Lenin's work "On the Significance of Militant Materialism," written in the spring of 1922, is justly regarded as the philosophical testament of our leader. In it, the tasks of the day were merged with the tasks of the entire epoch on the basis of a profound analysis of reality.

This monograph considers the challenges of science globalization, new trends of development in global studies and globalistics boosted by application of the evolutionary approach. Evolutionary globalistics focuses on the study of development and co-evolution of global processes and systems, and on their synergistic systemic phenomenon - global development. The concept of evolutionary globalistics is defined in the context of the universal (global) evolutionism and in terms of transition to new safer forms of civilization development and of interaction of civilization with (...) the nature of the Earth and Space. Special emphasis is placed on methods and approaches used in globalistics, as well as to spatio-temporal expansion of global studies. The evolution of globalistics itself is analyzed, including the development of such areas as political globalistics, legal globalistics, information globalistics, futuroglobalistics, nooglobalistics, cosmoglobalistics and other. Target audience: experts, lecturers, students, post-graduate students, a wide range of readers interested in the issues of globalistics and global studies. (shrink)

В работе предлагается эволюционный подход к исследованию глобальных процессов и глобальных систем. Для специалистов, научных работников, преподавателей, аспирантов и всех интересующихся проблемами будущего развития человечества.

В книге предлагается оригинальная трактовка глобальной эволюции, раскрывается содержание концепции планетарной и универсальной эволюции, основных принципов и методов их изучения.

Monografii︠a︡ posvi︠a︡shchena tvorchestvu Petra Evgenʹevicha Astafʹeva (1846-1893), zamechatelʹnogo russkogo filosofa, psikhologa i publit︠s︡ista iz plei︠a︡dy mysliteleĭ kont︠s︡a XIX veka -- "zolotogo veka" russkoĭ kulʹtury. V knige detalʹno rassmotreny osnovnye dostizhenii︠a︡ P.E. Astafʹeva, svi︠a︡zannye s obosnovaniem spiritualisticheskogo mirovozzrenii︠a︡: ego uchenie o dukhovnoĭ lichnosti i svobode voli, paradoksalʹnai︠a︡ traktovka chuvstva li︠u︡bvi, originalʹnai︠a︡ kont︠s︡ept︠s︡ii︠a︡ "bessoznatelʹnogo", predstavlenie o vere cheloveka v sebi︠a︡ kak pochve estestvennogo bogopoznanii︠a︡ i t.d. V edinstve s filosofsko-psikhologicheskim ucheniem P.E. Astafʹeva rassmotrena ego publit︠s︡istika (vkli︠u︡chai︠a︡ novyĭ i gluboko aktualʹnyĭ variant "troĭstvennoĭ (...) formuly") i namechena vozmozhnostʹ metafizicheskogo ponimanii︠a︡ nat︠s︡ionalʹnoĭ prirody cheloveka. V prilozhenii︠a︡ k knige vkli︠u︡cheny dva ėti︠u︡da avtora, posvi︠a︡shchennye poni︠a︡tii︠a︡m narodnosti i sobornosti. (shrink)

t. 1. Putʹ dukhovnogo obnovlenii︠a︡ ; Osnovy khristianskoĭ kulʹtury ; Krizis bezbozhii︠a︡ -- t. 2, kn. 1-2. Nashi zadachi -- t. 3. Shleĭermakher i ego "Rechi o religii" : religioznyĭ smysl filosofii : tri rechi, 1914-1923 ; I︠A︡ bgli︠a︡dyvai︠u︡sʹ v zhiznʹ : kniga razdumiĭ ; Poi︠u︡shchee serdt︠s︡e : kniga tikhakh sozert︠s︡aniĭ ; Putʹ k ochevidnosti -- t. 4. Poni︠a︡tii︠a︡ prava i sily ; Obshchee uchenie o prave i gosudarstve ; O suchnosti pravosoznanii︠a︡ ; O monarkhii i respublike -- t. 5. (...) Osnovnoe Nravstvennoe protivorechie voĭny ; O sopotivlenii zlu siloi︠u︡ ; Statʹi, Pisʹma -- t. 6, kn. 1. O li︠u︡beznosti sot︠s︡ialʹno-psikhologicheskiĭ opyt ; Osnovy khudozhestva, o sovershennom v iskusstve ; O tʹme i prosvetlenii : kniga khudozhestvennoĭ kritiki, Bunin, Remnozov, Shmelev -- t. 6, kn. 2. O Rossii ; Russkie pisateli, literatura, teatr, muzyka ; Khudozhnik i khudozhestvennostʹ -- t. 6, kn. 3. O Rossii i russkoĭ dushe ; Genii Rossii -- t. 7. O bolʹshevizme i kommunizme ; Muchenichestvo t︠s︡erkovʹ v sovetskom gosudarstve ; Sovetskiĭ soi︠u︡z ne Rossii︠a︡ ; O nat︠s︡ionalʹnom prievanii Rossii ; Tvorcheskai︠a︡ idei︠a︡ nashego budushchego -- t. 8. Bolʹshevist︠s︡kai︠a︡ politika mirovogo gospodstva ; Vzgli︠a︡d vi︠a︡alʹ ; Kniga razmyshleniĭ i upovaniĭ -- t. 9-10. Dnevnik ; Pisʹma ; Dokumenty (1903-1938) -- [t. 10.] Pisʹma ; Memuary (1939-1954) -- [t. 11. kn. 1] Perepiska dvukh Ivanov (1927-1934) -- [t. 11. kn. 2.] Perepiska dvukh Ivanov (1935-1946) -- [t. 11. kn. 3.] Perepiska dvukh Ivanov (1947-1950) godov -- [t. 12.] Stat·i, lekt︠s︡ii, vystuplenii︠a︡, ret︠s︡enzii (1906-1954) -- [t. 13.] Kto my?; O revoli︠u︡t︠s︡ii ; O religioznom krizise nashikh dneĭ -- [t. 14. kn. 1.] Filosofii︠a︡ Gegeli︠a︡ kak uchenie o konkretnosti Boga i cheloveka : uchenie o Boge -- [t. 14. kn. 2.] Filosofi Gegeli︠a︡ kak uchenie o konkretnosti Boga i cheloveka : uchenie o cheloveke -- [t. 15. kn. 1.] Aksiomy religioznogo opyta : issleovanie -- [t. 15. kn. 2.] Aksiomy religioznogo opyta issledovanie -- [t. 16. kn. 1.] Mir pered propastʹi︠u︡ -- [t. 16. kn. 2.] Mir pered propastʹi︠u︡ ; Analiticherskie zapiski i publit︠s︡istika -- [t. 17.] Gitler i Stalin. Publit︠s︡istika 1939-1945 godov -- [t. 18.] Spravedlivostʹ ili ravenstvo? ; Publit︠s︡istika 1918-1947 godov -- [t. 19.] Russkiĭ kolokol : zhurnal volevoĭ idei [No special title]. (shrink)

Научиться искусству точечной росписи совсем несложно, если у вас есть немного свободного времени и эта замечательная книга, в которой все основные техники описаны в форме доступных, понятных и наглядных мастер-классов. С помощью этого самоучителя вы освоите 10 техник точечной росписи, научитесь декорировать самые разные поверхности, сможете создавать красивые, практичные и долговечные изделия для дома, для себя и в подарок. Точечная роспись позволит вам почувствовать себя настоящим художником, даже если прежде вы совсем не умели рисовать. Новые творческие горизонты ждут! Желаем вам (...) вдохновенного творчества! (shrink)

The question of the identity of thought and being occupies an important place in the history of philosophy. Engels, addressing this question, wrote: "Is our thought capable of knowing the real world, can we in our ideas and concepts of the real world form a true reflection of reality? In philosophical language this question is called the question of the identity of thought and being. The vast majority of philosophers answer this question affirmatively.".

- a model, a norm, an ideal image, determining the mode and nature of behavior of an individual or a class in society. Creativity in accordance with an ideal, the shaping of natural materials in accordance with an ideal, constitute a specifically human form of life-activity distinguishing it from the activity of animals. As a universal aspect of goal-directed activity, the ideal appears in all spheres of the life of society: social, political, moral, esthetic, etc. The category of the ideal (...) has profound social meaning. Over the centuries, progressive classes have, in the struggle against outdated forms of societal relations, embodied their enthusiasm in the high ideals of liberty, equality, and fraternity. In our day, the ideal of the laboring masses of the entire world is communism, the building of a communist society, which is being effectuated in the USSR. "Each new step toward the shining peaks of communism," states the CPSU Program, "inspires the laboring masses of all countries, and constitutes vast moral support in the struggle for the liberation of all peoples from social and national oppression, accelerates the triumph of the ideas of Marxism-Leninism on a world scale". (shrink)

The article by D. I. Dubrovskii, "Brain and Mind" [Mozg i psikhika], published in Voprosy filosofii, No. 8, produced in me not only the desire to debate but also the desire to refrain, in that debate, from employing the tone he used. For that reason it seems necessary to me to list the points on which neither I nor, as I understand it, F. T. Mikhailov desires to take issue with the author of "Brain and Mind," because on these matters (...) we are entirely in agreement with him. To proceed in this fashion is necessary not for the sake of academic courtesy, but precisely in order to denote more clearly the actual points of difference between our positions, and then to let the reader decide which path he prefers. (shrink)

"The Party's struggle to educate the people as atheists," said Comrade L. F. Il'ichev in his report to the Ideological Commission of the Central Committee of the CPSU, November 25, 1963, "has had a history and has gone through stages, at each of which concrete problems were solved, and forms and methods of work specific to the given period were developed.".

In his book Gabriele Lolli discusses the notion of proof, which is, according to him, the most important and at the same time the least studied aspect of mathematics. According to Lolli, a theorem is a conditional sentence of the form ‘if T then A’ such that A is a logical consequence of T, where A is a sentence and T is a sentence or a conjunction or set of sentences. Verifying that A is a consequence of T generally involves (...) considering infinitely many interpretations; so it is something which is impossible to do in finite terms. Proofs may serve as ‘shortcuts’ in this respect. A proof is defined by Lolli as any finite argument certifying that A is a consequence of T. A proof is a shortcut in the sense that it spares us considering infinitely many interpretations.The reason for such a very general definition of proof is Lolli's strong belief that mathematics is not a rigid system of explicit rules, but rather a set of tools; as a consequence, there is no prescription as to what a proof should or should not be. Actually, mathematics is historically situated and not timeless, and the history of mathematics is the …. (shrink)

Starting from the 13th century, the question of defining theology as a science gained prominence within a new epistemological reflection on the discipline. It has been hypothesized that the availability of new translations of Aristotelian works significantly contributed to the growing interest among theologians in the theory of science. One of the most prominent intellectuals who recognized the necessity of defining theology as a science and outlining its boundaries and investigative methods in relation to other disciplines, was Albert the Great (...) (d. 1280). Numerous studies have been dedicated to exploring Albert’s treatment of this subject since the 1930s. However, little to no attention has been given to the role played by Arabic sources, particularly the works of Avicenna (Ibn Sīnā, d. 1037), the philosopher and polymath of Persian origin, in shaping Albert’s own definition of theology as a science. This contribution concentrates on the analysis of a section of the Summa Theologiae (Treatise I, quaestio V, chapter 3), with particular emphasis on the ‘translation’ of the logical-argumentative method from its domain of application in scientific and philosophical research to the branch of theology dedicated to safeguarding Christian doctrine against the criticisms and the attacks of heretics. The aim is to analyze how Albert accomplished this translation of the method of inquiry by drawing parallels between the defence of the principles of philosophical inquiry, which is a primary concern of metaphysics, and the defence of the articles of faith in theology. It is by reconciling sources from both the Christian and the Arabo-Islamic traditions that Albert claims the use of a form of dialectic argumentation within theology. (shrink)

Let X be a separable Banach space and Q be a coanalytic subset of . We prove that the set of sequences in X which are weakly convergent to some eX and is a coanalytic subset of . The proof applies methods of effective descriptive set theory to Banach space theory. Using Silver’s Theorem [J. Silver, Every analytic set is Ramsey, J. Symbolic Logic 35 60–64], this result leads to the following dichotomy theorem: if X is a Banach space, is (...) a regular method of summability and is a bounded sequence in X, then there exists a subsequence iL such that either there exists eX such that every subsequence iH of iL is weakly summable w.r.t. to e and QiH,e); or for every subsequence iH of iL and every eX with QiH,e)the sequence iH is not weakly summable to e w.r.t. . This is a version for weak convergence of an Erdös–Magidor result, see [P. Erdös, M. Magidor, A note on Regular Methods of Summability, Proc. Amer. Math. Soc. 59 232–234]. Both theorems obtain some considerable generalizations. (shrink)

The scholiast is clearly busy glossing a rare word. Here, as elsewhere in the scholia, Homer is cited for just that purpose. There is also an effective tendency to build judgements on a writer's style around the label ‘Oμηρικς. Curiously, in our case the scholiast seems to have hit upon the right reading of the passage. The detail about decaying timbers in the context of Nicias' letter could not help striking educated Greek readers, who, like Thucydides himself, had Homer at (...) their fingertips, as an echo of Agamemnon's words in Il. 2.135.1 argue that Thucydides intends the reminiscence to be perceived, and moreover, uses it to trigger off our understanding that the figure of Nicias should be read against that of the Homeric Agamemnon. (shrink)

Mikhail Bulgakov's novel The Master and Margarita was written between 1929 and 1940. Although delayed for a quarter of a century, it quickly found a stable place in our life as soon as it was published [for the first publication of the novel see: Moskva, 1966, no. 11; 1967, no. 1]. It is usually classified as a satirical philosophical novel. The satirical element puts it in the same family as such well-known works of the end of the '20s as the (...) novels of I. Il'f and E. Petrov, Twelve Chairs [Dvenadtsat' stul'ev] and The Golden Calf [Zolotoi telenok], but its emphatically philosophical orientation makes it all but a unique phenomenon in the history of Soviet literature. The novel's philosophical aspects have already been examined in a number of essays. Thus, for example, N. P. Utekhin analyzes the reflection of certain general philosophical categories in the novel. G. Chernikova and I. L. Galinskaia have endeavored to determine the concrete literary sources of the novel's philosophy [Chernikova 1971, pp. 213-219; Galinskaia 1986]. (shrink)

This interview, conducted over the span of several months, tracks the respective journeys of Constantin V. Boundas and Daniel W. Smith with the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze. Rather than “becoming Deleuzian,” which is neither desirable nor possible, these exchanges reflect an array of encounters with Deleuze. These include the initial discoveries of Deleuze’s writings by Boundas and Smith, in-person meetings between Boundas and Deleuze, and the wide-ranging and influential philosophical work on Deleuze’s concepts produced by both Boundas and Smith. At (...) stake in this discussion are key contributions by Deleuze to continental philosophy, including the distinction between the virtual and the actual and the very nature of a “concept.” Also at stake is the formative or pedagogical impact of a philosopher, like Deleuze, on those who find and fully engage with his texts, concepts, and project. Cette interview, menée sur plusieurs mois, suit les parcours respectifs de Constantin V. Boundas et Daniel W. Smith avec la philosophie de Gilles Deleuze. Au lieu de « devenir Deleuzien, » ce qui n’est ni souhaitable ni possible, ces échanges reflètent un éventail de rencontres avec Deleuze. Il s’agit notamment des premières découvertes des écrits de Deleuze par Boundas et Smith, des rencontres en personne entre Boundas et Deleuze, et du travail philosophique vaste et in????luent sur les concepts de Deleuze produit par Boundas et Smith. L’enjeu ici étant les contributions clés de Deleuze à la philosophie continentale, y compris la distinction entre le virtuel et l’actuel, et la nature même d’un « concept. » Mais il y a aussi l’impact formateur ou pédagogique d’un philosophe, comme Deleuze, sur ceux qui trouvent et s’engagent pleinement dans ses textes, ses concepts et ses projets. (shrink)

J. T. Hooker argues that at Il. 24.649 ⋯πικερτομ⋯ων must mean ‘taunting’ and, since ‘taunting’ makes no sense, that ⋯πικερτομ⋯ων must have entered ourIliadat this point from a version of theIliadslightly different from ours in which it did make sense. I wish to argue that ⋯πικερτομ⋯ων has a meaning different from ‘taunting’, which makes good sense of this, and every other, context.

_Abstract_: The question posed in the title serves as a springboard to examine the interdisciplinary nature of cognitive science and the role philosophy should play. I will argue that philosophy has a clearly defined role to play over and above the contributions made by philosophies specific to the various disciplines engaged in cognitive science. I also point out that by engaging with cognitive science – an endeavor defined by a clear scientific goal – philosophy itself will have to change in (...) ways that are bound to affect the future of philosophizing. In the first part of this paper, I play devil’s advocate, arguing that philosophy should not be amongst the disciplines engaged in cognitive science. In the second part, I discuss how the relationship between philosophy and psychology has been changed by their common participation in cognitive science: psychology is now admittedly philosophical and philosophy has become naturalized. In the third part, I suggest that philosophy is better equipped than psychology to handle the thorny question of representation in cognitive science. In the fourth part and conclusion, I argue that cognitive science will influence both the theory and practice of philosophy: the futures of cognitive science and philosophy are tied together. _Keywords_: Philosophy; Cognitive Science; Cognitive Psychology; Naturalism; Epistemology _Quale filosofia – se una ce ne vuole – per la scienza cognitiva?_ _Riassunto_: L’interrogativo posto nel titolo funge da punto di partenza per analizzare la natura interdisciplinare della scienza cognitiva e il ruolo che la filosofia dovrebbe avere al suo interno. Sosterrò che alla filosofia spetti un ruolo ben definito, al di là dei contributi forniti dai particolari indirizzi filosofici coinvolti nella scienza cognitiva. Sottolineerò anche che, confrontandosi con la scienza cognitiva – un ambito caratterizzato da un chiaro obiettivo scientifico – la filosofia stessa dovrà cambiare, assumendo modalità che influenzeranno il futuro del filosofare. Nella prima parte di questo articolo metterò le vesti dell’avvocato del diavolo, sostenendo come la filosofia non dovrebbe essere tra le discipline coinvolte nella scienza cognitiva. Nella seconda parte discuterò come il rapporto tra filosofia e psicologia sia mutato per effetto della comune partecipazione al progetto della scienza cognitiva: ora la psicologia è apertamente filosofica e la filosofia è filosofia naturalizzata. Nella terza parte mostrerò come la filosofia sia meglio equipaggiata della psicologia per fronteggiare l’ostico problema della rappresentazione nella scienza cognitiva. Nella quarta parte e nelle conclusioni sosterrò che la scienza cognitiva potrà influenzare la teoria e la pratica del filosofare: il futuro della scienza cognitiva e della filosofia sono reciprocamente legati. _Parole chiave_: Filosofia; Scienza cognitiva; Psicologia cognitiva; Naturalismo; Epistemologia. (shrink)

Our regular contributor on the business ethics scene in Poland reports on recent encouraging developments and sees them as contributing to the ‘moral revolution’ in addition to the political and economic ones which a leading Polish academic judges his country needs today. The author is Professor of Management at DePaul University Department of Management, 1 East Jackson Blvd, Chicago IL 60604, and Visiting Fulbright Professor of Management at Adam Mickiewicz University, Poznan.