Résumé La « question de l’animal » est au cœur des débats contemporains sur la subjectivité moderne et sa déconstruction. En prenant pour point de départ les références de Jacques Derrida à la plaidoirie de Montaigne pour les animaux de l’« Apologie de Raimond Sebond », nous tentons de montrer les différences de fond qui opposent les projets des deux penseurs. Pour Derrida, l’animal se présente au sujet humain comme une figure de l’altérité radicale, interdisant toute tentative d’établir une (...) continuité homogène. Tout en mettant le rationaliste dogmatiste au défi de connaître les « ressorts internes » qui animent les animaux, Montaigne souligne aussi l’homogénéité des comportements animaux et humains et la parenté qui les unit, tous deux étant assujettis, quoique sous des modalités différentes, à une même nature. L’animal représente enfin, selon Montaigne, un modèle pour l’homme, celui d’une appropriation à soi et à sa condition corporelle. (shrink)

It is widely held that assertions are partially governed by an epistemic norm. But what is the epistemic condition set out in the norm? Is it knowledge, truth, belief, or something else? In this paper, I defend a view similar to that of Stanley (2008), according to which the relevant epistemic condition is epistemic certainty, where epistemic certainty (but not knowledge) is context-sensitive. I start by distinguishing epistemic certainty, subjective certainty, and knowledge. Then, I explain why it's much more plausible (...) to think that "certain", rather than "know", is context-sensitive. After that, I respond to an important worry raised by Pritchard, according to which the proposed view is too strong to accommodate our current practice of assertion. I then show that the main linguistic and conversational data advanced in the recent literature in favour of the knowledge condition are best explained by the certainty view. Finally, I offer two principled considerations: the certainty view is the only one compatible with three independently plausible claims and it fits very well with the common thought that knowledge does not entail certainty. (shrink)

Is knowledge the epistemic norm of action and assertion? Gettier and justified-false-belief cases have been raised as counterexamples to the necessity direction of that claim. Most knowledge normers reply by distinguishing permissibility from excusability. An important objection to this move, however, is that it requires a still lacking view of epistemic excuses sufficiently general to cover all the cases, correctly relating the supposed excuse to the subject's cognitive life, and not collapsing into an account of the fundamental normative standard (see (...) Gerken 2017). In this paper, I rely on independent work in epistemology and cognitive science to suggest a novel account of epistemic excuses in terms of epistemic feelings. In contrast to other existing accounts, this account is immune from the above objection and can thus be used to rescue the knowledge norm. (shrink)

A certain number of cases suggest that our willingness to ascribe “knowledge” can be influenced by practical factors. For revisionary proposals, they indicate that the truth‐values of “knowledge” ascriptions vary with practical factors. For conservative proposals, on the contrary, nothing surprising is happening. Standard pragmatic approaches appeal to pragmatic implicatures and psychological approaches to the idea that belief formation is influenced by practical factors. Conservative proposals have not yet offered a fully satisfactory explanation, though. In this article, I introduce and (...) defend a third conservative proposal which I call “Refined Invariantism”. The two main claims of this proposal are that (1) we should distinguish between high stakes cases in which the subject does not believe (that he knows) the target proposition and those in which he believes (that he knows) the target proposition and that (2) we should adopt a psychological treatment for the first kind of case and a pragmatic treatment based on the epistemic standards for appropriate assertion and action for the second kind of case. I argue that this new combined approach avoids the main pitfalls of its two conservative rivals and that it gives new life to the generality objection levelled against revisionary views. (shrink)

According to a widely discussed view, knowledge plays a significant normative role in action: It is epistemically rational to treat p as your reason for action if and only if you know that p. As many philosophers have observed, however, this view clashes with the claim that knowledge is moderate and stable. For, granting that claim, there will be high stakes cases in which knowledge seems insufficient. To deal with such cases, some philosophers embracing the knowledge norm combine three independently (...) plausible claims. First, they say that no non-trivial condition is luminous; second, they say that doing something while not being in a position to know that that is appropriate is bad (in high stakes cases); third, they say that in the high stakes cases in question, the subject knows but fails to be in a position to know that she knows (Williamson Philos Q 55:213–235, 2005). This paper argues that this account can overcome the main objections already raised in the literature, but that it still faces the apparently insurmountable challenge of providing a natural and helpful way of substantiating the second claim. (shrink)

Among the main reactions to scepticism, fallibilism is certainly the most popular nowadays. However, fallibilism faces a very strong and well-known objection. It has to grant that concessive knowledge attributions—assertions of the form “I know that p but it might be that not p”—can be true. Yet, these assertions plainly sound incoherent. Fallibilists have proposed to explain this incoherence pragmatically. The main proponents of this approach appeal to Gricean implicatures (Rysiew in Noûs 35(4):477514, 2001; Dougherty and Rysiew in Philos Phenomenol (...) Res 78(1):123132, 2009; Dougherty and Rysiew in Synthese 181(3):395403, 2011). Very recently, some philosophers have observed that fallibilists can also explain this apparent incoherence pragmatically if they embrace a (context-sensitive) certainty norm for assertion (Petersen in Synthese 196(11):4691–4710, 2019; Beddor in Philos Impr 20(8), 2020; Vollet in Dialectica 74:3, 2020). In this paper, I argue for the superiority of this latter explanation over its older rivals. (shrink)

The traditional view in epistemology has it that knowledge is insensitive to the practical stakes. More recently, some philosophers have argued that knowledge is sufficient for rational action: if you know p, then p is a reason you have (epistemically speaking). Many epistemologists contend that these two claims stand in tension with one another. In support of this, they ask us to start with a low stakes case where, intuitively, a subject knows that p and appropriately acts on p. Then, (...) they ask us to consider a high stakes version of the case where, intuitively, this subject does not know that p and could not appropriately act on p without double-checking. Finally, they suggest that the best explanation for our shifty intuitions is that p is a reason the subject has in the low stakes case but not in the high stakes case. In short, according to this explanation, having a reason (in the epistemic sense) is sensitive to the stakes. If so, either knowledge is sensitive to the stakes or else you can know that p even if p is not a reason you have (in the epistemic sense). In this paper, I consider more closely the relation between having a reason (in the epistemic sense) and having a reason to check. I argue that the supposition that if one has p as a reason (in the epistemic sense) then one has a reason not to check whether p, or no reason to check whether p, is highly doubtful. On the contrary, I suggest, it is plausible that, given our fallibility, one always has an epistemic reason to check whether p, whether or not p is a reason one has (in the epistemic sense). On the basis of this observation, I show that one can offer a new way of explaining the cases in question, allowing us to reconcile the traditional view about knowledge and the sufficiency of knowledge for rational action. (shrink)

Many philosophers agree that there is an epistemic norm governing action. However, they disagree on what this norm is. It has been observed that the word ‘know’ is prominent in ordinary epistemic evaluations of actions. Any opponent of the knowledge norm must provide an explanation of this fact. Gerken has recently proposed the most developed explanation. It invokes the hypothesis that, in normal contexts, knowledge-level warrant is frequently necessary and very frequently sufficient (Normal Coincidence), so that knowledge-based assessments would be (...) a good heuristic for practical reasoning and epistemic evaluations of action. In this paper, I raise three problems for this approach. First, I argue that Normal Coincidence is ad hoc: it relies on an unsupported frequency hypothesis that we should expect to be false given the warrant account that Gerken also endorses. Second, I argue that, in any case, Normal Coincidence is insufficient to support the hypothesis that knowledge-based evaluation of action constitutes a good heuristic. Third, I consider three other hypotheses close to Normal Coincidence apparently more likely to support the heuristic hypothesis, but I argue that they seem even more ad hoc than Normal Coincidence. (shrink)

A certain number of philosophers are attracted to the idea that knowledge is the epistemic norm of practical reasoning in the sense that it is epistemically appropriate to rely on p in one’s practical reasoning if and only if one knows that p. A well-known objection to the sufficiency direction of that claim is that there are cases in which a subject supposedly knows that p and yet should not rely on p. In light of the distinction between sufficient and (...) insufficient reasons, some philosophers contend that these cases are inconclusive. In this paper, I argue that this insufficient reason manoeuvre is defective because it either misconstrues the relevant cases or is at odds with strong intuitions about how we (should) reason. I then put forward further considerations relative to the instability of some pieces of reasoning and show how they can be explained by a certainty norm for practical reasoning. (shrink)

Cet ouvrage est une réédition numérique d’un livre paru au XXe siècle, désormais indisponible dans son format d’origine.

Tout ce qui est dans l'oeuvre de Jacques, nous l'avons d'abord vécu à l'état de difficulté vitale et d'expérience, - les questions de l'art et de la morale, de la philosophie, de la foi, de la prière, de la contemplation. Cela nous a d'abord été donné à vivre, à chacun selon sa nature et la grâce de Dieu », notait Raïssa en 1934. Cette correspondance confirme le propos, qui nous fait pénétrer dans « l'amour fou » de deux vies (...) données l'une à l'autre, et la trame quotidienne de leur fécondité de pensée et de « grandes amitiés ».Leur conversion en 1906 scelle la vocation d'un couple venu déjà un peu d'ailleurs : lui, 18 ans, romantique, révolutionnaire et dreyfusard en diable, en rupture avec les élites républicaines laïques dont il est issu ; elle, 17 ans, comme sortie d'une peinture de Chagall, juive et slave en quête à la Sorbonne d'une nouvelle patrie spirituelle. Les premiers regards portés sur eux discernent déjà leur promesse : « Je les trouve absolument dignes l'un de l'autre ; ce sont même de si beaux types d'humanité qu'il faut se féliciter de les voir se rechercher. On ne trouve pas si souvent de couple bien assorti ; celui-là me paraît devoir donner un exemple lumineux. »Ils s'écrivent abondamment dès que les aléas de la vie les séparent et ce premier tome les suit dans la découverte d'eux-mêmes. Dans la discontinuité des circonstances, leur chemin métaphysique et mystique progresse, tandis que se révèle, derrière chaque ouvrage, chaque combat, chaque accompagnement spirituel, le secret de leur rayonnement : au fil de ces 712 lettres, c'est d'abord une histoire d'amour, dans un respect tendre et sacré de la singularité de l'autre. (shrink)

Many philosophers agree that there is an epistemic norm governing action. However, they disagree on what this norm is. It has been observed that the word ‘know’ is prominent in ordinary epistemic evaluations of actions. Any opponent of the knowledge norm must provide an explanation of this fact. Gerken has recently proposed the most developed explanation. It invokes the hypothesis that, in normal contexts, knowledge-level warrant is frequently necessary and very frequently sufficient (Normal Coincidence), so that knowledge-based assessments would be (...) a good heuristic for practical reasoning and epistemic evaluations of action. In this paper, I raise three problems for this approach. First, I argue that Normal Coincidence is ad hoc: it relies on an unsupported frequency hypothesis that we should expect to be false given the warrant account that Gerken also endorses. Second, I argue that, in any case, Normal Coincidence is insufficient to support the hypothesis that knowledge-based evaluation of action constitutes a good heuristic. Third, I consider three other hypotheses close to Normal Coincidence apparently more likely to support the heuristic hypothesis, but I argue that they seem even more ad hoc than Normal Coincidence. (shrink)

A prominent feature of American political consciousness is a desire to propagate democracy throughout the world. In our enthusiasm to share what we enjoy, Jacques Barzun sees that little attention is paid to exactly what we are trying to distribute. Through a brief historical survey of democracy, he shows that our popular conception of the term does not correspond with any particular definition. U.S. democracy has no central text and is distinctly different, in theory and in practice, from the (...) democracy of other states, both historical and contemporary. Democracy is an abstract ideal that is a function of time. Its present incarnation in the United States emphasizes freedom and equality through the means and language of specific personal rights. Barzun sees an internal tension in this formulation, one that ultimately threatens both freedom and equality if exported to the rest of the world. (shrink)

Pascal Engel défend explicitement le purisme (ou l’intellectualisme). Selon la version générale de cette thèse, les facteurs qui déterminent si une croyance est justifiée, ou si elle est une connaissance, ne concernent que la vérité. Ils sont totalement indépendants des désirs ou des préférences du sujet, ainsi que des conséquences pratiques potentielles du fait de posséder ces croyances. Dans son article « Pragmatic Encroachment and Epistemic Value » (2009), P. Engel concède que des facteurs pratiques peuvent déterminer la quantité de (...) données (ou la justification) dont on a besoin pour savoir ou croire, tout en maintenant que cela n’affecte pas le purisme épistémique (dans sa version évidentialiste) sur les notions de donnée ou de degré de justification. Mais cela ne revient-il pas tout simplement à concéder l’impurisme épistémique au moins à propos de la connaissance ou de la justification simpliciter des croyances ? Dans cet article, j’examine en détails la position de P. Engel. Je montre que, correctement comprise, elle est intégralement puriste. En considérant le principe connaissance-action, je soulève néanmoins un dilemme pour son approche, jetant ainsi un doute sur le potentiel qu’elle aurait à fournir une réponse puriste satisfaisante à l’argument fondamental motivant l’impurisme épistémique. (shrink)

An accessible and thorough introduction to implicatures, a key topic in all frameworks of pragmatics. Starting with a definition of the various types of implicatures in Gricean, neo-Gricean and post-Gricean pragmatics, the book covers many important questions for current pragmatic theories, namely: the distinction between explicit and implicit forms of pragmatic enrichment, the criteria for drawing a line between semantic and pragmatic meaning, the relations between the structure of language and its use, the social and cognitive factors underlying the use (...) of implicatures by native speakers, and the factors influencing their acquisition for children and second language learners. Written in non-technical language, Implicatures will appeal to students and teachers in linguistics, applied linguistics, psychology and sociology, who are interested in how language is used for communication, and how children and learners develop pragmatic skills. (shrink)

" Je veus qu'on m'y voie en ma façon simple, naturelle et ordinaire, sans contention et artifice : car c'est moy que je peins. Mes defauts s'y liront au vif, mes imperfections et ma forme naïfve (native, naturelle), autant que la reverence publique (la décence) me l'a permis. " Les Essais, on le sait, ne sont pas une autobiographie, mais un autoportrait emboîté dans un ensemble de digressions, de citations, d'anecdotes, de réflexions morales, présentés avec humour, ironie, parfois avec fausse (...) modestie, en se jouant des temps, des lieux, des circonstances. Lire Montaigne, c'est donc certes découvrir ce portrait que Montaigne fait de lui-même, mais aussi éprouver les forces et les failles de cette introspection : à quelles conditions peut-on se regarder avec lucidité? La lecture des Essais incite ainsi à vouloir avoir une meilleure idée de soi-même, plus exacte, plus précise. Tel peut être l'usage de Montaigne. Du moins, tel est l'exercice auquel s'est complu l'auteur par un dialogue fécond avec le philosophe. (shrink)

Derrière toute affirmation, derrière toute déclaration, derrière toute doctrine, se trouve toujours un je, même s'il ne se présente pas comme tel : un je qui pense, qui croit, qui sait. Nous faisons sans cesse usage de nous-même - de nos perceptions, de nos sentiments, de nos idées, de nos savoirs, de nos croyances, pour penser, agir, ou communiquer. La réflexion philosophique ne fait pas exception : ce livre examine les diverses modalités de l'usage de soi en philosophie."--Page 4 of (...) cover. (shrink)

L’introspection peut être conçue comme une manière de s’observer pendant qu’on se livre à une activité mentale et comme une méthode de recherche dans les sciences du mental, dans l’intention de comprendre et de décrire aussi précisément que possible les événements mentaux d’ordre divers qui ont lieu en nous. Les critiques de l’introspection mettent en cause aussi bien la méthode et ses résultats que la possibilité même d’user d’une telle procédure. Les premières objections ont trait au caractère « objectif » (...) de l’introspection. L’autre catégorie d’objections porte sur la possibilité d’observer un événement mental pendant que celui-ci a lieu. Il n’en reste pas moins que nous nous regardons penser, sentir, agir. Puisque l’introspection au sens restreint n’est pas possible, à cause justement des problèmes que posent l’objectivité des résultats et la simultanéité de l’observation, je propose d’élargir la portée de l’introspection en la renforçant en arrière, par la rétrospection, considérée comme un regard jeté sur ce qui vient d’avoir lieu dans mon monde mental ; et en avant, par la prospection, considérée comme un regard jeté sur ce qui se passe en général dans mon monde mental. En partant de ce double point de vue, on constate que l’introspection est non seulement possible mais qu’elle est même intéressante et féconde. (shrink)

Poete pour les Juifs, qui ne se sont pas reconnus dans sa philosophie, Salomon Ibn Gabirol a ete pour les chretiens le philosophe Avencebrol ou Avicebron. Dans le Fons Vitae, Ibn Gabirol cherche a concilier deux evidences qui se contredisent et auxquelles il adhere neanmoins absolument: l'evidence monotheiste d'un Dieu createur ex nihilo, et l'evidence neoplatonicienne de l'emanation graduelle de l'etre. Le Fons Vitae a joue un role important pour la scolastique chretienne, surtout dans la problematique de l'origine et de (...) la composition des substances spirituelles, l'Un, l'intellect et l'ame. Cette reprise de La philosophie de Salomon Ibn Gabirol, revue et mise a jour, s'accompagne de la nouvelle parution de la traduction francaise du Fons Vitae, sous le titre Le Livre de la Source de Vie. (shrink)

Quelqu'un sait quelque chose, voila la situation de depart de toute problematique cognitive. Dans toute situation cognitive, un sujet connaissant se trouve en relation cognitive avec un objet connu. Contrairement a l'approche analytique suivie par les disciplines cognitives classiques - logique, epistemologie, psychologie cognitive, et aujourd'hui l'intelligence artificielle - qui detachent l'objet de leur recherche de son contexte d'origine, la demarche de ce livre est integrante. Elle entend ne pas couper la problematique cognitive des situations cognitives effectives dans lesquelles cette (...) problematique prend corps et se deploie. (shrink)

Ce texte a déjà paru sur RussEurope le 6 mars 2015. Nous remercions Jacques Sapir de nous avoir autorisé à le reproduire ici. L'analyse des formes économiques qui commencent à se coaguler en Russie depuis 2000 suggère le retour à un modèle de développement où le poids de l'État sera particulièrement important, que ce soit sous des formes directes ou indirectes. Dans le même temps, ces formes économiques ne sont pas sans rappeler celles que l'on trouvait dans le modèle (...) de développement russe des années - Économie et Marxisme. (shrink)

In Verfassungslehre, Carl Schmitt spells out the radical implications of his own analysis in Der Begriff des Politischen of the concept of the political. He argues in this respect that the political component of modern constitutions, which is suppressed by liberal thinking through its privilege of the rule of law, is the most important component of these constitutions. The political component refers essentially to the form of the political unity of a people. In showing the priority of the political component, (...) Schmitt inter alia insists on drawing a distinction between the constitution and constitutional laws, the resurrection of the concept of sovereignty, understanding equality as first of all and necessarily implying an inequality in respect of those who are excluded from the political unity, and on the subjection of freedom to the political component of the constitution. What would the implications be for constitutional theory if one were to take seriously Derrida’s deconstruction of Schmitt’s concept of the political in Politiques de l’amitié? This essay takes the first tentative steps in this direction, by exploring in detail Derrida’s analysis as well as the new structure of the political that comes to the fore in this text. (shrink)