This paper explores what is apparently a non-topic for Luhmann. Luhmann is preoccupied with decision-making rather than with judgment. The paper argues that Luhmann, attempting to find a way out of the dilemma between the fundamentalism of positivistic legal theory and the relativism of anti-foundationalist post-modern thinking, presents the epistemological–ethical doublet of a “self-binding” of the law. In this bootstrapping manoeuvre decision plays the central part. The paper begins by examining judgment in its relation to decision as considered by non-system-theoretical (...) thinking. Against that background it unfolds the distinction between distinction, form and decision in systems theory and in the system-theoretical observation of the law. The article then discusses Luhmann’s description of the functioning of decision(-making) within the legal system. The hypothesis is that Luhmann blends here cognitive with ethical aspects. Finally, the article addresses Luhmann’s polemics against alternative approaches to his own. The suggestion is that ‘judgment’, in Luhmann’s systems theory, re-enters by the back door as an ethical–theoretical imperative that commands theory’s responsibility for society and law. (shrink)

The analysis of genetic and epigenetic mechanisms of the genotype–phenotypic connection has, so far, only been possible in a handful of genetic model systems. Recent technological advances, including next‐generation sequencing methods such as RNA‐seq, ChIP‐seq and RAD‐seq, and genome‐editing approaches including CRISPR‐Cas, now permit to address these fundamental questions of biology also in organisms that have been studied in their natural habitats. We provide an overview of the benefits and drawbacks of these novel techniques and experimental approaches that can now (...) be applied to ecological and evolutionary vertebrate models such as sticklebacks and cichlid fish. We can anticipate that these new methods will increase the understanding of the genetic and epigenetic factors influencing adaptations and phenotypic variation in ecological settings. These new arrows in the methodological quiver of ecologist will drastically increase the understanding of the genetic basis of adaptive traits – leading to a further closing of the genotype–phenotype gap. -/- . (shrink)

This paper examines the role of performance in law and music as a structural means of their self-programming construction. Music and law are considered as parallel social practices or performative doings. The paper begins with a critical analysis of the special aesthetical features of present-day juridical practice as exemplified by legal trial and legal expertise. Drawing upon reflections on the modern discourse on aesthetics and art, the article then examines in greater detail the specific traits of performance in law and (...) jazz music. Performative processes move from representation to presentation, from a preoccupation with rules and controlling to induced self-programming. Both law and jazz regard the unknown future as a resource for present decisions by “inventing” new possibilities; both require, expand and promote a responsibility that does not follow from statutes nor can be expressed in a code of ethics. Finally, the article addresses the performance situation in jazz. Jazz being polyphonic and improvisational by nature, improvisation makes explicit tradition by staging the context dependency of its performance. It is mediated by the knowledge, the operational history and the communication of the participants. Jazz is an exercise in the possibilities of an “aesthetics of imperfection” which can open up new ways of seeing law and politics. (shrink)

In this paper, I propose to use Johan Galtung’s notion of structural violence as aguide for linking society’s problems of processing social meaning to the very idea of law. At the heart of my interest is the discrepancy Galtung sees between real and possible social conditions. I will first focus on the specific character of violence as communication. I will then consider the consequences of the heterogeneity of the languages that law speaks. Law and everyday practice not only refer to (...) actions in different ways, but also constitute different actions through their references. Law thus acquires a double validity: an internal one, based on the consistency of its discourse, and an external one, derived from successful translations of practical certainties. While the former defies the assumption that law can be somehow resonant, the latter paves the way for a critical understanding of law. The final section argues that if practical reason aims to create just conditions, and law is meant to sustain life, its purpose cannot be the mere optimisation of the given. Law must address the totality of possible transformations, exploring contained but not yet realised models. (shrink)

Strategic games require reasoning about other people’s and one’s own beliefs or intentions. Although they have clear commonalities with psychological tests of theory of mind, they are not clearly related to theory of mind tests for children between 9 and 10 years of age “Flobbe et al. J Logic Language Inform 17(4):417–442 (2008)”. We studied children’s (5–12 years of age) individual differences in how they played a strategic game by analyzing the strategies that they applied in a zero, first, and (...) second-order reasoning task. For the zero-order task, we found two subgroups with different accuracy levels. For the first-order task, subgroups of children applied different suboptimal strategies or an optimal strategy. For the second-order task only suboptimal strategies were present. Strategy use for all tasks was related to age. The 5- and 6-year old children were additionally tested on theory of mind understanding and executive functioning. Strategy-use in these children was related to working memory, but not to theory of mind after correction for age, verbal ability and general IQ. (shrink)

This year marks the 30th anniversary of the publication of Niklas Luhmann’s (1927–1998) magnum opus Soziale Systeme. Grundriss einer allgemeinen Theorie [14]. On the occasion, this Special Issue of the International Journal for the Semiotics of Law celebrates the contribution of Luhmann’s thinking to our understanding of law, justice, and society.Luhmann’s work is wide open for argument. Some consider it the grand unified theory able to completely grasp social reality. Others see nothing but a substantially void conglomeration of analytical constructs (...) and “behaviouristic” descriptions joined together with “pseudo-empirism” [24, pp. 310, 313] or a hermetic ensemble of “self-mystifying semantics” [7, p. 76] supported by sophisticated strategies of pure self-apology. It might seem that the “giant” [1] theorist of the social has encouraged such impressions with pretensions which were “grandiose” in more than one respect [9, 23]. Indeed, readers who encounter systems theory for the first ti. (shrink)

Bermúdez's case for rational framing effects, while original, is unconvincing and gives only parenthetical treatment to the problematic assumptions of extensional and semantic equivalence of alternative frames in framing experiments. If the assumptions are false, which they sometimes are, no valid inferences about “framing effects” follow and, then, neither do inferences about human rationality. This commentary recaps the central problem.

Abstractabstract:Expectations about future events underlie practically every decision we make, including those in medical research. This paper reviews five studies undertaken to assess how well medical experts could predict the outcomes of clinical trials. It explains why expert trial forecasting was the focus of study and argues that forecasting skill affords insights into the quality of expert judgment and might be harnessed to improve decision-making in care, policy, and research. The paper also addresses potential criticisms of the research agenda and (...) summarizes key findings from the five studies of trial forecasting. Together, the studies suggest that trials frequently deliver surprising results to expert communities and that individual experts are often uninformative when it comes to forecasting trial outcome and recruitment. However, the findings also suggest that expert forecasts often contain a "signal" about whether a trial will be positive, especially when forecasts are aggregated. The paper concludes with needs for further research and tentative policy recommendations. (shrink)

The significance of counterfactual thinking in the causal judgement process has been emphasized for nearly two decades, yet no previous research has directly compared the relative effect of thinking counterfactually versus factually on causal judgement. Three experiments examined this comparison by manipulating the task frame used to focus participants' thinking about a target event. Prior to making judgements about causality, preventability, blame, and control, participants were directed to think about a target actor either in counterfactual terms (what the actor could (...) have done to change the outcome) or in factual terms (what the actor had done that led to the outcome). In each experiment, the effect of counterfactual thinking did not differ reliably from the effect of factual thinking on causal judgement. Implications for research on causal judgement and mental representation are discussed. (shrink)

Research suggests political identity has strong influence over individuals’ attitudes and beliefs, which in turn can affect their behavior. Likewise, firsthand experience with an issue can also affect attitudes and beliefs. A large survey of Americans was analyzed to investigate the effects of both political identity and personal impact on individuals’ reactions to the COVID-19 pandemic. Results show that political identity and personal impact influenced the American public’s attitudes about and response to COVID-19. Consistent with prior research, political identity exerted (...) a strong influence on self-reports of emotional distress, threat perception, discomfort with exposure, support for restrictions, and perception of under/overreaction by individuals and institutions. The difference between Democrats and Republican responses were consistent with their normative value differences and with the contemporary partisan messaging. Personal impact exerted a comparatively weaker influence on reported emotional distress and threat perception. Both factors had a weak influence on appraisal of individual and government responses. The dominating influence of political identity carried over into the bivariate relations among these self-reported attitudes and responses. In particular, the appraisal of government response divided along party lines, tied to opposing views of whether there has been over- or under-reaction to the pandemic. The dominance of political identity has important implications for crisis management and reflects the influence of normative value differences between the parties, partisan messaging on the pandemic, and polarization in American politics. (shrink)

»Fichte legt alles Gewicht auf den Weg und die Begründung und nicht auf das, was schon ist, als solches, d.h. auf die darin beschlossene Grundfrage, was das ist -- das endliche Ich, das schon ist --, und wie es denn schon ist. Fichte gibt -- und das ist der Grundzug der Metaphysik als Wissenschaftslehre -- der Gewißheit den Vorzug vor der Wahrheit.«.

»Fichte legt alles Gewicht auf den Weg und die Begründung und nicht auf das, was schon ist, als solches, d.h. auf die darin beschlossene Grundfrage, was das ist -- das endliche Ich, das schon ist --, und wie es denn schon ist. Fichte gibt -- und das ist der Grundzug der Metaphysik als Wissenschaftslehre -- der Gewißheit den Vorzug vor der Wahrheit.«.

This article surveys the latest research on risky-choice framing effects, focusing on the implications for rational decision-making. An influential program of psychological research suggests that people's judgements and decisions depend on the way in which information is presented, or ‘framed’. In a central choice paradigm, decision-makers seem to adopt different preferences, and different attitudes to risk, depending on whether the options specify the number of people who will be saved or the corresponding number who will die. It is standardly assumed (...) that such responses violate a foundational tenet of rational decision-making, known as the principle of description invariance. We discuss recent theoretical and empirical research that challenges the dominant ‘irrationalist’ narrative. These approaches typically pay close attention to how decision-makers represent decision problems (including their interpretation of numerical quantifiers or predicate choice) and they highlight the need for a more robust characterization of the description invariance principle. We conclude by indicating avenues for future research that could bring us closer to a complete—and potentially rationalizing—explanation of framing effects. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThe financial crisis of 2008 was unforeseen partly because the academic theories that underpin policy making do not sufficiently account for uncertainty and complexity or learned and evolved human capabilities for managing them. Mainstream theories of decision making tend to be strongly normative and based on wishfully unrealistic “idealized” modeling. In order to develop theories of actual decision making under uncertainty, we need new methodologies that account for how human actors often manage uncertain situations “well enough.” Some possibly helpful methodologies, (...) drawing on digital science, focus on the role of emotions in determining people's choices; others examine how people construct narratives that enable them to act; still others combine qualitative with quantitative data. (shrink)