In all likelihood, the Bush Administration’s aim is to continue abusive interrogation methods that on any reasonable definition amount to torture (methods such as waterboarding,” for example, in which a detainee is laid on his back and choked with water until he believes he is drowning). This new law, however, is both foolish and immoral: foolish, because torture won’t make Americans safer; and immoral, because torture is the grossest of affronts to human dignity.

This paper interrogates and reclaims clown practices in children’s rehabilitation as ‘foolish.’ Attempts to legitimize and ‘take seriously’ clown practices in the health sciences frame the work of clowns as secondary to the ‘real’ work of medical professionals and diminish the ways clowns support emotional vulnerability and bravery with a willingness to fail and be ridiculous as fundamental to their work. Narrow conceptualizations of clown practices in hospitals as only happy and funny overlook the ways clowns also routinely engage with (...) sadness, despair, discomfort and many other ways of being and doing. Our exploration of clown practices as foolish exposes the ways children’s rehabilitation upholds particular neoliberal models of success and invites a re-centring of rehabilitation and health care research and practice towards relationship building, supporting meaningful projects and a continued nurturing of aesthetic and pleasurable ways of being-in-the-world in the present moment as valuable unto themselves. (shrink)

In most cases, rule-governed relations and similarity relations can indeed be distinguished by the number of relevant features they require. This criterion is not sufficient, however, to explain other properties of the relations that have a more dichotomous character. I focus on the differential drive for consistency by inferential processes that draw on the two types of relations.

In this article, conviviality is examined as a constitutive part of human life. On the basis of (ethnographic) examples and discussion, it is maintained that it is a fundamental good, necessary for the valuation of most other goods. The role and function of conviviality, however, are often obscured in theory. Aristotle’s view of the virtues still allowed room for it. Most modern scientific and philosophical approaches ascribe a thinkable motive to interactions that stimulate our spontaneity and faith in life, such (...) as the motive of solving problems that can be construed in objective terms (as in neo-Darwinism), or of seeing reality correspond to reflexive representations of life (as in hermeneutics). Maurice Blondel’s critique of intellectualism and his view of tradition are invoked. By accepting conviviality as a prerequisite for human spirituality, we can focus on aspects of Christianity – like a respect for concrete traditions – that tend to disappear into the background when we frame its teachings and promises in intellectual terms. The argument also points to dangers connected with the fact that instrumental logic largely determines the shape of modern life: we easily forget one of the key conditions for experiencing human life as fulfilling and worthwhile. (shrink)

Reconciliation in South Africa is often taken to mean the creation of culturally diverse communities. In reality, though, the multicultural often turns out to be multiracial only with People of Colour being included in White-dominated spaces. Likewise, socio-economic transformation means raising people’s chances to attain a living standard more equal to that of the bulk of the White population. In both cases, the strong position of White people in sociocultural and socio-economic terms remains largely untouched. Hence the calls for decolonisation (...) which seem to render the reconciliation discourse dispensable. Vulnerability by White South Africans is proposed as an alternative response to ongoing inequalities which – it is suggested – could contribute to both decolonisation and reconciliation on an interpersonal level. Likely objections to such a proposal are considered before making a case for vulnerability as an appropriate Christian way of living, particularly in the context of former settler colonialism. (shrink)

Like the word of resurrection uttered at the mouth of Jesus' tomb, preaching is the proclamation of a word from beyond ourselves, a word of God's invincible grace and steadfast love.

The premise of this paper is that the fear of foolishness is essential to wisdom. Unfortunately, leaders are often conditioned to suppress fear in favor of confidence. However, wise leaders fear foolishness while foolish leaders are fearless. Leaders fall into traps and hit walls that result in fallacies. It is the recognition of these fallacies and the fear of their consequences that compel leaders to seek wisdom. This paper relies on protection motivation theory, the balance theory of wisdom, (...) the imbalance theory of foolishness, and the WICS model of leadership to caution leaders of foolishness so that wisdom can be developed. Specifically, the fear of foolishness is proposed as the motivating factor for the pursuit of wisdom. In doing so, the literatures of wisdom and fear are reviewed and the appraisal process of the fear of foolishness and the coping mechanisms to address foolishness are elaborated on. The protection motivation of the fear of foolishness can fundamentally change leader behaviors and attitudes for the sake of wisdom and individual, organizational, and societal well-being. (shrink)

A central theme in the Christian contemplative tradition is that knowing God is much more like ‘unknowing’ than it is like possessing rationally acceptable beliefs. Knowledge of God is expressed, in this tradition, in metaphors of woundedness, darkness, silence, suffering, and desire. Philosophers of religion, on the other hand, tend to explore the possibilities of knowing God in terms of rational acceptability, epistemic rights, cognitive responsibility, and propositional belief. These languages seem to point to very different accounts of how it (...) is that we come to know God, and a very different range of critical concepts by which the truth of such knowledge can be assessed. In this paper, I begin to explore what might be at stake in these different languages of knowing God, drawing particularly on Alvin Plantinga’s epistemology of Christian belief. I will argue that his is a distorted account of the epistemology of Christian belief, and that this has implications for his project of demonstrating the rational acceptability of Christian faith for the 21st century. (shrink)

Drawing on select works of Adorno, we will first rehearse his reasons for a rejuvenation of philosophy and apply them to philosophers working on world philosophical traditions. We will then analyse Adorno’s arguments pertaining to the theory–praxis relation to ascertain whether his thought could accommodate a study of world philosophical traditions for the simple reason that they are present in a particular society. Shifting our focus slightly, we reflect upon how current ways of professional philosophizing affect the study of world (...) philosophical traditions. As the example of Māori philosophy demonstrates, current philosophical practices seem to delimit the search for the unconventional in academic philosophy. Through its philosophical appropriation, the so-called unconventional tends to mimic conventional patterns in academic philosophy. We will then attempt to find reasons to critique this process within the Adornoian framework itself. The conclusion draws together different strands of the discussion and delineates some paths to take forward the world philosophies project in an Adornoian spirit. (shrink)

Drawing on select works of Adorno, we will first rehearse his reasons for a rejuvenation of philosophy and apply them to philosophers working on world philosophical traditions. We will then analyse Adorno’s arguments pertaining to the theory–praxis relation to ascertain whether his thought could accommodate a study of world philosophical traditions for the simple reason that they are present in a particular society. Shifting our focus slightly, we reflect upon how current ways of professional philosophizing affect the study of world (...) philosophical traditions. As the example of Māori philosophy demonstrates, current philosophical practices seem to delimit the search for the unconventional in academic philosophy. Through its philosophical appropriation, the so-called unconventional tends to mimic conventional patterns in academic philosophy. We will then attempt to find reasons to critique this process within the Adornoian framework itself. The conclusion draws together different strands of the discussion and delineates some paths to take forward the world philosophies project in an Adornoian spirit. (shrink)

Sometimes justifiably, we stop trusting someone’s testimony when we catch that person repeatedly on a lie. But what is the reason why we assign less credibility to someone if nothing justifies the lack of trust? When we give a person less credibility than she deserves because she belongs to a particular social group, we are committing a testimonial injustice. Is this due to factors that are individual (explicit prejudices and implicit biases) or structural (social norms and conventions, institutions and material (...) reality)? These two approaches differ both in their versions of the causes of these injustices and how to intervene to resist them. However, they can be easily integrated. (shrink)

This article is a review of R.L Park's Voodoo Science: The Road from Foolishness to Fraud.

Rem tene, the elder Cato advised the aspiring orator, verba sequentur. The advice applies equally to the textual critic. Of those who have attempted to emend, repunctuate, or defend this passage, few seem to have been troubled by any doubts about the firmness of their grip on the res, the precise point Poseidon is making. The usual view of what Poseidon means is that those who sack cities are foolish because such an act results in their own subsequent destruction, presumably (...) because they desecrate temples and thereby offend the gods. Poseidon's words are cited as encapsulating the ‘moral’ or ‘lesson’ of the play, that the destruction of others and their cities brings the victor no advantage but only his own ruin, that the sacking of cities is always and everywhere an act of criminal folly. Yet there are several features of the lines themselves that are hard to square with this reading, and the context, Poseidon's monologue and his dialogue with Athena, suggests a slightly different view of the lesson to be read from the coming destruction of the Greeks. (shrink)

Rem tene, the elder Cato advised the aspiring orator, verba sequentur. The advice applies equally to the textual critic. Of those who have attempted to emend, repunctuate, or defend this passage, few seem to have been troubled by any doubts about the firmness of their grip on the res, the precise point Poseidon is making. The usual view of what Poseidon means is that those who sack cities are foolish because such an act results in their own subsequent destruction, presumably (...) because they desecrate temples and thereby offend the gods. Poseidon's words are cited as encapsulating the ‘moral’ or ‘lesson’ of the play, that the destruction of others and their cities brings the victor no advantage but only his own ruin, that the sacking of cities is always and everywhere an act of criminal folly. Yet there are several features of the lines themselves that are hard to square with this reading, and the context, Poseidon's monologue and his dialogue with Athena, suggests a slightly different view of the lesson to be read from the coming destruction of the Greeks. (shrink)

The apostle Paul employed many techniques that demonstrated his leadership. One of the most understated instances of that is in his ‘Fool’s Speech’ in 2 Corinthians 11:16- 12:13. Paul flaunted his rhetorical skills in calling attention to his own shortcomings, in lampooning his opponents, and in revealing the source of his assurance for foolishness. This article evaluates Paul’s rhetorical masterpiece calling the Corinthians to humble submission to his apostleship by synthesizing the work of both Jennifer Glancy and Lawrence Welborn (...) with Don Howell. [All Scriptural quotes are taken from the New American Standard Bible © 1977]. (shrink)

Speaking of truth inescapably confronts us with paradoxes, i.e., correct deductive propositions like a Cretan claiming that all Cretans lie which (due to negative systemic self-reference) end up as circular contradictions, indeterminable questions, or dilemmas. Faced with the numerous paradoxical statements (apparently 82) found in the Bible, the German Protestant reformer Sebastian Franck (14991542), for example, conceded that any truth of God cannot be found in language but only in the immediate silent experience of God. Likewise, believers in an uncompromising (...) search for true facts about this world would certainly agree with (though arguably misappropriate) Wittgenstein in claiming that Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent. Paradoxes this article claims must neither be feared, nor avoided, nor become subject to hopeless attempts in searching for logic solutions. Paradoxes lead the way to truth in demonstrating that questions of truth, or truth claims, cannot be adequately addressed within the same system of communication (ortho-system) in which they are raised. The encounter with paradoxes (e.g., a God who creates but is uncreated) elevates language and communication onto a meta-level (or system) of communication in which new means (like for instance Gdel's numbering) are needed to speak of what is real but apparently cannot be true. These means, however, will turn out to be likewise paradoxes that furthermore call for new and creative ways of speaking of such truths that previously could not be communicated. The creative admission of paradoxes into communication philosophy will not solve age-old problems or dilemmas; however, it will playfully open up the conversation of science with religion to the creative means of the arts were truth is not argued but performed in paradoxes. (shrink)

Betr. u.a. Sebastian Brants "Narrenschiff.".

Book Three of Avatar: The Last Airbender portrays Uncle Iroh as wise and peace‐loving, in the mold of a Daoist sage. This chapter argues that Iroh's Book One foolishness is a pose, and Iroh's character does not fundamentally change. In Book One, he is wisely following strategies suggested by the ancient Chinese Daoist philosopher Zhuangzi for dealing with incompetent leaders. His seeming foolishness in Book One is in fact a sagacious strategy for minimizing the harm that Prince Zuko (...) would otherwise inflict on himself and others a gentle touch that more effectively helps Prince Zuko find wisdom than would be possible with a more confrontational approach. To understand Iroh's wisdom, it is useful to look to the ancient Daoist philosopher Zhuangzi, specifically his advice for dealing with incompetent rulers by following peacefully along with them, unthreateningly modeling disregard for fame and accomplishment while not being too useful for their ends. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Naked Women and Cheering Men Self‐Respect and Self‐Conscious Reflection Reasons and Self‐Conceptions Standards and the Freedom to be Foolish Can Girls Go Wild With Self‐Respect? Thoughtful Sexuality.

_Summary:_ This article is not about red trousers. The title points to a political foolishness that killed more than 100,000 soldiers. The discussion of this foolishness is an introduction to a general discussion of the reasons for political foolishness. – In her book ‘The March of Folly – From Troy to Vietnam’, Barbara Tuchman said that in the last 3,000 years mankind has made large progress, primarily in science, but also in medicine, architecture, economy, agriculture, etc. Only (...) in politics, in the art of managing a state, nearly no progress is visible. Others share this opinion. The Swedish Chancellor in the time of Gustav II Adolph, in the time of the 30 Years’ War, Axel Oxenstierna, said to his son, who was elected for an important political position and had doubts, whether, with his 18 years, he would be able to cope with this difficult task: “If you would know, my son, with what low degree of intelligence the world is governed....” – In surveys about the reputation of professions, politicians normally get low ranks. Why is that so? – In this article we try to give an answer to that question. The answer is very simple. Foolish decisions are reducible firstly to a low or wavering self-esteem. Secondly, they are based on a lack of phantasy; politicians have difficulties in finding new solutions for problems. – This answer is not at all new; already Platon and – nearly at the same time – the ancient Indian Bhagavad Gita gave the same response. In this article we develop a theory about political foolishness. (shrink)

‘A foolish consistency is the hobgoblin’ not only ‘of little minds,’ but of some classically trained minds as well. And it is surprising to see how this has caused certain unevennesses in ancient authors to be trued up. Aristophanes, for example, we are toldby a late venerable scholar, never permits a change of meter in a single speech directed to the same person; and to get rid of the two deviations from this rule, the framer of it cut down the (...) seemingly good trochaic tetrameters in the Peace to iambic trimeters, and then put line 555 before line 553 and took the three lines 555, 553, 554 from Trygaeus and assigned them to the coryphaeus. It is conceivable that if we possessed the thirty-three lost comedies of Aristophanes the editor might have had more and harder surgery on his hands. (shrink)

이 글은 데카르트와 후설의 출발점의 문제를 비교하면서, 테브나즈의 제 4환원, 즉 이성의 환원에 의해 열리는 철학의 근본 출발점을 정초하는 것을 목적으로 삼는다. 이를 위해서, 먼저 데카르트와 후설의 근본출발점의 문제를 비교·분석하고, 그 한계를 규명하는 것으로 시작할 것이다. 데카르트와 후설은 철학의 근본 출발점을 정초하고자 한다는 점에서 동일하지만, 방법론적인 면에서는 상이한 입장을 취하기 때문이다. 즉, 근본출발점을 정초하기 위해 데카르트가 반성적 방법을 택했다면, 후설은 현상학적 방법을 적용했다. 따라서 데카르트와 후설의 근본주의와 반성적 방법 및 현상학적 방법의 특징과 한계를 밝힘으로써 근본출발점의 문제가 새롭게 제기됨을 보여주고 그것의 (...) 철학적 함의를 밝힐 것이다. 나아가서 반성철학과 현상학에 뿌리를 두고 있는 테브나즈의 인간 조건의 철학을 통해 근본출발점의 문제를 새롭게 조명해 줄 이성의 환원 가능성 논제를 분석하고자 한다. 이성의 환원 가능성에 대한 논의는 내면화와 반성적 방법의 정화를 통해 이루어지는 인간적 조건의 철학의 형성과정과 이 과정에 개입해 들어오는 신의 말씀에 의한 이성의 어리석음에 대한 공격에 의해 수행됨을 발견할 것이다. 이러한 논의를 기반으로, 우리는 이성의 환원의 불가능성을 주장하는 후설의 입장의 한계를 천착하면서, 테브나즈의 이성의 환원가능성의 타당성을 검토할 것이다. 이를 토대로 우리는 후설의 세 가지 환원 외에 ‘이성의 환원’이라는 네 번째 환원이 가능하다는 점을 보여주고자 한다. 끝으로, 테브나즈가 제시하는 이성의 환원 가능성 논제에 기반하여, 우리는 근본출발점의 정초를 위한 대안으로 현상학적 방법과 반성적 분석의 방법의 결합을 제안할 것이다. (shrink)

Justice, equality, and righteousness—these are some of our greatest moral convictions. Yet in times of social conflict, morals can become rigid, making religious war, ethnic cleansing, and political purges possible. Morality, therefore, can be viewed as pathology-a rhetorical, psychological, and social tool that is used and abused as a weapon. An expert on Eastern philosophies and social systems theory, Hans-Georg Moeller questions the perceived goodness of morality and those who claim morality is inherently positive. Critiquing the ethical "fanaticism" of Western (...) moralists, such as Immanuel Kant, Lawrence Kohlberg, John Rawls, and the utilitarians, Moeller points to the absurd fundamentalisms and impracticable prescriptions arising from definitions of good. Instead he advances a theory of "moral foolishness," or moral asceticism, extracted from the "amoral" philosophers of East Asia and such thinkers as Ludwig Wittgenstein and Niklas Luhmann. The moral fool doesn't understand why ethics are necessarily good, and he isn't convinced that the moral perspective is always positive. In this way he is like most people, and Moeller defends this foolishness against ethical pathologies that support the death penalty, just wars, and even Jerry Springer's crude moral theater. Comparing and contrasting the religious philosophies of Christianity, Daoism, and Zen Buddhism, Moeller presents a persuasive argument in favor of amorality. (shrink)