCIENCIAS, sin tomar en cuenta la opinión de los editores de revistas colombianos, ni (...) a de la mayor parte de las universidades del país ha decidido hacer de indicadores como los informes de ciertas bases de datos pagas (ISI Web of Science, Scopus) sobre la ubicación de una revista en sus distintos cuartiles, la principal razón para determinar su categoría. Aunque semejante proceder echa por la borda un trabajo sostenido de más de 20 años, COLCIENCIAS sigue haciendo oídos sordos a los planteamientos de los académicos. Debido a dicha contingencia, este podría ser el último número de la revista que aparece en la categoría A2, para alcanzar la cual trabajamos incansablemente durante todos estos años cumpliendo al pie de la letra los requisitos establecidos. Resulta aventurado predecir lo que pueda ocurrir con la inestable política de COLCIENCIAS y su efecto sobre las revistas colombianas, así como con el destino de nuestra publicación. Confiamos en que, finalmente, dicha entidad acceda a escuchar a los editores, autores, académicos e instituciones universitarias y logre concertar una política más acorde con las realidades del país y, sobre todo, más ajustada a las especificidades de las revistas dedicadas a la filosofía o las humanidades. (shrink)

Bienvenidos al fascículo 27 de la revista Discusiones Filosóficas. Resulta muy gratificante saludar a nuestros lectores y agradecer a nuestros colaboradores y corresponsales por el permanente apoyo que le dispensan a este proyecto editorial. Como ha venido ocurriendo durante los últimos años, en esta ocasión registramos con enorme complacencia la posición destacada que obtuvo nuestra revista en el ranking de revistas de filosofía colombianas y latinoamericanas que se hizo con base en las mediciones del grupo de investigación U-sapiens. Por supuesto, (...) debemos seguir mejorando nuestros estándares de gestión para mantener y, en lo posible, ascender más en esta clasificación. Estamos haciendo nuestros mayores esfuerzos para cumplir con la periodicidad y para atender oportunamente los requerimientos de nuestros autores y lectores, y los constantes cambios del sistema nacional de publicaciones periódicas. La entrega que tiene el lector en sus manos está compuesta por diez artículos y dos reseñas. Esperamos que, como ha ocurrido hasta ahora, aporten al progreso de las investigaciones y discusiones sobre filosofía en el país y en otras regiones del mundo donde ya contamos con seguidores. (shrink)

Bienvenidos a una nueva entrega de la revista Discusiones Filosóficas. En esta oportunidad presentamos con orgullo el fascículo 28 de nuestra publicación, para el cual hemos seleccionado nueve artículos de investigadores nacionales y extranjeros. De conformidad con los frecuentemente modificados estándares de calidad para las publicaciones periódicas, el cuerpo editorial de la revista se ha comprometido de lleno con el cumplimiento de la periodicidad y procurará que cada nueva entrega nos acerque paulatinamente no sólo a los plazos establecidos, sino a (...) las ondiciones que se van introduciendo. Sin embargo, es preciso registrar la preocupación que embarga a muchos editores colombianos por la constante modificación de las condiciones para obtener el reconocimiento e inclusión en la base hemerográfica de COLCIENCIAS. (shrink)

Por medio de estas líneas extendemos un caluroso saludo a todos nuestros lectores, así como a autores, revisores y a todas las demás personas que contribuyen a que la revista Discusiones Filosóficas se mantenga activa en la comunidad académica nacional e internacional. Las revistas de filosofía de nuestro país reciben cada vez más exigencias y presiones de diversa índole, motivadas en los modelos de medición y los dictados de la cienciometría concatenados con ideas absurdas sobre la naturaleza de la investigación (...) de calidad en el área y la manera correcta de compartir y hacer circular sus resultados. Pese a todos estos escollos, con esta entrega alcanzamos ya los cuarenta fascículos, un logro importante pues son muchas las dificultades que hemos tenido que sortear para llegar a esta meta después de más de dos décadas de existencia de la revista. Como es apenas natural, este es un logro que se debe acreditar a muchas personas, entre los cuales es preciso mencionar a los autores, los evaluadores (sin cuyo generoso y desinteresado trabajo no sería posible seleccionar los mejores artículos) y a los integrantes del equipo técnico editorial que siempre nos han apoyado. Para esta entrega, y luego de un largo y dispendioso proceso, hemos seleccionado ocho artículos de investigación y una reseña. (shrink)

El artículo presenta una propuesta para promover la comprensión de las nociones de posibilidad, necesidad y validez argumental. Por medio de un criterio psicológico, la propuesta busca que los estudiantes capten dichas nociones de forma intuitiva antes de comenzar a usar las pruebas formales de validez. Se muestra cómo puede adaptarse la propuesta en el uso de los diagramas de Venn y en la diagramación de algunas formas silogísticas que la teoría clásica del silogismo considera válidas pero que no aparecen (...) como formas válidas en la diagramación canónica que usa los diagramas de Venn. (shrink)

Whereas most branches of neuroscience are thought to provide mechanistic explanations, systems neuroscience is not. Two reasons are traditionally cited in support of this conclusion. First, systems neuroscientists rarely, if ever, rely on the dual strategies of decomposition and localization. Second, they typically emphasize organizational properties over the properties of individual components. In this paper, I argue that neither reason is conclusive: researchers might rely on alternative strategies for mechanism discovery, and focusing on organization is often appropriate and consistent with (...) the norms of mechanistic explanation. Thus, many explanations in systems neuroscience can also be viewed as mechanistic explanations. (shrink)

This paper considers the way mathematical and computational models are used in network neuroscience to deliver mechanistic explanations. Two case studies are considered: Recent work on klinotaxis by Caenorhabditis elegans, and a longstanding research effort on the network basis of schizophrenia in humans. These case studies illustrate the various ways in which network, simulation and dynamical models contribute to the aim of representing and understanding network mechanisms in the brain, and thus, of delivering mechanistic explanations. After outlining this mechanistic construal (...) of network neuroscience, two concerns are addressed. In response to the concern that functional network models are non-explanatory, it is argued that functional network models are in fact explanatory mechanism sketches. In response to the concern that models which emphasize a network’s organization over its composition do not explain mechanistically, it is argued that this emphasis is both appropriate and consistent with the principles of mechanistic explanation. What emerges is an improved understanding of the ways in which mathematical and computational models are deployed in network neuroscience, as well as an improved conception of mechanistic explanation in general. (shrink)

The book is a comprehensive introduction to the work of the Estonian-German biologist Jakob von Uexküll. After a first introductory chapter by Morten Tønnessen and a second chapter on Uexküll's life and philosophical background, it contains four chapters devoted to the analysis of his main works; they are followed by a vast eighth chapter which deals with the influence Uexküll had on other philosophers and scientists, and by a conclusions focused on the possibility of updating Uexküll's work. The monograph combines (...) a careful reconstruction of the historical context in which the Uexküllian concepts emerged (the debate between mechanism and vitalism, contemporary scientific studies) and a thorough analysis of the philosophical contents of the Uexküllian views. As far as the key issue is concerned, Uexküll's notion of Umwelt refers to the perceptive and operative world which surrounds animal species; it is a subjective species-specific construction which provides living organisms with great security and behaviour stability. Moreover, the relationship that the animal carries out with its environment proves to be a complex system of semiotic interactions: its behaviour is not a set of mechanical reactions, but the result of a spontaneous attribution of meaning to the outside world, whose environmental elements are actively interpreted by the subject. The environment of animal species becomes a field of meaning, an exceedingly complex subjective elaboration; this can lessen the distance between animals and men, crediting both with the cognitive ability to grasp meanings and to use signs. (shrink)

This article discusses the relation between empirical and normative approaches in bioethics. The issue of dwarf tossing, while admittedly unusual, is chosen as a point of departure because it challenges the reader to look with fresh eyes upon several central bioethical themes, including human dignity, autonomy, and the protection of vulnerable people. After an overview of current approaches to the integration of empirical and normative ethics, we consider five ways that the empirical and normative can be brought together to speak (...) to the problem of dwarf tossing: prescriptive applied ethics, theoretical ethics, critical applied ethics, particularist ethics and integrated empirical ethics. We defend a position of critical applied ethics that allows for a two-way relation between empirical and normative theories. Against efforts fully to integrate the normative and the empirical into one synthesis, we propose that the two should stand in tension and relation to one another. The approach we endorse acknowledges that a social practice can and should be judged both by the gathering of empirical data and by normative ethics. Critical applied ethics uses a five stage process that includes: (a) determination of the problem, (b) description of the problem, (c) empirical study of effects and alternatives, (d) normative weighing and (e) evaluation of the effects of a decision. In each stage, we explore the perspective from both the empirical (sociological) and the normative ethical point of view. We conclude by applying our five-stage critical applied ethics to the example of dwarf tossing. (shrink)

The so-called “intentional object” occupies a central position in the debates about intentionality in Brentano and the Brentano School. How does it relate to the correlate, the content, or the intended, possibly external, transcendent object? Does it perhaps even coincide with one of these? There was no clear consensus on this neither in Brentano’s time nor today. In order to develop a new perspective on the problem of the intentional object, I would like to introduce a deliberately radical interpretation and (...) related terminological change: what if we were to avoid any talk of “object” in this context altogether? Perhaps this could help avoid the ambiguities and misunderstandings associated with talk of “intentional objects.” In my contribution I would like to sketch such an interpretation and consider whether this attempt could be useful to reframe the debate. (shrink)