Feuerbach is now recognized as a central figure in the history of nineteenth-century thought. He was one of Hegel's most influential pupils: he dominated German radical philosophy in the 1840s and was the leader of the Young Hegelians; his 'anthropological' critique of Hegel's idealism decisively influences the materialism and humanism of Marx and Engels; his critique of religion pointed the way for the philosophers of religion; and his psychological analyses found a place in Freudian thought and the existential and (...) phenomenological traditions. In this 1977 text, Professor Wartofsky wishes to go beyond this conventional view to establish Feuerbach as much more than a transitional figure between Hegel and Marx or an influence on important later developments. He seriously considers Feuerbach's philosophy on its own terms and seeks to demonstrate its continuing importance. He therefore traces Feuerbach's development in detail, emphasizing its dialectical character, and finds fundamental originality in his epistemology. (shrink)

This article contrasts Marx’s critical appropriation of Hegel in his mature works with Georg Lukács’s brilliant interpretation of the relation of Marx and Hegel. Hegel and the Hegelian turn in Marxism, as powerfully represented by Lukács, however, have been strongly criticized in recent decades by structuralist and post-structuralist thinkers for whom concepts central to Lukács’s project, such as totality and the historical Subject, are anti-emancipatory, expressions of domination. Nevertheless, the global historical transformations of recent decades – including the crisis of (...) the Fordist/Keynesian welfare state, the collapse of Soviet Communism, and the emergence of a neo-liberal capitalist global order – have called into question the post-Marxist turn. These historical changes, then, suggest the need for a renewed theoretical concern with capitalism. Marx’s critical appropriation of Hegel provides the basis for a critique both of Lukács as well as of post-structuralism in ways that can avoid the weaknesses of each while incorporating their strengths. (shrink)

"If we are to understand not only the direct impact of Marx on the development of German thought but also his sometimes extremely indirect influence, an exact knowledge of Hegel, of both his greatness and his limitation, is absolutely indispensable."- from the preface. It is well known that Hegel exerted a major influence on the development of Marx's thought. This circumstance led Lukacs, one of the chief Marxist theoreticians of this century, to embark on his exploration of Hegelian antecedents in (...) the German intellectual tradition, their concrete expression in the work of Hegel himself, and later syntheses of seemingly contradictory modes of though. Four phases of Hegel's intellectual development are examined: "Hegel's early republican phase," "the crisis in Hegel's views on society and the earliest beginnings of his dialectical method," "rationale and defense of objective idealism," and "the breach with Schelling and " The Phenomenology of Mind."" Lukacs completed this study in 1938, but because of the imminent outbreak of war, it was not published until the late 1940s. A revised German edition appeared in 1954, and it is this text that is the basis of this first English translation of the work.". (shrink)

Georg Lukács wrote The Theory of the Novel in 1914-1915, a period that also saw the conception of Rosa Luxemburg's Spartacus Letters, Lenin's Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism, Spengler's Decline of the West, and Ernst Bloch's Spirit of Utopia. Like many of Lukács's early essays, it is a radical critique of bourgeois culture and stems from a specific Central European philosophy of life and tradition of dialectical idealism whose originators include Kant, Hegel, Novalis, Marx, Kierkegaard, Simmel, Weber, and Husserl. (...) The Theory of the Novel marks the transition of the Hungarian philosopher from Kant to Hegel and was Lukács's last great work before he turned to Marxism-Leninism. (shrink)

"If we are to understand not only the direct impact of Marx on the development of German thought but also his sometimes extremely indirect influence, an exact knowledge of Hegel, of both his greatness and his limitation, is absolutely indispensable."- from the preface. It is well known that Hegel exerted a major influence on the development of Marx's thought. This circumstance led Lukács, one of the chief Marxist theoreticians of this century, to embark on his exploration of Hegelian antecedents in (...) the German intellectual tradition, their concrete expression in the work of Hegel himself, and later syntheses of seemingly contradictory modes of though. Four phases of Hegel's intellectual development are examined: "Hegel's early republican phase," "the crisis in Hegel's views on society and the earliest beginnings of his dialectical method," "rationale and defense of objective idealism," and "the breach with Schelling and The Phenomenology of Mind." Lukács completed this study in 1938, but because of the imminent outbreak of war, it was not published until the late 1940s. A revised German edition appeared in 1954, and it is this text that is the basis of this first English translation of the work. (shrink)

Georg Lukács wrote The Theory of the Novel in 1914-1915, a period that also saw the conception of Rosa Luxemburg's Spartacus Letters, Lenin's Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism, Spengler's Decline of the West, and Ernst Bloch's Spirit of Utopia. Like many of Lukács's early essays, it is a radical critique of bourgeois culture and stems from a specific Central European philosophy of life and tradition of dialectical idealism whose originators include Kant, Hegel, Novalis, Marx, Kierkegaard, Simmel, Weber, and Husserl.The (...) Theory of the Novel marks the transition of the Hungarian philosopher from Kant to Hegel and was Lukács's last great work before he turned to Marxism-Leninism. (shrink)

"The actuality of the revolution: this is the core fo Lenin's thought and his decisive link with Marx."This essay on Lenin, which appeared in 1924, was intended to head off the massive criticism leveled at Lukacs History and Class Consciousness by Communist Party leadership. It was a period in which Lukacs was decisively influenced by Lenin and by Rosa Luxemburg, and his intellectual development proceeded concretely toward a political interpretation of history and of literature.In a postscript Lukacs remains (...) essentially unchanged in his view of Lenin as a practitioner whose theoretical superiority lay in his ability to assess the sociohistorical uniqueness of any given situation that required action. Looking back, Lukacs regards the book as a document of the mid-twenties--of how a number of Marxists of the period saw Lenin's personality and mission and his place in world events. Ideas in the book were determined by the concepts of the period, its prejudices, illusions, and extravagances. Nevertheless, the book established certain spiritual verities in perceiving Lenin as the active-practical sage who had a skillfull tactical grasp of realpolitik which was neither empirical nor dogmatic but the culmination of a theoretical attitude. "His life was one of permanent action, of continuous struggle in a world in which he was profoundly convinced that there was no situation without a solution, for himself or his opponents. The leitmotiv of his life was accordingly: always be armed ready for action--for correct action." Lukacs further notes that an essential dimension of Lenin's activism was unceasingly self-education and constant openness to the lessons of experience.Lukacs also emphasizes a number of points in the book that remain methodologically valid, including criticisms of Lenin's behavior which were implicit and accurate critiques of Stalin's later development and the increasing bureaucratization and mechanization of the party. (shrink)

Over the years Hegel’s social and political theory has often been measured against the more overtly revolutionary views of Karl Marx. More often than not, Hegel has been judged conservative, his ideas deemed lacking in critical force. Just what is meant by “critical” and “revolutionary” has not always been made conceptually clear; but nonetheless, despite the deep influence of Hegelian dialectics on Marx’s conception of history and on the methodology of his analysis of capital, it has been generally acknowledged (...) that Marx was a more profound critic of the organization and inner dynamic of modern bourgeois society. Hegel’s supposed conservatism, traced back of course to those infamous comments in the Preface to the Philosophy of Right, is by now a well rehearsed story. Yet even for many of those commentators who have tried to reconstruct the view of Hegel as a conservative political theorist, Hegel’s analysis of civil society falls short of providing the critical tools necessary to overcome the emerging problems of nineteenth century bourgeois society, let alone those of today. It is at this point that so many have turned to Marx for a more radical critique of the values and structures of capitalist society. Certainly among the many commentators in the tradition of Lukács and Marcuse, the revolutionary impetus toward liberation is to be found in the work of Marx and not Hegel. (shrink)

The question which I raise in this paper—"Is Science contenporary rationality?"—is entended to place the issue in an historical context.That is to say: rationality has a history. Modem science, I will argue is the dominant contenporary form of this rationality, as a matter of fact. The ceritical question is then: what normative claim does contenporary science make for this dominant position? Can contenporary science be understood as a historical form of rationality which has superseded earlier forms, and which itself (...) has historical limitations? I compare the mathematical model of scientific rationality of seventeenth century science with that of contenporary science, and consider whether there are norms of rationality which remain invariant through historical change. (shrink)

It is widely assumed that science is the enemy of religious faith. The idea is so pervasive that entire industries of religious apologetics converge around the challenge of Darwin, evolution, and the "secular worldview." This book challenges such assumptions by proposing a different cause of unbelief in the West: the Christian conscience. Tracing a history of doubt and unbelief from the Reformation to the age of Darwin and Karl Marx, Dominic Erdozain argues that the most powerful solvents of religious (...) orthodoxy have been concepts of moral equity and personal freedom generated by Christianity itself. Revealing links between the radical Reformation and early modern philosophers such as Baruch Spinoza and Pierre Bayle, Erdozain demonstrates that the dynamism of the Enlightenment, including the very concept of "natural reason" espoused by philosophers such as Voltaire, was rooted in Christian ethics and spirituality. The final chapters explore similar themes in the era of Darwin and Marx, showing how moral revolt preceded and transcended the challenges of evolution and "scientific materialism" in the unseating of religious belief. The picture that emerges is not of a secular challenge to religious faith, but a series of theological insurrections against divisive accounts of Christian orthodoxy. (shrink)

This article discusses Heidegger’s interpretation of Parmenides given in his last public lecture ‘The Principle of Identity’ in 1957. The aim of the piece is to illustrate just how original and significant Heidegger’s reading of Parmenides and the principle of identity is, within the history of Philosophy. Thus the article will examine the traditional metaphysical interpretation of Parmenides and consider G.W.F. Hegel and William James’ account of the principle of identity in light of this. It will then consider Heidegger’s (...) contribution, his return to and re-interpretation of Parmenides in his last lecture. Heidegger will, through the Parmenidean claim that ‘Thinking and Being are one’ deconstruct the traditional metaphysical understanding of the principle of identity, and in its place offer a radically different conception of how our relationship, our ‘belonging together’ with Being can be understood. (shrink)

Zur Ästhetik Schillers.--Hegels Ästhetik.--Einführung in die Ästhetik Tschernyschewskijs.--Einführung in die ästhetischen Schriften von Marx und Engels.--Karl Marx und Friedrich Theodor Vischer.--Nietzsche als Vorläufer der faschistischen Ästhetik.--Franz Mehring (1846-1919)--Literatur und Kunst als Überbau.

The essence of religious alienation may be identified by the use of Marx's method as we study the relationship of human beings to inimical natural and social forces dominant over them and give primary attention to the internal structure of socioeconomic alienation. In this connection it is necessary to take into consideration that the category alienation does not reveal its historical quality directly. Therefore, Marx and Engels did not confine their analysis to identifying the major features of alienation, but sought (...) to uncover the specifics of particular historically concrete forms of alienation. But the category alienation is a wholly meaningful abstraction, for it expresses a characteristic feature of the "prehistory" of humanity: realities created by human beings present themselves as dominant inimical, spontaneous forces not subordinate to the action of human beings. The Marxist analysis of the economic basis of alienation is the key to understanding all alienation. (shrink)

Among the most influential parts of the philosophy of G.W.F. Hegel (1770-1831) were his ethics, his theory of the state, and his philosophy of history. The Philosophy of Right (Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts) (1821), the last work published in Hegel's lifetime, is a combined system of moral and political philosophy, or a sociology dominated by the idea of the state. Here Hegel repudiates his earlier assessment of the French Revolution as a "a marvelous sunrise" in the realization of (...) liberty. Rejecting the republican form of government, he espouses an idealized form of a constitutional monarchy, whose ultimate power rests with the sovereign. (shrink)

The political doctrine of Karl Marx is to be found in a broad range of both published and unpublished writings. This volume, the first of two which together span his entire output, presents his early texts of 1843-7, which predate the Communist Manifesto. excerpts from the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right and from the Paris Notebooks, Points on the State and Bourgeois Society and other writings are newly translated and arranged in a sequence that illuminates the development of Marx's (...) thought, while the introduction discusses the intellectual context of the theories he constructed. A chronology of Marx's life and career and an annotated bibliography complete a volume which will be an invaluable guide to the formation of one of the most influential doctrines in the history of political thought. (shrink)

Among the most influential parts of the philosophy of G.W.F. Hegel (1770-1831) were his ethics, his theory of the state, and his philosophy of history. The Philosophy of Right (Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts) (1821), the last work published in Hegel's lifetime, is a combined system of moral and political philosophy, or a sociology dominated by the idea of the state. Here Hegel repudiates his earlier assessment of the French Revolution as a "a marvelous sunrise" in the realization of (...) liberty. Rejecting the republican form of government, he espouses an idealized form of a constitutional monarchy, whose ultimate power rests with the sovereign. (shrink)

A new 2023 translation into American English of Marx's influential 1845 "Die heilige Familie oder Kritik der kritischen Kritik" from the original manuscript. This edition includes a new introduction by the translator and reference materials including a Glossary of Philosophic and Economic Marxist Terminology, an Index of Personalities Associated with Marx and a Timeline of Marx’s Life and Works. This is Volume IV in The Complete Works of Karl Marx by NL Press. The Holy Family is Marx's first foray into (...) building his dialectical materialism, while still attacking the modern Hegelians.The main title itself is mocking Bruno Bauer's "Pure Criticism", which Marx parodies with the nonsense "Critical Criticism". This is the first publication Engels and Marx published together, only one year after meeting in person in 1844. Here he is attacking other Hegelians and Critical Philosophy writ large, arguing against Hegel's idealistic dialectic for his own dialectal Epicurean Materialism which he began to outline in his Ph.D. Thesis "Differenz der demokritischen und epikureischen Naturphilosophie" in 1841. Marx believed that Critical Philosophy in general (kritische Philosophie), which sees the most fundamental task of Philosophy as primarily judging the possibility of knowledge before asserting any claim of knowledge itself, as misguided in its Platonic Ontology. The entire work is a polemic against "The Holy Family" of young Hegelians, mocking and insulting them on every page. He uses sarcastic parody, nearly Horatian satire, specifically towards Christianity- "Criticism so loved the masses that it sent its only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him should not perish, but have eternal life". Ultimately, he declared these dilettante philosophers "false prophets" and himself the true prophet of Atheistic, Skeptical and Materialistic Humanism. Here he also argues that the only way to deal with "the Jewish problem" is by eradicating Christianity and all metaphysical beliefs because the "bourgeois morality" gets in the way of implementing a true, final solution to the muddying of pure European nationality by the existence of the Jews. Here we see the foundations of the National-Socialist movement which declared "there is no God but the German people" and started eradicating millions in the name of Humanism and Progress. (shrink)

Quelle que fut la puissance avec laquelle Hegel concentrait par la pensee le monde phenomenal, il lui etait impossible cependant dans le cours d'un semestre de dominer entierement l'inepuisable matiere de l'histoire. [...] Son premier expose de l'hiver 1822-23 avait principalement pour fin l'evolution du concept de philosophie et voulait montrer comment celui-ci constitue en fait le fond de l'histoire [...]. La Chine et l'Inde n'etaient que des exemples pour montrer de quelle maniere on comprend philosophiquement un caractere national [...]. (...) Mais, c'est avec predilection qu'il s'arretait aux Grecs pour lesquels il conservait toujours un enthousiasme juvenil; et apres avoir brievement considere le monde romain, il cherchait enfin a ramasser en un petit nombre de lecons le moyen-age et les temps modernes, car [...] la ou dans le monde chretien, la pensee ne demeure plus cachee dans la foule des phenomenes, mais s'annonce elle-meme et se revele dans l'histoire, la philosophie peut concentrer son expose, n'ayant qu'a indiquer l'idee motrice. [...] Chez Hegel, chacune de ses lecons constituait un acte nouveau de la pensee, chacune n'exprime par suite que la forme philosophique qui animait l'esprit a ce moment. (shrink)

Quelle que fut la puissance avec laquelle Hegel concentrait par la pensee le monde phenomenal, il lui etait impossible cependant dans le cours d'un semestre de dominer entierement l'inepuisable matiere de l'histoire. [...] Son premier expose de l'hiver 1822-23 avait principalement pour fin l'evolution du concept de philosophie et voulait montrer comment celui-ci constitue en fait le fond de l'histoire [...]. La Chine et l'Inde n'etaient que des exemples pour montrer de quelle maniere on comprend philosophiquement un caractere national [...]. (...) Mais, c'est avec predilection qu'il s'arretait aux Grecs pour lesquels il conservait toujours un enthousiasme juvenil; et apres avoir brievement considere le monde romain, il cherchait enfin a ramasser en un petit nombre de lecons le moyen-age et les temps modernes, car [...] la ou dans le monde chretien, la pensee ne demeure plus cachee dans la foule des phenomenes, mais s'annonce elle-meme et se revele dans l'histoire, la philosophie peut concentrer son expose, n'ayant qu'a indiquer l'idee motrice. [...] Chez Hegel, chacune de ses lecons constituait un acte nouveau de la pensee, chacune n'exprime par suite que la forme philosophique qui animait l'esprit a ce moment. (shrink)

Recent anxieties about the deterioration of the global environment have had the effect of intensifying the ambiguity that surrounds the social roles of scientists and engineers. This has happened not merely, as suggested at the outset, because the environmental crisis has made their roles more conspicuous. Nor is it merely because recent disasters have alerted us to new, or hitherto unrecognized, social consequences of using the latest science-based technologies. What also requires recognition is that ideas about the social role of (...) modern science and engineering are embedded in, hence mediated by, larger views of the world. Within such American worldviews, moreover, the status of science and engineering is closely bound up with their perceived effect upon the environment.In the dominant culture, accordingly, the respect given to scientists and engineers is in large measure dependent on their ability to play the central role assigned to them in the historical narrative about progress. As the ostensible heroes of that popular story, they are expected to lead the way in realizing the promise of prosperity and general well-being. The environmental crisis surely has diminished the credibility of that story, thereby causing the social role of science and engineering to seem more dubious — more ambiguous. To be sure, the crisis also may have the effect, for very different reasons, of increasing the power and responsibility of organized science. But the late twentieth-century task of damage control cannot possibly elicit anything like the respect accorded to organized science by the earlier belief in progress.It also is important to recall, finally, that the narrative of progress itself has undergone a disillusioning transformation. The early Enlightenment version of the story depicted scientists and engineers working in the service of a social and political ideal that all people could share. But the later technocratic concept of progress, with its sterile instrumentalist notion of advancing the power of science-based technology as an end in itself, is far less likely to inspire trust. Its patent inadequacies have had the effect of enhancing the appeal, if only by contrast, of the seemingly “anti-science” ideologies of pastoralism and primitivism. All of which might be taken to suggest that if the scientific and engineering professions want to recover some of the respect and status they once had, they would be well advised to join with sympathetic humanists and social scientists in recuperating some of the idealism that the project of modern science formerly derived from its place within the ideology of progress. That might entail the sacrifice of their technocratic posture of neutrality, dissociating themselves from people and institutions responsible for environmental degradation, and their help in formulating a new concept — which is to say, new criteria — of progress to which they might commit themselves. A primary test of any proposed social policy under this new dispensation surely would be whether it would improve, or at a minimum protect, the life-enhancing capacities of the global ecosystem. *** DIRECT SUPPORT *** A8402064 00011 *** DIRECT SUPPORT *** A8402064 00012 *** DIRECT SUPPORT *** A8402064 00013. (shrink)

Quelle que fut la puissance avec laquelle Hegel concentrait par la pensee le monde phenomenal, il lui etait impossible cependant dans le cours d'un semestre de dominer entierement l'inepuisable matiere de l'histoire. [...] Son premier expose de l'hiver 1822-23 avait principalement pour fin l'evolution du concept de philosophie et voulait montrer comment celui-ci constitue en fait le fond de l'histoire [...]. La Chine et l'Inde n'etaient que des exemples pour montrer de quelle maniere on comprend philosophiquement un caractere national [...]. (...) Mais, c'est avec predilection qu'il s'arretait aux Grecs pour lesquels il conservait toujours un enthousiasme juvenil; et apres avoir brievement considere le monde romain, il cherchait enfin a ramasser en un petit nombre de lecons le moyen-age et les temps modernes, car [...] la ou dans le monde chretien, la pensee ne demeure plus cachee dans la foule des phenomenes, mais s'annonce elle-meme et se revele dans l'histoire, la philosophie peut concentrer son expose, n'ayant qu'a indiquer l'idee motrice. [...] Chez Hegel, chacune de ses lecons constituait un acte nouveau de la pensee, chacune n'exprime par suite que la forme philosophique qui animait l'esprit a ce moment. (shrink)

Marx and heidegger agree that capitalism turns everything into a commodity for economic exploitation. Unlike marx, However, Heidegger regards both capitalism and communism as instances of human subjectivism: the attitude that man is the measure of all things, And that everything is an object to be dominated by the human subject. Capitalist man dominates nature (including man) individually; communist man does so collectively. Marx, Unfortunately, Was taken in by hegel's anthropocentric view of history, And had an unwavering faith in (...) the promise of industrialization for liberating mankind from its problems. Heidegger calls for a new way of understanding humanity: as an integral part of nature, Not its lord and master. Neither capitalism nor communism can comprehend this way of thinking. (shrink)

Hegel conceptualized the capitalist economy as a system of needs, with commodities and money serving as means to human ends. While anticipating Marx’s criticisms of certain tendencies in capitalism, Hegel insisted that higher-order institutions, especially those of the modern state, could put them out of play and establish a reconciliation of universality, particularity, and individuality warranting rational affirmation. Hegel, however, failed to comprehend the emergence of capital as a dominant subject, subordinating human ends under its end. The structural coercion, domination, (...) and exploitation inherent in the capital/wage labor relationship illustrate that point, as does the depoliticization of inherently political matters in capitalist market societies. The reconciliation of universality, particularity, and individuality Hegel endorsed requires a form of socialism incorporating deliberative democracy in local workplaces and communities, conjoined with representative bodies on regional, national, and ultimately global levels. (shrink)

Philosophy & Social Criticism, Volume 48, Issue 9, Page 1302-1328, November 2022. Robinson Crusoe is a mythic character who lives not only in the popular imaginary but through the history of political and social thought. Defoe’s protagonist lives marooned on his island, isolated and apart from society. The narrative is a perfect naturalisation of the ‘bourgeois’ world, dependent on an ontology of the self-sufficient individual. This article analyses this lineage in the social contract theory of Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau. (...) Later, Hegel used the novel to illustrate his dialectic of mastery/servitude. Challenging the atomism of the state of nature, Hegel’s theory of recognition gives an account of positive freedom, where the individual is formed in and through social interdependence. This sociality is continued by Marx, who satirises Defoe's novel in his value-form critique of political economy. The value-form provides insight into Robinson's island labour and Marx's difference with Locke's labour theory of value. For Marx, the myth of ‘natural man’ hides the domination of capitalist development and Robinson Crusoe reflects the internalisation of the abstract rationality of commodity society. However, Marx's immanent critique of the novel points to a radical idea of social life and freedom. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Practical Necessity, Freedom, and History: From Hobbes to Marx by David JamesMeghan RobisonDavid James. Practical Necessity, Freedom, and History: From Hobbes to Marx. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021. Pp. 256. Hardback, $70.00.In his newest monograph, David James offers an elaborate, well-wrought reflection on human freedom and its limits by considering five canonical modern philosophers: Hobbes, Rousseau, Kant, Hegel, and Marx. Judging from the table of contents, (...) the book appears to be a work in the history of philosophy: each of the chronologically organized chapters examines a different aspect of necessity, history, and freedom in one of the five philosophers just mentioned. By focusing on those thinkers, James tracks a progression in the modern reflection on the nature of freedom and its relation to constraint. Specifically, he argues that such a progression culminates, with Marx, in finally getting the right understanding of the relation between freedom and two kinds of necessity—one practical, the other historical. This is an extremely ambitious book, and its scope is extensive: by its end, James has considered more than thirty philosophical works spanning nearly two hundred years. Yet, even though it makes several contributions to various longstanding scholarly debates, Practical Necessity, Freedom, and History is not a work of intellectual history. Its main seven chapters—each of which offers a richly complex interpretative analysis that is sure to challenge any reader, even a specialist—are preceded by an introduction that explains that the book's aim is to contribute to a vision of society where necessity and freedom are reconciled. This aim is not a mere framing device but structures the book's contents as well its interpretive method.On James's account, the project of reconciling freedom with necessity—which was initiated by Rousseau in the eighteenth century and then developed by each of the modern philosophers examined in this book (with the exception of Hobbes [9])—remains incomplete. James explains this incompleteness as in part due to the success of the "two-liberties" conception of freedom outlined by Isaiah Berlin which he understands as the "liberal" idea according to which liberty begins and ends where others are prohibited from interfering in one's freedom and the "neo-republican" idea according to which the mere threat of domination is a constraint on freedom. Both views of liberty are essentially negative, James argues, and also deficient because they entail an impoverished and incorrect idea of constraint. To get beyond this viewpoint, James proposes to augment the idea of constraint that such a viewpoint entails by including both additional forms of practical constraint and a positive idea of freedom as self-determination (1). James explains the importance of the concept of self-determination by stressing the role it played in "gaining control over social and historical conditions and forces that generate avoidable practical constraints on human agency that may or may not interfere in people's lives" (2). To this end, he locates a productive tension between freedom as self-determination and practical constraint: the former is limited by the latter which, at the same time, it seeks to abolish. The "two-liberties" view cannot grasp this tension, James argues, because, in tying agency back to a "clearly identifiable agent," it overlooks the plural nature of freedom (2). In short, freedom and necessity remain unreconciled because we have not understood the nature of constraint and its relation to freedom as self-determination.James seeks to fill this "knowledge gap" by returning to what Kant, Hegel, and Marx said on freedom and necessity (both practical and historical) when they reflected on the transition to a society in which freedom and necessity are eventually reconciled. Specifically, James tries to identify new possibilities implicit in those three thinkers' accounts and to "kick the tires," so to speak, by looking for holes in their understanding of practical necessity. In particular, he focuses on what Kant's, Hegel's, and Marx's understanding of freedom and necessity might entail about the role of suffering in the transition toward a society in which freedom and necessity are reconciled. In combing through those three thinkers' arguments for inconsistencies, contradictions, and pregnant loose threads, James strives to... (shrink)

There are few books in any language which attempt to survey the whole range of Lukács' work. English readers may, therefore, consider themselves fortunate to have available the present volume and, doubly fortunate, to have forthcoming in late 1970 or early 1971 yet another book by one of the present contributors, István Mészáros, titled the Life and Work of Georg Lukács. The work under review is based on a series of lectures in 1968 at the Graduate School of Contemporary European (...) Studies at the University of Reading. The Introduction by Parkinson is largely expository and concentrates on Lukacs' celebrated Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein. The individual essays which follow are critical examinations of Lukács' views in the fields of philosophy, sociology, and literary criticism. The essays are generally of a high caliber and the differences which the authors express in relation to various aspects of Lukács are themselves testimony to the complexity and depth of his thought. The most comprehensive, and, in many ways, the most interesting approach to Lukács is in the lead-off essay by Mészáros which, in the context of dealing with his concept of the dialectic, seeks to disclose the basic structure of Lukács' thought and to establish its continuity from the young Lukács to the mature Lukács. Mészáros finds from the very beginning not only a revolutionary turn in Lukács' structure of thought, but along with it--or within it--or perhaps even conditioning it--a complex and far-ranging "ought". The "ought-ridden" character of Lukács' thought, Mészáros claims, is both the source of some of his great intellectual achievements and of some of his great failures, particularly when he substitutes ideology and moral postulates for mediated, concrete reality. Those interested in the development of the concept of the dialectic from Hegel to Marx and from Marx to the present will find Mészáros' discussion of Lukács' categories of "totality" and "mediation" informative and thought-provoking. H. A. Hodges examines Lukács' critique of philosophical irrationalism and singles out for special study his comments on the degree to which Dilthey and Mannheim contributed toward this trend. Parkinson, in addition to writing the introduction, has an essay on the nature of Besonderheit, the central category of Lukács' aesthetics. He translates Besonderheit as "speciality" or "the special." Roy Pascal digs into Lukács' concept of totality as developed in the Ästhetik and as applied in his critique of Walter Scott and of Kafka. In addition, there is an essay by David Craig on how, in Lukács' view, history molds literature, and another essay by Stanley Mitchell on Lukács' concept of the "beautiful." All in all, while the book does not represent a definitive or inclusive introduction to the work of Lukács, it does constitute an important landmark in presenting many important dimensions of his thought, as well as some highly critical appraisals of its validity and importance.--H. B. (shrink)

Substantively revised entry, 2023. Georg (György) Lukács (1885–1971) was a literary theorist and philosopher who is widely viewed as one of the founders of “Western Marxism” and as a forerunner of 20th-century critical theory. Lukács is best known for his Theory of the Novel (1916) and History and Class Consciousness (1923). In History and Class Consciousness, he laid out a wide-ranging critique of the phenomenon of “reification” in capitalism and formulated a vision of Marxism as a self-conscious transformation (...) of society. This text became a reference point both for critical social theory and for many currents of countercultural thought. Even though his later work did not capture the imagination of the intellectual public to the same extent as his earlier writings, Lukács remained a prolific writer and an influential theorist in his later career and published hundreds of articles on literary theory and aesthetics, not to mention numerous books, including two massive works on aesthetics and ontology. He was also active as a politician in Hungary in both the revolution of 1919 and during the events of 1956. Today, his work remains of philosophical interest not only because it contains the promise of an undogmatic, non-reductionist reformulation of Marxism, but also because it combines a philosophical approach that draws on Neo-Kantianism, Hegel, and Marx with an acute cultural sensitivity and a powerful critique of modern life inspired by Weber’s and Simmel’s sociological analyses of modern rationalization. (shrink)

After the initial formulation of the concept of reification in Georg Lukács’s History and Class Consciousness (HCC, 1923), a series of confusing uses of it within critical theory have contributed to blurring its contours. In his pre-Marxist work, while analyzing the social rationalization process, Lukács located the modern form of mediation between subject and object and connected it with certain effects on the level of human consciousness and behavior. This very scheme is repeated and refined in HCC. In the (...) Reification essay, Lukács uses the neo-Kantian concept of the “form of objectivity” to grasp the central constitutive form of all kinds of objects in bourgeois society. He interprets Marx’s commodity form as the “archetype” of all capitalist objectivity, which consists in converting qualitative contents into quantitative categories. Thus, the formal/calculative rationality of exchange penetrates all kinds of objectification in modern society. In Lukács’s view, only in its modern, universalized form does rational objectification bring about the phenomenon of reification, i.e. the de-historicization and political neutralization of the social relations that constitute the social system and the dominant forms of consciousness. This systemic, cultural, and political understanding of reification can prove to be fruitful in the context of contemporary discussions on democratic transformative praxis. (shrink)

A major and timely re-examination of key areas in the social and political thought of Hegel and Marx. The editors' extensive introduction surveys the development of the connection from the Young Hegelians through the main Marxist thinkers to contemporary debates. Leading scholars including Terrell Carver, Chris Arthur, and Gary Browning debate themes such as: the nature of the connection itself scientific method political economy the Hegelian basis to Marxs' "Doctoral Dissertation" human needs history and international relations.

This article is a discussion of the rabble in the context of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right. The article will progress as follows: First, I present how Hegel discusses the formation of a rabble and consider Michael Allen’s and James Bohman’s arguments regarding the domination inherent in Hegel’s theory. Next, I critique Joel Anderson’s “Hegelian” solution to the problem of the rabble. Finally, I show that the rabble are precisely the “class” that Marx needs to bring about change in the organization (...) of society. Interestingly, there is a surprising similarity between Hegel’s discussion of the rabble and justified disobedience and the Marxism of Huey P. Newton. (shrink)

Marx's Rebellion Against Lenin is a representative of the contemporary revitalization of the thought of Marx. It fulfils this task in three ways. First, it overthrows the dialectical materialism of Engels and of Stalinist Bolshevism by exploring 18th century historical thought and illustrating how these Enlightenment historians and political theorists first explored method of historical explanation that were later adopted by Marx. It is shown that contrary to the theory of Stalinist Bolshevism, Hegel was a vital influence on Marx. Second, (...) Levine's book represents Marx as an exponent of Classical Humanism. Marx did not define communism as a form of materialism, as economic egalitarianism, but rather related communism to the Classical ethics of Aristotle, to the Aristotelian ideas of polis citizenship and the ethics of distributive justice. Third, it is argued that the 17th and 18th Century Enlightenment was not simply a liberal center extolling property, individual rights and capitalism. Instead it is shown that the 17th and 18th century Enlightenment was divided between an Enlightenment Center and an Enlightenment Left, with the Enlightenment Left challenging the domination of capitalism and private property. Marx's Rebellion Against Lenin traces the flow of the theories of the Enlightenment Left into Marx and in doing so liberates Marxist thought from its imprisonment in 19th century materialism and relocates it within the traditions of Classical Humanism. (shrink)

This paper is concerned with two theories of history—those of Hegel and of Marx. Its primary aim is to clarify. The writings of Hegel are notoriously obscure, and those of Marx have been variously interpreted, so there is room for a paper which tries to ensure that when the theories of history propounded by Marx and Hegel are criticized, what are criticized are views which they actually held. It is no part of this paper's thesis that, in his (...) theory of history, Marx consciously borrowed from Hegel. But it will be argued that there is more of Hegel in Marx than is sometimes supposed, and that if this fact is ignored one seriously distorts Marx. (shrink)

The search for a historically conscious individual who is disposed to “radical action” is the main thrust of this paper. This is premised on the following claims: first, that the modern society is a pathological society whose rules, most often but not necessarily, imply control and domination; thus a “refusal” to abide by these rules is the most appropriate alternative available; and, second, that there is still hope for the Enlightenment’s project of emancipation, that is, such “refusal,” which means a (...) political fight for liberation, is still winnable no matter how formidable the forces of domination may be. But this paper can only do so much. I do not offer any universal and prefab solution to the pathological society. What I do instead is argue that the emergence of a historically conscious individual who is disposed to “radical action,” which eventually leads to a “collective radical action,” is still possible today. I also argue that “radical action” presupposes an awareness of the concrete socio-historical situations, thus the importance of “historicity.” This is done through a reconstructive reading of Marcuse’sCritical Theory. In fact, my argument is just an echo on what Marcuse did more than four decades ago. (shrink)

It is true that Hegelian historicism has indeed led to a dominant ethos of moral relativism bound up with the belief that individual self-actualization is the highest value, thus creating a society that is, in the phrase of H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr. “after God.” Nevertheless, this egocentric and nihilistic relativism exists alongside a robust and militant moral totalitarianism enforced by the modern clerisy of the media, multi-national corporations, and government bureaucrats, that is, a “managerial elite.” This article argues that the (...) transcendental idealism of Kant and the subsequent historicization of Kant’s dialectic by Hegel has served to reconceptualize the older, Baconian view of science, creating the idea that scientific progress is moving toward the goal of a future perfection of absolute rational unity. The a priori rational structure of reality that makes science possible is not a Platonic Ideal, but something that unfolds within history. This is what allowed Marx to conceive of dialectical materialism as a science, and this is what allows the managerial elite of the present to claim a scientific and objective basis for their programs while at the same time using the tools of historical and cultural criticism to relativize and historicize the claims of all competing moral and social “constructs.”. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Hegel's Century: Alienation and Recognition in a Time of Revolution by Jon StewartClay GrahamJon Stewart. Hegel's Century: Alienation and Recognition in a Time of Revolution. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021. Pp. xi + 338. Hardback, $39.99.Hegel's Century serves as (yet another) important contribution in Jon Stewart's ever-expanding research in nineteenth-century philosophy. The central premise of this monograph explores Hegel's pan-European legacy and argues that Hegelian concepts are fundamental (...) for understanding major philosophical themes of the era, especially on the European continent. Dominant among these themes are alienation and recognition, particularly their adaptation to political philosophy and religious criticism. Stewart develops his theses via a series of chapters dedicated to individual thinkers: Heine, Feuerbach, Bauer, Marx, Kierkegaard, Dostoyevsky, Bakunin, and Engels. In each case, the concepts of alienation and recognition are teased out of primary texts and connected to, and contrasted with, their Hegelian origin. While scholars of nineteenth-century philosophy may find some value in re-envisioning the development of continental thought through Stewart's narrative [End Page 330] (especially insofar as it challenges unfortunate caricatures of the history of ideas), the target audiences of Hegel's Century are advanced students of philosophy and the general public of interested persons. Though this approach has its shortcomings, it is nevertheless a valuable addition to the literature. Not only does Stewart tell a compelling story about the trajectory of nineteenth-century philosophy, but he also connects this conceptual evolution to shifts in political, economic, literary, and religious history. As such, Hegel's Century is best thought of as a gateway text for students and autodidacts fascinated by the philosophical bases for a century of upheaval and revolution.Following a general introduction, Stewart divides the book into three parts, each more substantive than the last. His introduction does the necessary legwork detailing the purpose, audience, and strategy of the book. Its most philosophically interesting aspect is the outline of seven ideas Stewart hopes will reform the reception of nineteenth-century philosophy in the modern classroom. Philosophical exposition begins in part 1, which consists of two chapters wherein Stewart details those aspects of Hegel's philosophy that will be most thoroughly thematized throughout the book. These ideas are largely sourced from specific portions of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, and Lectures on the Philosophy of History. Chapter 1 focuses on Hegel's view of alienation in the Phenomenology, especially the (in)famous section on the master and bondsman. In chapter 2, Stewart explains Hegel's conception of Christianity and the nature of divinity. Stewart maintains that as a result of dense prose and conceptual rigor, Hegel's religious views were open to myriad ambiguous interpretations. When Stewart turns to "first-generation" thinkers, namely, those who attended Hegel's lectures in Berlin and were a direct part of the intoxicating intellectual atmosphere that spread therein, questions concerning the essence of Christianity (as Feuerbach's magnum opus suggests) are front and center. Stewart's cursory account of Hegel's theory of Christianity serves adequately as the background for contextualizing this intellectual drama.In part 2, three of these "first-generation" thinkers are given their own chapters: Heine (chapter 3), Feuerbach (chapter 4), and Bauer (chapter 5). In each case, the chapter starts with a short intellectual biography focusing on the formative role Hegel played in the thinker's development. This is followed by a sustained discussion of a few central texts and interspersed analyses of how Hegel's influence is felt therein. Stewart's discussion often shows the ambivalence with which each of these thinkers handled their Hegelian inheritance. Though the specifics differ, each of these three thinkers took Hegelian theory to a more radical limit than Hegel himself did. The chapters on Heine and Bauer—figures usually overlooked in survey courses—are admirable introductions for the interested neophyte.In part 3, Stewart shows Hegel's tentacles extending throughout the latter half of the nineteenth century, notwithstanding the Hegelians' difficulty in acquiring academic posts. The political and religious radicalism of first-generation critics bleeds into the formative development of the so-called "second generation" of thinkers: Marx... (shrink)

The philosophy of Hegel had been dominant, in a Neo-Hegelian decaying form, in Great Britain at the end of the last century. It was then challenged there by the neo-empiricisms of Bertrand Russell and G. E. Moore. Development in the United States was parallel, except that Neo-Hegelianism was knocked from its citadel by William James, Dewey, and to a much lesser extent by Peirce. Dewey retained some Hegelianism in his new naturalistic approach.

Marxists tend to write not only with conviction, but with passion, flowing from an active commitment to the emancipation of mankind. In the hands of a dogmatist, such conviction and passion can serve to forge new chains. In the hands of a creative thinker, they can give wings to the freedom struggle. Mészáros' book is a "winger"--one of the most far-ranging books on the subject of Marx's theory of alienation since Lukács' seminal Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein and his chapter on alienation (...) in Der junge Hegel. This is not at all surprising since Mészáros is a former student of, and assistant to, Lukács and freely acknowledges his intellectual indebtedness to his old teacher. The present work concentrates on a close examination of the various aspects of alienation as Marx dealt with them in the Paris Manuscripts of 1844. Mészáros makes clear, however, that the framework of interpretation and evaluation of the Paris Manuscripts is the totality of Marx's works. Within this context, the Manuscripts are presented as Marx's first great "synthesis in statu nascendi," in which he discovered the dialectic of alienated labor as the motive force in history, driving toward its own self-Aufhebung. Mészáros cites chapter and verse on the continuity of this original synthesis in the later works of Marx. Not only did Marx not abandon the concept of alienation after 1845, nor its centrality, but he did not, as has been often alleged, abandon the terms Entfremdung or Entäusserung either. Mészáros' justification for advancing the Marxian concept of alienation today is the bold assertion that the transcendence of labor's self-alienation is on the order of the day; it is the essential ingredient in rescuing mankind from self-destruction, and not a remote concept for the intellectual gratification of isolated intellectuals. Modern usage of the term 'alienation' has proliferated to the extent that it is used to apply to just about any and every manifestation of out-of-jointness between the individual and society, or between one individual and another. There is here a curious confirmation of Marx's thesis. His point was that capitalism inevitably extends alienation more and more pervasively into more and more aspects of life as it extends itself. Alienation is not a byproduct of capitalism; it is integral to the process of capitalism itself. From this, it is easy to derive the "necessity" of its transcendence. In addition to dealing with the origins and structure of Marx's theory of alienation, the author devotes separate chapters to the Economic Aspects, Political Aspects, Ontological and Moral Aspects, and the Aesthetic Aspects. The latter two chapters, in particular, display the influence of Lukács and the originality of Mészáros' points of departure. The last three chapters of the book take up The Controversy about Marx, The Individual and Society, and the Crisis of Education. Mészáros is sometimes unclear and stylistically ponderous, and he occasionally stretches Marx too much and too far, or gets pedantically over-involved in detail, but these are small flaws in a work which throws much light with rigorous scholarship on such an important subject in such a manifold of interrelated aspects.--H. B. (shrink)

Since Mueller’s 1958 article calling Hegelian dialectics a “legend,” it has been fashionable to deny that Hegel used thesis-antithesis-synthesis dialectics. But in truth, Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit has 28 dialectics hidden on four outline levels, and The Philosophy of History has 10 more on three outline levels. In Phenomenology’s macrodialectic, Hegel’s nonsupernatural Spirit–all reality, everything in the universe, including man and artificial objects–advances from unconscious + union (thesis) to conscious + separation (antithesis) to a synthesis of conscious (from the (...) antithesis) + union (from the thesis). Previous interpretations of Phenomenology have missed this dialectic: they have assumed that Spirit’s journey begins with consciousness, whereas the journey actually begins in the primordial state of nature, before man arrives and provides Spirit with its Mind (the collective mind of man). Mind then misperceives itself as a multitude of separate alien “objects”–things other than itself. The macrodialectic and all other dialectics are based on Christianity’s Johannine separation-and-return mythology; all Hegelian dialectics separate from a concept in the thesis, going to that something’s opposite (antithesis), and then return to the thesis concept. Thus, in Hegel’s master-and-slave dialectic (God = master, man = slave), man advances from potential + freedom to actual + bondage (religiosity) to actual + freedom (atheism). Only Marx and Tillich understood Hegelian dialectics. Marx’s basic dialectic (one of four) saw history separating from and returning to Communism, going from communal ownership + poverty (primitive communism, or gens) to private ownership + wealth (slavery, feudalism, capitalism) to communal ownership + wealth (final communism). Tillich’s basic dialectic (one of many) separates from and returns to God, advancing from Yes to God + Yes to supernaturalism (theism) to No to God + No to supernaturalism (atheism) to Yes to God + No to supernaturalism (humanism: humanity is the nonsupernatural “God above the God of theism”). (shrink)

Marxists tend to write not only with conviction, but with passion, flowing from an active commitment to the emancipation of mankind. In the hands of a dogmatist, such conviction and passion can serve to forge new chains. In the hands of a creative thinker, they can give wings to the freedom struggle. Mészáros' book is a "winger"--one of the most far-ranging books on the subject of Marx's theory of alienation since Lukács' seminal Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein and his chapter on alienation (...) in Der junge Hegel. This is not at all surprising since Mészáros is a former student of, and assistant to, Lukács and freely acknowledges his intellectual indebtedness to his old teacher. The present work concentrates on a close examination of the various aspects of alienation as Marx dealt with them in the Paris Manuscripts of 1844. Mészáros makes clear, however, that the framework of interpretation and evaluation of the Paris Manuscripts is the totality of Marx's works. Within this context, the Manuscripts are presented as Marx's first great "synthesis in statu nascendi," in which he discovered the dialectic of alienated labor as the motive force in history, driving toward its own self-Aufhebung. Mészáros cites chapter and verse on the continuity of this original synthesis in the later works of Marx. Not only did Marx not abandon the concept of alienation after 1845, nor its centrality, but he did not, as has been often alleged, abandon the terms Entfremdung or Entäusserung either. Mészáros' justification for advancing the Marxian concept of alienation today is the bold assertion that the transcendence of labor's self-alienation is on the order of the day; it is the essential ingredient in rescuing mankind from self-destruction, and not a remote concept for the intellectual gratification of isolated intellectuals. Modern usage of the term 'alienation' has proliferated to the extent that it is used to apply to just about any and every manifestation of out-of-jointness between the individual and society, or between one individual and another. There is here a curious confirmation of Marx's thesis. His point was that capitalism inevitably extends alienation more and more pervasively into more and more aspects of life as it extends itself. Alienation is not a byproduct of capitalism; it is integral to the process of capitalism itself. From this, it is easy to derive the "necessity" of its transcendence. In addition to dealing with the origins and structure of Marx's theory of alienation, the author devotes separate chapters to the Economic Aspects, Political Aspects, Ontological and Moral Aspects, and the Aesthetic Aspects. The latter two chapters, in particular, display the influence of Lukács and the originality of Mészáros' points of departure. The last three chapters of the book take up The Controversy about Marx, The Individual and Society, and the Crisis of Education. Mészáros is sometimes unclear and stylistically ponderous, and he occasionally stretches Marx too much and too far, or gets pedantically over-involved in detail, but these are small flaws in a work which throws much light with rigorous scholarship on such an important subject in such a manifold of interrelated aspects.--H. B. (shrink)

This text was originally delivered as the Marshall Lectures in Cambridge in 1967-1968 and one would expect that Alfred Marshall, the great economist of the liberal tradition, would come off the better in comparison with Karl Marx. The expectation is not disappointed, but in the end Kerr finds both Marshall and Marx equally irrelevant to the problems of the contemporary world. The liberalism and socialism which helped shape the modern world now stand historically exhausted. The formative influence in the world (...) is no longer the struggle between classes or between socialism and capitalism. The struggle now is within one pluralistic world, whose industrial nature embraces the socialist as well as the capitalist sectors. The nature of the struggle is no longer for the possession of property, but for power--power to set the rules, fix the rewards, and influence the style of life. Those who engage in the struggle are not economic classes, but social groups and individuals. There is a challenge to the whole society, but by its very nature it cannot succeed. The challenge comes from the under-class and from the outer-class. All other elements, including the workers, the managers, leaders, white-collar employees and self-employed, make up the inner-class and conduct the struggle for power within the framework of acceptance of the existing social order. The two points to emphasize here are that the under-class and outer-class do not have the combined strength to win out, except with the support of some dominant groups of the inner-class--a fairly hopeless prospect. Secondly, no group can win conclusively, since authority in a highly industrialized society can never be held equally by all, or entirely by one. We can only conclude from Kerr's exposition that mankind is forever stuck with what Hegel called a "bad infinity." Post-capitalism and post-socialism have no place to go and a new "end of history" has been attained. Kerr concludes wistfully that we "can only envy the optimism of Marx and Marshall that surround their views of the evolution of the working class."--H. B. (shrink)