This paper discusses the negative theology, based on the mystical discourse, as an alternative approach to the rational and positivist thought of the classical theology. Through the understanding and attempt to talk of God without the concept of being , the possibility of remaining in the theology domain will be analyzed here, but being guided rather by the search and love instead of the intellect’s descriptive interest, as it happens in mystical thought. The distinction between the positive theology and (...) the negative theology is presented in this argument as a path for thinking through and understanding God, by means of replacing the concept of being with the ideal Good, which awakens in the theologian a desire for union with the object. Love, in its appetitive meaning, becomes the adequate path for searching and meeting God, with no need for removing Him from His original condition. Therefore, the negative theology possibility reaches the extremely high level of mystique and contemplation. Keywords: God. Being. Theology. Mystique. Love. Resumo Este artigo discute a teologia negativa, sustentada sobre o discurso místico, como uma abordagem alternativa ao pensamento racional e positivista da teologia clássica. A partir da compreensão e da tentativa de falar sobre Deus sem o conceito de ser , será analisada, aqui, a possibilidade de continuar no domínio da teologia, mas se orientando mais pela busca e pelo amor e menos pelo interesse descritivo do intelecto, como acontece no pensamento místico. A distinção entre teologia positiva e teologia negativa é apresentada nesse argumento como caminho para reflexão e compreensão de Deus, a partir da substituição do conceito de ser pelo Bem ideal, que desperta no teólogo um desejo de união com o objeto. O amor, em sua acepção apetitiva, torna-se o caminho adequado para a busca e o encontro de Deus, sem a necessidade de retirá-lo de sua condição original. Desse modo, a possibilidade da teologia negativa alcança o elevadíssimo nível da mística e da contemplação. Palavras-chave : Deus. Ser. Teologia. Mística. Amor. (shrink)

A novidade do Deus cristão apresentado por Jesus Cristo é a Trindade. Sem contradizer o monoteísmo judeu, a reflexão para formulação dogmática se estendeu por quatro séculos. Sucessivamente, a Trindade foi tema esquecido na Igreja por 1.600 anos. Sua importância está sendo redescoberta não somente na liturgia, mas, também, na vida e na reflexão eclesial. A unidade no amor dos Três distintos, Pai, Filho e Espírito Santo, estimula a espiritualidade e a vivência do cristão de hoje. Para tanto, é necessário (...) o auxílio das ciências humanas, que permitem a atualização da linguagem do dogma sem a perda do seu conteúdo fundamental. A reflexão do teólogo napolitano Bruno Forte dá uma grande contribuição para a teologia atual, respeitando a formulação dogmática e, ao mesmo tempo, buscando categorias e linguagens apropriadas para a compreensão do homem contemporâneo. A Trindade de Deus tem algo importante a dizer para o ser humano de hoje a respeito de si mesmo, pois que feito “à imagem e semelhança de Deus” (Gn 2, 26). Palavras-chave : Trindade. Pai. Filho. Espírito Santo. Amor.The Holy Trinity is the novelty of God presented by Jesus Christ. Without contradicting Jewish monotheism, the reflection for a dogmatic formulation lasted for four centuries. Subsequently, the issue of the trinity was forgotten in the Church for 1,600 years. The importance of this issue is currently being rediscovered not only in the liturgy but also in life and ecclesial reflection. The unity in love on the part of the three distinct persons, Father, Son and Holy Spirit, stimulates spirituality and experience of the Christians today. To do so, one needs the assistance of the humanities that allow the update of the dogma of language without losing its essential content. The reflection of the Neapolitan theologian Bruno Forte is of great value to the current theology because it respects the dogmatic formulation and also uses categories and languages appropriate to an understanding of contemporary man. The Trinity of God has something important to say about the man himself because man was created as God’s image. (Gn 2,26). Keywords : Trinity. Father. Son. Holy Spirit. Love. (shrink)

O ponto de partida do presente artigo consiste na afirmação de que as religiões originárias do Próximo Oriente - Judaísmo, Cristianismo, e Islamismo - contêm em si mesmas inconsistências práticas e teóricas. Mais ainda, o autor afirma que estas religiões estão em contradição umas com as outras no que diz respeito a aspectos teológicos essenciais, para além de que entre elas existe um passado de guerra e de conflito. Ora estas são precisamente as razões pelas quais o autor considera que (...) a credibilidade epistemológica e moral destas religiões foi dramaticamente afectada. Daí o principal objectivo do artigo: contribuir para o esclarecimento do modo como Filosofia e Teologia podem cooperar entre si em ordem a uma mitigação destas deficiências. Nesse sentido, segundo o autor, uma e outra devem abraçar a possibilidade de demonstrar epistemologicamente que os conteúdos da revelação do ponto de vista da razão não são nem demonstráveis nem refutáveis, pois esses conteúdos não são proposições científicas acerca de eventos e processos interiores ao mundo, mas apenas a expressão de uma atitude religiosa em relação ao mundo no seu todo (e em relação a Deus). Nessa medida, diz o autor, nada justifica que atitudes religiosas de fé e de amor sejam caracterizadas como 'irracionais', antes a elas se devendo aplicar a designação de 'a-racional' ou simplesmente de 'transracional. Mais ainda, a Filosofia e a Teologia estão em posição de mostrar de que modo atitudes religiosas fundamentais estão construídas umas sobre as outras. Com efeito, básica em todas as formas de religião é uma atitude em relação ao mundo considerado como um todo, tal como se pode encontrar, por exemplo, no Taoismo ou no Zen-Budismo, de modo que aqui não se encontra qualquer forma de crença numa divindade transcendente; ora é precisamente esta atitude que o autor do artigo designa por 'Religiosidade A'. Como 'Religiosidade B', por outro lado, designa o autor toda a atitude religiosa de fundo que transcende o mundo presente e nos remete para a existência de um Deus único e da sua Revelação, tal como é o caso com o Judaísmo, o Cristianismo, e o Islamismo. Aqui, a tarefa consiste sobretudo em clarificar de forma lógica e conceptual a possibilidade de uma auto-revelação divina bem como da sua aceitabilidade nos termos de uma crença humanamente constituída. Finalmente, o artigo refere também aquela que o autor considera ser a 'Religiosidade C', expressão esta que simplesmente denota aquela atitude em que, com base nas premissas presentes nas formas A e B de religiosidade, somos especificamente remetidos para á Revelação cristã, ou seja, para a experiência nos termos da qual se professa a encarnação de Deus em Jesus de Nazaré e se afirma a sua condição de ser expressão do amor incondicional de Deus para com todos os seres humanos. Na verdade, a natureza incondicional deste amor apresenta-se como um escândalo moral diante da auto-compreensão ética da humanidade. Consequentemente, a incompreensibiliâade deste amor não pode ser senão objecto da revelação divina e da pura fé, únicos modos possíveis de ele se transformar numa possível justificação 'moral' dos seres humanos. /// Starting-point of this article is the fact that the religions originated from the Near East - Judaism, Christianity, and Islam - do contain in themselves theoretical and practical inconsistencies. Moreover, they contradict each other in essential theological regards, and they made war upon each other in the past. For these reasons, their epistemological and moral credibility has been dramatically diminished. In this context, the article aims at showing how philosophy and theology might be able to work together in alleviating these deficits. First, they may demonstrate epistemologically that the contents of revelation are neither rationally demonstrable nor refutable because they are not scientific statements upon events and processes within the world but the expression of a religious attitude towards the world as a whole (and towards God). Therefore, such attitudes as religious faith and love shouldn't be designated 'irrational', but rather as arational' or, 'transrational'. Furthermore, philosophy and theology are able to show in what manner fundamental religious attitudes are built upon another: Basic for all higher forms of religion is an attitude towards the world as a whole – as one can find for instance in Daoism or Zen-Buddhism – where there is not yet any belief in a transcendent deity; that attitude is called 'Religiosity A'. So called 'Religiosity B' is a fundamental attitude which transcends this world and refers to a sole God and his revelation as can be found among Jews, Christians, and Muslims. Here, the possibility of divine self-revelation and of its acceptability by human faith has to be clarified logically and conceptually. Finally, 'Religiosity C denotes that attitude which, on the premises of those Religiosities A and B, refers to the specifically Christian revelation which confesses the incarnation of God in Jesus and presents him as the expression of God's unconditional love to all human beings. The unconditionality of this love seems to be a moral scandal to human moral understanding. Therefore, this unconceivable love has to be object of divine revelation and of pure faith so that it might be the basis of all possible 'moral' justification of humankind. (shrink)

Partimos da afirmação de K.-O. Apel, repetida por João Maria André, de que "[...] é na ‘mística' do ‘logos' e na teologia negativa do Pseudo-Dionísio que, de modo determinante, Nicolau de Cusa irá beber os traços fundamentais da sua filosofia da linguagem". Com base no De filiatione Dei propomo-nos refletir sobre a relação fundamental e constitutiva entre o verbo mental humano e o Verbo ou Logos eterno. A importância desse texto, no âmbito do problema da linguagem em Nicolau de Cusa, (...) é reconhecida por Casarella justamente por sua inflexão cristológica em relação aos primeiros sermões, pois, em oposição à reflexão intratrinitária dos sermões, a imagem humanamente visível de Cristo torna-se o espelho da linguagem, ou seja, em Cristo, vemos de modo perfeito o que pode ser expresso por meio da linguagem. O texto cusano é uma meditação sobre Jo, I, 12: "Mas a todos que o receberam deu o poder de se tornarem filhos de Deus: aos que creem em seu nome". Interessa-nos principalmente a meditação sobre os exemplos aduzidos por Nicolau de Cusa para explicitar de que modo colhemos a unidade divina intelectualmente, pois serão nesses exemplos ou enigmas que o autor pensará a relação constitutiva entre o verbo mental humano e o verbo mental inefável. We begin with the statement of K.-O. Apel, repeated by João Maria André, that "[…] it is in the ‘mystic' of the ‘logos' and in the negative theology of pseudo-Dionysus that, in a determinate manner, Cusa would receive the fundamental features of his philosophy of language". Based on De filiatione Dei, we reflect on the fundamental and constitutive relationship between the mental human word and the eternal Word or Logos. The importance of this text in the context of the problem of language in Cusa is recognized by Casarella, specifically for its Christological inflection in relation to Cusa's first sermons. In opposition to the intra-Trinitarian reflection of the sermons, in De filiatione Dei the humanly visible image of Christ becomes the mirror of language; that is, it is in Christ that we see the perfect mode that can be expressed by means of language. Cusa's text is a meditation on John 1:12: "But as many as received him, to them gave he power to become the sons of God, even to them that believe on his name". Of principal interest to us are the examples adduced by Cusa that make explicit the way in which we intellectually receive the divine unity, as it is in these examples or enigmas that the author reflects on the constitutive relation between the mental human word and the ineffable mental word. (shrink)

A linguagem apofática é um gênero discursivo estreitamente relacionado à Teologia Negativa, cuja formulação mais acabada se encontra na obra do Pseudo-Dionísio (séc. V), místico que funda uma tradição negativa que se perpetuará durante toda a Idade Média e Moderna. Na contemporaneidade diversos autores (DERRIDA, 1995 e 1997; FRANKE, 2007; PONDÉ, 2003; VEGA, 2004 e 2009 e outros) têm destacado a retomada desse gênero discursivo nas artes, na literatura e nas ciências humanas de forma geral. A linguagem apofática é, portanto, (...) um discurso que visa à própria transcendência e se orienta para a denúncia de um vazio intrínseco à linguagem e ao mundo que dela se origina, de tal modo que o Deus que aí comparece desliza sob nossa linguagem sem se deixar prender em nossas teias discursivas. No presente texto a impossibilidade do nome de Deus torna-se metáfora para se refletir, a partir do exemplo da mística de Angelus Silesius, sobre as possibilidades de um pensamento negativo cujos fundamentos sejam o esvaziamento da linguagem, que se vê despojada de sua capacidade de dizer o mundo, e o aprendizado do não-saber. Palavras-chaves: Linguagem apofática; Linguagem; Angelus Silesius; não-saber.Apophatic language is a genre closely related to negative theology, whose the most accomplished formulation is found in the Pseudo-Dionysius work (fifth century), who founded a mystical tradition that perpetuated throughout the Middle and Modern Ages. Several authors in contemporary such as Derrida (1995 and 1997), (Franke, 2007), (Pounde, 2003), (Vega, 2004 and 2009), and others, have highlighted the resumption of that genre in the Arts, Literature and the Humanities in general. Apophatic is, thus, a discourse that seeks transcendence, and it orients itself to denounce the emptiness intrinsic to language as well as to world, so that the God that there appears slips under our language without being caught in our discursive webs. In this text the impossibility of God's name becomes a metaphor to reflect, from the example of the mystique of Silesius Angelus, on the possibility of a negative thought whose foundations are the emptiness of the language, which finds itself stripped of its ability to tell the world, and from the learning of the not-knowing. Keywords: Apophatic language; Failure of language; Angelus Silesius; not-to knowing. (shrink)

For over twenty years, Richard Kearney has insisted that theology must not follow traditional metaphysical itineraries along paths that offer perspectives on God as Being Itself, or as Pure Act, or as causa sui. Instead, it should chart avenues that lead through the poetics of imagination, past the synthesizing dynamics of narrative, and toward the destination of God as a God that privileges potentiality over actuality. In constant dialogue with deconstructive and postmodern theories, Kearney has developed an "onto-eschatological hermeneutics" of (...) the "God Who May Be" that presents a post--metaphysical, perhaps even more biblical, interpretation of God as divine possibility. This paper investigates Kearney's "onto-eschatological" poetics of God as it relates to his imaginative theological method and to the Pauline notion of kenosis as the risk of divine love. It concludes by associating Kearney's theopoetics with Kierkegaard's idea of repetition as a cipher for understanding the kinetics of the God Who May be as an alternative to the traditional metaphysical structures of God as a static "I Am Who I Am." /// Desde há mais de vinte anos que Richard Kearney vem insistindo em que a teologia deveria deixar de seguir os itinerdrios metafísicos tradicionais, ou seja, deveria deixar para trás os caminhos metafísicos que oferecem perspectivas sobre Deus enquanto Ser-mesmo, Acto Puro, ou causa sui. Em vez disso, a teologia deveria antes seguir caminhos orientados por uma poética da imaginação, para além da dinâmica sintetizadora da narrativa e em direcção a uma noção de Deus que privilegia a potencialidade sobre a actualidade. Num diálogo constante com as teorias desconstructoras e pós-modernas, Richard Kearney desenvolveu uma "hermenêutica ôntico-escatológica" do "Deus que pode ser", hermenêutica essa que nos oferece uma interpretação pós-metafísica, talvez mesmo mais bíblica, de Deus como divina possibilidade. O presente artigo investiga a poética "ontico-escatológica" de Deus em Richard Kearney, ou seja, o modo como ela se relaciona quer com o seu imaginativo metodo teológico quer com a noção paulina de kenose enquanto risco do amor divino. O artigo conclui com o estabelecimento de uma relação de proximidade entre a teopoética de Richard Kearney e a ideia kierkegaardiana de repetição enquanto cifra, relação essa que nos permite compreender o movimento próprio do "Deus que Pode Ser" enquanto alternativa às estruturas metafísicas tradicionais e o modo como estas perspectivam Deus a partir do estático "Eu Sou Quern Sou". (shrink)

Resumo O presente artigo se encontra na interface entre literatura e religião e trata-se de um estudo da linguagem presente na obra de João da Cruz intitulada “Chama viva de amor”, utilizando-se, para tal, de alguns recursos da crítica literária. Esta obra teve a redação de seu poema realizada entre os anos de 1582-1584 e de seus comentários nos anos de 1585/86 (primeira redação) e 1591 (segunda redação). É um texto que, tanto em sua dimensão poética quanto em sua prosa, (...) retrata algumas das especificidades da forma do místico trabalhar com a linguagem ao tentar traduzir sua experiência “inefável”: ou seja, desconstrói e a reconstrói para que seja capaz de comunicar algo do vivido. Com vistas a atingir este objetivo, após uma breve introdução à vida e a obra joãocruciana, abordar-se-á brevemente a estrutura e as principais temáticas presentes na obra supracitada. A seguir, apresentar-se-á alguns dos recursos lingüísticos utilizados por João da Cruz, tais como o uso de paradoxos, antíteses e antônimos com freqüência, neologismos e arcaísmos, ressignificações de conceitos, aproveitamento da polissemia de muitos vocábulos, a forte presença de metáforas e símbolos e uma forma particular de lidar com os registros espaço-temporais e a lógica racional. Palavras-chave : João da Cruz, teologia negativa, mística, linguagem mística.The present article is placed in the isthmus of Literature and Religion, and consists of a study of the language that is present in the work of João da Cruz entitled “Chama viva de amor” (Living flame of love) , using, for such purpose, some of the Literary Criticism’s resources. This work had its poem written between 1582-1584, and its comments, in 1585/86 (first writing) and 1591 (second writing). It is a text that, as much as in its poetics dimension as in its prose, pictures some of the mystic’s method of working with the language when trying to communicate their ineffable experience: that is, deconstruct it and reconstruct it so that it can communicate something from the experienced. Aiming at that purpose, after a brief introduction to the life and work of João da Cruz, the study will approach the structure and the main themes present in the aforementioned work. Furthermore, some of the linguistics resources used by João da Cruz will be presented, such as neologisms and archaisms, concepts resignification, the use of polysemy of many words, the strong presence of metaphors and symbols, and a special way of working the spatial-temporal accounts and the rational logics. Key words: John of the Cross, negative theology, mysticism, mystical language. (shrink)

This paper poses the question “Why did Augustine not use his Trinitarian theology to better effect in the Pelagian controversy?” I demonstrate first that Augustine’s mature Trinitarian theology would be directly relevant to the Pelagian discussions after the year 415. Second, I show a slight progression in Augustine’s treatment of relevant issues from 418 through the end of his life in his anti-Pelagian corpus. I argue that Augustine does not use his Trinitarian theology to his full advantage in the anti-Pelagian (...) corpus. I suggest that Augustine avoided these connections at least in parí because the Trinitarian reflections on “God is love” (I Jn 4) would ultimately push the anti-Pelagian reflections on God’s love for Jacob (Rom 9:13) towards universalism, but Augustine had already rejected universalism. (shrink)

O artigo se confronta com a problemática da relação entre teologia e ciências sociais. Sua pretensão é formular adequadamente os termos dessa relação, explicitando a importância, a função e o lugar das ciências sociais na elaboração do discurso teológico e no produto teológico. Começa apresentando o debate sobre a relação entre teologia e ciências sociais na América Latina nas últimas décadas através de seus principais interlocutores: Gustavo Gutiérrez e Clodovis Boff; Juan Luis Segundo e Ignácio Ellacuría. E conclui, esboçando, de (...) modo sistemático, ainda que em forma de tese, a estrutura teórica fundamental dessa relação. Ela tem a ver com o conhecimento da realidade na qual se vive a fé e que deve ser pensada teologicamente; com a dimensão social do reinado de Deus, assunto da teologia cristã; com o caráter social da teologia, enquanto teoria; e com a suspeita ideológica e o processe de des-ideologização e libertação da teologia. Palavras-chave: Social. Teologia. Ciências sociais. Mediação.This article presents the issue of the relationship between theology and the social sciences. For this purpose, the author seeks to formulate the terms of the relationship of these two areas of Knowledge, highlighting the importance, the role and the place of the social sciences in the development of the theological discourse and of the theological product. At the beginning of the text the author presents a discussion on the relationship between theology and the social sciences in Latin America in recent decades through its main representatives: Gustavo Gutierrez and Clodovis Boff, Juan Luis Segundo and Ignacio Ellacuria. The paper also presents a systematic outline of the fundamental theoretical framework of the relationship between theology and the social sciences, showing that this relationship binds to the knowledge of the reality in which faith is placed. In conclusion, the texts highlights that faith must be considered theologically on three levels: with the social dimension of the Kingdom of God, which is an issue of Christian Theology; with the social character of theology as a theory; with the ideological suspicion and with the process of liberation of theology. Key-words : Social. Theology. Social Sciences. Mediation. (shrink)

The author discusses St. Bernard of Clairvaux’s understanding of paradisus claustralis—the monastic life of union with the Divine Will. Specifically, he tries to answer the question whether divine love can be taught according to the method proposed by St. Bernard. He makes his way through a whole thicket of artificial obstacles erected around it in order to show the whole positive contribution of history to the understanding of St. Bernard’s mystical theology.

Reconciliação Divina, Humana e Planetária: o desafio do amor divino diante da crise existencial humana e ecológica (Divine, Human and Planetary reconciliation: the challenge of divine love against the human and ecological existential crisis) Pretende-se, num primeiro momento, fazer um estudo sobre o modelo salvífico da reconciliação, apresentando (1) as causas do afastamento humano, (2) a barreira do pecado, (3) a obra de Deus em Cristo, bem como (3) sua manifestação de amor. Num segundo momento, abordar-se-á a respeito do (...) a specto subjetivo da reconciliação, isto é, a re-ação cristã ao modelo. Num terceiro momento discorrer-se-á a respeito da nova relação de igualdade que o ser humano pode experimentar. Três aspectos importantes serão abordados com relação a esta nova relação proposta por Deus: (1) a Reconciliação com Deus, (2) a Reconciliação humana e (3) a Reconciliação em dimensões cósmicas/planetárias, onde toda natureza está em sintonia com Deus e a humanidade . A intenção do artigo é apresentar o amor divino como solução capaz de validar esta relação reconciliatória divina; ação esta que através da entrega de Cristo é estendida ao ser humano uma nova forma de vincular-se a Deus e de mudar o mundo no qual habita. Este amor entregue dá-se de forma incondicional a todos que, animados pela boa nova da reconciliação, aceitam sua mensagem eficaz e dispõem-se a construir um mundo melhor, sempre movidos pela entrega primeira de Cristo. Palavras-chave: reconciliação; amor divino; salvação; meio ambiente.At first, it is intended to do a study about this reconciliatory theology, stating (1) the reasons for the human separation, (2) the barrier of sin, (3) the work of God in Christ, as well as (4) his expression of love. A second time, it will raise about the subjective aspect of reconciliation, ie the christian re-action to the model. A third time will be about the new relationship of equality that the human being can experience. Three important issues will be spoken concerning to this new relationship proposed by God: (1) the reconciliation with God, (2) the human reconciliation and (3) the cosmic/planetary reconciliation, where all nature is in harmony with God and humanity. The article’s intention is to present the divine love as a solution able to validate this divine and reconciliatory relationship; an action that inaugurated by death of Christ on the cross, becomes real and effective for all mankind. This love delivered, which is offered indiscriminately, happens unconditionally to all that, excited by the good news of reconciliation, accept your effective message and is willing to construct a better world, always moved by the delivery of Christ. Keywords: reconciliation; divine love; salvation; environment. (shrink)

Propósito deste ensaio é apresentar uma nova abordagem ao velho problema que é o acesso filosófico ao Deus cristão. Isto acontece dentro do esquema de uma nova metafísica cujo ponto de partida é a capacidade que a mente tem de percepcionar a totalidade do ser, facto este que o artigo apresenta como sendo justamente uma estrutura central do intelecto. Dado que as distinções entre intelecto e mundo, conceitos e realidade, sujeito e objecto, etc., já pressupõem a totalidade do ser dada (...) perceptivamente e nela está baseada, esta totalidade, assim concebida, torna-se mais fundamental que todas aquelas famosas distinções. A tarefa dessa nova metafísica aqui em questão consiste em explicitar uma explicação desta totalidade. No presente artigo, esta explicação é desenvolvida apenas numa direcção, a saber, a explicação no sentido de como proceder da totalidade do ser para o Deus cristão. Neste sentido, uma distinção fundamental é feita entre "o Absoluto" e "Deus ". A filosofia tradicional acreditou frequentemente que a filosofia só poderia explicitar a "determinação" do absoluto como criador do universo finito. O autor do artigo visa justamente demonstrar que outras determinações do Absoluto podem ser filosoficamente alcançadas; mas isto pressupõe que a história da liberdade do Absoluto seja radicalmente tomada em consideração. Ora isto, por sua vez, significa que a história e interpretação da religião - especialmente da religião segundo a tradição judaico-cristã - tem de ser vista como um tópico filosófico verdadeiramente central. Assim compreendido, o Absoluto é apropriadamente designado por "Deus ". Segue-se que uma das consequências desta abordagem é a de que uma vincada distinção entre filosofia tradicional e teologia tradicional cristã deve ser abandonada. /// The purpose of this essay is to present a new approach to the old problem of philosophical access to the Christian God. This is done within the frame of a new metaphysics whose starting point is the mind's perception of the totality of being which is shown to be a central structural feature of the mind as such. Since the distinctions between mind and world, concepts and reality, subject and object, and the like, already presuppose the perceptually given totality of being and are based on it, this totality, so concei-ved, is more fundamental than all those famous distinctions. The task of the envisaged new metaphysics consists in working out an explication of this totality. In this paper this explication is developed only in one direction: the explication in the sense of how to proceed from the totality of being to the Christian God. To this effect, a fundamental distinction is made between "the Absolute" and " God". Traditional philosophy had constantly believed that philosophy could only work out the "determination "of the Absolute as the creator of the finite universe. The paper endeavours to demonstrate that further determinations of the Absolute can be philosophically reached; but this presupposes that the history of the freedom of the Absolute is radically taken into account. And this, in turn, amounts to the claim that the history and interpretation of religion - most especially according to the Judaic-Christian tradition -must be seen as a central philosophical topic. Thus understood, the Absolute is appropriately called " God". One of the consequences of this approach is that the sharp distinction between traditional philosophy and traditional Christian theology should be abandoned. (shrink)

O projeto de parentalidade e suas consequências na existência do ser humano. Uma reflexão a partir da perspectiva religiosa (The parenting project and its consequences in human being’s existence. A consideration from the religious view) - DOI: 10.5752/P.2175-5841.2013v11n31p1059 Gerar um filho é gerar uma vida. No processo geracional estão embutidas várias implicações e consequências tanto para quem gera, quanto para quem é gerado. Para o casal, o nascimento de um filho é o fruto inquestionável de sua união. Entretanto, também deve (...) ser fruto da vontade, do cuidado e do amor desse casal. Um ser humano que se sente amado e querido por seus pais será o reflexo de uma existência radicada no amor e por isso, uma presença amorosa. Deste modo, o estudo a respeito do projeto de parentalidade tem como proposta colaborar na reflexão a respeito da totalidade do ser humano a partir de uma existência ainda como intenção, que se desenvolve no encontro de um pai e uma mãe que desejam como fruto de seu amor, gerar aquele ou aquela que já é por eles amado, amada. Trata-se de um ato de amor que constrói de maneira consciente a existência de uma humanidade plenamente consciente de si em virtude da consciência e da vontade de quem quis gerá-la. A religião tem um forte apelo na maneira com que o ser humano se relaciona com o projeto de parentalidade. Palavras chave: Teologia. Bioética. Parentalidade. Família. Religião.To generate a child is to generate a life. In the generation process are embedded several implications and consequences both for those who generate and for those who are generated. For the couple the birth of a child is unquestionably the fruit of their union. However, it should also be the result of the will, the care and the love of this couple. A human being who feels loved and cherished by its parents will be the reflection of a life based in love and therefore, a loving presence. Thus, the study about the parenting project is proposing to collaborate in thinking about the whole human being from his/her intent before his/her existence, which develops from the encounter of a father and a mother who desire as the fruit of their love to generate the one that is already beloved by them. It is an act of love that builds consciously the existence of a fully self-conscious humanity by the virtue of consciousness and the will of those who wanted to generate it. Religion has a strong appeal in the way that human being relates itself with the parenting project. Keywords: Theology. Bioethics. Parenting. Family. Religion. (shrink)

O presente artigo pretende situar a candente questão das teologias índias no tempo atual e o desafio essencial do reconhecimento da alteridade indígena e dos direitos que acompanham essa singularidade. Inicia-se com a reflexão sobre as controvérsias que envolvem o tema das teologias índias no contexto eclesial contemporâneo. A seguir, discute-se o difícil aprendizado que envolve a tomada de consciência dos povos indígenas como “povos distintos”. Nota-se na atual conjuntura da Igreja católica romana um particular embaraço nesse delicado campo, e (...) uma tendência a entender a diversidade religiosa como momento passageiro ou conjuntural. A questão da alteridade ganha uma peculiar atualidade para a teologia cristã, que vem provocada a ampliar o seu campo de compreensão. Tal aprendizado envolve a ampliação do olhar e também o resgate de valores que são fundamentais, e que nem sempre estão presentes no repertório cristão, como o resgate da espiritualidade terrenal desses povos indígenas. A vida espiritual expressa pela teologia índia revela-se “cosmoteândrica”. Nos rituais andinos celebra-se uma grande comunhão que integra a comunidade humana, o meio ambiente e a divindade geradora de vida. Encontra-se uma viva consciência da imanência de Deus e da sacralidade da criação, da transparência de Deus e de sua diafania por toda parte. Essa espiritualidade recupera valores que são essenciais para o ser humano e que estão esquecidos e abafados em nossa sociedade marcada por uma lógica egocêntrica e pela racionalidade do mercado. Palavras-chave: Teologia índia; alteridade; espiritualidade terrenal; espiritualidade cosmoteândrica. ABSTRACT The present article aims to situate the discussion of the Indian theologies nowadays. It also seeks to situate the essential challenge of the recognition of native alterity as well as the rights that go with such peculiarity. This paper first begins by reflecting on controversies that cover the question of the Indian theologies in the current days.. After that, a detailed discussion on the difficulties of general apprenticeship involving consciousness of the native people as “a different people ” is made. Expressive difficulties on the part of the Catholic Church in dealing with diversity as well as its tendency to comprehend diversity as a conjunctural and not a structural subject are currently observed. The discussion on alterity has required full attention on the side of Christian theology, which has broadened understanding on such issue. Apprenticeship concerning the question of alterity involves expansion of vision and also the recovering of those values which have always been present on Christian repertoire. It is important to emphasize here that one of those basic Christian values to be considered are those related to the recovering of terrestrial spirituality of native people. The spiritual life expressed by the Indian theology appears to be "cosmoteandric". In the Andean rituals, celebration and integration of human community, environment and divinity, are always present. A lively consciousness of the immanence of God, as well as awareness of the sacrality of the creation and the transparency of God and of his manifestation in everywhere is often found among Indian people. Such spirituality recovers values considered of strong importance for human being but unfortunately put aside in our society which is undoubtedly marked by an egocentric logic and by the rationality of economy and market. Key words : Indian theology; alterity; terrestrial spirituality; cosmoteandric spirituality. (shrink)

Resumo No que se segue, discuto o que eu quero dizer com Misticismo Ortodoxo em Filosofia e Teologia, com referências específicas a Pseudo-Dionísio, o Areopagita; São Simeão, o Novo Teólogo e São Nicolau Cabasilas. Depois abordarei o que considero ser a meta da Mística Ortodoxa em Filosofia e Teologia, ou seja, o rapto ecstático e a união com o Deus Uno e Trino por meio da glorificação ou deificação. A minha investigação vai terminar com uma análise acerca da diferença entre (...) a abordagem de Deus Uno e Trino na Mística Ortodoxa da abordagem Católica Romana de Deus percebido como ‘Esse de ipsum subsistens’ juntamente com as duas formas diferentes de misticismo que estas percepções de Deus implicam. Palavras-chave : intelectualismo esotérico, Misticismo Ortodoxo, nuvem do não saber, ontologia, proporcionalidade doxástica, sinergiaIn what follows, I discuss what I mean by Orthodox Mysticism in Philosophy and Theology with specific reference to Ps. Dionysius the Areopagite, St. Symeon the New Theologian and St. Nicholaos Cabasilas. I then discuss what I take to be the goal of the Orthodox mystic in Philosophy and Theology, i.e., ecstatic rapture and union with the Triune God through glorification or deification. My investigation will finish with an examination of how the Orthodox mystical approach to the Triune God differs from the Roman-Catholic approach to God perceived as ‘Esse ipsum subsistens’ and the two different forms of mysticism that these two perceptions of God imply. Keywords : cloud of non-knowledge, doxastic proportionality, esoteric intellectualism, ontology, Orthodox Mysticism, synergos. (shrink)

This theological argument job has three sections, each of them dealing with one of its aspects. In the first, on the creation, there are the data as presented in the Holy Scriptures, the development of creationist theology and confirmation that science and theology can illuminate each other since respecting each others' differences. In the second, on the incarnation, it is confirmed that God is not unfamiliar to his work because, after creating it, continued veiling about to send his Son to (...) bring it to fullness. The Word became flesh, became man in the womb of Mary, so that human being could take part in the divine life. In the third, on the mercy, it is the divine attention to the most vulnerable human beings, and as such attention becomes central to the plan of salvation for those who knew Jesus Christ and want to be part of his kingdom. (shrink)

Between Thought, Religion, and Contemporaneity: the hyperboles of being and the equivocal communication of the sacred (Entre o Pensamento, a Religião e a Contemporaneidade: as hipérboles do ser e a comunicação equívoca do sagrado).The contemporary philosophical thought regards itself as postmetaphysical, post-religious, postmodern, and post-philosophical. It advocates for metaphysics without metaphysics, ethics without ethics, and religion without religion. This paper aims at exploring the possibilities of thinking through the place and role of God, religion, and mystique in the philosophical discourse (...) of contemporaneity, having William Desmond’s thought as a reference. According to Desmond’s thought, there’s an intimate, idiotic, porosity in the call to truth. Thought is communication openness for its own originating source. This means that thought is situated at the knowledge threshold, and it may open up to a reverence attitude in the face of the mystery of being. Through metaphysical metaphors, intermediate names going beyond the univocal determination of metaphysical constructs from the past, Desmond aims at thinking through something which is present amidst finitude, indicating a foremost transcendence going beyond our experience: an upper transcendence essentially asymmetrical to our own transcendence. Such metaphors or hyperboles safeguard the enigma involved in the issue of God and the religious being. This enigma or mystery isn’t something negative, but openness for a fuller and overdetermined agapic origin. Keywords: Metaxology. Religion. Postmodern. Agape. Mystique. Resumo O pensamento filosófico contemporâneo se compreende como pós-metafisico, pós-religioso, pós-moderno e pós-filosófico. Ele advoga uma metafisica sem metafisica, uma ética sem ética e uma religião sem religião. O objetivo deste artigo é explorar as possibilidades de refletir sobre o lugar e o papel de Deus, da religião e da mística no discurso filosófico da contemporaneidade, tendo como referência o pensamento de William Desmond. Para o pensamento desmondiano, existe uma porosidade íntima, idiótica, no chamado à verdade. O pensamento é uma abertura comunicativa para a sua própria fonte originadora. Isso significa que o pensamento se encontra no limiar do saber, podendo abrir-se para uma posição de reverência diante do mistério do ser. Através de metáforas metafisicas, nomes intermediários para além da determinação unívoca das construções metafisicas do passado, Desmond busca refletir sobre algo presente em meio à finitude, que indica uma transcendência primeira que vai além da nossa experiência: uma transcendência superior essencialmente assimétrica à nossa própria transcendência. Tais metáforas ou hipérboles asseguram o enigma envolvido na questão de Deus e do ser religioso. Tal enigma ou mistério não é algo negativo, mas uma abertura para uma origem agápica mais plena e supradeterminada. Palavras-chave: Metaxologia. Religião. Pós-moderno. Ágape. Mística. (shrink)

Resumen Según el diagnóstico sobre la academia contemporánea del pensador italiano Piero Coda, la teología, disciplina escindida de la filósofa desde la modernidad, se ha reducido a una mera apologética de la fe. En este marco, la Trinidad se vacía de contenido ontológico, dejando de ser principio de interpretación de la realidad. En el presente artículo analizaré las consecuencias antropológicas que posee el hecho de que la creación, específicamente del hombre, sea imago Trinitatis en el pensamiento de Edith Stein. En (...) la primera sección, presentaré brevemente cómo Stein aborda el misterio y las relaciones intra-trinitarias utilizando las imágenes del amor y de la vida. Luego, presentaré brevemente el desarrollo de la noción de persona y como ésta es resignificada a la luz del dogma trinitario para explicar en qué sentido Dios es persona. En la segunda sección, presentaré cómo se da la imagen del Dios Trino en la creación. Este será el primer paso, dado que para Stein el discurso cosmológico es solo la antesala del discurso antropológico. Finalmente, analizaré cómo se da la imagen del Dios trinitario en la persona humana y por ende cómo esta noción es resignificada y enriquecida.According to the diagnosis on the contemporary academy of the Italian thinker Piero Coda, theology, having been cut off from philosophy since modernity, has been reduced to mere apologetics. Within this framework, the doctrine of the Trinity is emptied of any ontological content, ceasing to be a principle of interpretation of reality. In this article I will analyse the anthropological consequences of the fact that creation, specifically of man, is imago Trinitatis in the thought of Edith Stein. In the first section, I will briefly present how Stein approaches mystery and intra-Trinitarian relationships using the images of love and life. Then, I will offer a quick description of the development of the notion of person and how it is re-signified in light of the Trinitarian dogma as to explain in what sense God is a person. In the second section, I will present how the image of the Triune God appears in Creation, a first step in cosmological discourse that will lead, for Stein, to the anthropological discourse. Finally, I will analyse how the image of the Trinitarian God is present to the human person and therefore how this notion is re-signified and enriched. (shrink)

Pode chamar a atenção que um pensamento tão especulativo como o de Hegel seja vinculado à mística. Objectivo do presente artigo é precisamente mostrar que a filosofia de Hegel demonstra um grande interesse pela experiência mística, precisamente na medida em que nela se dá um verdadeiro conteúdo especulativo, ainda que construído em linguagem simbólica e representativa. O artigo está organizado em três partes. Na primeira, o autor define aquilo que Hegel entende por "mística" e "especulação". Na segunda valoriza-se a aportação (...) da tradição mística no âmbito do pensamento especulativo hegeliano, particularmente o contributo de Jakob Boehme. Na terceira parte, o autor analisa a Mística na filosofia hegeliana da religião, atendendo de modo particular ao conceito de "culto" como sendo o lugar em que Hegel situa a unio mystica entre o crente e Deus. Aparece assim que a experiência mística, especialmente a cristã, é altamente especulativa, porque na união com Deus se honra a diferença, se vincula o sujeito com a comunidade e se o compromete pelo amor e a eticidade com o mundo. /// lt might seem unusual that a speculative thought such as Hegel's be related with the mystical This article intends to prove that Hegel's philosophy shows a great interest for mystical experience, because in such experience there is a true speculative content, although built on symbolic and representative language. The article is organized in three parts. In the first one, the author defines what Hegel means by "mystical" and "spe-culation". In the secondpart, he considers the contribution of mystical tradition included in HegeVs speculative thought, especially the contribution of Jakob Boehme. Finally, in the third part, the mystical in Hegel's Philosophy of Religion is analised, especially the "cult" which is the site where Hegel places the unio mystica between the believer and God. It is clear, theny that mystical experience - especially the Christian one - is highly speculative, because in the union with God, difference is honored, the subject is related to the community, and becomes committed, through love and ethics, to the world. (shrink)

En este trabajo se estudia del amor personal humano y del amor personal divino desde la antropología trascendental de Leonardo Polo. Se indica que el amor personal humano está abierto naturalmente al mundo, a los demás, al propio hombre y, en especial, a Dios; que es creciente y que puede ser elevado. El amor personal divino es pluripersonal y está abierto al humano en su creación, elevación y glorificación. In this work we study the human personal love and the (...) divine personal love according the transcendental anthropology of Leonardo Polo. We sustain that the human personal love is naturally open to the world, to others, to the self, and over all to God; that it is growing and susceptible of be elevated by God. The divine personal love is pluripersonal and is open to the man in his creation, elevation and glorification. (shrink)

Uma palavra universal, existente desde a primeira forma de conscientização do homem, amor. Palavra que poeticamente, se disser que é tão antiga quanto se faz nova. A grande questão abordada sobre o amor, é se sua essência como expressão do que é, nas relações humanas e na relação com a vida, ainda possui o seu conceito original ou se perdeu ao longo dos anos? O amor de Deus não muda e perpassa a história., mesmo que no período presente, a palavra (...) amor se perde num chamado modo de viver líquido. Assim, verificará que o amor não está em crise, o Amor de Deus não é o problema, mas como relacionar um amor sólido e permanente, numa sociedade líquida e inconstante? São esses os questionamentos que este artigo deseja enfrentar. (shrink)

The present text deals with some of the ways used to argue in favor of the existence of God. It seems, however, that an appeal to the arrangement of the world in order to evidence the truth of theism faces a number of limitations. The central hypothesis of theistic worldview, however, is consistent with the assumption of science itself, an intelligible universe being what one would expect from a reality created by someone intelligent with purpose. The approach of focusing on (...) the cognoscibility of the world, although not eliminating the doubt about the existence of God, seems to be a more promising proposal, in the context of the dialogue between science and theology, than the proposal that focuses on gaps in human knowledge, in order to fit God in these gaps, since the previous one, contrary to this, can’t be eroded by the progress of scientific knowledge. (shrink)

This paper aims at examining the issue of the role of supreme being theology in non-Abrahamic traditions. According to the dominant view in contemporary philosophy of religion, the philo-sophical project of inferring divine properties from the concept of God as a maximally perfect being, usually called supreme being theology, is an exclusivity of the Abrahamic traditions. In attempting to question this view, I investigate the developments of two key-concepts of Vedāntatradition –the concepts of Brahman (literally, the greatest) and Bhagavān (literally, (...) the possessor of all excellences) –in thethought of three famous vedantins: Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja and Jīva. (shrink)

In the early centuries of the nascent Church, we find a fountain experience lived by the Church at its beginnings: mystagogy. In this period of the Church’s history, the pedagogy which inspires the Church Fathers is mystagogy, that is, the pedagogy of Mystery. We believe that in the mystagogy experience, lived in the Church in the 3rd and 4th centuries, one finds a fruitful fountain which may be paradigmatic with regard to the contemporary religious experiences. We invite the reader to (...) walk with us along the pedagogy that is characteristic of the early centuries of the Christian route: mystagogy. Mystagogy reaches us as fountain pedagogy, which may be paradigmatic for an opening process and dialogue with the new subjectivities and intersubjectivities under construction. The mystagogy experienced in the early days of Christianity becomes a theological place which dialogues with our times, a dialogue between the fountain theology, foremost, and the theology of nowadays, a second reflection. Key words: Mystagogy. Pedagogy of faith. Mystique. Spirituality. Modernity. Resumo Nos primeiros séculos da Igreja nascente encontramos uma experiência fontal vivida pela Igreja dos primórdios: a mistagogia. Nesse período da história da Igreja, a pedagogia que inspira os Padres da Igreja é a mistagogia, ou seja, a pedagogia do Mistério. Acreditamos que na experiência mistagógica, vivida na Igreja nos séculos III e IV, encontra-se uma fonte fecunda que pode ser paradigmática em relação às experiências religiosas contemporâneas. Convidamos o leitor a caminhar conosco pela mistagogia própria dos primeiros séculos da trajetória cristã: a mistagogia. A mistagogia nos chega como uma pedagogia fontal, que pode ser paradigmática para um processo de abertura e diálogo com as novas subjetividades e intersubjetividades em construção. A mistagogia experimentada nos primeiros tempos do cristianismo torna-se um lugar teológico que dialoga com nossos tempos, um diálogo entre a teologia fontal, primeira, e a teologia de hoje, reflexão segunda. Palavras-chave: Mistagogia. Pedagogia da fé. Mística. Espiritualidade. Modernidade. (shrink)

Os heterônimos do poeta português Fernando Pessoa constituem uma das mais fantásticas criações da poesia moderna. Através deles, fingindo-se um deles, o poeta apresenta-se múltiplo, como que habitado por várias pessoas, encerrando vários eus, num jogo literário em que entretanto não se identifica com nenhum deles. Sem desconsiderar a complexidade dessa criação literária, o artigo propõe-se a abordar alguns aspectos da obra do “Pessoa ele-mesmo”. Em certo sentido, Pessoa ele-mesmo é também um heterônimo. Poeta fingidor, nada nele é diretamente confessional (...) ou biográfico. Pessoa ele-mesmo apresenta-se como a expressão dramática de uma busca de identidade, aberta numa constelação de personalidades complexas e sofridas. A dor fingida que finge a dor sofrida e outras representações da dor existencial de Pessoa ele-mesmo podem ser lidas como angústia e mística. Para tecer esse percurso, o artigo se reportará basicamente às poesias inéditas de 1919-1935, basicamente os últimos escritos do grande e múltiplo poeta português. Palavras-chave : Fernando Pessoa. Heterônimos. Angústia. Mística. Teopoética.The heteronyms of the Portuguese poet Fernando Pessoa is one of the most fantastic creations of modern poetry. Through them, and pretending to be one of them, the poet presents himself as multiple, as if inhabited by several people, assuming several selves, in a literary game in which the poet does not identify himself with any of them. Without ignoring the complexity of such literary creation, the paper aims to address some aspects of the work of “Fernando Pessoa-himself”. In a sense, “Fernando Pessoa-himself” is also a heteronomous that carries a message that is neither confessional nor a bibliographic one. “Fernando Pessoa-himself” presents himself as a dramatic expression of an identity search within a constellation of some complex and suffered personalities. The “pretended pain” that pretends to be a true suffering as well other representations of the existential pain of “Fernando Pessoa-himself” can be comprehended as anxiety and mystique. To accomplish this purpose, the article will report primarily to the unpublished last poems of the great poet Fernando Pessoa, written between 1919 and 1935. Keywords: Fernando Pessoa. Heteronyms. Anguish. Mystique. Theopoetic - DOI: 10.5752/P.2175-5841.2012v10n25p93. (shrink)

O postulado prático da existência de Deus é problemático por várias razões: primeiro, Kant nega que ele proporciona qualquer cognição da natureza ou existência de Deus como um ser em si; segundo, ele salienta a natureza prática do postulado contribuindo para o desempenho de nossos deveres; e, terceiro, Kant parece mesmo algumas vezes indicar que nosso postulado de Deus não corresponde a nenhuma realidade, mas é um mero pensamento. No meu trabalho, eu sustento o argumento que o postulado de Kant (...) de Deus pode ser melhor entendido como um conceito sem extensão que serve para unificar vários outros conceitos e obrigações morais mas que ele próprio não tem referência. Eu sustento esse argumento apontando para a relação do postulado para o propósito da filosofia prática, em oposição à teórica e pelo exame da função regulativa da razão em geral e invocando a teologia construtivista contemporânea. A fim de mostrar este ponto eu primeiro analiso a natureza de um postulado comparando postulados a hipóteses transcendentais e crenças da Crítica da Razão Pura. Em segundo lugar, eu examino o uso que Kant faz do postulado da existência de Deus como sendo “imanente... para propósitos práticos” e “somente em referência à lei moral e em função dela” na Crítica da Razão Prática. Terceiro, eu procuro pela função que o postulado de Deus desempenha no Opus Postumum e em outros textos de 1790 para mostrar que Kant chegou mais e mais a argumentar pelo papel funcional ao invés do referencial desse postulado. Ao longo do trabalho, eu discuto a natureza da filosofia prática – direcionada ao uso livre das nossas vontades – como sendo distinta da filosofia teórica – dirigida ao conhecimento dos objetos. Eu mostro como essa solução pode fazer Kant um naturalista metafísico. Eu também entro em questões contemporâneas da teologia relacionadas com o papel humano na construção de sistemas conceituais para ajudá-los a fazer sentido ao mundo que eles experienciam no contexto de um mistério maior que desafia a conceitualização.Kant’s practical postulate for the existence of God is puzzling for several reasons: first, he denies that it provides any cognition of the existence or nature of God as a being in itself, second, Kant stresses the practical nature of the postulate as contributing to performance of our duties, and third, Kant even seems on occasion to indicate that our postulate of God does not correspond to any reality but is a merely a thought. In my paper I advance the argument that Kant’s postulate of God is best understood as an extensionless concept that serves to unify various other moral concepts and moral obligations but that has no referent itself. I make this argument by noting the relation of the postulate to the purpose of practical, as opposed to theoretical, philosophy, and by examination of the regulative role of reason in general, and by invoking contemporary constructivist theology. In order to show this point I first examine the nature of a postulate by comparing postulates to transcendental hypotheses and to beliefs from the Critique of Pure Reason. I second examine the use to which Kant puts the postulate of the existence of God as “immanent . . . for practical purposes” and “only in reference to the moral law and for the sake of it” in the Critique of Practical Reason. Third, I look at the role that the postulate of God plays in Kant’s Opus Postumum and other texts from the 1790s to show that Kant came more and more to argue that the postulates have this functional rather than referential role. Throughout the paper I discuss the nature of practical philosophy – directed toward the free use of our wills – as distingushed from theoretical philosophy – directed toward knowledge of objects. I note how this solution could make Kant a metaphysical naturalist. I also touch on contemporary issues in theology related to the role of human construction of systems of concepts to help them make sense of the world they experience in the context of a greater mystery that defies conceptualization. (shrink)

Resumo de dissertação: ARAÚJO, Luiz Antônio de. A negação conceitual de deus e seus desdobramentos a partir da mística especulativa do Pseudo-Dionísio Areopagita.

O presente artigo apresenta uma reflexão sobre as interfaces entre teologia e espiritualidade. Sabe-se que a teologia escolástica se tornou muito especulativa e racional, relegando a espiritualidade à piedade popular e suas devoções. Teólogos modernos redescobrem a dimensão existencial da teologia, uma vez que, enquanto ciência da revelação, ela busca uma linguagem racional coerente para a experiência cristã de Deus. A teologia conjuga fé e razão; a experiência de fé, no entanto, é anterior à reflexão racional que, em última instância, (...) está a serviço da experiência, para iluminá-la e torná-la mais fiel à experiência fundamental da revelação de Jesus Cristo, que se encontra nas Escrituras. Nesse sentido, a espiritualidade emerge como aspecto intrínseco à teologia. A teologia, se permanecer fiel à sua missão, se expressará existencialmente como sapientia fidei. Este artigo trata, portanto, da relação evidente, mas muitas vezes esquecida, entre teologia (discurso racional) e espiritualidade (experiência cristã de Deus), mostrando que a teologia só cumpre o seu papel de serviço à Igreja se conduz o crente à experiência do mistério indizível de Deus que se aproximou de nós em Jesus Cristo. Palavras-chave: Teologia. Experiência de Deus. Espiritualidade. Trindade. Oração.The present article presents a reflection on the connection between theology and spirituality. It is known that scholastic theology became very speculative and rational reducing spirituality to popular piety and its devotions. Modern theologians have rediscovered the existential dimension of theology, once that, being the science of revelation, it seeks a rational language coherent with the Christian experience of God. Theology joins faith and reason – the experience of faith, nonetheless, comes before the rational reflection, which, in last instance, is in benefit of the experience in order to illuminate it and make it more faithful to the fundamental experience of revelation in Jesus Christ, found in the Scriptures. In this sense, spirituality emerges as an intrinsic aspect to theology. Theology, if it is to remain faithful to its mission, expresses itself existentially as sapientia fidei (the wisdom of faith). This article treats, therefore, of the evident relationship, many times forgotten, between theology (rational discourse) and spirituality (Christian experience of God) showing that theology only fulfills its role in service to the Church if it leads the believer to an experience of the undivided mystery of God in the person of Jesus Christ. Keywords: Theology. Experience of God. Spirituality. Trinity. Prayer. (shrink)

Resumen: Esta investigación propone una valoración al diálogo teológico-literario desde la obra Cuatro poetas desde la otra ladera del teólogo español Olegario González de Cardedal. En primer lugar, se esbozan elementos que la obra -tangencialmente- sugiere para una lectura teológica fundamental, poniendo de relieve el diálogo con la literatura; la relación dialógica del ser humano con Dios, en su doble vertiente: homo capax Dei/Deus capax hominis; y el aspecto vivencial de los poetas como criterio de lectura para la comprensión de (...) la Revelación. En segundo lugar, se propone un balance valorativo del diálogo y método teológico-literario que ha surgido de la lectura de la obra, ofreciendo claves de lectura metodológica e interpretativa desde la literatura como otredad de la teología. Abstract: This research proposes an assessment of the theological-literary dialogue from the work Cuatro poetas desde la otra ladera of the Spanish theologian Olegario González de Cardedal. In the first place, elements are outlined that the work -tangentially- suggests for a fundamental theological reading, highlighting the dialogue with literature; the dialogic relationship of the human being with God, in its double aspect: homo capax Dei/Deus capax hominis; and the experiential aspect of the poets as a reading criterion for the understanding of the Revelation. Secondly, an evaluative balance of the theological-literary dialogue and method is proposed which has emerged from the reading of the work, offering keys for methodological and interpretive reading from literature as otherness of theology. (shrink)

This article aims to rescue the principles of Natural Theology in the thinking of Thomas Aquinas regarding the possibility of a rational knowledge of God. Thomas, influenced by Aristotle's philosophy, will claim that for the reason he can arrive at the certainty of the existence of God. Certainty that is evident, but that needs to be demonstrated. To this end, it elaborates five ways, called evidence, to prove the existence of divinity, always based on the assumption that all rational knowledge (...) has its origin in experience. All the work of Thomas Aquinas has a continuity in contemporary philosophy, being studied and developed by several authors who give form to the thomist movement, particularly in dialogue with other sciences. (shrink)

Pretendemos poner de manifiesto en este estudio la importancia y relevancia del amor en la reflexión filosófico-teológica cristiana a partir de uno de sus más grandes maestros: san Buenaventura. Nos centramos en los distintos significados del término “amor” a partir de los sujetos protagonistas del amor: el hombre y Dios. E intentamos extraer algunas consecuencias filosóficas de la afirmación de “Dios es amor” en el pensador franciscano. San Buenaventura muestra un dominio del pensamiento anterior a él al que añade la (...) impronta de su ser franciscano, mostrando un pensamiento realmente original y sugerente. We intend to make clear the importance of love in the christian philosophicaltheological reflection through one of its greatest masters: St. Buenaventura. We will focus on the different meanings of the term “love” by looking at its two main subjects, that is, Man and God. Besides, we will try to comprehend some consequences of the statement “God is Love” according to this Franciscan thinker. St. Buenaventura shows a great command of the currents of thinking previos to his own. This, added to his being Franciscan, makes his doctrine truly orignal and suggestive. (shrink)

Se parte del planteamiento general de la perspectiva moderna que aún impera en la interpretación regular de la fe, para señalar sus insuficiencias. Posteriormente, se aborda la oposición entre universalidad ética y particularidad teológica, con base en las observaciones hechas por Kant y Kierkegaard, respectivamente, a fin de determinar el ámbito de la fe y su independencia respecto de la moral. Hecho el deslinde entre el Dios de la fe y el Dios de las filósofos, se describen los rasgos fundamentales (...) de la fe teologal, con base en el testimonio neotestamentario. Finalmente, se expone la concepción místico-religiosa de San Juan de la Cruz acerca de la fe como conocimiento oscuro amoroso, para luego aclarar en qué sentido la fe está íntimamente relacionada con el amor-ágape y la esperanza. Unidad que constituye la esencia de la actitud teologal. Be part of the overall approach of the modern perspective that still prevails in the interpretation regular of faith, to point out its shortcomings. Subsequently, deals with the opposition between ethical universality and particularity theological, based on observations made by Kant and Kierkegaard, respectively, to determine the field of faith and independence from morality. Made the boundary between the God of faith and the God of the philosophers, describes the basic features of theological faith, based on the New Testament witness. Finally, we illustrate the mystical-religious conception of San Juan de la Cruz about faith as loving dark knowledge, then clarify in what sense faith is intimately linked to the love-agape and hope. Unit which is the essence of the theological attitude. (shrink)

Keith Ward is right in Christ and the Cosmos that “the idea of God as a sort of society is a bad idea”. Christian theology would make better sense if Christians did not say God is comprised of three persons, each with distinct centers of consciousness, distinct relations, distinct wills, and so on. This formulation of the Trinity is more tritheistic than monotheistic. I argue that for a host of reasons, Christians should conceive of the Trinity as one God who (...) instantiates in three forms. I also suggest Christians would be wise to say God is essentially loving and essentially related to creation. (shrink)

O problema de fundo da especulação eckhartiana é a verdade do ser uno enquanto Deus e divino ligada à questão do seu conhecimento. Operando uma síntese da tradição neoplatônico-agostiniana e do pensamento do Pseudo-Dionísio Areopagita, o mestre dominicano funda os alicerces da sua teologia unitiva na teoria do ser. The fundamental problem of Eckhartian speculation is that of the connection between the truth of the unique being as God and the question of His knowledge. By creating a synthesis of the (...) Augustinian-Platonic tradition and the thought of Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite, the Dominican master founds the basis of his unitary theology in the theory of being. (shrink)

Este artigo apresenta uma tradução da hermenêutica sobre a unicidade de Deus de um capítulo (sura) do Alcorão, de acordo com o pensamento de Avicena (Ibn Sῑnā). É o capítulo denominado capítulo do Monoteísmo, cujo número é 112 no Alcorão. Antes, porém, há uma introdução sobre o que representou o Alcorão nos primórdios do Islã e a sua influência no desenvolvimento da filosofia e da teologia em terras do Islã. Nesse texto, pode ser constatado que, na doutrina islâmica, o primeiro (...) fundamento e o mais rigoroso é a unicidade de Deus. É sobre isso que este artigo discorre. This paper presents a translation of the hermeneutics of the oneness of God from chapter (sura) 112 of the Qur'an (the Chapter on Monotheism), according to the thought of Avicenna (Ibn Sῑnā). First, however, there is an introduction which presents the Qur'an in the early days of Islam, as well as its influence on the development of philosophy and theology in Islamic lands. It may be noted in this text that the first and most rigorous foundation is Islamic doctrine is the oneness of God. (shrink)

From the moment in which all body is hidden, and the grave is empty of all presence, has a fundamental lack in common. Therefore this lack, in regard to the Christian world, is expressed in terms of original concealment. For its part, the medieval theological and mystical tradition, heiress and interlocutor of a metaphysical tradition of the Hellenic world, systematized throughout the centuries the grammar of this disappearance in terms of an inaccessibility and irreducibility of being, namely, an essential of (...) the Logos negativity. One could anticipate, therefore, as arrival point, than the language of the Christian mystical tradition, is not only the language of the lack of a body, but also the search for one language enough to reconcile the universal with the autonomous unit of the language. This article proposes, therefore, rebuild the way in that historian and Jesuit theologian, Michel de Certeau, genealogically rebuilt part of a mystical tradition that, immersed in a series of variables and potential historical of enunciation, is expressed in terms of “a place without place”, originally missing whose, would lead to a relationship of alterity. This would be one of the outcomes in early Western modernity of what from the origins of Neoplatonism known as the solitude of the one, either, the absence of God. (shrink)

In this article I explore how a philosophical conception of love may be used to draw debate on the death of God beyond the binary opposition between theology and philosophy through a comparative study of the work of Jean-Luc Marion and Jean-Luc Nancy. Although Marion’s reading of love—in both its theological and phenomenological guises—proposes an innovative phrasing of a non-metaphysical notion of divinity, I argue that it is ultimately unable to maintain its coherence in nominal discourse due to (...) Marion’s insistence on keeping love and being separate. In contrast, through his unique thinking on ontology, Nancy’s philosophy allows us to reposition love at the heart of being, from whence it may serve as a means of disrupting the very principle governing the atheist and theist world-views. Far from dismantling Marion’s core proposition, I conclude that the two thinkers may in fact be more closely aligned than previous scholarship has acknowledged, coming together in the need to affirm an experience of the impossible that takes place in the present rather than in any eschatological fulfillment to come. At this intersection between two nominally very different thinkers, love forms an ontological limit-point for thought that poses a challenge to both theology and philosophy alike as they continue to grapple with the question of religion in the twenty-first century. (shrink)

"Mystic Maybe's": the title comes from Augustine Birrill's words on the death of Matthew Arnold. Is it true that Richard Kearney's philosophy of religion, like Arnold's reflections on the Bible, are "mystic maybe's," mere flirtations with possibility? In order to answer this question I seek to understand Kearney's expression "the God who may be" and to see if it fits into a non-metaphysical philosophy of religion. The expression is clarified by way of comparisons with Wolfhart Pannenberg's eschatological understanding of God (...) and Eberhard Jungel's theology of possibility. One weak point in Kearney's philosophy of religion, it is argued, is its avoidance of theology in the name of the philosophy of religion. A sound philosophy of religion needs to engage with theology. /// "Mystic Maybe's" (Possibilidades místicas): Este titulo deriva das palavras de Augustine Birrill acerca da morte de Mathew Arnold. O autor do artigo pergunta até que ponto a filosofia da religião de Richard Kearney não será, tal como as reflexões de Arnold acerca da Bíblia, um mew "místico talvez", um simples namoro com a possibilidaãe. Em ordem a responder à questão, o autor procura compreender o sentido da expressão de Richard Kearney acerca do "Deus que pode ser" de modo a avaliar até que ponto a expressão se adequa a uma filosofia não-metafísica da religião. O artigo clarifica a expressão de Kearney mediante uma comparação quer com a compreensão escatológica de Deus de Wolfhart Pannenberg quer com a teologia da possibilidade de Eberhard Jüngel. Mostra-se, desta forma, que um dospontos maisfracos na filosofia da religião de Richard Kearney consiste na sua tentativa de escapar à teologia em nome da filosofia da religião. Com efeito, argumenta o autor do artigo, uma autêntica filosofia da religião não pode deixar de estar num diálogo eficaz com a teologia. (shrink)

"God wants to marry us" (p. 14, 97, 122), es decir, Dios quiere casarse con nosotros, es el tema central del presente libro, y según otros autores, es también el sentido real de la Biblia. La Biblia no es un libro que nos enseña cómo encontrar a Dios, sino el libro que nos revela cómo Dios nos busca incansablemente y nos relata las innumerables veces y maneras en las que Dios trata de hacerse el encontradizo para que el ser humano (...) lo acoja en su corazón. Pues bien, este es el principal argumento del autor de este libro. La obra de Christopher West es a todas luces teológica, y nos deja ver, con sencillas palabras, la profundidad de la teología del cuerpo propuesta por el Papa Juan Pablo II. Aquí encontraremos que el significado de la vida del ser humano está impreso en su propio cuerpo, en su sexualidad. Cabe anotar que se requiere algún mínimo de conocimiento teológico para leer este libro con facilidad, y da por sentado un cierto conocimiento de la Sagrada Escritura, la cual es citada 213 veces, además de las veces que hace referencia al capítulo quinto de la carta de San Pablo a los Efesios. De todas maneras, el estilo fluido y cercano del autor, así como la mención a algunos ejemplos de la vida cotidiana, permite que el contenido del libro se vaya asimilando poco a poco. (shrink)

O artigo procura responder a um dos grandes desafios teológicos da atualidade: o diálogo inter-religioso. Trabalha a dimensão da práxis do diálogo, especialmente, no pensamento de Leonardo Boff, identificado a partir de 1992 em um novo paradigma - o paradigma ecológico. A dialogação (como práxis dialogal) é pensada num grande encontro teoantropocósmico, articulando Deus, Ser humano e Natureza. Três momentos compõem essa práxis dialógica: dialogação mística ou espiritual; dialogação fraterna; e a ética da vida. Não são três momentos separados. Articulam-se (...) e estão interconectados. Começam e terminam com a mística, expressam-se no estarcom-o-outro, na fraternidade e nos critérios de pensar e agir eticamente. Palavras-chave: Diálogo inter-religioso; Práxis; Mística; Fraternidade; Ecologia; Ética. ABSTRACT This paper aims at responding to one of the great theological challenges at present: inter-religions dialogue. It focuses on the dimension of the praxis of dialogue, especially on Leonardo Boff´s thought, identified as of 1992 according to a new paradigm - the ecological one. Dialogue as praxis is taken into account within the scope of a wide Theo-anthropo-cosmic encounter, articulating God, the Human Being and Nature. Such dialogical praxis comprises three moments: mystical or spiritual dialogue; fraternal dialogue; and the ethics of life. Those are not three separate moments: they are articulated and interconnected. They start and end with mystics, and they express themselves in being-with-the-other in fraternity and in the criteria for ethical thought and action. Key words: Inter-religions dialogue; Praxis; Mystics; raternity; Ecology; Ethics. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Cur Deus Verba: Why the Word Became Words by Jeremy HolmesJames B. ProthroCur Deus Verba: Why the Word Became Words by Jeremy Holmes (San Francisco: Ignatius, 2021), 284 pp.This book's title plays on the incarnational analogy, and its argument begins and ends with God's purposes to draw humanity into communion with himself through revelation. In both aspects, Holmes echoes Dei Verbum (DV, §§2, 13). However, rather than pursuing (...) a revelation-historical organization or beginning with Scripture's texts to derive conclusions about its nature and purpose, the book takes a "top-down" (13) approach to bibliology. In this way, its strength is the theological framing or refraining it gives to common questions.The first three chapters culminate, he claims, in a "definition of Scripture" (11). Beginning with the Trinity and creation, Holmes argues that all things have their being by participating in the inner life (the Word) of the Father, thus reflecting him, and that the Spirit drives creatures "toward the pattern of the Son" (33). God desires creatures to be good and causes of goodness in others, patterned after and in the Son through the Spirit's impulse to return them to God. In the Incarnation, God "reconciles nature with grace" (39) and in Christ perfects these desires. In Christ, man is now "included in the life of the Trinity" (37) and an agent of revelation, reflects God perfectly, and in love sends the Spirit to return humans to God through himself. This leads to reflections on Scripture directly. "Scripture is meant to impress the interior life of the Church on each generation; put another way, it is meant to impress Christ the Head on the members of his Mystical Body" (69). This brings Holmes to the topics of inspiration and canon. In order for human texts to impress Christ on his members, to communicate the divine through human means, "God himself" must be "addressing the [End Page 393] heart of the believer" (72). He makes a case for canon by pointing to the communal nature of humans. Tradition and canon, by which truth as a common good is formulated for a society, order and inform the society regarding its purpose, history, and character. "Tradition," then, "is good for man as man" (57) even in natural society, and all the more so in the supernatural society, the Church. The "texts that embody and transmit the tradition" (63) give continuity and life to the organism that is the Church, while within that tradition these texts can function as a sort of "guide rail" and a "mirror" of its identity (67).This overall view of Scripture lends perspective to particular topics (chs. 4-12). Turning to Scripture's authorship and inspiration, Holmes emphasizes again that God means humans to be real causes of revelation as God "attaches his voice" to their writing (82, 91, and throughout). This may, in differing circumstances, involve endowing them with particular and even unusual graces, many of which God grants to others who hand on revelation (such as Augustine), but in the case of the biblical authors the ("only") difference is that God "intended" biblical texts like Luke "to sound not only Luke's voice but God's voice as well" (91). His "general account of the fact of biblical difficulties" (202), then, depicts the human "author's soul" as "like the body of an instrument, determining the overtones of everything he writes" (208). God writes the notes to be played and selects the instruments, and God "asserts what the human author asserts" (210). But the particularities of an author's soul (and upbringing, assumptions, etc.) can be seen in anything from grammatical infelicities in Paul to the author's assumptions about a geocentric solar system, the goodness of killing the Canaanites, or Qoheleth's unawareness of an afterlife. God attaches his voice to their writing, and these instruments play "only God's note" (219), but God "does not affirm or deny" the assumptions or unasserted views of the author when writing (209). Scripture's purpose is not merely to impart doctrine but to conform one to Christ, and difficult passages are inspired in part for us to... (shrink)

(Spanish) RESUMEN: La libertad absoluta postulada por Viktor Emil Frankl y Jean-Paul Sartre, la Shoah y la creencia en un dios omnipotente, bueno y justo parecen contradecirse. La pregunta por el sentido del sufrimiento de las víctimas del Holocausto (la verdadera catástrofe, el mayor crimen contra la humanidad), simbolizado por Auschwitz, y como punto de inflexión en la historia, es terriblemente dolorosa y parece no tener una respuesta filosófica ni teológica. A mi juicio, es importantísimo distinguir entre las víctimas inocentes (...) de la Shoah que perecieron y las víctimas inocentes que sufrieron un verdadero infierno y perdieron a sus seres queridos, pero que lograron sobrevivir. Ambas son víctimas, por supuesto, pero así como encontrarle un posible sentido al sufrimiento de las víctimas masacradas y gaseadas podría suponer un insulto a su sufrimiento y agonía –en especial, al horror que sufrieron los niños–, el horrible sufrimiento de los supervivientes pudo dar, tal vez, de alguna manera, un sentido a sus vidas después de la liberación de los campos de concentración y exterminio, ya fuera como voz, como protesta o como simple supervivencia. Frankl apuesta por un sentido último (que abraza el sentido del sufrimiento de las víctimas), y Sartre, aunque parezca no apostar por sentido alguno, volcó su vida al compromiso político después de la Segunda Guerra Mundial, y ello parece vislumbrar una minúscula pizca de sentido después de la barbarie. La filosofía de Frankl es un sí a la vida incluso en las situaciones más extremas, un grito casi nietzscheano que exalta el valor de la vida más allá de cualquier sufrimiento. Frankl, padre de la logoterapia y superviviente del Holocausto, abre una puerta a Dios al hablar de un dios inconsciente, una dimensión suprahumana y una fe incondicional, y define la religión como espiritualidad y como la búsqueda del hombre por el sentido último. Según Frankl, la libertad no se contradice con Dios, y la religión existe no a raíz de la barbarie, sino a pesar de la barbarie. El existencialismo sartreano es una filosofía de la libertad radical y de la responsabilidad. El hombre está condenado a ser libre. El ser humano es un ser en el que la existencia precede a la esencia. Somos totalmente responsables de lo que somos. Sartre afirma que la libertad humana es incompatible con Dios. En un mundo sin Dios, la moral la construyen los hombres, con sus propias decisiones y sus acciones, y la existencia y el sufrimiento de las víctimas no tienen sentido alguno. Sartre define al hombre como libertad, responsabilidad, angustia y contingencia. Frankl define al hombre como libertad, responsabilidad, espiritualidad y búsqueda de sentido. Con esta tesis me propongo entrar en la resbaladiza dimensión del dolor, la desesperación, el sentido y sinsentido del sufrimiento de las víctimas (teniendo presente los horrores de Auschwitz, que en teología y filosofía ha simbolizado desde la liberación de los campos la muerte de Dios y la muerte de la moral). Es verdad que no solo los hombres, mujeres y niños judíos fueron víctimas de la barbarie alemana, pero, como reza el mensaje de Elie Wiesel en la exposición permanente del Block 27 del Auschwitz-Birkeanu State Museum: "Not all victims were Jewish in this place, but all Jews were victims". La Shoah no es un episodio dentro de la Segunda Guerra Mundial, sino un punto de inflexión en la historia de la humanidad, y es una catástrofe que nos concierne a todos, hombres y mujeres judíos y no judíos, religiosos e irreligiosos, creyentes e increyentes, como seres libres, responsables y morales que somos –o que deberíamos ser. Muchas de las víctimas del Holocausto, en medio de la desesperación, entraron en las cámaras de gas orando, aferrándose a la esperanza de que ese final espeluznante no era un punto final. Con esta tesis no me propongo de ninguna manera responder a la eterna pregunta de si Dios existe o no, sino que propongo interpretar ese grito hacia Dios como un desesperado anhelo de esperanza. También me propongo encontrar una coherencia en las posturas de estos dos grandes pensadores para quienes la libertad y la responsabilidad definen al hombre: Frankl (quien apuesta por una dimensión suprahumana donde existe un sentido último en el que el sufrimiento de las víctimas tiene que tener algún sentido, aunque ese sentido sea completamente incomprensible en la dimensión humana) y Sartre (el existencialista ateo por excelencia, para quien el mundo, la existencia y el sufrimiento son absolutamente contingentes). En el primer capítulo expongo la logoterapia y el existencialismo sartreano: describo las tres dimensiones del hombre y las tres búsquedas de sentido propuestas por Frankl, y expongo las cinco consecuencias de "l'existence précède l'essence", centrándome en la libertad y la responsabilidad, y hablo del suicidio. El segundo capítulo está dedicado al dios inconsciente frankleano, la dimensión suprahumana, la búsqueda por el sentido último y la fe incondicional. En el tercer capítulo ilustro la libertad sin Dios sartreana, la ontología sartreana, el ateísmo sartreano y el humanismo sartreano, y hablo sobre la responsabilidad, la mauvaise foi, la contingencia, la situation y la angustia. El cuarto capítulo es necesariamente histórico (sin dejar de ser filosófico): me pregunto por la muerte de Dios después de Auschwitz, argumento y defiendo la unicidad del Holocausto (la Shoah es un punto de inflexión en la historia de la humanidad), describo las masacres antes de los campos de exterminio (Einsatzgruppen, Ordnungspolizei y Wehrmacht), el gigantesco complejo de Auschwitz (Stammlager, Auschwitz-Birkenau y Monowitz-Buna), reflexiono sobre Dios y el mal (centrándome en los niños de Auschwitz), describo los días de Frankl en Auschwitz, hablo de Dios como esperanza, de la inmortalidad y la escatología, de la crueldad de Dios, de la relación entre el cristianismo y el antisemitismo, del islam y el antisemitismo, critico el silencio de Dios, hablo de la muerte de Dios y del juicio contra Dios. En el quinto capítulo expongo la moral frankleana (una moral que atañe al hombre y no a Dios), basándome en su teoría del amor y en su única obra de teatro (Synchronisation in Binkerwald), y la moral sartreana (una moral que atañe a una humanidad sin Dios), recordando a Dostoyevsky, analizando la famosa cita de Garcin en Huis clos "L'enfer, c'est les Autres", criticando el marxismo de Sartre y cuestionando (con la mirada de Frankl y Sartre) el verso de Brecht "Erst kommt das Fressen, dann kommt die Moral"; al final del capítulo incluyo una reflexión propia y las críticas frankleana y sartreana sobre la impunidad de los verdugos y colaboradores después del Holocausto (con el permiso de Dios). Después de la Conclusión, añado un Apéndice sobre las vidas de Frankl y Sartre, para poder entender mejor su obra. PALABRAS CLAVE: logoterapia, existencialismo sartreano, búsqueda de sentido, libertad, responsabilidad, moral, angustia, sufrimiento, supervivientes, víctimas, contingencia, espiritualidad, religión, Dios, esperanza, antisemitismo, culpa, Auschwitz, Holocausto, Shoah. /// (English) ABSTRACT: The absolute freedom defended by Viktor Emil Frankl and Jean-Paul Sartre, the Shoah and the belief in an omnipotent, benevolent and just God seem to contradict each other. The question of the meaning of the victims' suffering of the Holocaust (the true catastrophe, the biggest crime against humanity), simbolised by Auschwitz and as a turning point in History, is terribly painful and doesn't seem to have an answer. In my opinion, it's crucial to distinguish between the innocent victims of the Shoah who perished and the innocent victims who sufferend a real hell and lost their loved ones, but managed to survive. Both are victims, of course, but just as finding a possible meaning to the suffering of the massacred and gassed victims could result in an insult to their suffering and agony –especially to the horror that the children suffered– the gigantic suffering of the survivors could, maybe, somehow, give a meaning to their lives after the liberation of the concentration and extermination camps, either as a voice, as a protest, or as a simple survival. Frankl believes in an ultimate meaning (that embraces the meaning of the victims' suffering), and Sartre, even if it appears not to embrace any meaning, turned his life to political engagement after War World II, and that attitude seems to give a tiny glimpse of meaning after the barbarity. Frankl's philosophy says yes to life even in the most extreme situations, and it's a Nietzschean-like scream that exalts the value of life beyond any monstrous suffering. Frankl, the father of logotherapy and a Holocaust survivor, opens a door to God when he talks about an unconscious God, a supra-human dimension and an unconditional faith; he defines religion as spirituality and as man's search for ultimate meaning. According to Frankl, freedom is not contradictory with God, and religion exists not because of the barbarity but in spite of the barbarity. Sartrean existentialism is a philosophy of radical freedom and responsibility. Men are condemned to be free. We are beings where the existence precedes the essence. We are completely responsible of what we are. Sartre argues that human freedom is incompatible with God. In a godless world, morality is constructed by people, with their own choices and actions, and human existence and the suffering of the victims don't have any meaning. Sartre defines man as freedom, responsibility, Angst and contingency. Frankl defines man as freedom, responsibility, spirituality and search for meaning. With this dissertation I attempt to enter in the slippery dimension of the pain, despair, meaning and meaninglessness of the victims' suffering (having in mind the horrors of Auschwitz, that in theology and in philosophy have simbolised, since the liberation of the camps, the death of God and the death of morality). It's true that not only Jewish men, women and children were victims of the German barbarity, but, as Elie Wiesel's message from the permanent exhibition from Block 27 of the Auschwitz-Birkeanu State Museum reads: "Not all victims were Jewish in this place, but all Jews were victims". The Shoah is not an episode inside War World II, but a turning point in the history of humankind, and a catastrophe that embraces us all, Jewish and not not Jewish men and women, religious and not religious, believers and not believers, as the free, responsible and moral beings that we all are –or that we should be. A lot of the victims, in the midst of their desperation, entered into the gas chambers praying, holding to the hope that their horrifying end was not the ultimate end. With this dissertation I do not attempt to answer the eternal question of the existence of God, rather, I will try to interpret that scream to God as a longing for hope. I also intend to find a coherence between the thought of these two great thinkers for whom freedom and responsibilty define man: Frankl (who argues that there is a suprahuman dimension where an ultimate meaning exists and where the victims' suffering has to have a meaning, even if this meaning is completely incomprehensible in the human dimension) and Sartre (the atheist existentialist par excellence, for whom the world, human existence and suffering are absolutely contingent). In the first chapter I expose logotherapy and Sartrean existentialism: I describe the three dimensions of man, the three searches for meaning, the five consequences of "l'existence précède l'essence" and I speak about suicide. The second chapter delves into the unconscious God, the supra-human dimension, the ultimate meaning and the unconditional faith. In the third chapter I expose the freedom without God defended by Sartre, Sartre's ontology, Sartre's atheism, Sartre's humanism, and his ideas about responsibility, mauvaise foi, contingency, situation, and Angst. The fourth chapter is necessarily historical (while being philosophical too): I wonder about the death of God after Auschwitz, I argue and defend the uniqueness of the Holocaust (the Shoah is a turning point in the history of humankind), I describe the massacres before the extermination camps (Einsatzgruppen, Ordnungspolizei y Wehrmacht), the gigantic Auschwitz camp complex (Stammlager, Auschwitz-Birkenau y Monowitz-Buna), I reflect on God and evil (focusing on the children of Auschwitz), I describe Frankl's days in Auschwitz, I talk about God as hope, about immortality and escathology, I discuss God's cruelty, the relationship between Christianity and antisemitism and Islam and antisemitism, I question the silence of God, and I talk about the death of God and about the trial against God. In the fifth chapter I talk about the Franklean morality (a morality that concerns man and not God), on the basis of his love theory and his only work of theater (Synchronisation in Binkerwald), and the Sartrean morality (a morality that concerns a humanity without God), remembering Dostoyevsky, analysing Garcin's famous quote in Huis clos "L'enfer, c'est les Autres", crticizing Sartre's marxism and questioning (with Frankl's and Sartre's eyes) Brecht's verse "Erst kommt das Fressen, dann kommt die Moral"; at the end of the chapter I include my own reflection (and Frankl and Sartre's critique) about the impunity of the executioners and collaborators after the Holocaust (with God's permission). After the Conclusion, I add an Appendix about the lives of Frankl and Sartre, which helps understanding better their work. KEYWORDS: logotherapy, existentialism, search for meaning, freedom, responsibility, morality, Angst, suffering, survivors, victims, contingency, spirituality, religion, God, hope, antisemitism, guilt, Auschwitz, Holocaust, Shoah. (shrink)

INTRODUCTION BY NANCY FUMERO What is a translation that stalls comprehension? That, when read, parsed, obfuscates comprehension through any language – English, Portuguese. It is inevitable that readers expect fidelity from translations. That language mirror with a sort of precision that enables the reader to become of another location, condition, to grasp in English in a similar vein as readers of Portuguese might from João Guimarães Rosa’s GRANDE SERTÃO: VEREDAS. There is the expectation that translations enable mobility. That what was (...) written in one language be accessible in another. And that a translator is to serve as a mediator, acting ultimately in service to ideas within the source text. To disperse them. However, this notion of translation is partly antithetical to the ideas in Rosa’s work. Or, alternately, to convey the despair of terrain slipping beneath one’s feet, and to encounter the heightened suspense of magic, the translation, as part of its strategy, cannot devotedly rely on its original language, not as its source text. The work undertaken by Felipe W.Martinez is a new form of translation that risks everything in order to encounter the same treacherous knowing Rosa had traversed. And it takes its risks by not taking risks: by being, almost word for word, a literal translation. This is an approach that reductively converts, as opposed to translates. The idiomatic differences between English and Portuguese are not accented. The syntax is not finessed. Liberties are not assumed on account of improving readability. What stands, resoundingly amid such absences, is the awakened challenge of reading. The genuine peril of not knowing. That is, this translation, one that purports to know nothing, creates access into the guileful world Rosa had created in Portuguese. But not by translating. If anything, GRANDE SERTÃO: VEREDAS is speaking a cosmic language through a linguistic one. And W.Martinez does us the service of recognizing this, as what configures the shapes of words and sentences is not as simple as neologisms, portmanteaus, and digressions, but as terrifying as the path the fool traverses: all paths. As such, this translation doesn’t speak English, just as the original does not speak Portuguese. It is the assemblage of paradox as a new logic that can be navigated, if only one could suspend the comfort of readability, of expectation. If one could descend a mountain in the pitch dark of night, each step shocking the body, unable to acclimate to the unleveled heights. Without a doubt, the translation is incongruous to the Portuguese. Taking a small excerpt to compare: Eh, well, thereafter, the rest the Sir provide: comes the bread, comes the hand, comes the god, comes the dog. What is striking is the interplay between “god” and “dog”. To most English speakers, this anagram is a familiar one. But in Portuguese the words god (“deus”) and dog (“cão”) are not so closely linked. In fact, there is no direct mention of “deus” in Rosa’s text: Eh, pois, empós, o resto o senhor prove: vem o pão, vem a mão, vem o são, vem o cão. Both are fascinating. In Rosa’s excerpt, the rhythm is unmistakable and precise, despite, of course, the indices of hesitation: the commas, the Eh, the uncomfortable way of searching through prolongation and wait. This is the sort of paradox Rosa can engage within a sentence. W.Martinez’s does this as well, at a scale that reverberates beyond the sentence, and with one noticeable addition: deus. What may appear to be an overstep, to add such a weighted word that draws out wordplay but is, nevertheless, not in the source text, is exemplary of risk. The translation buzzes because of it. This is because throughout the text we encounter dogs frequently, as some primal beast on par with humans. The dog is one that masters and can be mastered. A creature that is at times its face, and at others a mask. It is a powerful presence. For the translator to be attuned to the reverent undercurrent attributed to this animal, and create within the translation such charged play in English from what was only an implication in Portuguese, is in tribute to the grand beauty within dissonance. What aberrant modes of writing and translation can teach us most assuredly, is that things, words, are not in states of rightness or wrongness, but of oscillation. This isn’t so different from what Rosa says himself: The Sir look…see: the most important and beautiful, of the world, is this: that the people are not always same, still were not completed — but that they go always shifting. They tune or detune. We find this so readily in W.Martinez’s translation, this tuning and detuning. Nancy Fumero Los Angeles GRAND SERTÃO: VEREDAS BY JOÃO GUIMARÃES ROSA TRANSLATED FROM THE PORTUGUESE BY FELIPE W.MARTINEZ Nonothing. Shots that the Sir heard were man brawling not, God be. Bleach white sights on the tree in the backyard, down in the river. By my right. I do this every day, I like; from the bad of boyhood. Thereof they came to call on me. Case of a calf: a white calf, errorful, eyes of to not be—saw selves—; and with a mask of a dog! They told me; I didn’t want to catch a sight. Same that, by the defects of birth, upturned lips, looked to be a laughing man. Folkface, dogface: they determined—it was the devil. Bananas. Killed it. Do not know who owned it. They came to borrow my guns. I caved. I’ve no power to impose. Oh, sir, you laugh certain laughs…Look: when it’s a true shot, first the dogs begin to bark, instantly—after, then, you see who’s handed death. Sir, endure, this is the Sertão. Some want that it is not: that situated Sertão is in and out of those general fields, they say, end of the road, highlands, the other Urucuia. Toleima. For those of Cortino and of Curvelo, then, isn’t here said Sertão? Ah! That there’s more! To place the Sertão it’s told: it’s where the pastures lack latches; where one can tear off ten, fifteen leagues without running into a houseinhabitant; where criminalousness lives out its christ jesus. Sifted out from the tightening grip of the law. The Urcuia comes from the western mountains. But today, its banks, give all—farmlands of farms, pastures of meadows of good yield, low tides, cultures that go kill for kill, until these virgins there are. The general fields run round. These general fields are without size. Ultimately, whichever one one approves, the Sir knows: bread or breads, it’s a question of heads…the Sertão is everywhere. Of the devi? No comment. Sir ask the dwellers. Falsely I fear they unspeak that name of his—only say: whatsitcalled. Volt! no… Whosoever over avoids it, lives with it. In the sentence of one Aristides—who exists in the first palm grove on the right hand side, called Vereda-of-Cow-Calm-of-Saint-Rita—everyone believes: he can't pass in three designated places: then can be heard the tiny cry, behind, a little voice warning:— "Here I come! Here I come!... "— that is the Capirote, the whatsitcalled... And one Jise Simplicio—who anyone from here will swear he keeps an imp in house, a little satanite, imprisoned and obliged to help in all greedful deeds; reason that Simplicio emprises en route to complete riches. As such, for this they say too that his beast bristles and refuses, denying his banner, unyielding, when he wishes to mount... Superstition. Jise Simplicio and Aristides, continue getting fatter, thence unheard or heard. Still the Sir study: right now, in these days of time, you have people purporting that the devil proper stopped, mid-passage, in Andrequice. A boy out of there, to whom'd appeared, and there lauded that, to get here—normally, by horse, a day-n-half—he was capable of such with only some twenty minutes enough... by coasting the River of Chico by the headwaters! Or, too, who knows—sans offense—will not have been, for example, even yourself the Sir who announced such, when you passed by there, for fun run funny? Thereof, not my given crime, I know that wasn't. And evil I wanted not. Only that one question, in hours, at times, brightens peaceful reason. But, the Sir understand: if such a boy, there was, he wanted to dupe. Because, hey, that, to cut the river off by the springs, would be the same thing as one redoubling in the internals of this our state of ours, costant of a journey of some three months... Then? Whatsitcalled? Dodo. The fantastication. And, the respect of giving him such these names of delicacy, is what it is for one to want to invoke that he form of form, with his presence! Not that is. I, personally, almost that have lost in him the creed, deserving to Deus; is the that to the Sir I say, to pure-secret. I know that it is well established, that it greases our Saintly-Gospels. On occasion, I conversed with a young seminarian, super suitable, conferring in the book of prayers and coated in vestments, with a stick of black-sage in hand—prosed that he went auxilitator to the father, to extract the Cujo, from the body living of an oldwoman, in Waterfalls-of-Bulls, he went with the vicar of Field-Round... I conceive. The Sir not is as I? I didn't believe a single thing. Compadre mine Quelemem describes that that which reveals effect are the low spirits meager, of third, adoing in the worst darkness and with anxieties of connecting selves with the livers—they give support. Compadre mine Quelemem is who much me consoles—Quelemem of Goias. But he has to live far from here, in Jijuja, Vereda of Buriti Dark... Ahrr, I leave myself there, that in enevildemonment or with support—the Sir too must have had known diverse, men, women. As not yes? For me, umpteen I've seen, that I've learned. Ma-Neigh, Blood-o'Other, or Legion-Lips, or Tear-em-Down, Cold-Cutter, or Sissy-Goat, one Treciziano, or Verdigris... or Hermogenes... o'them, pileload. If I could forget so many names... I'm not a man for calming horses! And, same, whom of yes of to be jagunço self enters, yea is for some competence entrant of demonion. Will it not? Will it? From first, I made and mixed, and to think not I thought. I didn't have the deadlines. I lived pulling difficult from difficult, fish alive on griddle: who lives asp'rously, no fantasies. But, now, fete of fate to me comes, and sans little disquietudes, I'm from creaky net. And myself invented in this like, of to speculate ideas. The devil exists and nonexists? I say the saying. Opennouncement. These melancholies. The Sir sees: exists waterfall; and since? But waterfall is gulch of ground, and water so pouring from it, retumbling; the Sir consume that water, or undo that bankment, remainder waterfall any? To live is negotiation much perilous. I explain to the Sir: the devil vigors inside of human, the wrinkles of human— or is the human ruin, or the human of adversess. I free, per se, citizen, is that not has devil notone. Notone!— is the that I say. The Sir approve? Me declares total, frank— is high merit that me make: and to beg might, increased. This case— by rashtravagance that me they see— is of mine certain importance. God grant not was... But, not say that the Sir, awised and instructed, that agrees in people of them?! Not? You I appreciate! Your high opinion composes my value. Yea I knew, waited for it— yea the field! Ah, a we, in oldness, we lack of to have plowing of rest. You I appreciate. Is devil notone. Nor esprit. Never I've seen. Someone ought to see, then was I myself, this your servant. Was I you to tell... Well, the devil regulate his state black, ins creatures, ins womens, ins humans. E'en: ins childrens— I declaim. Since not is said: "boy—trainee of the devil"? And ins thes uses, ins plants, ins waters, in terra, in wind... Manures. …The devil in the street, in the middle of the vortex... Hey? Hey? Ah. Figuration mine, of worse by back, the certain memories. Mal-make me! I suffer pain of to tell not…Meliorate, if chillingly: well, in a ground and with equal format of branches and leaves, not give to cassava-calm, that is eaten common, and the cassava-mad that kills? Now, the Sir yea saw a strangeness? A cassava-sweet can rapidly to turn agonizing— motives not I know, at times is said that is for replanted in the terrain always, with mutations then, of caules—go embittering, of s’much in s’much, of its self takes poisons. And, well look: the other, the cassava-mad, too is that at times can fix calm, the estimate, of is to eat sans notone mal. And what this is? Eh, the Sir yea saw, for to see, the ugliness of hate pleated, facetorqued, on the faces of one cobrarattlesnake? Observed the porker fat, capita day more felicity brute, capable of, could, snort and engulf for its own dirty coziness the world total? And sparrowhawk, blackbird, some, the features of they yea represent the need of cleave for before, rend and shred by beak, appears a knife much fine for ruin I desire. Total. Has even twisted races of stone, horrorous, venomous— that spoil mortal the aquas, if they are buried beneath of well; the devil inside of them sleeps: they are the devil. Is known? And the demon— that is only thus the significance of one mercury malign— have order of to follow the path of him, have license to brag?! Arr, he is variegated in all! What the what wastes, goes spending the devil of inside of the people, by itttybits, is the reasonable to suffer. And the delight of love—compadre mine Quelemem says. Family. Really? Is, and not is. The Sir think and not think. Total is and not is… Almost all more grave criminous ferocity, always is much good husband, good son, good father, and is good-friend-of-your-friends! I know of those. Solo that have the afters— and Deus, joined. I spy many nimbi. But, in veracity, son, too, softens. Look: one called Aleixo, resident a league from Step-of-Sour, in Of-Sand, was the man of major badness calm that yea you saw. Me agreed that near the house of his had a weir, amidst the palms, with traíras, for souls of enormous, desenormous, to the real, that received fame; the Aleixo gave of to eat to them, in hours just, they self accustomed to if assuch of lunacies, in order to gobble, seemed to be fishes instructed. One day, solo for grace rustic, he killed an oldman who by there passed, destitute begging alms. The Sir not doubt—have people, in this bored world, that kill solo in order to see someone make grimace… Eh, well, thereafter, the rest the Sir provide: comes the bread, comes the hand, comes the god, comes the dog. This Aleixo was man afamilied, had children small; they were the love of his, total, absurdity. Gave good, that not even a year there passed, of to killed the oldman poor, and the children of Aleixo there they asickened. Smallepidemic of measles, they said, but complex; they never heal. When, then, they healed. But the eyes of theirs vermillionized high in an inflame of spraining to rebellion; and nexthing— the that not I know is if they went of at once, or one later and later other and other— they remained blind. Blind, sans remission of one sweet of light of this Ours! The Sir imagine: stairset— three boys and one girl— all blind. Sans remediable. The Aleixo not lost the judgment, but he changed; ah, mutated complete— now lives of band of Deus, sweating to be good and charitous in all his hours of night and of day. Appears even that he fixed the felicity, that before not was. He himself says he was a man of luck, because Deus wanted to have pity of him, to transform for there the route of his soul. That I heard, and me it gave rage. Reason of the children. If being castigated, what culpa of the let-there-bes of Aleixo those little children had?! Compadre mine Quelemem reproved my uncertainties. That, for certain, inother life returnaound, the children too had been the most wicked, of the mass and part of the father, demons of the same kettle of place. Sir the what thinks? And the oldman, assassinated? — I know the Sir goes to discuss. Well, too. In order that he had a sin of crime, in the body, by to pay. If the people— conforming compadre mine Quelemem is who says— if the people turn to to incarnate renovated, I contemplate even that enemy of death can come as son of the enemy. Look see: if to myself I say, has a subject Pedro Pindo, neighbor of here more six leagues, man of good for all in all, he and the woman of his, always been good, of goodness. They have a son of some ten years called Valtei—name modern, is the that the population of here now appreciates, the Sir knows. Well this-little-thing, thislet, since that some understanding illuminated in him, deed demonstrated the that is: petition stepfather, acid burner, likeful of ruin of inside of the profundity of the species of its nature. In which that torments, to the slowly, of all beasts or raisinglings little that quarrel; one time he found a creole woman hooched foolish sleeping, he arranged a shard of bottle, lashed at three points on the stern of the legs of hers. The what this boy drooled seeing, is bleeding hen or to knife pig.— “I enjoy of to kill…”— one occasion he teeny me told. He opened in me a fright; because: birdy that self leans over— the flight yea is ready! Well the Sir oversee: the pa, Pedro Pindo, mode of to correct this, and the ma, they give in him, misery and mast—they cast the boy sans to eat, they tied to trees in the yard, he nude, unplumed, even in June cold, they tilled the bittybody of his with the trammel and with the goblet, after they cleansed the skin of the sanguine, with bottle gourd brine. The people know, spy, fix wasted. The boy yea relowered of thinness, the eyes entering, caress of bones, enskulled, and tuberculated, the time total hacking, coughness of the that draw parched pectorals. Arr, that now, visible, the Pindo and the woman self habituated of on him hit, of little bit in little they were creating in this a pleasure ugly of diversion— as they regulate the canings in hours certain comfortable, until they call people to see the example good. I think that boy not endure, yea there is in the ta-da, not arrive for the lent to come… Ooee-ooee, then?! Not being as compadre mine Quelemem to want, that explication is that the Sir bestowed? That boy had to be a man. He should, in swing, terrible perversities. Soul of his was in the pitch. Demonstrated. And, now, paid. Ah, but, happens, when he’s crying and paining, he suffers equal that as was as a boy good… Bird, I saw all, in this world! Yea I saw even horse with hiccups… —the that the thing most costous that is. Good, but the Sir may say, should of: and in the start— for offenses and arts, the people— as for that was that s’much amended was started? Ey, ey, ey all collided. Compadre mine Quelemem, too. Am solo a sertanite, in these high ideas I navigate mal. Am much poor poor-thing. Envy my pedigree and of ones conform the Sir, with total reading and doctoration. Not is that I be illiterate. I spelt, years and middle, midly speller, memory and palmer. I had master, Master Lucas, in the Curralinho, he memorized grammar, the operations, rule-of-three, even geography and study patria. On leaves great of paper, with caprice I traced handsome maps. Ah, not is for to speak: but, since of the start, me they thought sophisticated of side. And that I merited of to go to course latin, in Lesson Waterlily—that too they said. Time nostalgic! Going today, I appreciate a good book, despaced. On the farm The Lilittlelemon, of one mine friend Vito Soziano, so sign of this almanac thick, of logoglyphs and conundrums and other divided matters, all year come. In s’much, I place primacy is in the reading advantageous, life of saints, virtues and examples— missionary astute engambling the Indians, or Saint Francis of Assis, Saint Anthony, Saint Gerald… I like much of moral. To ratiocinate, exhort the others for the good way, to acounsel to just. Mine woman, that the Sir knows, vigils for me: much prayer. She is a blessable. Compadre mine Quelemem always says that I may to aquiet my fears on conscience, that being well-attended, terrible good-esprits me protect. Eep! With like… As is of saint effect, I help with mine to want to accredit. But not even always can I. The Sir knew: I total the mine life I thought for me, lining, I am born different. I am and I same. I divert of total the world… I almost that nothing not I know. But I disconfide of many things. The Sir, conceding, I say: in order to think long, I am dog master— the Sir loose in mine front an idea ease and I research that by profundity of total the backwoods, amen! Look: the should of to have, was of so reunited-selves the wise, politicos, constitutions graded, closed the definitive the notion— to proclaim for one time, art assemblies, that not have devil notone, not exists, not possible. Valor of law! Solo assuch, they gave tranquility good to the people. Because the government not cares?! Ah, I know that not is possible. Not me settled the Sir for philistine. One this is to place ideas arranged, other is to deal with country of people, of flesh and sanguine, of thousand-and-many miseries… S’many people—gives scare of to know—and notone so calms: All nascenting, crescendoing, so wedding, wanting collocation of employment, consumables, health, abundance, to be important, wanting rain and affairs good… Of luck that lacks of so to choose: or we t’weave of to live in the salacious common, or care solo of religion solo. I could to be: father clergyman, if not chief of jagunços; for other things not was I birthed. But mine oldness yea principaled I erred of total account. And the rheumatism… There as whom says: in the primers. Ahem. Hey? Hey? The that more I think, I testify and explain: all-the-world is mad. The Sir, I, we, the people all. For this is that so lacks principally of religion: in order to desendodorize, to disdodoate. Pray is that heals of lunacy. In the general. This is that is the salvation-of-the-soul…Much religion your servant! I here, not I lose occasion of religion. I profit of all. I drink water of all rivers… One solo, for me is little, maybe not me arrives. I pray christian, catholic, I burrow the certain; and I accept the prayers of compadre mine Quelemem, doctrine of he, of Kardec. But, when I can, I go in the Mindubim, where one Matias is believer, methodist: the people so accuse of sinner, reads high the bible, and why, singing hymns beautiful of his. Total me quiets, me suspends. Whatever small shade me refreshes. But is solo much provisory. I wanted to pray— the time total. Many people not me approve, they think that law of Deus is privileges, invariable. And I! Doof! I Detest! The what I am? — the what I do, that want, much curia. And in face of total I face, executed. I? —not I trammel. Look: I have a black girl, Maria Leoncia, long from here not she lives, the prayers of her afame much virtue of power. Well to her I pay, every month— ordering of to pray for me one third, every saint day, and, on the Sundays, a rosary. Value, so values. Mine woman not sees mal in this. And I am, yea mandated word for an other, of the voyage-voyage, a Izina Calanga, in order to come here, I heard of that prayer too with grand mermermerits, I go to effect with she treatment equal. I want handful of those, me defending in Deus, reunited of me in volta… Cuts of Christ! To live is much perilous… To want the good with too much force, of incertain way, can yea to be being so wanting the mal, per to initiate. These humans! All they pull the world for itself, for the to concert amended. But capita one solo sees and understands the things of one his world. Amountain, the most supro, most serious was Mediero Vaz. That one man ancient… his Joaozy Ben-Ben, the most brave of all, no-one never can decipher how he by inside consisted. Joca Ramiro— grand man prince!— was politico. Zé Bebelo wanted to be politico, but had and not had luck: fox that lingered. So Candelario so demonized, by to think that was with illness mal. Titao Passos was the by the appreciation of friends: solo per via of them, of his same amities, were that such high so ajagunçoed. Antonio Do— severe bandit. But by half, grand majority half that be. Andalecio, in the profound, a good man-of-good, being raving in his total justice. Ricardao, same, wanted was to be rich in peace: for this he warred. Solo the Hermogenes was that born formed tiger, and assassinite. And the “Ofidios White”? Ah, not me speak. Ah this… joyless mischeivious, that was— that was a poor boy of the destiny… So good, congruous. The Sir heard, I you told: the ruin with the ruin, they terminate by the spine-bushes so to crack— Deus awaits that spendance. Boy!: Deus is patience. The contrary, is the devil. So consumes. The Sir file knife on knife— and file— that so they scrape. Even the rocks of the profound, one of in the other, they go-so aroundabounding even, that the rivulet rolls. Per enquantity, that I think, total as hath, in this world, is because so merits and lacks. Afterly precise. Deus not so reports with rifle, not garrotes the regulation. For what? Quit: goof with goof—one day, some illumination and learn: smart. Solo that, at times, for most auxiliar, Deus begets, in the middle, a pinch of pepper… Therebe? Well, for example: some time, I went of train, there in Seven-Lagoons, for parts of to consult a medical, of name me indicated. He went vested well, and in car of first, by via of the doubts, not me they shadowed for jagunço ancient. It goes and happens, that, close same of me, enfront, he took aseat, returning from the wild North, a mac Jazevedao, delegate professionale. Came with a capanga of his, an undercover, and I well knew the two, of that s’much a was ruin, as the other ruin was. The veracity to say, first I had the strict of me to surpasss for one lonng, to mutate of my place. Judgement me told, meliorate stay. Well, looking, I looked. And— you I tell: never I saw face of man furnished of brutez or malady more, of the them in that. As that was ogre, trussed of thickset, relustered of crude in the eyes small, and armed a chin of stone, toweringbrow; not of mid nor forehead. Not laughed, not so laughed not even one time; but, speaking or silent, the people appeared always to him some teeth, prey pointed of canids. Arr, and blustered, an ittybit. Solo growled curt, low, the mid-words grizzled. He came relooking, historicizing the documents— one by one the leaves with portraits and with the blacks of the digits of jagunços, lifters of horses and criminouses of death. That application of work, in one thing of those, generated the ire in the people. The undercover, busybodyguard, total close, seated joined, attending, excelling of to be dog. Me made a dread, but solo in the goof of the corpus, not in the intern of the courages. One hour, one of those reports fell— and I bent quickly, I knew there precisely by why, not I wanted, not I thought— even today I raise shame of this— I picked the paper of the ground, and delivered to him. Thereof, I say: I had more rage, because I did that; but there yea it was done. The man not even me looked, not even said notone thankfulment. Event he soles of the shoes of his— solo looking— that soles rough thick, bent of enormous, appearing iron bronzed. Because I knew: This Jazevedao, when he apprehended someone, the primary quiet thing that proceeded was that he came entering, sans to have to to say, feigning some hurry, and go stepping on the top of the feet of the poorthings. And that on these occasions he gave laughters, gave… Well, geck! I delivered to him the leaf of paper, and went leaving of there, by to have hand on me of not to destroy by shots that subject. Meat that much they weigh… And umbilicated beginning of belly pot bellied, that me created will… With my lightness, joyful that I’d kill. But, the barbarities that this delegate made and happened, the Sir not even has callus in heart to be able me to hear. He achieved of many men and women to cry blood, for the simple universolo ours here. Sertão. The Sir knows: sertão is where mandates who is strong, with the guile. And bullet is a tidbit of metal… S’much, I say: Jazevedao— one assuch, should of to have, needed? Ah, need. Leather ruined is that calls goad of point. That there be that, after— business particular of he— in the life or in the other, each Jazevedao, accomplished the that he has, desclimbs in his time of pain, too, until to pay the that he gave— compadre mine Quelemem is there, in order to fiscalize. The Sir knows: the peril that is to live… But solo of the mode, of these, by ugly instrument, was that the jagunsaga so finished. Sir thinks that Antonio Do or Olivino Oliviano were going to fix goodies by pure spelling of itself, or by begging of the infelicitous, or by always to hear sermon of father? You I think! In the aims… Of jagunço comported active in order so to repent in the middle of his jagunsagas, solo I lay of one: called Joe Cazuzo— was in smashing of one shotshow, for on the summit of the place Sierra New, district of river rusted, on the stream Traçadal. We made mal minority small, and they closed in order summit of us the personnel of one Coronel Adalvino, forted politico, with many soldiers uniformed in the center, commanding of the Lieutenant Epiphany Helm, that after fixed captain. We lasted hour more hour, and yea gave almost of encircled. There, of misslip, that Joe Cazuzo— man much valiant— so kneeled turned on the ground of the thick, lifted the arms that not even shoots of Jatoba dry, and solo yell, howl clear and howl deaf:— “I saw the Virgin Ours, in the resplendor of the Heavens, with her children of angels!... ” He screamed not touched. — “I saw the Virgin!... ” He ensouled? We desequaled. Bolt for my horse—that I thought— I leaped in mal seat, noteven I knew in which rupture-time I unfastened the halter, of tied up it foot of timber. I flew, arrived. Bullet come. The pasture roared. In the brush, the fear of the people so goes to the whole, one fear intentional. I could to lash out, fated burro brute, giv-that, giv-that. Some two or three bullets so drovein the pad of the mine saddle, they perforated of to tear away almost much the kapok of the filling. Horse trembled in pro, in middle of gallop, I know: thinks in the owner. I not fit of to be more well shrunken. Bulleted came to the sack that I had on the back, with few mine things. And other, of fusil, in ricochet decreed, heated my thigh, sans me wound, the Sir see: bullet does the what to want—so pierced impressed, between in me and the harness! Times crazy… Burumbum!: the horse so kneeled in the fall, dead perhaps, and I yea falling for front, embraced in foliage full, branched and linias, that me swayed and skewered, done I was pendulating in web of spider… Whither? I traversed that life total… Of fear of anxiety, I ruptured to read with mine corpus that forest, I know there — and me fell world below, rolled for the hollow of a grotto closed of shrubs, always me grasped— rolled same assuch: after: after, when I saw mine hands, total on they that not was withdrawn sanguine, was smeared green, on the digits, of leaves living that I pulled and mashed… I landed on the sedge of the profound— and a beast dark gave a releap, with a sneeze, too mad of fright: that was a papa-mel, that I descried; in order to flee, this is solely. Bigger being I, me doused mine overcoat; I spigotted total. And of one bit of thought: if that beast irara lying there then there not had cobra. I took the place of his. Existed cobra notone. I could me to lose. I was solo spineless, softness, but that not deadened, inside, the collisions of the heart. I gasped. I conceived that they came, me kill. Not even did mal, me mattered not. Assuch, some moments, at least I guarded the license of term in order me to rest. Conforming I thought in Diadorim. Solo I thought was in he. One joão-congo sang. I wanted to die thinking in my friend Diadorim, hand-o-bro, who was on the Sierra of WoodO’Bow, almost on the border baiana, with our other half of the so-candelarios… With my friend Diadorim me embraced, sentiment my went-flew right for he… Ay, arr, but: that this mine mouth not has order notone. I am accounting outside, things divagated. In the Sir me confide? Til-that, til-that. Say the angel-of-the-guard… But, conforming I came: after so knew, that same the soldiers of the Lieutenant and the goats of Coronel Adalvino remitted of to respect the blast of that Joe Cazuzo. And that this ended being the man most pacificious of the world, fabricator of oil and sacristan, in the Saint Sundays White. Times! For total, cleaned revelation, I fix thinking. I like. Meliorate, for the idea if well to open, is travelling in train-of-iron. Could, lived to top and to bottom, inside of it. Information that I ask: same in the Heavens, end of end, how is that the soul wins so to forget s’much sufferments and maladies, in the received and in the given? The how? The Sir knows: are things of hideous ofmuch, have. Pain of corpus and pain of idea mark forted, that forted as the total love and rage of hate. Goes, sea… Of luck that, then, the Firmiano, by appellationed Louse-of-Snake, so leoprosized with the leg disconformed, thickening, of that disease that not so cures; and not discern almost more, constant the branchials in the eyes, of the cataracts. Of before, years, had to of so disarray of the jagunsaga. Well, one occasion, some was on the ranch of his, on the High Jeuitai, after accounted—that, turns time, comes subject, he would say: “Me give yearning is of to seize a soldier, and such, for one good flay, with knife blind… But, first, to castrate…” The Sir conceive? Who has more dose of demon in self is Indian, any race of brusque. Folk see nation ofthese, for there profound of the generals of Goias, theofwhere has vagarous grand rivers, of aquas always so clear pleasantly, running of down crystal rosed… Louse-of-Snake gave of sanguine of heathen. Sir me will say: but that he pronounced that out of mouth, manner of to represent that yet not was old decadent. Opus of to oppose, for fear of to be tame, and cause in order so to see respected. Total listened for such rule: palavered of ruins, for more so valued, because we to the environs is hard durability. The worst, but, is that they finish, through the same ford, given of one day to execute the declared, in the real. I saw s’much crudity! Pain not pays to account; if I go, I collide. And me dedrip, three that me sicken, this total. Me convokes that the personnel, today in day, is good of heart. This is, good in the trivial. Malices wildwants, and perversities, always have some, but scarcities. Generation mine, true, was not assuch. Ah, goes to turn a time, in which not is used more to kill people… I yea am old. Good, I was saying: question, this that me excavates… Ah, I formed that question, for compadre mine Quelemem. That me responded: that, for close to heaven, we so amplified so, that total the uglies past so exhaled of not to be—fated sans-modus from time of youngster, mal-arts. As we not lack of to have remorse of the which divulged in the pulsation of his nightmares of one night. Assuch that: fleeced-so, flourished-so! Ahem. For this said, is that the journey to the Heavens is delayed. I confide with compadre mine Quelemem, the Sir knows: reason of creed same that has—that, for total the mal, that so does, one day so repays, the exact. Subject assuch rises three times, in ante of to want to facilitate in any minutia reprehensible… Compadre mine Quelemem never speaks vacant, not subtreats. Solo that this to he not I go to expose. We never should have to declare that accept entire the alien—that is what is the rule of the king! The Sir look…see: the most important and beautiful, of the world, is this: that the people are not always same, still were not completed — but that they go always shifting. They tune or detune. Truth major. Is the that the life me taught. This that me animates, mound. And, other thing: the devil and the brutes; but Deus is treacherous! Ah, a beauty of treacherous— gives like! The force of his, when he wants— boy!— me gives the fear dread! Deus comes coming: no one not sees. He does in the law of gentle— assuch is the miracle. And Deus attacks beautiful, so amusing, so economizes. The well: one day in a tannery, the little knife mine I had dropped inside of a tank, solo soup of bark of tan, stryphnodendron adstringens, angico, there I know. —“Tomorrow I try…”— I said, withmyself. Because it was of night, light notone I not disputed. Ah, then, I found: on the other day, early, the knife, the iron of it, had been gnawed, almost by half, by that aqua dark, total quiet. I left, for more to see. Crack, fuse! Know the what was? Well, in that same of afternoon, there: of the little knife solo so found the handle… The handle, for not to be of cold metal, but of horn of deer. There is: Deus… Good, the Sir heard knows, the that knows me understands… We sum, not think that religion fractures. Sir think the contrary. Visible that, those other times, I painted—belief that the neoglaziovia variegata lifts the flower. Ah, good my joy… Boyhood. But boyhood is task for more later so to deny. Too, I of that of to think in vague in s’much, lost mine hand-of-man for the management hot, in the middle of all. But, today, that I ratiocinated, and think the endeavor, not nor for this not I give for low my competence, in a fire-and-iron. The to see. Would approach would come here with war on me, with bad parts, with other laws, or with excessive looks, and I even draw to ignite this zone, ay, if, if! Is in the mouth of the blunderbuss: is in the rete-te-tem… And lonelyonly not I am, there-of-the. For not this, I was I placed encircle my mine people. Look the Sir: here, close, vereda below, the Paspe — cropper my — is mine. More league, if that, have the Herpetotheres, and have the compadre Ciril, him and three children, I know that they serve. Band of that hand, the Alaripe: knew the Sir the that is that so boasts, in rifleation and by the knife, one cearense did this! After more: the João Innatal, the Quipes, Lophiosilurus-of-claws. And the Fafafa— this gave fights high, all side with me, in the combat old of the Anteater-such: we cleaned the wind of whom not had order of to respirate, and ante these we desencompassed… The Fafafa has a mass of mares. He raises horses good. Even a little more distant, on the ped-of-sierra, of band mine was the Sesfred, Jesualdo, the Nelson, and João Concliz. Some others. The Triol… And not I go valuing? I leave terra with them, of theirs the what is mine is, we close that we not even brothers. For what I want to gather richness? They are there, of arms aireated. Enemy to come, we cross called, gathering: is hour of one good shotshowerment in peace, they exp’riment to see. I say this to the Sir, of confidence. Too, not go to think in double. We want is to work, propose tranquility. Of me, person, I live for mine woman, that total mode-meliorate merits, and for the devotion. Well-to want of mine woman was that me assisted, prayers of hers, graces. Love comes of love. I say. In Diadorim, I think too— but Diadorim is the mine nebulina… Now, well: not I wanted to touch on this more— of the Tineaous; arrive. But has a nevertheless: I ask: the Sir believe, think trust of truth in that parlance, of with the demon so to able to deal with pact? No, no is no? I knew that not there. I spoke of favas. But I like of total good confirmation. To vend you proper soul… Inventionate false! And, soul, the what is? Soul of has to be thing internal supremed, much more of the of inside, and is solo, of the that one if thought: ah, soul sheer! Decision of to vend soul is fearless moll, fantasied of moment, has not the obedience legal. Can I to vend those good terras, thereof of between the Veredas-Four— that are of one Mr. Admiral, who resides in the capital federal? Can I some? Then, if one boy boy is, and for this not so authorizes of to negotiate… And we, this I know, at times is solo fated boy. Mal that in mine life I prepared, I was in a certain infancy in dreams — total runs and arrives so swift —; will be that if hath flame of responsibilities? If dream; yea so did… I gave rapadura to the chump! Ahem. Well. If his soul, and has, it is of Deus established, not even that the person want or not want. Not is vendible. The Sir not thinks? Me declare, frank, I beg. Ah, you I appreciate. You so see that the Sir knows much, in idea firm, beyond of to have letter of doctor. You I appreciate, for much. Your company me gives high pleasures. In terms, I liked that I would live here, or close, was a help. Here not so has conviviation that to instruct. Sertão. Knows the Sir: sertão is where the thought of the people so forms more forted of the than power of the place. To live is much perilous… Eh, that you so go? Yeayea? Is that not. Today, no. Tomorrow, no. Not I consense. The Sir me forgive, but in endeavor of mine friendship accept: the Sir stay. After fifth of-morning-early, the Sir wanting to go, then goes, same me leaves feeling your absence. But, today or tomorrow, no. Visit, here in house, with me, is for three days! But, the Sir really intends to trespass the field this sea of territotires, for sortment of to confer the what exists? You have your motives. Now— I say for me — the Sir comes, came late, Times were, the customs mutate. Almost that, of legitimate loyal, little surplus, not even no excess more nothing. The bands good of valientoughs they reparted their end; many who were jagunço, by ouch pain, beg alms. Same as the herdsmen they doubt of to come in the commerce vested of clothes entire of leather, they think that garb of jerkin is ugly and boor. And even the herd in the shrubbed pasture goes waning less mad, more educated: casted of zebu, dissee with the rest of corralers and captiveborns. Always, in the generals is to the poverty, to the sadness. A sadness that even gladdens. But, then, for a crop reasonable of bizzarancies, I recounsel of the Sir to entest journey more dilated. Not were my desmight, by acids and rheumatism, there I went. I guided the Sir till total. March 2013 San Diego, CA ORIGINAL TEXT NONADA. TIROS QUE O SENHOR ouviu foram de briga de homem não, Deus esteja. Alvejei mira em árvores no quintal, no baixo do córrego. Por meu acerto. Todo dia isso faço, gosto; desde mal em minha mocidade. Daí, vieram me chamar. Causa dumbezerro: um bezerro branco, erroso, os olhos de nem ser – se viu –; e com máscara de cachorro. Me disseram; eu não quis avistar. Mesmo que, por defeito como nasceu, arrebitado de beiços, esse figurava rindo feito pessoa. Cara de gente, cara de cão: determinaram – era o demo. Povo prascóvio. Mataram. Dono dele nem sei quem for. Vieram emprestar minhas armas, cedi. Não tenho abusões. O senhor ri certas risadas... Olhe: quando é tiro de verdade, primeiro a cachorrada pega a latir, instantaneamente – depois, então, se vai ver se deu mortos. O senhor tolere, isto é o sertão. Uns querem que não seja: que situado sertão é por os campos-gerais a fora a dentro, eles dizem, fim de rumo, terras altas, demais do Urucuia. Toleima. Para os de Corinto e do Curvelo, então, o aqui não é dito sertão? Ah, que tem maior! Lugar sertão se divulga: é onde os pastos carecem de fechos; onde um pode torar dez, quinze léguas, sem topar com casa de morador; e onde criminoso vive seu cristo-jesus, arredado do arrocho de autoridade. O Urucuia vem dos montões oestes. Mas, hoje, que na beira dele, tudo dá – fazendões de fazendas, almargem de vargens de bom render, as vazantes; culturas que vão de mata em mata, madeiras de grossura, até ainda virgens dessas lá há. O gerais corre em volta. Esses gerais são sem tamanho. Enfim, cada um o que quer aprova, o senhor sabe: pão ou pães, é questão de opiniães... O sertão está em toda a parte. Do demo? Não gloso. Senhor pergunte aos moradores. Em falso receio, desfalam no nome dele – dizem só: o Que-Diga. Vote! não... Quem muito se evita, se convive. Sentença num Aristides – o que existe no buritizal primeiro desta minha mão direita, chamado a Vereda-da-Vaca-Mansa-deSanta-Rita – todo o mundo crê: ele não pode passar em três lugares, designados: porque então a gente escuta um chorinho, atrás, e uma vozinha que avisando: – “Eu já vou! Eu já vou!...” – que é o capiroto, o que-diga... E um José Simpilício – quem qualquer daqui jura ele tem um capeta em casa, miúdo satanazim, preso obrigado a ajudar em toda ganância que executa; razão que o Simpilício se empresa em vias de completar de rico. Apre, por isso dizem também que a besta pra ele rupeia, nega de banda, não deixando, quando ele quer amontar... Superstição. José Simpilício e Aristides, mesmo estão se engordando, de assim nãoouvir ou ouvir. Ainda o senhor estude: agora mesmo, nestes dias de época, tem gente porfalando que o Diabo próprio parou, de passagem, no Andrequicé. Um Moço de fora, teria aparecido, e lá se louvou que, para aqui vir – normal, a cavalo, dum dia-e-meio – ele era capaz que só com uns vinte minutos bastava... porque costeava o Rio do Chico pelas cabeceiras! Ou, também, quem sabe – sem ofensas – não terá sido, por um exemplo, até mesmo o senhor quem se anunciou assim, quando passou por lá, por prazido divertimento engraçado? Há-de, não me dê crime, sei que não foi. E mal eu não quis. Só que uma pergunta, em hora, às vezes, clareia razão de paz. Mas, o senhor entenda: o tal moço, se há, quis mangar. Pois, hem, que, despontar o Rio pelas nascentes, será a mesma coisa que um se redobrar nos internos deste nosso Estado nosso, custante viagem de uns três meses... Então? Que-Diga? Doideira. A fantasiação. E, o respeito de dar a ele assim esses nomes de rebuço, é que é mesmo um querer invocar que ele forme forma, com as presenças! Não seja. Eu, pessoalmente, quase que já perdi nele a crença, mercês a Deus; é o que ao senhor lhe digo, à puridade. Sei que é bem estabelecido, que grassa nos Santos- Evangelhos. Em ocasião, conversei com um rapaz seminarista, muito condizente, conferindo no livro de rezas e revestido de paramenta, com uma vara de maria-preta na mão – proseou que ia adjutorar o padre, para extraírem o Cujo, do corpo vivo de uma velha, na Cachoeira-dos-Bois, ele ia com o vigário do Campo-Redondo... Me concebo. O senhor não é como eu? Não acreditei patavim. Compadre meu Quelemém descreve que o que revela efeito são os baixos espíritos descarnados, de terceira, fuzuando nas piores trevas e com ânsias de se travarem com os viventes – dão encosto. Compadre meu Quelemém é quem muito me consola – Quelemém de Góis. Mas ele tem de morar longe daqui, na Jijujã, Vereda do Buriti Pardo... Arres, me deixe lá, que – em endemoninhamento ou com encosto – o senhor mesmo deverá de ter conhecido diversos, homens, mulheres. Pois não sim? Por mim, tantos vi, que aprendi. Rincha- Mãe, Sangued’Outro, o Muitos-Beiços, o Rasgaem-Baixo, Faca-Fria, o Fancho-Bode, um Treciziano, o Azinhavre... o Hermógenes... Deles, punhadão. Se eu pudesse esquecer tantos nomes... Não sou amansador de cavalos! E, mesmo, quem de si de ser jagunço se entrete, já é por alguma competência entrante do demônio. Será não? Será? De primeiro, eu fazia e mexia, e pensar não pensava. Não possuía os prazos. Vivi puxando difícil de dificel, peixe vivo no moquém: quem mói no asp’ro, não fantaseia. Mas, agora, feita a folga que me vem, e sem pequenos dessossegos, estou de range rede. E me inventei neste gosto, de especular idéia. O diabo existe e não existe? Dou o dito. Abrenúncio. Essas melancolias. O senhor vê: existe cachoeira; e pois? Mas cachoeira é barranco de chão, e água se caindo por ele, retombando; o senhor consome essa água, ou desfaz o barranco, sobra cachoeira alguma? Viver é negócio muito perigoso... Explico ao senhor: o diabo vige dentro do homem, os crespos do homem – ou é o homem arruinado, ou o homem dos avessos. Solto, por si, cidadão, é que não tem diabo nenhum. Nenhum! – é o que digo. O senhor aprova? Me declare tudo, franco – é alta mercê que me faz: e pedir posso, encarecido. Este caso – por estúrdio que me vejam – é de minha certa importância. Tomara não fosse... Mas, não diga que o senhor, assisado e instruído, que acredita na pessoa dele?! Não? Lhe agradeço! Sua alta opinião compõe minha valia. Já sabia, esperava por ela-já o campo! Ah, a gente, na velhice, carece de ter sua aragem de descanso. Lhe agradeço. Tem diabo nenhum. Nem espírito. Nunca vi. Alguém devia de ver, então era eu mesmo, este vosso servidor. Fosse lhe contar... Bem, o diabo regula seu estado preto, nas criaturas, nas mulheres, nos homens. Até: nas crianças – eu digo. Pois não é ditado: “menino – trem do diabo”? E nos usos, nas plantas, nas águas, na terra, no vento... Estrumes. ... O diabo na rua, no meio do redemunho... Hem? Hem? Ah. Figuração minha, de pior pra trás, as certas lembranças. Mal hajame! Sofro pena de contar não... Melhor, se arrepare: pois, num chão, e com igual formato de ramos e folhas, não dá a mandioca mansa, que se come comum, e a mandioca-brava, que mata? Agora, o senhor já viu uma estranhez? A mandioca-doce pode de repente virar azangada – motivos não sei; às vezes se diz que é por replantada no terreno sempre, com mudas seguidas, de manaíbas – vai em amargando, de tanto em tanto, de si mesma toma peçonhas. E, ora veja: a outra, a mandiocabrava, também é que às vezes pode ficar mansa, a esmo, de se comer sem nenhum mal. E que isso é? Eh, o senhor já viu, por ver, a feiúra de ódio franzido, carantonho, nas faces duma cobra cascavel? Observou o porco gordo, cada dia mais feliz bruto, capaz de, pudesse, roncar e engolir por sua suja comodidade o mundo todo? E gavião, corvo, alguns, as feições deles já representam a precisão de talhar para adiante, rasgar e estraçalhar a bico, parece uma quicé muito afiada por ruim desejo. Tudo. Tem até tortas raças de pedras, horrorosas, venenosas – que estragam mortal a água, se estão jazendo em fundo de poço; o diabo dentro delas dorme: são o demo. Se sabe? E o demo – que é só assim o significado dum azougue maligno – tem ordem de seguir o caminho dele, tem licença para campear?! Arre, ele está misturado em tudo. Que o que gasta, vai gastando o diabo de dentro da gente, aos pouquinhos, é o razoável sofrer. E a alegria de amor – compadre meu Quelemém, diz. Família. Deveras? É, e não é. O senhor ache e não ache. Tudo é e não é... Quase todo mais grave criminoso feroz, sempre é muito bom marido, bom filho, bom pai, e é bom amigo-de-seus-amigos! Sei desses. Só que tem os depois – e Deus, junto. Vi muitas nuvens. Mas, em verdade, filho, também, abranda. Olhe: um chamado Aleixo, residente a légua do Passo do Pubo, no da-Areia, era o homem de maiores ruindades calmas que já se viu. Me agradou que perto da casa dele tinha um açudinho, entre as palmeiras, com traíras, pra-almas de enormes, desenormes, ao real, que receberam fama; o Aleixo dava de comer a elas, em horas justas, elas se acostumaram a se assim das locas, para papar, semelhavam ser peixes ensinados. Um dia, só por graça rústica, ele matou um velhinho que por lá passou, desvalido rogando esmola. O senhor não duvide – tem gente, neste aborrecido mundo, que matam só para ver alguém fazer careta... Eh, pois, empós, o resto o senhor prove: vem o pão, vem a mão, vem o são, vem o cão. Esse Aleixo era homem afamilhado, tinha filhos pequenos; aqueles eram o amor dele, todo, despropósito. Dê bem, que não nem um ano estava passado, de se matar o velhinho pobre, e os meninos do Aleixo aí adoeceram. Andaço de sarampão, se disse, mas complicado; eles nunca saravam. Quando, então, sararam. Mas os olhos deles vermelhavam altos, numa inflama de sapiranga à rebelde; e susseguinte – o que não sei é se foram todos duma vez, ou um logo e logo outro e outro – eles restaram cegos. Cegos, sem remissão dum favinho de luz dessa nossa! O senhor imagine: uma escadinha – três meninos e uma menina – todos cegados. Sem remediável. O Aleixo não perdeu o juizo; mas mudou: ah, demudou completo – agora vive da banda de Deus, suando para ser bom e caridoso em todas suas horas da noite e do dia. Parece até que ficou o feliz, que antes não era. Ele mesmo diz que foi um homem de sorte, porque Deus quis ter pena dele, transformar para lá o rumo de sua alma. Isso eu ouvi, e me deu raiva. Razão das crianças. Se sendo castigo, que culpa das hajas do Aleixo aqueles meninozinhos tinham?! Compadre meu Quelemém reprovou minhas incertezas. Que, por certo, noutra vida revirada, os meninos também tinham sido os mais malvados, da massa e peça do pai, demônios do mesmo caldeirão de lugar. Senhor o que acha? E o velhinho assassinado? – eu sei que o senhor vai discutir. Pois, também. Em ordem que ele tinha um pecado de crime, no corpo, por pagar. Se a gente – conforme compadre meu Quelemém é quem diz – se a gente torna a encarnar renovado, eu cismo até que inimigo de morte pode vir como filho do inimigo. Mire veja: se me digo, tem um sujeito Pedro Pindó, vizinho daqui mais seis léguas, homem de bem por tudo em tudo, ele e a mulher dele, sempre sidos bons, de bem. Eles têm um filho duns dez anos, chamado Valtei – nome moderno, é o que o povo daqui agora apreceia, o senhor sabe. Pois essezinho, essezim, desde que algum entendimento alumiou nele, feito mostrou o que é: pedido madrasto, azedo queimador, gostoso de ruim de dentro do fundo das espécies de sua natureza. Em qual que judia, ao devagar, de todo bicho ou criaçãozinha pequena que pega; uma vez, encontrou uma crioula bentabêbada dormindo, arranjou um caco de garrafa, lanhou em três pontos a popa da perna dela. O que esse menino babeja vendo, é sangrarem galinha ou esfaquear porco. – “Eu gosto de matar...” – uma ocasião ele pequenino me disse. Abriu em mim um susto; porque: passarinho que se debruça – o vôo já está pronto! Pois, o senhor vigie: o pai, Pedro Pindó, modo de corrigir isso, e a mãe, dão nele, de miséria e mastro – botam o menino sem comer, amarram em árvores no terreiro, ele nu nuelo, mesmo em junho frio, lavram o corpinho dele na peia e na taca, depois limpam a pele do sangue, com cuia de salmoura. A gente sabe, espia, fica gasturado. O menino já rebaixou de magreza, os olhos entrando, carinha de ossos, encaveirada, e entisicou, o tempo todo tosse, tossura da que puxa secos peitos. Arre, que agora, visível, o Pindó e a mulher se habituaram de nele bater, de pouquinho em pouquim foram criando nisso um prazer feio de diversão – como regulam as sovas em horas certas confortáveis, até chamam gente para ver o exemplo bom. Acho que esse menino não dura, já está no blimbilim, não chega para a quaresma que vem... Uê-uê, então?!Não sendo como compadre meu Quelemém quer, que explicação é que o senhor dava? Aquele menino tinha sido homem. Devia, em balanço, terríveis perversidades. Alma dele estava no breu. Mostrava. E, agora, pagava. Ah, mas, acontece, quando está chorando e penando, ele sofre igual que se fosse um menino bonzinho... Ave, vi de tudo, neste mundo! lá vi até cavalo com soluço... – o que é a coisa mais custosa que há. Bem, mas o senhor dirá, deve de: e no começo – para pecados e artes, as pessoas – como por que foi que tanto emendado se começou? Ei, ei, aí todos esbarram. Compadre meu Quelemém, também. Sou só um sertanejo, nessas altas idéias navego mal. Sou muito pobre coitado. Inveja minha pura é de uns conforme o senhor, com toda leitura e suma doutoração. Não é que eu esteja analfabeto. Soletrei, anos e meio, meante cartilha, memória e palmatória. Tive mestre, Mestre Lucas, no Curralinho, decorei gramática, as operações, regra-de-três, até geografia e estudo pátrio. Em folhas grandes de papel, com capricho tracei bonitos mapas. Ah, não é por falar: mas, desde o começo, me achavam sofismado de ladino. E que eu merecia de ir para cursar latim, em Aula Régia – que também diziam. Tempo saudoso! Inda hoje, apreceio um bom livro, despaçado. Na fazenda O Limãozinho, de um meu amigo Vito Soziano, se assina desse almanaque grosso, de logogrifos e charadas e outras divididas matérias, todo ano vem. Em tanto, ponho primazia é na leitura proveitosa, vida de santo, virtudes e exemplos – missionário esperto engambelando os índios, ou São Francisco de Assis, Santo Antônio, São Geraldo... Eu gosto muito de moral. Raciocinar, exortar os outros para o bom caminho, aconselhar a justo. Minha mulher, que o senhor sabe, zela por mim: muito reza. Ela é uma abençoável. Compadre meu Quelemém sempre diz que eu posso aquietar meu temer de consciência, que sendo bem-assistido, terríveis bons-espíritos me protegem. Ipe! Com gosto... Como é de são efeito, ajudo com meu querer acreditar. Mas nem sempre posso. O senhor saiba: eu toda a minha vida pensei por mim, forro, sou nascido diferente. Eu sou é eu mesmo. Diverjo de todo o mundo... Eu quase que nada não sei. Mas desconfio de muita coisa. O senhor concedendo, eu digo: para pensar longe, sou cão mestre – o senhor solte em minha frente uma idéia ligeira, e eu rastreio essa por fundo de todos os matos, amém! Olhe: o que devia de haver, era de se reunirem-se os sábios, políticos, constituições gradas, fecharem o definitivo a noção – proclamar por uma vez, artes assembléias, que não tem diabo nenhum, não existe, não pode. Valor de lei! Só assim, davam tranqüilidade boa à gente. Por que o Governo não cuida?! Ah, eu sei que não é possível. Não me assente o senhor por beócio. Uma coisa é pôr idéias arranjadas, outra é lidar com país de pessoas, de carne e sangue, de mil-e-tantas misérias... Tanta gente – dá susto de saber – e nenhum se sossega: todos nascendo, crescendo, se casando, querendo colocação de emprego, comida, saúde, riqueza, ser importante, querendo chuva e negócios bons... De sorte que carece de se escolher: ou a gente se tece de viver no safado comum, ou cuida só de religião só. Eu podia ser: padre sacerdote, se não chefe de jagunços; para outras coisas não fui parido. Mas minha velhice já principiou, errei de toda conta. E o reumatismo... Lá como quem diz: nas escorvas. Ahã. Hem? Hem? O que mais penso, testo e explico: todo-omundo é louco. O senhor, eu, nós, as pessoas todas. Por isso é que se carece principalmente de religião: para se desendoidecer, desdoidar. Reza é que sara da loucura. No geral. Isso é que é a salvaçãoda- alma... Muita religião, seu moço! Eu cá, não perco ocasião de religião. Aproveito de todas. Bebo água de todo rio... Uma só, para mim é pouca, talvez não me chegue. Rezo cristão, católico, embrenho a certo; e aceito as preces de compadre meu Quelemém, doutrina dele, de Cardéque. Mas, quando posso, vou no Mindubim, onde um Matias é crente, metodista: a gente se acusa de pecador, lê alto a Bíblia, e ora, cantando hinos belos deles. Tudo me quieta, me suspende. Qualquer sombrinha me refresca. Mas é só muito provisório. Eu queria rezar – o tempo todo. Muita gente não me aprova, acham que lei de Deus é privilégios, invariável. E eu! Bofe! Detesto! O que sou? – o que faço, que quero, muito curial. E em cara de todos faço, executado. Eu não tresmalho! Olhe: tem uma preta, Maria Leôncia, longe daqui não mora, as rezas dela afamam muita virtude de poder. Pois a ela pago, todo mês – encomenda de rezar por mim um terço, todo santo dia, e, nos domingos, um rosário. Vale, se vale. Minha mulher não vê mal nisso. E estou, já mandei recado para uma outra, do Vau-Vau, uma Izina Calanga, para vir aqui, ouvi de que reza também com grandes meremerências, vou efetuar com ela trato igual. Quero punhado dessas, me defendendo em Deus, reunidas de mim em volta... Chagas de Cristo! Viver é muito perigoso... Querer o bem com demais força, de incerto jeito, pode já estar sendo se querendo o mal, por principiar. Esses homens! Todos puxavam o mundo para si, para o concertar consertado. Mas cada um só vê e entende as coisas dum seu modo. Montante, o mais supro, mais sério – foi Medeiro Vaz. Que um homem antigo... Seu Joãozinho Bem-Bem, o mais bravo de todos, ninguém nunca pôde decifrar como ele por dentro consistia. Joca Ramiro – grande homem príncipe! – era político. Zé- Bebelo quis ser político. (shrink)

The purpose of the following text is to analyze the development of the understanding of God in the theological-biblical imaginery, as well as the formulations that allow us to understand the development of Transcendent identity in history and in the construction of the talk and about God. Starting from a brief synopsis of the biblical Old Testament design of elements present in the theological imagination of the identity of the God of Israel, from liberating perception present in the image of (...) God Revelation from Jesus Christ phenomenon, passing briefly to the understanding of God as Trinity and culminating with the perception of identity of God within the current context of liberation, it points out the development of the identity of a God who – far from remain static, immobile, inert – assumes an itinerant identity alongside your people. Thus, the present paper analyses aspects of revelation and maps an identity of God from these elements, pointing to the construction of the identity design of a God who, by walking along the humanity, is not free to be assimilated and perceived in different forms in the course of this Revelation route. (shrink)

Este artículo analiza la obra de dos beguinas del s. XIII pertenecientes a la denominada teología vernácula. Se propone caracterizar las obras de Matilde de Magdeburgo,La luz que fluye de la divinidad, y de Margarita Porete, El espejo de las almas simples, a fin de determinar las notas más distintivas de las autoras. En ambos trabajos el amor es central, a la vez que está íntimamente vinculado con el conocimiento. Aun así, la lectura de los textos y su detenido examen (...) permite proponer que la obra de Matilde está principalmente relacionada con la literatura del amor cortés mientras que la de Margarita, a la vez que incluye estos elementos, está más enraizada en la mística de la nada, que será luego ampliamente conocida en la tradición por el trabajo de Meister Eckhart. Por esta razón, el lugar otorgado a los sentidos y la corporalidad adquiere mayor relevancia en la obra de Matilde, mientras que en Margarita la experiencia amorosa unitiva es puramente espiritual. Estos matices en las caracterizaciones de la unión con la divinidad deben ser leídos en su contexto histórico, dado que durante el s. XIII y el siguiente se desarrolló una polémica sobre el carácter afectivo o intelectual de la unión mística. Estas diferentes maneras de entender el amor que encontramos en los trabajos de estas autoras medievales representan otro modo de abordar la idea y la función del eros, que desde Platón en adelante ha sido uno de los temas centrales de la reflexión filosófica. (shrink)

Analisa-se o sentido histórico-social das expressões rûªH yhwh (“espírito de Yahweh”), rûªH-rä`â më´ët yhwh (“espírito mau desde junto de Yahweh”), rûªH-´élöhîm rä`â (“espírito mau de Deus”), rûªH-´élöhîm (“espírito de Deus”) e rûªH härä`â (“espírito mau”), de e em 1 Sm 16,14-23. Postula-se a identidade comum de todos esses personagens noológicos. Guiado por um exercício de crítica aplicada a versões da passagem, bem como pela consulta crítica por amostragem de comentários internacionais, aplica-se análise retórica e histórico-social à narrativa. Conclui-se que, no (...) horizonte de produção do texto, concebia-se essa figura celeste como o equivalente noológico de oficiais a serviço de reis, incumbidos de atividades que tanto podiam ser classificadas eticamente como boas quanto más, correspondendo tal concepção teológica ao estado da cultura judaico-israelita pré-persa. Não se trata de dois personagens: o “espírito de Yahweh” / o “espírito de Deus”, de um lado, e o “espírito mau (de Yahweh ou de Deus)” de outro, mas da descrição diferenciada da mesma figura em conformidade com a ação interpretada como realizada por ele no exercício de sua prestação de serviços ao deus-rei. Palavras-chave : 1 Sm 16,14-23. Espírito de Yahweh. Espírito de Deus. Espírito mau de Yahweh. Espírito mau de Deus. Espírito mau.The sociohistorical meaning of the expressions rûªH yhwh (“spirit of Yahweh”), rûªH-rä`â më´ët yhwh (“evil spirit from Yahweh”), rûªH-´élöhîm rä`â (“evil spirit of God”), rûªH-´élöhîm (“spirit of God”) and rûªH härä`â (“evil spirit”) of and in 1 Sm 16.14-23 is analyzed. The common identity of all these noological characters is postulated. Guided by an exercise of criticism applied to versions of the passage as well as the critical search of samples of international commentaries, rhetoric and the social-historical analysis is applied to the narrative. It is reasoned that, in the text’s production horizon, this celestial figure is conceived as the noological equivalent to officials at service of kings, responsible for activities that could be classified as both ethically good and bad, such theological conception correspond to the pre-Persian state of Jewish-Israeli culture. They are not two characters: the “spirit of Yahweh” / “spirit of God” on one side , and the “evil spirit (of Yahweh or God)” on the other, but different descriptions of the same figure in accordance to the action interpreted as carried out by him in the provision of services to the god-king . Keywords: 1 Sm 16,14-23. Spirit of Yahweh. Spirit of God. Evil spirit of Yahweh. Evil spirit of God. Evil spirit. (shrink)

The article explores critical elements to understand how Origen elaborates his mystical theology in his Commentary on John. The spiritual progress process implies that rational beings are guided, by God’s Logos, from the practical life to the theoretical one becoming son or daughter of God, in the likeness of the Logos. This process aims at knowing the Father as he is known by the Logos. The article has two parts: 1. The Father’s presence, through the Logos, in rational beings, and (...) 2. a brief characterisation of the salvation, particularly in the perspective of the mediation by the Son of God. (shrink)

Portuguese translation by Desiderio Murcho of "Could God's Purpose Be the Source of Life's Meaning?" (Religious Studies 2000).

In the current secularization of religion nowadays, particularly of Christianity, we see that in the celebrations of the sacraments, specially Baptism and Eucharist, people are looking for something to give their lives sense, that they even don’t know for sure what is, but through the liturgical rites, expressed by the body language, try to make life in accordance with faith, even though still in a superficial way. Through the theology of the sacraments, theology of revelation and anthropology we realize that (...) the relationship between the human being and God is still very present and currently up-to-date, and not something "unknown" or even "lost". Thus, the human being is still seeking a close relationship with the Being who created him at His image and likeness that can be realized and manifested in liturgical celebrations, not forgetting the communal character of each liturgical act and its expressions. (shrink)

A utilização de um texto bíblico por um senador para justificar sua oposição a medidas de proteção ambiental é pretexto para uma série de considerações acerca da Teologia cristã sobre o meio-ambiente, e a relação entre religião e sociedade. Três questões são levantadas: a pretensa separação dos humanos da natureza, a pretensa homogeneização do "ser humano", e a pretensa simplicidade da interpretação teológica de um texto sagrado. O emprego dos verbos hebraicos KABASH e RADAHA abre uma discussão sobre o sentido (...) da dominação na teologia cristã, a partir do princípio hermenêutico básico de que o todo das Escrituras Sagradas deve ser interpretado à luz da revelação maior em Cristo. A partir daí, o artigo propõe uma articulação de parlamentos, como seria o caso de um parlamento teológico, para tratar de argumentos desse tipo, promovida a partir do Senado Federal para nortear decisões que afetam o bem-estar da sociedade como um todo. Palavras-chave : Ser humano; Natureza; Teologia cristã; Religião; Sociedade.The use of a biblical text by a Senator to justify his opposition to environmental protection measures works as a pretext for a series of considerations about Christian theology on environment, as well as the relationship between religion and society. Three questions are to put: the alleged separation of humans from nature, the alleged homogeneity of the "human being", and the assumed simplicity of the theological interpretation of a sacred text. The use of following Hebrew verbs KABASH and RADAHA opens a discussion about the meaning of domination in Christian theology, from the basic hermeneutic principle that Sacred Scriptures must be interpreted in the ligh of Christ Revelation. Thereafter, this article proposes an articulation of parliaments, as in the case of a theological parliament happen to deal with these kind of arguments, to be promoted from the Senate in order to guide decisions that affect the welfare of society as a whole. Key words: Human beings; Nature; Christian Theology; Religion; Society. (shrink)