Karen McCarthy Brown Mama Lola:. Vodou Priestess in Brooklyn Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991. ISBN 0‐520‐07073‐9. Hardcover, $24.95. Pp. x+405.

If the tiles of a mosaic are arranged symmetrically, then the image those tiles constitute must be symmetric as well. This paper formulates and defends the general principle at work in this case: roughly, that a symmetry cannot ground an asymmetry. It is argued that the principle supports strong objections to four metaphysical views: qualitativism, relationalism, the tenseless or ‘B’ theory of time, and comparativism. A response to these objections is developed which appeals to fragmentalism, the view that reality contains (...) facts which are incompatible with one another. But fragmentalism might be thought too bizarre to tolerate, and if it is, then the objections developed in this paper may well be fatal. (shrink)

Current orthodoxy in modal logic and metaphysics has it that actuality is non-contingent in the following sense: for all p, if actually, p, then necessarily, actually, p. Call this thesis (Actuality) Necessitism and its negation (Actuality) Contingentism. Thus, according to Contingentism, there is at least one proposition p which is actually true but which could have been actually false. In another paper, one of us (Glazier 2023) has recently defended Contingentism. The present paper explores the logic of actuality under (...) Contingentism. After informally introducing Contingentism and outlining what we take to be the main motivations for accepting it, we consider how contingent actuality should be taken to be. We argue that the nature, or essence, of actuality imposes certain limits on the extent to which actuality could have been different, and these then inform our view of the logic of actuality. Turning to the formal study of the logic of contingent actuality, we specify a formal language and a possible world semantics for that language and distinguish a number of natural notions of validity and consequence to which it gives rise. We present axiomatizations of the different resulting logics and examine the variety of iterated modalities in our systems. We establish soundness and completeness results. (shrink)

Esse artigo examina a crítica de Hans Jonas à utopia marxista, questionando os limites ecológicos existentes para se atingir o ideal de uma sociedade de abundância e afirma que sua concepção de uma vida módica e respeitadora daqueles limites coincide com as tendências e propostas mais avançadas que surgiram nos últimos tempos como alternativas ao crescimento e ao desenvolvimento.

Recent years have seen an explosion of interest in metaphysical explanation, and philosophers have fixed on the notion of ground as the conceptual tool with which such explanation should be investigated. I will argue that this focus on ground is myopic and that some metaphysical explanations that involve the essences of things cannot be understood in terms of ground. Such ‘essentialist’ explanation is of interest, not only for its ubiquity in philosophy, but for its being in a sense an ultimate (...) form of explanation. I give an account of the sense in which such explanation is ultimate and support it by defending what I call the inessentiality of essence. I close by suggesting that this principle is the key to understanding why essentialist explanations can seem so satisfying. (shrink)

In diesem aufsatz erortert der verfasser die grundlegenden heideggerschen begriffe der "befindlichkeit" und des "verstehens," und auf diese weise bestimmt er sein eigenes verhaltnis zu heidegger. ausgehend von der heideggerschen these uber die destruktion der metaphysik stellt er in diesem zusammenhang die frage nach der destruktion dieser destruktion, namlich der destruktion der vernunft-losigkeit der moderne, um dadurch eine neue stellung zur philosophie und ihrer tradition zu gewinnen.

Any explanation of one fact in terms of another will appeal to some sort of connection between the two. In a causal explanation, the connection might be a causal mechanism or law. But not all explanations are causal, and neither are all explanatory connections. For example, in explaining the fact that a given barn is red in terms of the fact that it is crimson, we might appeal to a non-causal connection between things’ being crimson and their being red. Many (...) such connections, like this one, are general rather than particular. I call these general non-causal explanatory connections 'laws of metaphysics'. In this paper I argue that some of these laws are to be found in the world at its most fundamental level, forming a bridge between fundamental reality and everything else. It is only by admitting fundamental laws, I suggest, that we can do justice to the explanatory relationship between what is fundamental and what is not. And once these laws are admitted, we are able to provide a nice resolution of the puzzle of why there are any non-fundamental facts in the first place. (shrink)

I survey the philosophical literature on grounding explanation and its connection to metaphysical ground.

Philosophers have observed that metaphysical necessity appears to be a true or real or genuine form of necessity while epistemic necessity does not. Similarly, natural necessity appears genuine while deontic necessity does not. But what is it for a form of necessity to be genuine? I defend an account of genuine necessity in explanatory terms. The genuine forms of necessity, I argue, are those that provide what I call necessitarianexplanation. I discuss the relationship of necessitarian explanation to ground.

I develop a puzzle, the resolution of which, I argue, requires an unfamiliar distinction between two forms or senses of metaphysical modality, each bearing a different relationship to time. In one sense of ‘metaphysically possible’, it is metaphysically possible for it to be a time other than the time it is now; in another sense, this is not metaphysically possible.

Let a priority micro pluralist be someone who holds that particles or other microscopic objects are fundamental. Rivals to priority micro pluralism include priority monism (the view that the only fundamental concrete object is the entire cosmos) as well as the Aristotelian view that some ordinary macroscopic objects are fundamental. Although priority micro pluralism is popular, I show that it encounters great difficulty in even the most straightforward cases. For example, this tennis ball is spherical; how is this fact to (...) be grounded in facts about the microscopic realm? I consider a number of possible answers to this question. The most promising proposals attempt to exploit the close connection emphasized by Kripke between objects and their original material constituents. I argue that these proposals fail. I conclude that it is worth seriously considering alternatives to this sort of pluralism. (shrink)

Interventional research on deceased organ donors and donor organs prior to transplant holds the promise of reducing the number of patients who die waiting for an organ by expanding the pool of transplantable organs and improving transplant outcomes. However, one of the key challenges researchers face is an assumption that someone who receives an organ that was part of an interventional research protocol is always a human subject of that same study. The consequences of this assumption include the need for (...) oversight by an institutional review board and for research-level informed consent from transplant recipients, all within the complex practical realities of the organ donation and transplantation process in the United States. The current national focus on this issue provides an opportunity to think critically about the policy goals of the human subjects regulations and their application to the nascent field of deceased organ donor intervention research. We propose that for donor research where the transplant recipient does not fall under the definition of human subject, the clinical consent model—rather than the consent model used for human research subjects—best facilitates the policy objectives of balancing clinical innovation, transparency, and protection of patients in an ethically responsible and legally compliant manner. (shrink)

Could I have been someone other than who I am? Philosophers from Williams to Nagel to Lewis have been tempted to answer 'yes', but how can we make sense of such a view? I argue that to say that it is contingent who I am is to say that it is contingent what perspective I have, in a distinctively metaphysical sense of perspective.

Among the most promising options for vindicating Oppenheim and Putnam’s unity of science hypothesis is the ‘Mentaculus’ of Albert and Loewer. I assess whether this promise can be borne out. My focus is on whether the Mentaculus can deliver what Oppenheim and Putnam call the ‘unity of laws’: the reduction of special science laws to the laws of fundamental physics. I conclude that although the Mentaculus may support a fairly strong form of reductionism, it falls short of upholding the unity (...) of laws. (shrink)

Leonid Pitamic was convinced that law could not be understood and explored by a single method aiming at a pure object of enquiry. He argued that it was necessary to employ other methods besides the normative one (especially the sociological and axiological methods), which, however, should not be confounded. Methodological syncretism can be avoided by clearly distinguishing between different aspects of law and by allowing the methods to support each other. By following this guideline, and by arguing according to a (...) clear method, we can also open up a space for dialogue and for the juxtaposition of contrasting points of view. (shrink)

ABSTRACTA lineage has been drawn between the immanent philosophy articulated by Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari and the work of Donna Haraway, most notably by the nomadic feminist and immanentist Rosi Braidotti. However, while containing certain parallels via the process nature of their ontologies, upon further inspection, such an equivocation is unwarranted on the grounds that it fails to remain nuanced in distinguishing the precise ‘mechanism’ or midwife that gives birth to the continued proliferation of the flux of becoming. This (...) disparity is exposed through the erection of a homology using Lacanian psychoanalysis that eases the passing from immanentism to Haraway by showing that the latter inscribes the obverse of L'Autre into the field of becoming unravelling privileged channels of desire. This results in an ingenuity that can never be pinned down by the signifier and, further, actively works to subvert it through ploy. (shrink)

Priority monism is the doctrine that there is exactly one substance: the whole concrete cosmos. This paper develops an objection to priority monism. The objection is that although every substance is necessarily a substance, for the priority monist the cosmos is not necessarily a substance. It follows that the cosmos is not a substance and so priority monism is false. The priority monist's pluralist opponent, I argue, can avoid a parallel objection to her view.

English summary: The degree of law will determine how goods are distributed and balanced in legal relationships. The selected essays take up the question of how to understand law, and especially how to behave within the extent of the law. The lawyer is always confronted with the righteousness within and of the law. Justice within the law is not his work. If the lawyer is not satisfied with this kind of justice, he can respond as a moral personality. Justice before (...) the law offers some leeway in which one can make decisions. Therein lies the appeal of the work of the lawyer, and also his considerable responsibility. The legal decision is closely related to legal ethics. This builds on solid traditional values, which must necessarily expand in terms of affairs of time and space, as well as towards the responsibility of future generations. The German and English writings reprinted here are divided into six groups: (I) The equitable allocation as the core of law, (II) probation of law and rule of law, (III) responsible legal decisionmaking, (IV) the correlativity of justice, (V) dialogical nature of jurisprudence, and (VI) from the Slovenian tradition of thought. German and English text. German description: Vom Mass des Rechts hangt es ab, wie die Gueter und Lasten in Rechtverhaltnissen verteilt und ausgeglichen werden. Die ausgewahlten Abhandlungen stellen sich der Frage, wie man Recht verstehen soll - und besonders, wie man sich gegenueber dem Mass des Rechts verhalten soll.Der Jurist ist immer mit der Gerechtigkeit im Gesetz und vor dem Gesetz konfrontiert. Die Gerechtigkeit im Gesetz ist nicht sein Werk. Wenn der Jurist mit dieser Art der Gerechtigkeit nicht einverstanden ist, kann er als Moralpersonlichkeit reagieren. Die Gerechtigkeit vor dem Gesetz bietet einen Spielraum, in dem man Entscheidungen trifft. Darin liegt der Reiz der Arbeit des Juristen und auch seine betrachtliche Verantwortung.Das juristische Entscheiden ist eng mit der Rechtsethik verbunden. Diese baut auf einer festen Wertetradition auf, die sie notwendigerweise im Hinblick auf das Zeit- und Raumgeschehen und auf die Verantwortung gegenueber kuenftigen Generationen erganzen und ausbauen muss.Die hier wieder abgedruckten deutschen und englischen Schriften sind in sechs Gruppen unterteilt: (I) Die gerechte Zurechnung als Kern des Rechts, (II) Bewahrung von Recht und Rechtsstaatlichkeit, (III) Verantwortliches Rechtsentscheiden, (IV) Die Korrelativitat des Rechts, (V) Dialogische Natur der Jurisprudenz und (VI) Aus der slowenischen Denktradition. (shrink)

Law is a system of legal rules and legal principles. The distinction between them is a relative one. Always such definite major and minor premises are to be formed that the case can be subsumed under the rule and a conclusion, which includes the decision, can be drawn. This applies to legal principles that are operationalised by legal rules as well as to statutory forms of legal rules, which are often open as to their meaning and/or contain definitions that comprise (...) elements of principles. The basic characteristic of legal principles is that they are value measures directing the definition of legal rules as to their contents, the understanding of the rules, and the manner of their application. Legal principles aim at a goal, have weight, and define the scope of the meaning within which the legal rules move. The operationalisation of legal principles is the _ratio decidendi_ that the court has to achieve in order to be able to decide in a concrete case. Legal principles live through the rules that are the reasons for the decision in a concrete case. New cases can be solved by a new operationalisation of legal principles or by analogous application of precedents if the new cases, in their essential elements, correspond to cases that have already been decided. (shrink)

The basic question is whether and in what sense it is possible to speak about gaps in the law. If we disagree with Kelsen’s thesis that the nature of gaps in the law is that of an ideological formula, then we have to define them legally and to find the criteria regarding how they can be filled. It is also important that incompletenesses as regards contents - Hart treats them as “open texture” - are organic parts of laws. The Slovene (...) Courts Act is in accord with this thesis and for that very reason provides - the provision was written by the author of this paper - that “the judge has to decide in such a way as if he had in front of him an indefinite number of equal cases”. (shrink)

This Element examines the contemporary literature on essence in connection with the traditional question whether essence lies within or without our world. Section 1 understands this question in terms of a certain distinction, the distinction between active and latent facts. Section 2 steps back to investigate the connections between essence and other philosophical concepts. Section 3 brings the results of this investigation to bear on the traditional question, sketching an argument from the premise that essentialist facts are explained by the (...) origins of things to the conclusion that such facts are active. (shrink)

Contemporary Maya Spirituality: The Ancient Ways Are Not Lost. Jean Molesky‐Poz. Austin: University of Texas Press, 2006. 201 pp. Biblio. ISBN 0292713096, $35.00 (cloth).

I explore Martin Heidegger’s figure of the last god found in his middle period of thinking from 1936–1939 centring my analysis on Contributions to Philosophy: Of the Event (Beiträge) and how this conception is messianic in nature. The last god is a particular instantiation of a being among beings rather than representing a literary or philosophical structure that lies ahead in the future. I emphasise the notion of the turning that occurs within Ereignis, a revived playfulness, wherein the lightning-flash (das (...) Blitzen) appears as a trace or guide towards a new beginning. I conclude by investigating the historical and cultural ramifications that the arrival of the last god would have. (shrink)

Transitionaljustice mechanisms and the International Criminal Tribunal for the FormerYugoslavia (ICTY) have had only a limited success in overcoming ethnic divisionsin Bosnia-Herzegovina. Rather than elaborating upon the role of local politicalelites in perpetuating ethnic divisions, we examine ordinary peoples’ popularperceptions of war and its aftermath. In our view, the idea that elites havecomplete control over the broader narratives about the past is misplaced. Weargue that transitional justice and peace mechanisms supported by externalactors are always interpreted on the ground in context-specific (...) ways, creatingdifferent citizens’ experiences, “memories” of the war, and their respectivehopes and disappointments in regards to the relationship between peace andjustice in Bosnia. We suggest that analyses of the post-conflict developments inBosnia-Herzegovina must take into account what gives the narratives ofexclusion their power, and what are the objective political, social andeconomic constraints that continue to provide a fertile ground for theirwidespread support. (shrink)