RESUMENEn la obra del pensador gallego Francisco Sánchez (1551-1623), titulada Que nada se sabe, existen una serie de características que nos obligan a relacionarla directamente con el pensamiento judío. Entre estas cuestiones se hallan: las citas bíblicas recogidas por su autor, siendo la gran mayoría de ellas procedentes del Antiguo Testamento; la falta de la dedicatoria a la virgen María o la relación entre el alma y el cuerpo que recoge Sánchez y que es de claro origen judío.PALABRAS CLAVEESCEPTICISMO, PENSAMIENTO (...) JUDÍO, FRANCISCO SÁNCHEZABSTRACTIn the work of the thinker Francisco Sanchez (1551-1623), entitled That nothing is known, there are some characteristics that force us to directly relate it to the Jewish thought. Some of these questions are: the Biblical quotations gathered by its author, coming the great majority of them from the Old Testament; the lack of the dedication to Virgin Mary or the relation between the soul and the body that Sanchez shares with the Jewish tradition. All these topics point at the importance of this tradition in the work That nothing is known.KEYWORDSSCEPTICISM, JEWISH THOUGHT, FRANCISCO SANCHEZ, RENAISSANCE. (shrink)

Franciscus Sanchez ist profunder Kenner der erkenntnistheoretischen Auseinandersetzungen seiner Zeit. Sein konsistentes skeptisches Denken und der hohe Grad der Argumentativität seiner Ausführungen machen Sanchez zu einem herausragenden Vertreter des frühneuzeitlichen Skeptizismus.

La obra más popular de Francisco Sánchez, Quod nihil scitur (1581), transmite un pensamiento completamente escéptico. No obstante, otros escritos como Carmen de Corneta anni MDLXXVII (1578), nos ofrecen diversas ideas de cómo consideraba Sánchez que era posible el conocimiento científico como, por ejemplo, su pensamiento sobre las relaciones causales entre objetos naturales.

The most popular work of Francisco Sánchez, Quo nihil scitur (1581), transmits an absolutely sceptic thought. However, other writings like Carmen de Cometa anni M.D.LXXVII (1578), offer us different ideas about how Sánchez considers possible the scientific knowledge like, for example, his idea about the casual relations between natural objects.

The most popular work of Francisco Sánchez, Quo nihil scitur (1581), transmits an absolutely sceptic thought. However, other writings like Carmen de Cometa anni M.D.LXXVII (1578), offer us different ideas about how Sánchez considers possible the scientific knowledge like, for example, his idea about the casual relations between natural objects.

ResumenEn el marco intelectual del Renacimiento hubo una serie de pensadores que se mostraron disconformes con el aristotelismo dominante. La variedad de sus posturas así como lo distinto de sus posicionamientos filosóficos ha podido actuar como obstáculo para poder ver las similitudes que, en torno a la crítica aristotélica, presentan. El caso de Juan Luis Vives y de Gianfrancesco Pico puede resultar paradigmático, a estos se suma con fuerza Francisco Sánchez, quien dedicó una parte importante de su obra Quod (...) nihil scitur a criticar a Aristóteles, aunque más aún a sus comentaristas.Palabras claveFilosofía del Renacimiento, Francisco Sánchez, Juan Luis Vives, Gianfrancesco Pico, aristotelismo, historia de la filosofía.AbstractIn the intellectual frame of the Renaissance, there were some thinkers who did not agree with the Aristotelism prevailing at the time. The variety of their philosophical positions and opinions may have been an obstacle for an approach to their similarities regarding the Aristotelian critic. The case of Juan Luis Vives and Gianfrancesco Pico della Mirandola can be paradigmatic. Also Francisco Sánchez, who strongly joined their position, devoted an important part of his play Quod nihil scitur to criticize Aristotle –although he focused on his commentators above all.KeywordsPhilosophy in the Renaissance, Francisco Sanchez, Juan Luis Vives, Gianfrancesco Pico, Aristotelism, History of Philosophy. (shrink)

This paper analyses the available eyewitness accounts and documents relating to the young Francisco Sanchez’s sojourn in Italy with the aim of highlighting the influence of this experience on his education and on his particular form of scepticism. The issue of the certainty of geometry, addressed in his letter to Clavio, is an example of a theme that the Portuguese philosopher must have picked up from a typical debate in Italian academic circles at that time. Even more enlightening for an (...) exact understanding of his Quod nihil scitur, however, are the contemporary discussions on the epistemological status of medicine and on the reliability of traditional Galenic pathology. They show that, instead of being the expression of a radical lack of confidence in every form of knowledge, nihil sciri denotes simply a rejection of the perfect cognition of things and a receptiveness towards a model of ‘weaker’ knowledge, inspired precisely by the exercise of medical practice. (shrink)

Ante la consideración general de que el principio verum/factum es una fórmula de implicación revolucionaria sólo con Vico, se pretende examinar la tesis del Quod Nihil Scitur de F. Sánchez, con objeto de mostrar que, lejos de ser una idea marginal e incidental, el principio se encuentra en la base de la teoría epistemológica del filósofo ibérico. De hecho, el presente trabajo intenta demostrar la formulación viquiana como una respuesta a la crisis escéptica que surgía de la (...) teoría del concimiento de Sánchez. Aceptando la premisa básica del escepticismo, Vico puso fin a la crisis escéptica.As to the general view of the verum/factum principle as a revolutionary formula of implication embodied in Vico’s Philosophy, this paper aims to examine the main thesis of F. Sánchez’s Quod Nihil Scitur in order to show that the principle, far from being a casual or incidental idea, lies on the bottom of his epistemological theory. In fact, this paper intends to present the vichian formula as a response to the esceptical crisis which came out from Sánchez’s very own theory of knowledge. Once the basic assumption of scepticism has been retorted, Vico brought to an end the sceptical crisis. (shrink)

This is an edition of one of the crucial texts of Renaissance scepticism, Quod nihil scitur, by the Portuguese scholar Franciso Sanches. The treatise, first published in 1581, is a refutation of Aaristotelian dialectics and scientific theory in the search for a true scientific method. This volume provides a critical edition of the original text, an English translation, a substantial introduction, and comprehensive annotation.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:92 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY seulement apr~s qu'on a drmontr6 son existence (pp. 182, 183, 185, 188). Or ceci nous parait tout h fait erronr: la critique mrt~physique de l'activit6 rrv~le qu'elle implique drpendance, et non seulement par rapport ~t d'autres 8tres finis (ce qu'Aristote a drift vu), mais par rapport ~t une Cause transcendante et infinie qui, en crrant l'~tre fini, lui donne constamment le pouvoir de se drpasser (...) en produisant ses aetes seconds. C'est pourquoi l'analyse mrtaphysique de l'activit6 est une des voies qui conduisent ~t la drcouverte de Dieu. Scot lui-m~me, du reste, reconnait que tout changement implique drpendance et rrv~le l'existence d'un Etre immuable et absolu (pp. 184-185). Ceci nous donne l'occasion de revenir h la prima via de Thomas d'Aquin. La libert6 avec laquelle nous avons discut6 nagu~re la valeur des quinque viae ne permet pas de nous SOUl~onner d'attachement servile aux positions du saint Docteur. La prima via est une preuve incomplete de l'existence de Dieu entendu comme le Crrateur unique de l'univers, nous avons dit et redit pourquoi. Mais l'argumentation qui s'appuie sur le principe de motion nous a toujours paru et nous parait encore inattaquable: dans la Summa contra Gentiles (I, 13), Thomas 6tait encore emp~tr6 dans la physique d'Aristote, mais, dans la Summa theologiae il se maintient strictement au plan mrtaphysique : un ~tre qui change vraiment ne saurait changer par lui-mSme. Ce principe est inrbranlable et la critique de Duns Scot est inol~rante ici. F. VAN STEENBERGHEN Louvain Francesco Sanchez. By Salvatore Miecolis. (Bari: Tipografia Levante, 1965. Universith di Bari, Pubblicazioni dell'Istituto di filosofia, no. 8. Pp. 100, one plate. No price given). Francisco Sanches,1 the Portuguese philosopher and physician of Jewish parentage who was also a relative of Montaigne, ranks as one of the more interesting of sixteenthcentury thinkers. Not only is he an important reviver of scepticism in the sixteenth century, but his best known work Quod nihil scitur (first printed in 1581) was still well enough known in the next century to draw several separate attacks. What is more, various scholars have pointed out the similarities between the arguments used in Sanches' work and Descartes' cogito argument. Though there are now quite a number of studies on Sanches, especially in Portuguese, there is not yet a defnitive study of aU aspects of his life, thought, and influence. In English there is very little indeed and we could well use a monograph or at least an article on Sanches to make some of his ideas accessible to a wider audience. A definitive study will require much work and 1 This is the Portuguese form of his name. It is also sometimes given the Spanish spelling 'Sanchez' as in the title of Miccolis' book. He was born near the Spanish-Portuguese border about 1550 and moved to France, while still a boy, and there spent the remainder of his life. There has been much discussion whether Sanches was in fact Portuguese or Spanish by birth and, consequently, which is the correct form of his name. It does not seem as though the question of his nationality can be answered with certainty. We have chosen to use the Portuguese form since the Portuguese seem to have adopted him as one of their philosophers more frequently than have the Spanish. BOOK REVIEWS 93 would have to use the extensive notes made by H. P. Cazac, who died before he could utilize all of the material which he had collected,z For these reasons one might look to Miccolis' book as a new contribution to Sanches studies. One is bound to be disappointed, however, for little new material is brought forth here and even previous studies on Sanches are not fully utilized. Although this study has the format of a book, its length is little more than that of a substantial article (ca. 25,000 words). After a very brief introductory section on the life and works of Sanches, the author treats the Quod nihil scitur and 'Sanches and medicine' in... (shrink)

Agostino Lupoli considers anew the skeptical elements in Hobbes’s Logica. At variance with Popkin’s approach, which he finds insufficient, and in the line with the late Arrigo Pacchi’s insights, which he intends to extend, he shows that the De corpore contains both more than traces of skepticism and a very engaged discussion of the thesis of Quod nihil scitur, the famous, but seldom read, book by Francis Sanchez, who taught philosophy and medicine in France in the early (...) years of seventeenth century. In line with nominalist logic, Sanchez makes a very sharp criticism of Aristotelian theory of the definition, whose ontological claims he criticizes. In accordance with this criticism is Hobbes’s strict nominalism, his tautological conception of the proposition as well as other elements in his logic. (shrink)

This is an edition of one of the crucial texts of Renaissance skepticism, Quod nihil scitur, by the Portuguese scholar Franciso Sanches. The treatise, first published in 1581, is a refutation of Aaristotelian dialectics and scientific theory in the search for a true scientific method. This volume provides a critical edition of the original text, an English translation (the first ever published), a substantial introduction, and comprehensive annotation.

Julián Sanz del Río, fundador del movimiento filosófico del krausismo español, evolucionó políticamente desde el liberalismo moderado al progresista entre 1844 y 1854. Sus amigos moderados desconocían esta circunstancia, y se prestaron a ayudarlo, hasta que una recensión de dos libros franceses publicada en la Gaceta de Madrid, denunciada primero por la prensa tradicionalista por heterodoxia, y luego por los Obispos de Barcelona y Zamora, permitió conocer su verdaderos planteamientos políticos y su anticlericalismo.

A veces se argumenta que la acción tiene primacía sobre la cau salidad. Esto se puede entender de dos maneras: que la causalidad es una proyección de la acción al ámbito natural o que la causalidad presupone un agente que actúa. Defiendo que la primera tesis es falsa y que la segun da sólo liene sentido desde una teoría realista de las causas.

The limits of gnoseologic paradigm, from Aristotle to Locke. The effort here has its basis in the need to overcome limits of interpretation, tabulations and classifications that often accompany analyses on classic empirism, in general and his Locke, in particular. We try to find aut in Greek philosophy the germs of moderat empirism. And if Aristotel is undeniable, such a possible start, will wonder, perhaps, Plato's thought.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:[Quaestio prima: quomodo est anima omnia]“Anima quodammodo est omnia.”2Verbum Philosophi est et abbreviatum; non autem omnibus satis manifestum. Quid me, Vir Dei,3 iam sollicitas in isto? Scis enim quod imperitussum scientia, et iste sermo profunda forte indiget exquisitione. Quaeris ergo specificari tibi illud quod dico ‘quodammodo’; quomodo enim erit anima omnia? Istum modum velles tibi specificari: autin summa dictione una, aut secundum singula entia singulos modos explicare.Videtur (...) ergo ipse Philosophus declarare istam propositionem inductive sic:‘sensus est quodammodo sensibilia, intellectus est quodammodo intelligibilia’,4igitur etc.[Obiectiones]Hic statim duo obicis:Primum quod cum anima tres partes habeat – vegetativam, sensitivam,intellectivam – in hac ostensione Philosophi ipsum vegetativum nulli entium attribuitur per quodammodo essendi idem, ergo videtur quod non debeatdicere: anima simpliciter quodammodo est omnia, sed secundum aliquas parteseius solum.Item, videtur quod debeat dici quod solum intellectivum sit quodammmodo omnia; nam omnia omnino sunt intelligibilia: universalia, singularia. Omnes naturae vere et simpliciter intelligibiles sunt quantum in ipsis est, licet prima et remotissima principia a nobis non intelligantur. Defectus enim in nobis est sicut in oculis vespertilionis, quibus non videt solem.[2] Item, quomodo est sensus ipsa sensibilia et intellectus ipsa intelligibilia?Aeque enim ignotae sunt hae assumptiones sicut et conclusio. Nam sensitivum res vivens est et substantia; sensibilia, res non-viventes et accidentia, qualitates de tertia specie qualitatis.5 Quomodo ergo est haec illa? Iam enim patet quod non conveniunt nisi in esse et ente tantum; in nullo enim genereomnino. Igitur videtur quod nihil sit dictu ‘sensus est quodammodo sensibilia’.Nam multo magis proprie et vere dictum videretur si diceret quis ‘homoquodammodo est asinus’, nam haec conveniunt in genere et generibus.Similiter, quaeris ex parte intellectus et intelligibilium. Intelligibilia enimsunt et substantiae et accidentia, et res viventes et non-viventes; ipsum autem intellectivum, solum substantia et res vivens.[Prima responsio Philosophi ad obiectionem secundam: Sensus est in potentia tale quale sensibile in actu]6Vir Dei, dices mihi, colligendo ex ipso eodem auctore, et respondebis |A 281vb| mihi cum quaero: sensus quomodo est ipsum sensibile? Respondebis cum Philosopho, quia hoc modo, scilicet quod ‘sensus est in potentia tale quale est ipsum sensibile in actu’,7 et illud pertractabis ad singulos sensus et sensibilia. Sic visus est in potentia tale quale est ipsum visibile in actu, et ita de aliis.Sed ego contra: Vir Dei, si ‘sensus est in potentia tale etc.’, ergo aliquando erit in actu tale, etc.Ad idem: sentire quoddam pati est et quaedam alteratio. Est enim sensus de genere virtutum passivarum secundum eundem Philosophum.8 Agens autem et patiens in principio sunt dissimilia; in fine vero, cum passum est, sunt similia.Igitur sensitivum ex quo sentiendo quodammodo patitur et passivum est. Infine cum passum est, simile erit ipsi activo, scilicet sensibili. Tunc igitur erit‘sensus tale in actu quale est etiam ipsum sensibile in actu’.Sed nunc quaero quid hoc sit dictu, scilicet quod aliquando ipsum sensitivum in actu sit tale quale ipsum sensibile. Quid dicis ‘tale quale’? Numquid si actu video colorem, est virtus visiva oculi mei actu color? Aut non dicis talis estcolor? Quaero, si in qualitate assimilabitur illa virtus visiva actu colori, nihil videtur huiusmodi expositio. |E 107vb| Sicut enim superius dictum est, non videntur convenire nisi in solo ente et esse.9Confiteor, Vir Dei, quia haec ultimo obiecta tentativa sunt, sed necessaria tamen ad propositum si recte dissolvantur, per gratiam ergo Dei et per orationes tuas, Vir Dei, spero ad haec quandoque redire.[Secunda responsio Philosophi ad obiectionem secundam: homo ut mundus minor]Sed nec illud quod legimus videtur sufficere ad propositum problema, Vir Dei: ‘homo est quodammodo omnis creatura et mundus’, minor scilicet,10 et communicans cum omnibus creaturis, hoc modo: “esse cum lapidibus, vivere cum plantis, sentire cum brutis, intelligere cum angelis,” et tandem cum Deo.11Si secundum hunc modum velim praedictum sermonem exponere, non erit.. (shrink)

Anselm of Cantorbery wrote Proslogion, where is formulated the famous ‘Unum argumentum’ about the existence of God. This argument was been disputed and criticized by numerous logicians from an extensional view point. The classical predicate logic is not able to give a formal frame to develop an adequate analysis of this argument. According to us, this argument is not an ontological proof; it analyses the meaning of the “quo nihil maius cogitari posit”, a characterization of God, and establish, by (...) absurd, that “quod non posit cogitare non esse” by using the hypothesis: “to think in re” is taller than “to think in solo intelectu”. We discuss this relation and the difference between the meanings of the elementary predicates ‘to be in re’, ‘to be in intellectu’ and ‘to be in solo intellectu’. We propose a new logical approach of this ‘Unum argumentum’ of Anselm by using Curry’s Combinatory Logic. Indeed, Combinatory Logic is an abstract applicative formalism of operators applied to operands; in this formalism, the predicates, viewed as specific operators, can be composed and can be transformed, by an intrinsic way, into more complex predicates, by means of abstract operators, called “combinators”, studied by Combinatory Logic. We show that this formalism is a logical frame where it becomes possible to discuss and to formulate cognitive representations of the meanings of predicates used inside of the ‘Unum argumentum’ and to explain how the argument runs. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Anonymus Defensorium Ockham Ms. Romae, bibl. Angelica 1017 ff. 21r-36r Conspectus siglorum: = addendum censeo [....] = delendum censeo«..» = litterae illegibiles factae sive propter codicis corruptionem deperditae [[..]] = scriptor delevit Y.../ = in margine sive supra lineam inserta (?) = lectio incerta t...-t = corrupta esse videntur I22rl = incipit pagina 22 recto codicis«cCapitulum 15. De novem praedicamentis denominativis> Praedicamenta (adn. in mg.: Capitulo 15) alia a (...) substantia sunt quaedam denominationes substantiae. Denominatur enim substantia a qualitate 'qualis', a quantitate 'quanta', a relatione 'relata', \ab/ actione 'agens', et sic de singulis. Unde sicut conceptus ordinati in praedicamento substantiae sunt univoci, habentes univocam praedicationem de substantia prima, ita conceptus ordinati in praedicamentis accidentalibus sunt conceptus denominativi respectu substantiae, habentes praedicationem denominativam de ipsa—licet possunt esse univoci in suo ordine, et de suis inferioribus univoce praedicari. Est autem (adn. in mg.: Quaestio bona quarta) hic investigandum, utrum secundum multitudinem denominationum de substantia sit multitudo realitatum; ut, sicut sunt denominationes secundum novem genera distinctae, ita res et realitates novem generum distinctae. Quae est utrum novem denominantia substantiam sint dispositiones distinctae realiter a substantia, aut sint 111 Franciscan Studies (54) 1994-1997 112ANONYMUS dispositiones distinctae tantum ratione, sicut Commentator1 innuit. (adn. in ima pag.: Utrum secundum multitudinem denominationum de substantia sit multitudo realitatum, id est utrum novem praedicamenta distinctas habent realitates.) Et ista dubitatio de praedicamentis denominativis consimilis est dubitationi superius2 factae de praedicatis univocis et de correspondentia praedicamentorum et realitatum. Et videtur hie conformiter dicendum sicut de praedictis, scilicet quod multitudo rerum non est secundum multitudinem coneeptuum quiditativorum. Et hoc manifestum est, sumentibus nobis suppositiones has: Primo (adn. in mg.: Prima suppositio) quod substantia habet entitatem propriam. Ex illo sequitur evidenter intentum, nam si praedicamenta denominantia substantiam distinguerentur ab ea realiter, circumscriptis illis realitatibus, nulla remaneret realitas substantiae propria. Si enim substantia materialis haberet [[aliunde figuram puta a qualitate]] aliunde extensionem, puta a quantitate, aliunde figuram, puta a qualitate, aliunde positionem, et ita de alus, istis circumscriptis, quaero quid remaneret pro entitate substantiae? Non apparet quod aliquid, nisi fingas totam realitatem substantiae materialis posse habere esse punctuale et in puncto salvari, quod non capit imaginario. Quia de ratione substantiae materialis et corporeae, quae distinguitur contra immaterialem et incorpoream, est quod habeat partem extra partem.3 Et ita videtur quod substantia materialis erit seipsa quanta, et seipsa terminata, et per consequens seipsa figurata. Seipsa, inquam, et per se, perseitate excludente rem aliam. Secunda suppositio (adn. in mg.: Secunda suppositio) est quod non est contradictio realitatem unam esse, realitate ab ea distincta non existente. Patet, quia non est contradictio nisi affirmetur et negetur idem de eodem,4 implicite vel explicite. Et ista suppositio 1Cf. Averroës In Metaph. V com. 14 (1562) 148EF. 2Cf. supra cap. 11 'De univocis'; cf. cap. 12 (f. 24v): Et manifestum est, quoniam non oportet multitudinem esse in conceptibus, sicut nec multitudo in conceptibus sequitur multitudinem eorum quae sunt in vocibus, necessario sumentibus nobis suppositiones has. 3Cf. Guillelmus de Ockham Summa logicae I c. 44 (OPh I 137): quantitas continua permanens nihil aliud est nisi res una habens partem situaliter distantem a parte. 4Cf. Aristot, De interp. 9, 18a29-30: In his ergo quae sunt et facta sunt necesse est affirmationem vel negationem veram vel falsam esse; Anal. post. 1,11 77a30; Tópica VI,6 143bl6: Nam de omni vel affirmatio vel negatio vera est; Metaph. IV,9 1005bl9- THE DEFENSORIUM OCKHAM1 1 3 concludit similiter intentum. Nam quia contradictio est corpus de genere substantiae (id est substantiam materialem) esse, et non esse quantum (id est non habere partem extra partem); ideo quantitas non est alia res a corpore. Item quia contradictio est magnitudinem esse, et ipsam non esse terminatam et figuratam; ideo figura non est alia res a corpore sive magnitudine. Item quia contradictio est totum esse, et non esse maius parvus distinguerentur specie cum sint plures partes materiae in magno quam in parvo. Solet etiam dici quod magnum et parvum non variant speciem. Istae viae (adn. in mg.: Quod quantitas continua non sit res distincta) non concludunt de quantitate continua, quia non repugnaret sibi unitas; nec ex parte sui, quin scilicet possit habere unitatem formae accidentalis convenientem, nec ex parte subiecti, quin scilicet posset habere subiectum unum. Sed sufficienter videtur convinci quod... (shrink)

My topic is the materialist appropriation of empiricism – as conveyed in the ‘minimal credo’ nihil est in intellectu quod non fuerit in sensu (which interestingly is not just a phrase repeated from Hobbes and Locke to Diderot, but is also a medical phrase, used by Harvey, Mandeville and others). That is, canonical empiricists like Locke go out of their way to state that their project to investigate and articulate the ‘logic of ideas’ is not a scientific project: (...) “I shall not at present meddle with the Physical consideration of the Mind” (Essay, I.i.2, in Locke 1975; which Kant gets exactly wrong in his reading of Locke, in the Preface to the A edition of the first Critique). Indeed, I have suggested elsewhere, contrary to a prevalent reading of Locke, that the Essay is not the extension to the study of the mind of the methods of natural philosophy; that he is actually not the “underlabourer” of Newton and Boyle he claims politely to be in the Epistle to the Reader (Wolfe and Salter 2009, Wolfe 2010). Rather, Locke says quite directly if we pay heed to such passages, “Our Business here is not to know all things, but those which concern our Conduct” (Essay, I.i.6). There would be more to say here about what this implies for our understanding of empiricism (see Norton 1981 and Gaukroger 2005), but instead I shall focus on a different aspect of this episode: how a non-naturalistic claim which falls under what we now call epistemology (a claim about the senses as the source of knowledge) becomes an ontology – materialism. That is, how an empiricist claim could shift from being about the sources of knowledge to being about the nature of reality (and/or the mind, in which case it needs, as David Hartley saw and Denis Diderot proclaimed more overtly, an account of the relation between mental processes and the brain). (David Armstrong, for one, denied that there could be an identification between empiricism and materialism on this point: eighteenth-century history of science seems to prove him wrong: see Armstrong 1968 and 1978.) Put differently, I want to examine the shift from the logic of ideas in the seventeenth century (Locke) to an eighteenth-century focus on what kind of ‘world’ the senses give us (Condillac), to an assertion that there is only one substance in the universe (Diderot, giving a materialist cast to Spinozism), and that we need an account of the material substrate of mental life. This is neither a ‘scientific empiricism’ nor a linear developmental process from philosophical empiricism to natural science, but something else again: the unpredictable emergence of an ontology on empiricist grounds. (shrink)

PHILOSOPHY OF HUMAN RIGHTS: HUMAN RIGHTS IN LIGHT OF THEIR INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION Summary The book consists of two main parts: in the first, on the basis of an analysis of international law, elements of the contemporary conception of human rights and its positive legal protection are identified; in the second - in light of the first part -a philosophical theory of law based on the tradition leading from Plato, Aristotle, and St. Thomas Aquinas is constructed. The conclusion contains an application (...) of the results of the analysis conducted in the second part. The first part comprises four chapters. The first aims at revealing characteristics of human rights on the basis of an analysis of historical conditioning of the inter-national law of human rights and its development. The historical context displays the practical, vindicative, and critical character of the positive legal protection of human rights. Moreover, the process of change of positive human rights law is distinguished from the process of change of human rights as such. In the second chapter the content of human rights - a topic which is only auxiliary to the conducted analysis - is discussed. Basic typology and catalogues of rights proclaimed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and protected in the International Covenants of Human Rights are presented. The review of the content of rights aims at a more precise limitation of the field of research. The examination shows a diversity of rights which poses a serious challenge to the coherence of every philosophical theory of human rights. In the third chapter, central in the first part, international law is analyzed with regard to the characteristics of rights and the foundations of them. The analysis of documents shows a number of solutions referring to the anthropological foundations of rights. The inherent dignity of the human person is the source of all human rights. Each human being is recognized as free, and endowed with both reason and conscience. In the propounded conception of man individuals are not rivals but create a community which is a condition for their development. International law characterizes the rights as universal, inherent, inalienable and inviolable. The reconstructed conception also comprises the following basic elements: on the level of the structure of rights, a recognition of their equality, interdependence, and comprehensiveness; in the grounding of these rights, a recognition of the anthropological foundations of law; in the conception of positive law, a recognition of the secondariness of the positive law of human rights to human rights themselves, and a recognition of human rights and justice as the basis for legal order; in the conception of state, a recognition of the well-being of the individual as the fundamental aim of actions undertaken by political institutions, and recogni¬tion of rights which form an impassable boundary to the power of the state, includ¬ing its legislative actions. The characterization of the international legal paradigm serving for the under¬standing of human rights is supplemented by analyses of the structure of their posi¬tive legal protection. Various meanings of the terms "right" and "freedom" are distinguished. Subjective right, as basic structure of the positive legal protection of human rights, is understood as a complex relation formed by various legal situations of the subject of a right which create a functional whole in respect of the subordi-nation of human person to its good. Subordinating person to a good proper for it, expressed usually in a proclamatory norm, is the central element of particular rights around which further elements aiming at the realization of this good are built. In the second part of the book a philosophical theory is developed which allows for the location of a coherent foundation for the presented characterization of human rights and their positive legal protection. This part consists of two chapters. The first includes a review of some - not entirely satisfactory - means of founding of human rights; the second presents philosophical conceptions of law and man which may form a basis for the constructed theory. The review of arguments contained in the first chapter does not aim at a detailed analysis of various specific ways of argumentation encountered in works on this subject but rather at a concise presentation of the main possible lines of argumentation. These analyses also serve to emphasize the positive solutions which are pro¬posed later and to underscore the explanatory power of the elaborated theory. This theory, retaining accurate intuitions contained in the presented types of argumenta¬tion, helps in avoiding their consequences which are difficult to reconcile with the reconstructed paradigm of human rights. Efforts to base human rights on the norms of international law rightly take into account the necessity of determining the content of the rights and their positive legal protection as a means for the realization of man's good. These attempts, how¬ever, do not properly take into account the inherent character of human rights, which are independent of positive law and provide grounds for applying specific legislative measures and not others. Founding human rights on freedom accurately points at the freedom of an indi¬vidual as a constitutive element of some rights; however, absolutization of freedom leads, to a loss of an important element of the contemporary paradigm of under¬standing human rights. This foundation undermines recognition of the fact that human rights may set limits to both the freedom of others and the freedom of the subject of rights itself. Additionally, attempts at the so-called axiological justification of human rights are discussed. This type of justification has a few variants depending on the as¬sumed conception of value. Subjectivistic conceptions have similar advantages and disadvantages to the conceptions basing human rights on freedom; objectivistic conceptions while providing for the universality of human rights place, the fundamental aim of human rights protection beyond the individual human being - in the idealistically existing world of values; finally, conceptions rooting values and human rights in culture, while accurately noting that human rights are learned through the medium of culture, place the source of human rights beyond a concrete individual - in culture and processes which take place in it - which leads to difficulties in finding a basis for the universality of rights. Furthermore, attempts to ground human rights in specific characteristics of the human being are presented. This type of approach points to an important problem of dependence of the content of rights on what man is. However, recognition of specific characteristics of a human being as an ontic foundation of the existence of rights poses a danger to their universality since one has to accept that it is not enough to be a man to be a subject of rights, but a man possessing specific charac¬teristics. The second chapter aims at outlining solutions worked out by Saint Thomas Aquinas. For a fuller understanding of his propositions selected elements of Plato's and Aristotle's philosophy are presented. It was them who formulated the founda¬tions for reflection on law and justice in the ontological context. A qualification is made that Stoicism is not be analysed in depth. Although Thomas' concept of law was undoubtedly developed under the influence of the Stoic doctrine as well, it is not in this that one should look for the tools to understand the ontic foundations of human rights and law in general since the Stoic moral philosophy and philosophy of law were developed in the context of a theory of being which assumed monistic and pantheistic premises as foundations, leading to the recognition of a total subor¬dination of the human individual to a larger unity of which man is only a part. The analysis of Plato's and Aristotle's texts concentrates on problems of justice. Plato seems to be the first philosopher who reflected on the formula basic in the history of European thought: to render to each his due. It appears that justice as both a characteristic of man and his acts is understood in the perspective of that which is just, that which is a good for another man - the recipient of the act. The basis for determining what is just is the relation of correspondence between some¬one and something. While in the case of Plato this relation is based on something beyond its terms, namely on ideas, in the case of Aristotle the relation occurs on account of the elements of the relation itself. Something is just when it contributes to the develop¬ment of the recipient of an act realizing that which is just. At the same time, the realization of that which is just is a good for the agent. In the analysis of the just two types of relation are revealed: the relation of due-to-recipient occurring on account of the compatibility of that which is due, with the recipient of the act; and - a "superstructure" - a relation of obligation-of-subject occurring on account of the compatibility of the acting subject with the thing which should be done. The basis for being that which is due is formed by various potentialities of development of man - the recipient of agency; the basis of being that which is an obligation is the possibility of development of the subject of action. Aristotle distinguishes various types of freedom and points to the necessity of taking them into account in the discussion of justice. Among other things, as the core of man's freedom, he considers life for its own sake, which can be seen as his expression of the basic indices of the autotelic character of man - which is funda¬mental for later conceptions of dignity. The freedom which is described by him is not, however, inherent and inalienable; being free is conditioned by a factual possi¬bility of undertaking actions, which are not solely means to the realization of aims set by others. Thomas Aquinas takes over the Aristotelian research perspective both in his conception of man and of law. At the same time, however, he significantly enriches it. In anthropology he develops a conception of personal being. Drawing upon his distinction between existence ("that something is") and essence ("what something is"), he sees the basis for being a person in the dignity of personal being which is a certain way of existence of a rational being more perfect than that of non-personal beings. The person is a being which, by virtue of its act of existence, is individual¬ized in a specific way. It is an aim in itself. Expressing it in a negative way, one may say that it does not exist as a means for the realization of the aims of others and, in this sense, that it is free. As distinct from Aristotelian conclusions, being a person is not conditioned by the specific actions of a being. Dignity is inherent, based on that which is the foundation of the factual existence of every rational being. Although freedom requires that a being is rational, dignity still encompasses all being, all its properties and potentialities. Thus an act conforming with dignity has to take into account a whole human being. Among different types of that which is just, ius, the first place, from the point of view of understanding law, falls to "the just thing itself ("ipsa res justa"), which is right in the full meaning of the word. On the one hand, it is that which is due; on the other hand, it determines the way of acting in the utmost degree, since the course of every act is determined in the fullest extent by its aim. The content of ius may be determined both by elements independent of free decisions - ius naturale - and by free decisions taking into account the state of things - ius positivum. Recognition of the objective structure of being as the basis of law does not entail that it is possible or desirable to determine unequivocally "the only right" patterns of conduct. This concept is very well justified within the system proposed by Saint Thomas. Individualization of being is a significant element of the develop¬ment of a person as a person. It is attained by the realization of individual aims which are not unequivocally determined by circumstances and the nature common to all people. By virtue of free choices made in the sphere of that which is not by its nature unjust, the object of action becomes ius. Since in the realization of the person the individualization of human being is central, Aquinas clearly sees the need for the protection of the sphere of "dominion of will". This sphere itself constitutes ius naturale, something which is due to man independently of the acts of will. Therefore "law should forbid nothing which is not unjust" ("nihil debet lege prohiberi quod licite fieri potest", In 3 Sent., dist. 40, q. I, a. 1, 3). Besides the relation of due-to-recipient, ius also includes the relation of obligation-of-subject which is superimposed on the relation of due-to-recipient. As far as the ontic foundations of obligation are concerned, in explaining why man is subordinated to realization of the good of others, Aquinas generally follows Aristotle in accepting that this basis is the subordination to moral good - to actions conforming with the learned truth about reality. Aquinas' systemic solutions allow, however, to reach deeper and understand why moral development is also a development of the whole human being. This was difficult within Aristotle's system, since he was reluc¬tant to decide whether precedence should be given to intellectual or moral develop¬ment. The inclination to realise good of another appears to be a transcendental characteristic of being, based on its very existence. Morality understood as rational and free subordination to realize the good of another is a specifically personal way of the realization of this inclination. Thus just actions contribute to the actualization of being in the aspect of its existence and therefore to the actualization of being as a whole. Thomas' conception of natural law (lex naturalis) as participation in eternal law (lex aeterna), offers possibilities for grasping that which is just as something which is basically accessible cognition, independently of Revelation and independently of faith in God, and at the same time as something based in eternal law, understood as a design of God's wisdom. Eternal law, embracing all particular actions, is not, from the human perspective, accessible cognition directly. It is enacted in the struc-ture of the created being and - in case of human beings - in free choices taking this structure into account. In the concluding remarks, the results obtained earlier are applied directly to the contemporary conception of human rights. Human rights are understood in the first place as "just things" - concrete goods of man; as that which is due because of subordination, based on dignity, to the personal development of man. That which is just is understood as a relational - actual or potential - state of things, which exists by virtue of existing relations. Evaluations referring to that which is right are true when respective relations of due-to-recipient take place; norms of conduct are true when respective relations of obligation-of-subject take place. Examples of the application of the sketched theory outside the field of human rights are also presented. Procedural consequences of the developed theory are shown, such as the discrimination of two types of legislative procedures which differ significantly in the structure of argumentation: the first aims at recognition of that which is just independently of the will of the legislator, and the second, at making individual or collective "projects" of development compatible. Finally the possibilities of applying the theory to the increasingly important problems of the protection of the environment and the "rights" of animals are mentioned. The central issue is a philosophical conception of man and his freedom and a conception of law. It is also indispensable to turn to a general theory of being. The search for a comprehensive theory of human rights requires attention to the Abso¬lute Being - God - as well. This is important for at least two reasons. First, a conception of the Absolute Being is integral to philosophy of the systemic type -of which the present book is a piece. A conception of the Absolute Being is signifi¬cant for understanding all being, including, first of all, man as a personal being. Second, every theory of human rights which does not comprise the problem of the Absolute may be questioned as to whether solutions adopted in it do not lead, in consequence, to eliminating God from the perspective of the understanding of law. It is desirable that a philosophical theory should deal with this problem directly. A theory which eliminates God from the perspective of the understanding of rights will be unacceptable for all those who, for philosophical reasons or relying on faith, consider God as the author of inherent rights. Nevertheless, a theoretical approach to rights from the perspective of the Absolute Being should only be a possible extension of a philosophical approach which bases rights on something which is cognizable independently of the acceptance of the existence of God so that the theory is also acceptable for those who reject the existence of God or suspend their judgment on this subject. The pursued theory should therefore contain, on the one hand, reference to natural, faith-independent foundations of human rights, but on the other hand, point to a possible extension accounting for the Absolute Being. The analyses contained in this chapter have undoubtedly some historical value since they are based on source texts. Nevertheless, the use of these texts and not critical works was dictated, first of all, by a conviction that analyses embrace a given theory in the aspect selected by the interests of the researcher. Therefore to find out what past thinkers say on the subject characterized in the first part it is simpler to reach to the sources than to adopt the existing critical works. The pre¬sented reconstruction of Aquinas' views on philosophy of law incorporates proposi¬tions of supplementing and developing some of the ideas undertaken by him. Obligation to act in this and not an other way arises because human actions are subordinated to the conformity, on the one hand, of aims realized by these actions and, on the one hand, the order of being determining that which is favourable to man or destroys him. The content of the order of being is, on the one hand, determined by the structure of being independent from man's will and, on the other, by free decisions of man. (shrink)

Empiricism is a claim about the contents of the mind: its classic slogan is nihil est in intellectu quod non fuerit in sensu, ‘there is nothing in the mind (intellect, understanding) which is not first in the senses’. As such, it is not a claim about the fundamental nature of the world as material. I focus here on in an instance of what one might term the materialist appropriation of empiricism. One major component in the transition from a (...) purely epistemological claim about the mind and its contents, to an ontological claim about the nature of the world, is the new focus on brain-mind relations in the eighteenth century. Here I examine a Lockean trajectory as exemplified in Joseph Priestley’s 1777 Disquisitions Relating to Matter and Spirit. But Locke explicitly ruled out that his inquiry into the logic of ideas amounted to a ‘physical consideration of the mind’. What does it mean, then, for Priestley to present himself as continuing a Lockean tradition, while presenting mental processes as tightly identified with ‘an organical structure such as that of the brain’ (although he was not making a strict identity claim as we might understand it, post-Smart and Armstrong)? One issue here is that of Priestley's source of ‘empirical data’ regarding the correlation and indeed identification of mental and cerebral processes. David Hartley’s theory in his 1749 Observations on Man was, as is well known, republished in abridged form by Priestley, but he discards Hartley's 'vibratory neurophysiology' while retaining the associationist framework, although not because he disagreed with the former. Yet Hartley was at the very least, strongly agnostic about metaphysical issues (and it is difficult to study these authors while bracketing off religious considerations). One could see Locke and Hartley as articulating programs for the study of the mind which were more or less naturalistic (more strongly so in Hartley’s case) while avoiding ‘materialism’ per se; in contrast, Priestley bit the (materialist) bullet. In this paper I examine Priestley’s appropriation and reconstruction of this ‘micro-tradition’, while emphasizing its problems. (shrink)

Retraçant sont itinéraire philosophique dans Beau Voyage, quelques mois avant sa mort, Maurice Pradines (1874-1958) résume sa philosophie de la sensation par cet adage: "Nihil est in sensu quod non prius fuerit in intellectu". Pour l'auteur de la Philosophie de la sensation, la sensation est, en effet, originairement intelligente: elle n'a de légitimité biologique qu'en tant qu'elle donne quelque chose à comprendre. Renvoyant dos-à-dos le sensualisme (qui construit l'intelligence sur une sensation denué d'esprit) et le rationalisme (qui prétend (...) trouver l'esprit dans une raison transcendante), Pradines inscrit l'intentionalité au cœur de la physiologie de la sensation. Percevoir, pour un vivant, c'est d'abord percevoir quelque chose qui intéresse la vie, à savoir un danger à écarter ou un objet à conquérir. Aussi n'est-il guère surprenant que le sens ultime de la sensation soit l'espace: elle est le signe d'une distance à déployer ou, au contraire, à réduire. Les phénomènes psychiques ne peuvent être des données immédiates puisqu'ils font sens dans la stricte mesure où l'espace les élabore en même temps qu'il se construit. Les fondements d'une psychologie conséquente peuvent, dès lors, être posés. Elle consistera à saisir la genèse de l'esprit à partir du sens biologique de la sensation, c'est-à-dire d'une spatialité pensée elle-même comme "genèse première". (shrink)

My topic is the materialist appropriation of empiricism—as conveyed in the ‘minimal credo’ nihil est in intellectu quod non fuerit in sensu. That is, canonical empiricists like Locke go out of their way to state that their project to investigate and articulate the ‘logic of ideas’ is not a scientific project: “I shall not at present meddle with the Physical consideration of the Mind”. Indeed, I have suggested elsewhere, contrary to a prevalent reading of Locke, that the Essay (...) is not the extension to the study of the mind of the methods of natural philosophy; that he is actually not the “underlabourer” of Newton and Boyle he claims politely to be in the Epistle to the Reader. Rather, Locke says quite directly if we pay heed to such passages, “Our Business here is not to know all things, but those which concern our Conduct”. There would be more to say here about what this implies for our understanding of empiricism, but instead I shall focus on a different aspect of this episode: how a non-naturalistic claim which falls under what we now call epistemology becomes an ontology—materialism. That is, how an empiricist claim could shift from being about the sources of knowledge to being about the nature of reality.. Put differently, I want to examine the shift from the logic of ideas in the seventeenth century to an eighteenth-century focus on what kind of ‘world’ the senses give us, to an assertion that there is only one substance in the universe, and that we need an account of the material substrate of mental life. This is neither a ‘scientific empiricism’ nor a linear developmental process from philosophical empiricism to natural science, but something else again: the unpredictable emergence of an ontology on empiricist grounds. (shrink)

In his prefatory epistle dedicating his Naturalis Historia to Vespasian, the elder Pliny takes great pains to plead that his magnum opus is unworthy of the emperor: ‘maiorem te sciebam, quam ut descensurum hue putarem’ . Continuing in this vein, Pliny goes on to say ‘praeterea est quaedam publica etiam eruditorum reiectio’, and appeals for support to the great Cicero: ‘utitur ilia et M. Tullius extra omnem ingenii aleam positus, et, quod miremur, per aduocatum defenditur’ . Cicero's aduocatus is (...) the satirist Lucilius, from whom a mangled fragment in trochaic septenarii is then quoted: ‘nec doctissimis. Manium Persium haec legere nolo, Iunium Congum uolo.’ The sense of this fragment, which Pliny very probably quoted from the now-lost beginning of Cicero's preface to his De Re Publica, can be restored from Cicero, De Oratore 2.25: ‘nam ut C. Lucilius…dicere solebat ea quae scriberet neque ab indoctissimis se neque a doctissimis legi uelle, quod alteri nihil intelligerent, alteri plus fortasse quam ipse; quo etiam scripsit “Persium non curo legere” , “Laelium Decimum uolo” : sic ego…’. This latter passage has allowed the former to be restored, to some extent exempli gratia, to the following form in Warmington's and Krenkel's editions of Lucilius. (shrink)

In his prefatory epistle dedicating his Naturalis Historia to Vespasian, the elder Pliny takes great pains to plead that his magnum opus is unworthy of the emperor: ‘maiorem te sciebam, quam ut descensurum hue putarem’. Continuing in this vein, Pliny goes on to say ‘praeterea est quaedam publica etiam eruditorum reiectio’, and appeals for support to the great Cicero: ‘utitur ilia et M. Tullius extra omnem ingenii aleam positus, et, quod miremur, per aduocatum defenditur’. Cicero's aduocatus is the satirist (...) Lucilius, from whom a mangled fragment in trochaic septenarii is then quoted: ‘nec doctissimis. Manium Persium haec legere nolo, Iunium Congum uolo.’ The sense of this fragment, which Pliny very probably quoted from the now-lost beginning of Cicero's preface to his De Re Publica, can be restored from Cicero, De Oratore 2.25: ‘nam ut C. Lucilius…dicere solebat ea quae scriberet neque ab indoctissimis se neque a doctissimis legi uelle, quod alteri nihil intelligerent, alteri plus fortasse quam ipse; quo etiam scripsit “Persium non curo legere”, “Laelium Decimum uolo” : sic ego…’. This latter passage has allowed the former to be restored, to some extent exempli gratia, to the following form in Warmington's and Krenkel's editions of Lucilius. (shrink)

Composti tra il 1703 e il 1704, e pubblicati postumi da R.E. Raspe nel 1765, i Nuovi saggi sullíintelletto umano costituiscono un trattato di filosofia della conoscenza, ma scandito secondo la prospettiva metafisica elaborata dall’«autore del sistema dell’armonia prestabilita», come suona il sottotitolo del volume. Sono redatti in forma di dialogo tra Filalete, seguace di Locke, e Teofilo, portavoce di Leibniz, e i loro capitoli seguono pari passo, a mo’ di commentario analitico, quelli del Saggio sullíintelletto umano di Locke. Gli (...) estremi della disputa tra i due filosofi, imperniata per lo più sul tema della teoria della conoscenza in generale, sono riassumibili, da un lato, nell’assioma empirista lockiano, di tradizione aristotelico-tomista, secondo cui nihil est in intellectu quod non fuerit in sensu (niente è nell’intelletto che non sia già stato nella sensibilità), e, dall’altro lato, nella risposta corrosiva e tagliente di Leibniz: excipe: nisi ipse intellectus (a eccezione dell’intelletto stesso). Ma, oltre al confronto con la posizione teorica di Locke, Leibniz fornisce al lettore i fondamenti e i principi del proprio sistema speculativo, tra i quali spiccano: il concetto di monade quale sostanza individuale, inestesa, dotata di attività; la teoria delle piccole percezioni, intese come processi e stati mentali inconsci (teoria che apre la strada alla scoperta dell’inconscio); la lex continui, ovvero la legge della connessione totale del mondo, che non tollera né salti né vuoti; il principium individuationis, basato sul principio metafisico di identità degli indiscernibili; il principio ontologico dell’infinita molteplicità e diversità del reale; la massima secondo cui «il fondo delle cose è ovunque identico». I Nuovi saggi sullíintelletto umano furono pubblicati postumi da R.E. Raspe nel 1765 in G.W. Leibniz, Oeuvres philosophiques latines et franÁoises, Amsterdam-Leipzig. La traduzione è stata condotta sull’edizione critica curata da A. Robinet e H Schepers: G.W. Leibniz, Nouveaux Essais, Akademie Verlag, Berlin 1962, con recezione dei corrigenda acclusi nella ristampa del 1990. (shrink)

The purpose of this note is to banish for ever from our histories of Roman literature the term elocutio nouella as a description of the style preached and practised by Cornelius Fronto. Commenting on a speech recently delivered by the Emperor Marcus, Fronto declares : Pleraque in oratione recenti tua, quod ad sententias attinet, animaduerto egregia esse; pauca admodum uno tenus uerbo corrigenda; non nihil interdum elocutione nouella parum signatum. The standard interpretation of the last clause is that (...) given by Haines : ‘some parts here and there were not sufficiently marked with novelty of expression’. It is my contention that it means: ‘some parts here and there were insufficiently clear through new-fangled diction’. (shrink)

Quomodo versus lyrici legendi sint, plerumque inter metricos constat, licet de origine singulorum versuum vel colorum dubia moveantur; at ne illud quidem confirmari potest in genere illo peculiari, quo multae strophae Pindari et Bacchylidis et nonnullae poétarum scenicorum compositae sunt. Quod in talibus versibus maxime conspicuum est, hoc est, quod metra τоû σоυ et διπλασíоυ γéνоυς; in eis coniunguntur vel coniungi videntur, ita, ut ambitus utriusque partis aut par aut non multum maior minorve sit. lam antiqui metrici parum (...) compertum habebant, qua ratione eiusmodi versus explicarent. Cum maior pars ceterorum versuum lyricorum etiam post Alexandri aetatem in usu essent et doctrina grammaticorum hanc quoque materiam complecteretur, pauca versuum illorum vestigia remanebant, postquam chori lyrici et dramatici conticuerunt. Habemus quidem Meliambos Cercidae eodem genere carmina pangere conati, quo clarissimi illi veteres, sed eos perlegentes statim sentimus artem intermortuam non ab isto Megalopolitano nova vita donatam esse; nihil enim frigidius cogitari potest, quam si quis oda pindarica recitata ad Cercidae versus se convertat eosque alta voce pronuntiare conetur. Metrici graeci et romani praeter paucos versus eosque singillatim genus nostrum non tractant nee quisquam ex eorum numero de genere toto disseruit. Horatium et suamet ipsum arte prae ceteris excellentem et doctrina metrica haud mediocriter imbutum non aliter ac nos huius aevi philologos nescire, quomodo carmina pindarica ab ipso poeta componerentur, ex Oda notissima patet, in qua Pindarum quisquis studet aemulari frustra in re desperata desudare perhibetur. Ad universam lyricorum graecorum artem pertinent, quae a Cicerone in Oratore affirmantur, qui tamen clausulis orationis numerosae operam dans rem metricam non neglexit: sed in versibus res est apertior, quamquam etiam a modis quibusdam cantu remoto soluta esse videatur oratio, maximeque id in optima quoque eorum poëtarum, qui λυρικоí a graecis nominantur, quos, cum cantu spoliaveris, nuda paene remanet oratio. Causam hanc vel maximam esse puto in nullo alio carmina pangendi genere musicam, saltationem, metrum tam arte cohaesisse; cum poësis non iam pars habebatur υθμιξου, quod φθγγοδ, σχμα, συλλαβ definiebant, ut Aristoxeni terminis utar , via stabilita ambitum singulorum versuum ac colorum statuere conarentur et indoloem pedum metricorum conicendo indicarent. (shrink)

De benef. I. i i p. i i : Inter multos ac uarios errores temere inconsulteque uiuentium nihil propemodum, uir optime Liberalis, dixerim, *quod beneficia nee dare scimus nee accipere. Sequitur enim, ut male conlocata male debeantur; de quibus non redditis sero querimur; ista enim perierunt, cum darentur.

Hoc tempore velut per universum orbem Romanum, bellicum canentibus bucinis, excitae gentes saevissimae, limites sibi proximos persultabant. Gallias Raetiasque simul Alamanni poputabantur; Sarmatae Pannonias et Quadi; Picti Saxonesque et Scotci, et Attacotti Brittanos aerumnis vexavere continuis; Austoriani Mauricaeque aliae gentes, Africam solito acrius incursabant; Thracias et diripiebant praedatorii globi Gothorum. Persarum rex manus Armeniis iniectabat, eos in suam dicionem ex integro vocare vi nimia properans, sed iniuste, causando, quod post Ioviani excessum, cum quo foedera firmarat et pacem, nihil (...) obstare debebit, quo minus ea recuperaret, quae antea ad maiores suos pertinuisse monstrabat. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Abailard and Non-Things MARTIN M. TWEEDALE On SEVERAL OCCASIONSin his logical writings Abailard extracts himself from embarrassing ontological implications of his analyses of language by resorting to the notion of a something that is not a thing. I shall note here two such occasions and then discuss Abailard's explanations of this procedure based on the grammatical distinction of personal and impersonal constructions. Since the texts on this latter topic (...) are especially confusing, a considerable portion of my effort will be spent on making sense of them as preparation for drawing some conclusions about Abailard's overall approach. My purpose here is to show how Abailard's grammatical analyses are fundamental to his defence of a number of metaphysical positions. I also want to suggest that Abailard's grammatical approach, especially on the question of dicta, contains insights of continuing interest. Not all of Abailard's non-things are particularly associated with analyses of language. For instance, there are the likenesses the mind supposedly constructs for itself in order to think of things that are not being perceived. These Abailard calls fictive things (res ficta), and he refuses to give them the status of real psychological entities. ~ The likenesses are compared to mirror images which Abailard is also willing to treat as non-things. However, I wish to restrict my discussion here to cases which arise from Abailard's analysis of the reference of certain words. One such instance occurs in his discussion of universals. The peculiar nonthing here is the "state" (status), which, Abailard maintains, is "the common cause by which the universal word is imposed"7 Abailard is very careful to dis1Glossae super Porphyrium, in Peter Abelards philosophische,.gchriIten, edited by Geyer (henceforth referred ~o as Geyer), Miinster i. W., 1919 (BGPM, vol. 21), pp. 20-21, ll. 23-32: Intellectus autem sicut nec corporeo indigens instrumento est, ita /nec/ necesse est eum subiectum corpus habere in quod mittatur, sed rei ~dmilitudine contentus est, quam sibi ipse animus conficit, in quam suae intelligentiae actionem dirigit. Unde turr,~ destructa vel remota sensus qui in earn agebat, perit, inteUectus autem permanet rei similitudine auimo retenta. Sigut autem sensus non est res sentita, in quam dirigitur, sic nec intellectus forma est rei quam concipit, sed intellectus actio quaedam est animae, unde intelligens dicitur, forma vero in quam dirigitur, res imaginaria quaedam est et ficta, quam sibi, quando vult et qualm vult, animus conficit.... 11.9-17: Quaero enim, utrum flla quadratura et ilia altitudo vera forma sit intellectus, qui ad similitudinem quantitatis turris ducatur et compositionis eius. Sed profecto vera quadratura et vera altitudo non nisi corporibus insunt, ficta etiam qualitate nec intellectus nec ulla vera essentia forrnari potest. Restat igitur, ut sicut ficta eat qualitas, ficta substantia sit ei subiecta. Fortasae autem et ea speculi imago, quae visui subiecta apparere videtur, nihil esse vere dici potest, quoniam scilicetin alba speguli superficie contrarii coloris qualitas saepe apparet. Ibid., pp. 19-20,II. 14-16- ~ad nunc ea quae breviter tetigimus, diligenter perquiramus, scilicet quae sit iIla communis causa, secundum quam universale nomen impositum est.... 11. 21-29. Singuli homines discreti ab invicem, gum in propriis differant tam essentiis quam formis, ut supra meminimus rei physicam inquirentes, in eo tamen conveniunt, quod homines aunt. Non dico in homine, gum res nulla sit homo uisi discreta, sed in esse hominem. Esse autem hominem non est homo nec res aliqua, si diligentius consideremus, [329] 330 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY tinguish three different questions frequently confused in discussions on universals. The first is "What is 'universal' predicated of?", and the answer is simply words --words not in the sense of mere marks or sounds, but of meaningful marks or sounds. Another is "How do we have an idea associated with universals?" Here the aforementioned likenesses enter as that by which the mind can have an idea applicable to many individuals. But there is also the question of what makes a certain word correctly applicable to many things. Abailard does not make the error of thinking that an idea in the mind or some operation of the mind could possibly be the cause, as some conceptualists seem to think. This would lead to the conclusion that... (shrink)

VBI Varro de uilla rustica facienda agit, de culina haec monet: in primisculina uidenda ut sit admota, quod ibi hieme antelucanis temporibus aliquot res conficiuntur, cibus paratur ac capitur. Hunc locum legentes sponte nosmet ipsos rogamus, quid sibi uelit illud admota. ‘Prope cellam uilici,’ inquit Keilius , de qua paulo ante sermo est: uilici proximum ianuam cellam esse oportet eumque scire, qui introeat aut exeat noctu quidue ferat, praesertim si ostiarius est nemo. Sed si locum ita interpretamur, quomodo intellegenda (...) est sententia, quae sequitur, causalis: quod ibi hieme cet.? Num uilicus in cella iacens uel sedens moderari debebat opera, quae mane in culina fiebant ? An idcirco culinam proximam cellae uilici esse oportebat, ut inter utramque paruum spatium interesset, si uilicus ab altera ad alteram commeare uellet? Et hoc et illud uix credibile est Varronem significare uoluisse. Accedit, quod in uilla rustica culina non prope ianuam est, sed in parte interiore cohortis, quemadmodum docent fundamenta aperta uillae rusticae Pompeianae , et probatur uerbis Vitruuii , qui ita praecipit: ‘in corte culina quam calidissimo loco designetur.’ Quae cum ita se habeat, apud Varronem legendum esse puto: in primis culina uidenda ut sit admota, h.e.ad meridiem spectans . Nam si ita legimus, neque admota suo caret datiuo,1 et perspicuum fit, quid sententia causalis quod ibi hieme cet. sibi uelit. Diligenti enim domino ‘prouidendum’ est, ‘familia ubi uersetur, si fessi opere aut frigore aut calore, ubi commodissime possint se quiete reciperare’ . Talis dominus etiam curabit, ut ‘hieme antelucanis temporibus’ serui ‘aliquot res conficere et cibum parare et capere’ possint loco calidissimo uillae , sed situe hie locus longe an prope a cella uilici, nihil ad rem pertinet. (shrink)

The establishment of the Campanian nation.Carthaginian expedition to Sicily.. Insigni magnis rebus anno additur nihil turn ad rem Romanam pertinere visum, quod Carthaginienses, tanti hostes futuri, turn primum per seditiones Siculorum ad partis alterius auxilium in Sicilian! exercitum traiecere.

Where much contemporary philosophy seeks to stave off the "threat" of nihilism by safeguarding the experience of meaning--characterized as the defining feature of human existence--from the Enlightenment logic of disenchantment, this book attempts to push nihilism to its ultimate conclusion by forging a link between revisionary naturalism in Anglo-American philosophy and anti-phenomenological realism in recent French philosophy. Contrary to an emerging "post-analytic" consensus which would bridge the analytic-continental divide by uniting Heidegger and Wittgenstein against the twin perils of scientism and (...) skepticism, this book short-circuits both traditions by plugging eliminative materialism directly into speculative realism. (shrink)

Where much contemporary philosophy seeks to stave off the "threat" of nihilism by safeguarding the experience of meaning--characterized as the defining feature of human existence--from the Enlightenment logic of disenchantment, this book attempts to push nihilism to its ultimate conclusion by forging a link between revisionary naturalism in Anglo-American philosophy and anti-phenomenological realism in recent French philosophy. Contrary to an emerging "post-analytic" consensus which would bridge the analytic-continental divide by uniting Heidegger and Wittgenstein against the twin perils of scientism and (...) skepticism, this book short-circuits both traditions by plugging eliminative materialism directly into speculative realism. (shrink)

In an outline of a paper found amongst his philosophical papers and correspondence after his untimely death in 2001—“Nihil Obstat: An Analysis of Ability,” reproduced in this volume—David Lewis sketched a new compatibilist account of abilities, according to which someone is able to A if and only if there is no obstacle to their A-ing, where an obstacle is a ‘robust preventer’ of their A-ing. In this paper, we provide some background context for Lewis’s outline, a section-by-section commentary, and (...) a general discussion of the account’s main features. (shrink)

Post-Cartesian Occasionalism argues that the power of causing an effect depends on knowledge of the means by which the effect is produced. The argument is used to deny finite beings the power to act. Arnold Geulincx expresses this thesis in the principle Quod nescis quomodo fiat id non facis. Here, my purpose is to show that: 1. The philosophical problem that is at the origin of the principle Quod nescis quomodo fiat id non facis originates in Galen’s De (...) foetuum formatione, a work translated into Latin only in 1535. 2. Important works of early modern philosophy, such as Campanella’s Del senso delle cose e della magia, discuss Galen’s text. 3. Due to their rejection of teleology, Descartes’ physics and metaphysics are completely foreign to the Quod nescis principle. Comparing the Cartesian theory of animal-machines with the theory of animal behavior of Pierre Chanet, a philosopher who adopts the principle, confirms this claim. (shrink)

In contemporary nihilism the nihility stretches, so to speak, into the site of God’s being, and in this way becomes an abyss. And upon this godless nihility that has become an abyss, all life, not only biological life and souls, but even spiritual and personal life, manifests the form of something fundamentally meaningless. At the same time, it is furthermore claimed that human beings can only truly become free and independent and become true subjects when they resolutely ground themselves upon (...) this abyssal nihility. (shrink)

blandior ratio : C, 34). I will first survey how extensive, albeit usually overlooked, is Leibniz’s concern with these “weaker” forms of reasoning, and how crucial they are for many of his practical and theoretical endeavors. I will then trace back this acute need of Leibniz´s brand of rationalism to the peculiar nature of the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR), as opposed to the other basic principle of his philosophy, the Principle of Contradiction (PC). I will present here only the (...) bare bones of the argument, in a sort of extended summary, omitting the textual support as well the references to the relevant secondary literature. (shrink)

This article centres on the legal recognition of same-sex marriage with a view to exploring the issue of unspeakability; that is, the condition whereby some questions cannot be articulated because of a lack of words. More specifically, the article will explore what happens to those social practices that are not given legal speakability and thereby legal recognition/protection. To this end, I first focus on how words are produced in the sphere of everyday life and their dependence on the existence of (...) a widespread normality. I then discuss how the law sees to the preservation and the reproduction of normality by providing a set of categories which are made available to law-abiders to settle disputes when they arise. In doing so, I elucidate the twofold role played by law as both a selective and a creative device. To cast some light on the particular way law operates, I discuss an important decision by the Italian Constitutional Court in 2010, which provides a telling example of how legal officials are able to seal off the set of legal categories and to leave some issues in the sphere of the unspeakable. I then unearth a paradox: while unspeakability reveals a condition of powerlessness, the acquisition of speakability could bring about even harsher exclusionary effects. I conclude by arguing that the entry into the sphere of official law is always a Janus-faced achievement, but can play as an effective instrument of critique. (shrink)