Commentaries on Aristotle's writings have been produced since the 2nd century AD. This edition contains Greek commentaries on his work from the 3rd to the 8th centuries AD by, among others, Alexander of Aphrodiensias, Themistios, Joh. Philoponus, Simplicius in Greek.

Commentaries on Aristotle's writings have been produced since the 2nd century AD. This edition contains Greek commentaries on his work from the 3rd to the 8th centuries AD by, among others, Alexander of Aphrodiensias, Themistios, Joh. Philoponus, Simplicius in Greek.

Simplicius surveys ideas about place and time from the preceding thousand years of Greek philosophy. Translation of text with commentary and notes.

The commentary attributed to Simplicius on Aristotle's On the Soul appears in this series in three volumes, of which this is the first. The translation provides the first opportunity for a wider readership to assess the disputed question of authorship. Is the work by Simplicius, or by his colleague Priscian, or by another commentator? In the second volume, Priscian's Paraphrase of Theophrastus on Sense Perception, which covers the same subject, will also be translated for comparison. Whatever its authorship, (...) the commentary is a major source for late Neoplatonist theories of thought and sense perception and provides considerable insight into this important area of Aristotle's thought. In this first volume, the Neoplatonist commentator covers the first half of Aristotle's On the Soul, comprising Aristotle's survey of his predecessors and his own rival account of the nature of the soul. (shrink)

"In his discussion of Quality, Aristotle reports a debate on whether justice admits of degrees, or whether only the possession of justice does so. Simplicius reports the further development of this controversy in terms of whether justice admits a range or latitude (platos). This debate helped to inspire the medieval idea of latitude of forms, which thus goes back much further than is commonly recognized - at least as far in the past as Plato and Aristotle."--BOOK JACKET.

"Aristotle's Physics Book 3 covers two subjects: the definition of change and the finitude of the universe. Change, which enters into the very definition of nature as an internal source of change, receives two definitions in chapters 1 and 2, as involving the actualization of the potential or of the changeable. Alexander of Aphrodisias is reported as thinking that the second version is designed to show that Book 3, like Book 5, means to disqualify change in relations from being genuine (...) change. Aristotle's successor Theophrastus, we are told, and Simplicius himself, prefer to admit relational change."--BOOK JACKET. (shrink)

"This volume offers a new translation of the Neoplatonist philosopher Simplicius' commentary on the chapters concerning place and time in Aristotle's Physics, Book Four. Written after the closing of the Athenian Neoplatonist school in A.D. 529, the commentary clarifies the structure and meaning of Aristotle's arguments and provides a rich account of 800 years of interpretation." "Surprisingly, in the first five chapters of Book Four Aristotle shows place as two-dimensional: one's place is the two-dimensional inner surface of one's surroundings. (...) He also suggests that the upward motion of air and fire and the downward motion of earth and water are partly explained by the natural places to which they tend. Place thus has power (dunamis) of its own. In his last five chapters, Aristotle argues that if time did not entail change its passage would be undetectable, and that time, by definition countable, requires the existence of conscious beings to do the counting. Among the many relevant views that Simplicius records are those of Galen, who attacks this claim, and of Eudemus, who rebuts the Pythagorean theory that history will repeat itself exactly. J. O. Urmson's translation serves as a companion to his earlier translation of the Corollaries on Place and Time, in which Simplicius sets forth his own views as distinct from those of Aristotle." "A major sourcebook for the interpretation of Aristotle, this volume will be welcomed by scholars and students in the fields of classics, ancient philosophy, ancient history, and medieval studies."--BOOK JACKET.Title Summary field provided by Blackwell North America, Inc. All Rights Reserved. (shrink)

[1] Handbook 1-26 -- [2] Handbook 27-53.

This is one in a series of translations with introductions, copius notes and comprehensive indexes. It fills an important gap in the history of European thought.

"Simplicius starts with a survey of previous commentators and an introductory set of questions about Aristotle's philosophy and about the Categories in particular. The commentator, he says, needs to present Plato and Aristotle as in harmony in most things."-- Publisher description.

"Simplicius' commentary is the most comprehensive account of the debate on the validity of Aristotle's Categories. Simplicius discusses where the differentia of a species (for instance, the rationality of humans) fits into the scheme of categories. Another is why Aristotle elevates the category of Quantity to second place, above the category of Quality. Further, de Haas shows how Simplicius arrives at multiple definitions of "universal" to solve some of the problems."--BOOK JACKET.

The following discussion' of the manuscript tradition of Simplicius' commentary on Aristotle's Physics i-iv originated in an examination of the tradition of the fragments of Parmenides. It is therefore illustrated not only from Simplicius but particularly from the texts of Parmenides quoted by him. This will not be misleading, since, though many of these texts are quoted by Simplicius more than once, there is little or no sign in any manuscript of interpolation from one passage to another (...) and it is not likely that any scribe could have interpolated the text from an independent manuscript of Parmenides. (shrink)

The book contends that the digression ending Simplicius’ In de caelo 2.12 is not a proper history of early Greek planetary theory, but a creative atempt to show that to accept Ptolemy’s planetary hypotheses one need not repudiate Aristotle’s argument that the cosmos is eternal.

At "Categories" 12b5-16 Aristotle appears to regard the referents of declarative sentences, such as "Socrates is sitting," as what later writers were to call "complexe significabilia," i.e., items such as that Socrates is sitting. Simplicius' discussion of this passage in his commentary on the "Categories" clearly shows the influence of Stoic philosophy of language; but, if we follow the text printed by Kalbfleisch, Simplicius' commentary is seen to be a muddle of Stoic and Aristotelian elements, neither properly understood. (...) It is possible, however, by making a crucial emendation to the text, to preserve the Aristotelian integrity of Simplicius' theory of meaning. On that line Simplicius would be adopting the view that a declarative sentence refers to a thought in the first instance and a "complexe significabile" in the second instance. This view is plausibly the upshot of combining the "Categories" text with the first chapter of "De Interpretatione.". (shrink)

: In earlier work, Bernard R. Goldstein and the present author have introduced a procedural rule for historical inquiry, which requires that one take pains to establish the credibility of any citation of ancient thought by later writers in antiquity through a process of verification. In this paper, I shall apply what I call the Rule of Ancient Citations to Simplicius' interpretation of Aristotle's remarks in Meta L. 8, which is the primary point of departure for the modern understanding (...) of Greek planetary theory. I first sketch several lines of argument that lead me to conclude that Simplicius' interpretation should not be accepted because it assumes a concern with planetary phenomena unknown to the Greeks before the late 2nd and early 1st centuries BC. Then, after showing that there is a fairly well defined range of readings of Aristotle's remarks more in keeping with what we actually know of astronomy in the 5th and 4th centuries BC, I conclude that neither Aristotle's report about the Eudoxan and Callippan accounts of the celestial motions nor Simplicius' interpretation of this report is a good starting point for our understanding of early Greek planetary theory. (shrink)

In his commentary on Physics I 9, Simplicius claims that individual forms individuate matter. Given that in the same text he calls the immanent form ‘universal,’ it seems reasonable to conclude that the individual forms are individual instances of one universal species–form. However, Simplicius also mentions accidental properties that are peculiar to form rather than to matter. On the basis of Simplicius’ commentaries on the Categories and on the Physics, I argue that the individuating accidents are not (...) part of the individual forms, but that each individual’s form coordinates the individual’s accidental features. By belonging to a certain species, the individual form sets limits as to which accidents a matter–form compound can assume. This approach enables Simplicius to combine hylomorphism with a theory of individuation through properties. Furthermore, in his commentary on De Caelo I 9 Simplicius explains the uniqueness of each individual’s conglomeration of properties in light of his Neoplatonic cosmology: each individual corresponds to an individual cosmic disposition that determines its characteristic features. (shrink)

The paper examines Simplicius's doctrine of propensities in his commentary on Aristotle's Categories and follows its application by the late thirteenth century theologian and philosopher James of Viterbo to problems relating to the causes of volition, intellection and natural change. Although he uses Aristotelian terminology and means his doctrine to conflict minimally with those of Aristotle, James's doctrine of propensities really constitutes an attempt to provide a technically rigorous dressing to his Augustinian and Boethian convictions. Central to James's procedure (...) is his rejection, following Henry of Ghent, of the principle that “everything that is moved is moved by another”. James uses Simplicius' doctrine of propensities as a means of extending the rejection of that principle, which Henry had limited to the case of the will, to cognitive operations and natural change. The result is a theory of cognition and volition that sees the soul as the principal cause of its own acts, and a theory of natural change that minimizes the causal impact of external agents. (shrink)

The paper examines Simplicius's doctrine of propensities in his commentary on Aristotle's Categories and follows its application by the late thirteenth century theologian and philosopher James of Viterbo to problems relating to the causes of volition, intellection and natural change. Although he uses Aristotelian terminology and means his doctrine to conflict minimally with those of Aristotle, James's doctrine of propensities really constitutes an attempt to provide a technically rigorous dressing to his Augustinian and Boethian convictions. Central to James's procedure (...) is his rejection, following Henry of Ghent, of the principle that “everything that is moved is moved by another”. James uses Simplicius' doctrine of propensities as a means of extending the rejection of that principle, which Henry had limited to the case of the will, to cognitive operations and natural change. The result is a theory of cognition and volition that sees the soul as the principal cause of its own acts, and a theory of natural change that minimizes the causal impact of external agents. (shrink)

At "Categories" 12b5-16 Aristotle appears to regard the referents of declarative sentences, such as "Socrates is sitting," as what later writers were to call "complexe significabilia," i.e., items such as that Socrates is sitting. Simplicius' discussion of this passage in his commentary on the "Categories" clearly shows the influence of Stoic philosophy of language; but, if we follow the text printed by Kalbfleisch, Simplicius' commentary is seen to be a muddle of Stoic and Aristotelian elements, neither properly understood. (...) It is possible, however, by making a crucial emendation to the text, to preserve the Aristotelian integrity of Simplicius' theory of meaning. On that line Simplicius would be adopting the view that a declarative sentence refers to a thought in the first instance and a "complexe significabile" in the second instance. This view is plausibly the upshot of combining the "Categories" text with the first chapter of "De Interpretatione.". (shrink)

Ibn S¯ına, known to the Latin West as Avicenna, was a medieval Aristotelian— one of the greatest of all medieval Aristotelians. He lived in Persia from 980 to 1037, and wrote mostly in Arabic. Simplicius of Cilicia was a sixth century Neoplatonist; he is known mostly for his commentaries on Aristotle. Both of these men were, broadly speaking, part of the same philosophical tradition: the tradition of Neoplatonic or Neoplatonizing Aristotelianism. There is probably no direct historical connection between them, (...) however, and anyway I will not try to demonstrate one. In this paper I will examine their closely related, but ultimately quite different, accounts of corporeity— of what it is to be a body—and in particular of the essential relationship between corporeity and materiality. (shrink)

The doctrines of Parmenides of the one being and of the world of seeming were—as is well known—interpreted in different ways in the course of the history of philosophy, and even in twentieth-century historic-philosophical research, there is no agreement on the meaning of the two parts of the poem. Regarding the one being there are four attempts of explanation to be distinguished: The being is material; the being is immaterial; it is the esse copulae or must be seen as a (...) modal category; it is the entity of being. This latter interpretation, if we can call it an interpretation, is chiefly influenced by Heidegger. The Doxa-part, however, is seen as a more or less critical doxography; a second-best, hypothetic explanation of phenomena which is not truth but verisimilitude; a systematic unit together with the first part, the ἀλήθεια We do not have to discuss the differences between the outlined explanations separately; in the following, we shall show that some modern interpretations were already expressed in a similar way in antiquity. With this, we shall concentrate especially on the Neoplatonist Simplicius who in his commentary on Aristotle’s Physics expounds the first part of the Parmenidean poem completely and, in addition, the most important doctrines of the second part. (shrink)

Simplicius’ project of harmonizing previous philosophers deserves to be taken seriously as both a philosophical and an interpretive project. Simplicius follows Aristotle himself in developing charitable interpretations of his predecessors: his distinctive project, in the Neoplatonic context, is the rehabilitation of the Presocratics (especially Parmenides, Anaxagoras and Empedocles) from a Platonic-Aristotelian perspective. Simplicius’ harmonizations involve hermeneutic techniques which are recognisably those of the serious historian of philosophy; and harmonization itself has a distinguished history as a constructive philosophical (...) method. (shrink)

This paper examines two doxographies present in Ḥunayn’s summaries to Galen’s treatise On the Elements. We track the origin of these doxographies back, from Greek scolia to Galen’s treatise to Simplicius’ Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics, which we show to be the ultimate source. We also point out that Simplicius’ Commentary inspired an interpretation of Parmenides and Melissus that we find in Ḥunayn’s texts. This allows us to see remnants of Simplicius’ Commentary in the Arabic world and to (...) shed some light on the production of these summaries to Galen’s work called Summaria Alexandrinorum. (shrink)

Review of Simplicius: On Aristotle, On the Heavens 3.1-7, trans. Ian Mueller, London: Duckworth, 2009.

Aristotle in Physics I,1 says some strange-sounding things about how we come to know wholes and parts, universals and particulars. In explicating these, Simplicius distinguishes an initial rough cognition of a thing as a whole, an intermediate "cognition according to the definition and through the elements," and a final cognition of how the thing's many elements are united: only this last is επιστημη. Simplicius refers to the Theaetetus for the point about what is needed for επιστημη and the (...) ways that cognition according to the definition and through the elements falls short. By unpacking this reference I try to reconstruct Simplicius' reading of "Socrates' Dream," its place in the Theaetetus ' larger argument, and its harmony with other Platonic and Aristotelian texts. But this reconstruction depends on undoing some catastrophic emendations in Diels's text of Simplicius. Diels's emendations arise from his assumptions about definitions and elements, in Socrates' Dream and elsewhere, and rethinking the Simplicius passage may help us rethink those assumptions. (shrink)

Analyses the exegetical strategies of the Neoplatonist Simplicius.

In explicating a passage from Physics A 3, Simplicius reports a criticism by Alexander of Aphrodisias against Plato’s conception of not-being in the Sophist. Alexander deems this conception contradictory, because it posits that unqualified not-being is. Simplicius defends Plato and gives a diagnosis of what he regards as Alexander’s interpretative mistake in raising his objection. I unpack this debate and bring out ways in which it sheds light on important aspects of Plato’s project in the Sophist and of (...) Simplicius’ own philosophical background, notably in Damascius’ De principiis. (shrink)

This article presents, as a case study, the various inconsistencies which occur in the prosopographical entries concerning Simplicius, one of Sidonius’ most frequent addressees. Through the exegesis of passages of letters addressed to him (Epist. 3.11, 4.4, 4.7, 4.12, 5.4) and of passages believed to concern him (Carm. 24.89; Epist. 2.9 and 5.7), it argues for a revision of the common identification of Simplicius as brother of Apollinaris and Thaumastus, and for a re-evaluation of the sources which supposedly (...) lead to this conclusion. Some cautionary remarks on the unchecked use of prosopography as a tool are followed by a hypothesis concerning the identity of this addressee of Sidonius. (shrink)