Banks face a dilemma in choosing between maximising profits and facilitating the sustainable use of resources within a carbon-constrained future. This study provides empirical evidence on this dilemma, investigating whether a bank loan announcement for a firm with high carbon risk conveys information to investors about the firm’s carbon risk exposure collected through a bank’s pre-loan screening and ongoing monitoring. We use a sample of 120 bank loan announcements for ASX-listed firms over the period 2009–2015. We measure high carbon risk (...) exposure based on whether firms meet the reporting threshold of the NGER scheme. We document positive and significant excess loan announcement returns for loan renewals for high carbon risk firms, but not for loan initiations. Further, we document a more significant loan announcement return for renewals with favourable term revisions. Finally, we find no evidence that the market differentiates between domestic and foreign lenders. Taken together, our results suggest that investors perceive that banks incorporate carbon risk considerations into their lending decisions. Our results highlight the value of banks as financial intermediaries given the information asymmetry surrounding firms’ carbon risk exposure, and more generally the need to extend modern banking theory to consider issues such as the impact of banks’ CSR reputation on lending decisions. (shrink)

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This article defends psychology and psychoanalysis against the accusation that their use of anthropomorphism in descriptions of brain and mind reintroduces the 'little man in the brain' and generates a viciously circular analysis. It queries the clarity of the concept 'anthropomorphic', And argues that many predicates which are allegedly 'characteristically human' are freely and literally attributable to machines, Parts of the brain, Etc.; this merely points out the unsurprising fact that non-Humans often perform tasks which humans can also perform. It (...) does not make these non-Humans into intelligent man-Analogues. (shrink)

In Being and Nothingness Jean-Paul Sartre contends that the self's fundamental relation with the other is one of inescapable conflict. I argue that the research of the last few decades on the ability of infants - even newborns - to imitate the facial expressions and gestures of adults provides counter-evidence to Sartre's claim. Sartre is not wrong that the look of the other may be a source of self-alienation, but that is not how it functions in the first instance. An (...) earlier and more primary form of looking with and at the other is a source of self-discovery. In early imitation, the infant and adult each see the other not as objects of experience but as subjects of action. Such looking is necessary for the infant to realize its own potential as a self-conscious, goal-directed subject of perception and action. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Frühmittelalterliche Studien Jahrgang: 36 Heft: 2 Seiten: 357-366.

Porter and Kramer are very clear that shared value is not corporate social responsibility. Not only do they criticize the four principles on which CSR rests: moral obligation, sustainability, license to operate, and reputation, as ineffective and vague, they maintain that the only reason for companies to engage in sustainability projects is to decrease costs and thus increase profits, not because they have a corporate responsibility to help protect the environment the people who dwell in it. Because social problems cause (...) extra costs for companies and thus decrease profits, they say that companies should have strategies that might appear to be socially responsible, but are not because the intent is to improve profits. This paper will describe the current definitions and focus of CSR, explain shared value, and then propose ways that commitment to CSR can be made public by leaders and their businesses, such as using social license to operate, third-party assessors, and new business structures. (shrink)

What surfaces first when one examines the philosophy of mind of Sartre and Spinoza are the differences between them. For Spinoza a human mind is a mode of the divine mind. That view is a far cry from Sartre’s view of human consciousness as a desire never achieved: the desire to be god, to be the foundation of one’s own existence. How could two philosophers, one a determinist and the other who grounds human freedom in the nature of consciousness itself, (...) be seen as having any commonalities worth exploring? How could the noted user of the deductive method and one of the most important phenomenologists of the twentieth century share any philosophical ground at all? I will argue in this paper that despite the very real differences between their two philosophies, there are striking similarities between Sartre’s view of consciousness and Spinoza’s view of the mind. They become apparent when one examines each one’s analysis of the nature of mind and its relationship to itself, the body, and the world. Both are heir to a kind of Aristotelian naturalism. This commonality between them derives from their mutual rejection of Descartes’ substance dualism. I first explore the consequences of that rejection on how each one conceives of the relationship between the mind and its objects. Next I examine their view of the mind’s relation to itself and finally I look at how each one understood the mind’s relationship to the body and the world. The examination of their two views reveals how much they anticipate and support theories of mind defended by contemporary analytic philosophers of mind. (shrink)

Although Sartre rejects a certain kind of idealism in "Truth and Existence", I argue that a commitment to a kind of transcendental idealism remains. I explore the expression of this idealism in "Truth and Existence" and how it enhances an idealist tradition which begins with Kant. More importantly, I examine Sartre's divergence from Kantian idealism and his blending of pragmatism with idealism, in a way most similar to Wittgenstein's. Unlike Wittgenstein's idealism, however, Sartre's idealism, I argue, brings him dangerously close (...) to solipsism and creates for his theory of truth a serious problem of cognitive splintering. (shrink)

This paper argues that the force and weaknesses of Thomas Nagel’s arguments against psychophysical reductionism can be felt more fully when held up to the defense of a similar view in Jean-Paul Sartre’s Being and Nothingness. What follows for both from their shared rejection of psychophysical reductionism is a defense of the claim that an objective conception of subjective reality is necessarily incomplete. I examine each one’s defense of this claim. However, although they both claim an objective conception of subjectivity (...) will be incomplete, they do think we have some ability to form such a conception and I examine next the quite different ways in which Nagel and Sartre relate this ability to our use of language. The last sections of the paper discuss each philosopher’s belief that although the tension between the objective and the subjective is irreconcilable, humans continue to desire such reconciliation, i.e., they desire to be God. (shrink)

This paper argues that the force and weaknesses of Thomas Nagel’s arguments against psychophysical reductionism can be felt more fully when held up to the defense of a similar view in Jean-Paul Sartre’s Being and Nothingness. What follows for both from their shared rejection of psychophysical reductionism is a defense of the claim that an objective conception of subjective reality is necessarily incomplete. I examine each one’s defense of this claim. However, although they both claim an objective conception of subjectivity (...) will be incomplete, they do think we have some ability to form such a conception and I examine next the quite different ways in which Nagel and Sartre relate this ability to our use of language. The last sections of the paper discuss each philosopher’s belief that although the tension between the objective and the subjective is irreconcilable, humans continue to desire such reconciliation, i.e., they desire to be God. (shrink)

The central tenet in the ontology Sartre describes and seeks to defend in Being and Nothingness is that being divides into the for-itself and the in-itself. Self-consciousness characterizes being-for-itself and distinguishes it from being-in-itself. What it means for a being to exist for itself is that it is self-conscious. How Sartre characterizes self-consciousness in Being and Nothingness is, however, a question that remains to be asked. There is no simple answer to this question. For Sartre, there are really several levels (...) of self-consciousness: the self-consciousness of consciousness at the pre-reflective level, at the level of reflection and at the level of being-for-others. There is a profound difference between the self-consciousness of being-for-others and impure reflection, on the one hand, and the self-consciousness of reflection and pre-reflective consciousness, on the other. With being-for-others and impure reflection, self-consciousness involves the attempt to grasp the self as an object for consciousness. Although the nature of this attempt and the reasons for its ultimate failure differ at each level, these levels are bound together by a common sense of self-consciousness as a consciousness of the self as an object. (shrink)

Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is increasingly important in the global environment. Businesses that want to be socially responsible, but do not have the resources of multinational corporations, can partner with non-governmental (NGO), not-for-profit (NFP), and religious organizations to access information about the culture, customs, and needs of the people in areas where they wish to do business. Without such information, CSR projects can have unintended consequences that are not beneficial for the community. Suggesting that local farmers sell corn to ethanol (...) producers may increase the farmers' income but also increase the cost of a food staple to the community. Providing food aid may result in local farmers being unable to sell their crops for enough money to buy seed for the next harvest. Donating cheaper cinder blocks instead of adobe bricks may result in more available housing, but the housing may be unlivable in the summer heat. This paper presents a three-part model for businesses to follow to develop socially responsible projects. The first strategy is to use electronic sources of information about a country and area for background information. The second strategy is to gather on-the-ground information about important issues from the people who are already operating in a community as part of NGO, NFP and missionary initiatives. The third strategy is to develop scenarios that will help identify possible negative consequences of socially responsible projects so that the project implementation can be monitored for such consequences and interventions designed to decrease or counter the impact of negative consequences. (shrink)