In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content: Six Poems GEORGE KALOGERIS The Atomists To see what the matter is, in all of its dense, Teeming particulars, and not through the lens Of a microscope but by the most lucid, precise, Leap of imagination: the first was Leucíppus. But it was his student, Democritus, who stated That human understanding was truly futile, Given the random collisions of atoms. Still, He blinded himself to keep (...) from being distracted. When he broke the long-jump record by two whole feet, Bob Beamon dropped to his knees, buried his face In his hands, and wept in a pit of sand—the trace Of his human, Olympian flight still fresh as a heel-print. When the earthquake struck Kalamáta, and Uncle Sotíri Lost everything, he asked a taxi driver To take him to “a nice high place by the sea. And then come back for me in half an hour.” arion 28.3 winter 2021 58 six poems One Credit Seminar on the Odes of Horace We were sitting around a polished oak table, just getting to Those famous lines near the end of the Sestius Ode: Revenant whitefaced Death is walking not knowing whether He’s going to knock at a rich man’s door or a poor man’s When one of the students (Andrew) said it was “totally weird”— Which led us to look at the paleness of Death’s appearance, Whose pallor is what, when he comes, comes with him: the sickness and shock In his ghastly face. And that’s where we stopped. And then It was Jennifer’s email, saying “I’m sorry for missing class, But I’m having panic attacks. I keep flashing back To March 19th, when I entered my dorm-room and found my boyfriend Dead of an overdose... I can get you a note... What reading should I do to be prepared for next week?” O goodlooking fortunate Sestius, don’t put your hope in the future; The night is falling, the shades are gathering around; The walls of Pluto’s shadowy house are closing you in. There who will be lord of the feast? What will it matter, What will it matter there, whether you fell in love With Lycidas, this or that girl with him, or he With her? So David Ferry’s great translation goes, And its tone of tender, knowing, bemusement is Horace’s Pitying voice, but whose pity has come to speak to us Through the whitefaced mouth of revenant Death, still going From house to house, until he gets to Jennifer’s dorm-room. And what will it matter now if Andrew was drawn to the line About fishermen hauling their caulked boats to the water? It’s late September. We’re sitting around a polished oak table Whose wood is sacred to Jove, whose lightning-bolt Has already sounded deep in the heart of Indian summer. George Kalogeris 59 Greek School The very first poem I ever knew by heart: That sing-song forsaken one assigned to me. Recited on our other Independence Day. When some of the girls were dressed in peasant costumes, And some of the boys in kilts of the freedom fighters. And the timid rest of us in our Sunday best. In the church gym, where Father Mihos called us Up to the microphone, and one by one We showed the parents what we’d learned in Greek school. In Horace’s Ode to his Lyre, the poet prays That his song will serve as the medicine of sorrows, His stricken voice the trembling instrument— Schooled as he was in Sappho, who said the ancient Prescription left a bittersweet taste in her mouth: Glukopikron. For me it’s that first-grade poem I stammer to remember: Egwo tha geino Yiatrós... “I shall grow up to be a doctor...” Just saying that, my elders perk up their ears. And even if Poetry wasn’t the kind of calling Expected of me, and one by one they all Got sick and died, it’s still the medicine That keeps them leaning forward on their folding chairs. 60 six poems Money Doesn’t Grow On Trees But evergreen the... (shrink)

This paper is a critical discussion of the recent tendency to moralize various aspects of life that were previously viewed as private and discretionary. The paper takes as its starting point six recently unearthed moral prohibitions, and it examines the prospects for defending each as an extension of some familiar moral requirement. Its conclusion is not only that none of the extended prohibitions are defensible, but also that each impedes morality's function by limiting the ability of those whose lives it (...) governs to pursue their own aims as they see fit. (shrink)

In this paper, I propose a framework that supports both free will and anomalous mind-matter interaction (psychokinesis). I begin by considering the argument by the physicist Sean Carroll that the laws of physics as we understand them rule out psychokinesis (and other modes of psi). I find Carroll’s claims problematic, in part due to what I believe are misunderstandings of arguments borrowed from David Hume. I proceed to consider a more dispositional notion of causality (in contrast to one characterized by (...) universal and necessary laws) which I argue is more hospitable to both psychokinesis and free will. I then incorporate recent work from the philosophy of mind and science to arrive at a framework that supports both real volition and psychokinesis, which I argue are intimately linked. This approach is fundamentally dispositional, but grounded in an ontologically prior field of awareness and potentiality. I also consider that the regularities (or causal natures) we observe in our physical world are ultimately supported by what we might term teleological “intentions” within a nonlocal, mind-like quantum ground. (shrink)

_African-American Philosophers_ brings into conversation seventeen of the foremost thinkers of color to discuss issues such as Black existentialism, racism, Black women philosophers within the academy, affirmative action and the conceptual parameters of African-American philosophy.

This book offers a new and compelling account of distributive justice and its relation to choice. Unlike luck egalitarians, who treat unchosen differences in people's circumstances as sources of unjust inequality to be overcome, Sher views such differences as pervasive and unavoidable features of the human situation. Appealing to an original account of what makes us moral equals, he argues that our interest in successfully negotiating life's ever-shifting contingencies is more basic than our interest in achieving any more specific goals. (...) He argues, also, that the state's obligation to promote this interest supports a principled version of the view that what matters about resources, opportunity, and other secondary goods is only that each person have enough. The book opens up a variety of new questions, and offers a distinctive new perspective for scholars of political theory and political philosophy, and for those interested in distributive justice and luck egalitarianism. (shrink)

Throughout the debate on psi, skeptics have almost universally insisted on different standards for evaluating the evidence, claiming that psi represents a radical departure from our current scientific understanding. Thus, there is considerable ambiguity about what standard of evaluation psi must meet. Little attention has been paid to the possible harm to the integrity of scientific investigation from this resulting inconsistency in testing standards. Some have proposed using a Bayesian framework as an improvement on this dilemma in order to more (...) explicitly model beliefs, assumptions, and background scientific knowledge, especially when evaluating a controversial hypothesis. Recently, Kuhn’s notion of paradigms, which constrains scientific research within bound- aries believed to be most productive, has been incorporated into a Bayesian framework. Within this framework, I explore a likely paradigm or meta-theory used by skeptics that typically constrains research and makes it difficult for psi evidence to be accepted. It appears that such a paradigm would in many respects have difficulty accounting for consciousness, which is fundamental to an understanding of psi. I discuss why psi data are likely to play a key role in making progress in solving the problem of consciousness. Thus, applying different standards of evaluation to psi data is likely counterproductive. (shrink)

As the pagan classical world was subsumed into Christianity sexually hyperactive gods and goddesses transmuted into saints, their former statues that glorified the perfection of their bodies smashed into pieces and reimagined as austere two-dimensional icons to be worshipped by the new faithful. That dualistic and polemic narrative, where the soul’s purpose was to annihilate the body, survives today in the distinction between software and hardware, algorithms and robots, the former as the “ghosts” that animate the empty vessels, the “machines”. (...) But how does this narrative impact our cultural and social fantasies in the twenty-first century as we accelerate toward coexisting, uniting, or merging with intelligent artifacts? How does “humanness” blur when it is claimed by no-biological human-like entities too, or when humans augment their perception, consciousness and physical power through genetic engineering, drugs, or software and mechanical prostheses? Suppose we are destined to remake ourselves in the image of our ancient gods. Will it be through the embodiment of technologies in the physical reality, or through the complete disembodiment of our minds inside virtual worlds? (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Advising Parents Perseverance Wisdom Interpretive Puzzle Further Reading.

This chapter contains sections titled: The Excellence of Exploiting Others The Ruler‐as‐Ruler Argument An Objection The Rulers‐in‐Our‐Cities Argument Further Reading.

The earliest writer who deserves to be called a psychologist is Hobbes; and if we consider the time when he wrote, we cannot fail to be surprised at what I may term his prevision of the most important results which have now been established by science. He was the first clearly to sound the note which has ever since constituted the bass, or fundamental tone, of scientific thought. Let us listen to it through the clear instrumentality of his own language:-.

First Published in 1999. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

This chapter deals with one of the common fallacies in Western philosophy, ad hominem: circumstantial. The circumstantial variety of the ad hominem argument is distinct from the direct form in that instead of directly attacking the character of the arguer, one draws attention to an inconsistency in the personal circumstances of the proponent (his/her commitments) and the content of his/her argument/position as a way to question his/her sincerity or credibility. As with all the ad hominem argument forms, the ad hominem: (...) circumstantial has both fallacious and legitimate uses. Fallacious uses of the ad hominem argument type are pernicious, in part, because of how difficult it can be to respond to them in an effective way. One of the main issues with ad hominem arguments is telling which are fallacious and which are not. (shrink)

Fraudulent financial reporting, financial statements with errors so material as to require restatement, and biased reporting marred by defects such as managed earnings have plagued financial reporting in many countries in recent years. All of those failures are ethics failures that represent breaches of fiduciary duties by individuals who accepted responsibilities but did not fulfill them. The financial reporting system practiced in America is viewed by the parties involved in it as generally satisfactory. However, according to another view, the interests (...) of those primarily and secondarily responsible for those reports conflict with the interests of the intended beneficiaries, or users, of the corporate financial statements. A more realistic view of the actual operation of that reporting system shows that it is fundamentally flawed. Primary responsibility for failures rests with top management and financial management of the reporting corporation who are so strongly motivated to render favorable reports on their stewardship that they neglect their fiduciary responsibilities to investors. Secondary responsibility falls on independent auditors who are so heavily influenced by enterprise management that they, too, fail in carrying out their responsibilities to users of the audited financial statements. Ethics compromises are also found in the performances of academic accountants and members of accounting standards-setting bodies. The conflict between managements interest in reporting its performance in a favorable light and investors interest in decision-useful financial information will always exist and require regulation. However, changes in those regulations and in the basic governance arrangements involving shareholders, management, and auditors could reduce the opportunities and temptations for failures in carrying out fiduciary responsibilities. Most importantly, the close relationships between auditors and management must be loosened in favor of closer relationships between auditors and investors. (shrink)

This analysis of the emergent automated vehicle technology focuses on the friction at its interface with society, clouding its future. The sequential focus of development → deployment is reconfigured as reciprocal: society ↔ technology. A best path forward is presented that incorporates environmental and social sustainability factors as they relate to climate change and public health. The path’s signpost is automated electric vehicles deployed in public and private fleets. This course has promise to recover automobility from the damaging, unsustainable legacy (...) of personal internal combustion vehicles—highlighted by their toxic and carbon emissions, and road casualties. (shrink)

In his In Praise of Blame, George Sher aims to provide an analysis and defense of blame. In fact, he aims to provide an analysis that will itself yield a defense by allowing him to argue that morality and blame "stand or fall together." He thus opposes anyone who recommends jettisoning blame while preserving morality. In this comment, I examine Sher's defense of blame. Though I am much in sympathy with Sher's strategy of defending blame by providing an analysis (...) that shows its connection to our commitment to morality, I question his execution of this strategy. Sher hopes to defend our blaming practices by showing our dispositions to them to be a merely contingent consequence of a belief-desire pair that is itself justified by whatever justifies our commitment to morality. I doubt our blaming practices can be defended in this way. In explaining my doubts, I provide a short comparison of Sher's approach with that of P. F. Strawson in "Freedom of Resentment." I suggest that we might do better by exploring the connection between our commitment to morality and our blaming practices themselves. (shrink)

Written in the intense political and intellectual tumult of the early years of the Weimar Republic, _Political Theology_ develops the distinctive theory of sovereignty that made Carl Schmitt one of the most significant and controversial political theorists of the twentieth century. Focusing on the relationships among political leadership, the norms of the legal order, and the state of political emergency, Schmitt argues in _Political Theology_ that legal order ultimately rests upon the decisions of the sovereign. According to Schmitt, only the (...) sovereign can meet the needs of an "exceptional" time and transcend legal order so that order can then be reestablished. Convinced that the state is governed by the ever-present possibility of conflict, Schmitt theorizes that the state exists only to maintain its integrity in order to ensure order and stability. Suggesting that all concepts of modern political thought are secularized theological concepts, Schmitt concludes _Political Theology_ with a critique of liberalism and its attempt to depoliticize political thought by avoiding fundamental political decisions. (shrink)

Despite regulatory reforms aimed at inhibiting aggressive financial reporting, earnings management persists and continues to concern practitioners, regulators, and standard setters. To provide insight into this practice and how to mitigate it, we conduct an experiment to examine the impact of two independent variables on CFOs’ discretionary expense accruals. One independent variable, incentive conflict, is manipulated at two levels —i.e., the presence or absence of a personal financial incentive that conflicts with a corporate financial incentive. The other independent variable is (...) CFOs’ earnings management ethics, measured as their assessment of the ethicalness of key earnings management motivations. We find that incentive conflict and EM-Ethics interact to determine CFOs’ discretionary accruals such that in the presence of incentive conflict, CFOs with low EM-Ethics tend to give into the personal incentive by booking higher expense accruals; and in the absence of an incentive conflict, CFOs with low EM-Ethics tend to give into the corporate incentive by booking lower expense accruals. We also find support for a mediated-moderation model in which CFOs’ level of EM-Ethics influences their moral disengagement tendencies which, in turn, differentially affect their discretionary accruals, depending on the presence or absence of incentive conflict. Theoretical and practical implications of these findings are discussed. (shrink)

In this, his most influential work, legal theorist and political philosopher Carl Schmitt argues that liberalism's basis in individual rights cannot provide a reasonable justification for sacrificing oneself for the state. This edition of the 1932 work includes the translator's introduction which highlights Schmitt's intellectual journey through the turbulent period of German history leading to the Hitlerian one-party state. It also includes Leo Strauss's analysis of Schmitt's thesis and a foreword by Tracy B. Strong placing Schmitt's work into contemporary context.

The idea that we should simply live in the moment, and should not concern ourselves about the future or the past, has long been a staple of popular philosophy. In this paper, I first attempt to clarify the doctrine and then examine the case for accepting it. My conclusions are, first, that a number of its implications seem quite unpalatable; second, that the main advantages that living in the moment are said to yield are greatly overstated; and, third, that to (...) live by any version of the doctrine that was not highly watered down would be to sacrifice much of what gives meaning to our lives. (shrink)

Intimate relationships such as love and friendship involve familiar patterns of vulnerability. Loving someone renders one susceptible to distress and sorrow when the beloved is harmed and when the loving relationship is impaired. The distinctive kind of vulnerability bound up with intimate relationships also presents an opportunity for wrongful exploitation: for one participant to unfairly use, take advantage of, the other. In the case of commercial exploitation (e.g., exploitation of sweatshop workers), the remedy typically involves either preventing those in the (...) relevant positions of power from taking advantage of the vulnerability of the powerless or removing the vulnerabilities of those in the relevant positions of powerlessness. I argue there are there limits to the application of these two strategies in the intimate relationship context, and I consider what (if anything) might guard against the possibility of exploitation in intimate relationships. (shrink)

This chapter deals with one of the common fallacies in Western philosophy: ad hominem: tu quoque. An ad hominem: tu quoque argument is often seen in political debate. As Walton stresses: “The primary case of the tu quoque type of ad hominem retort occurs when an ad hominem reply is used to respond to an ad hominem attack”. As with all the ad hominem argument forms, the ad hominem: tu quoque has both fallacious and legitimate uses. Fallacious uses of the (...) ad hominem argument type are pernicious, in part, because of how difficult it can be to respond to them in an effective way. One of the main issues with ad hominem arguments is telling which are fallacious and which are not. The chapter looks at some examples to illustrate the use of proponent's ad hominem, and respondent's ad hominem. (shrink)

This chapter deals with one of the common fallacies in Western philosophy called ad hominem: bias. The ad hominem argument form is one way of engaging another's character. It is the direct or indirect impugning of a person's character that unites the various forms of the ad hominem argument. Many textbook accounts of the ad hominem argument are much too cavalier in their approach, often treating the ad hominem argument form as usually/always fallacious. As with all the ad hominem argument (...) forms, the ad hominem: bias has both fallacious and legitimate uses. Fallacious uses of the ad hominem argument type are pernicious, in part, because of how difficult it can be to respond to them in an effective way. The chapter looks at some examples to illustrate the use of proponent's purported bias relevant to the argument/position. (shrink)

This chapter focuses on one of the common fallacies in Western philosophy, ad hominem: direct. An ad hominem argument is an argument “to”, “toward”, or “against” the person. As with all of the ad hominem argument subtypes, the ad hominem: direct occurs in the context of some kind of dialogue or exchange, real or imagined. That is, an ad hominem occurs in response (the respondent) to the stated argument/position of another person. Instead of addressing the argument/position of the proponent, the (...) respondent addresses the proponent's character in such a way that his credibility is questioned in order to either question or refute his argument/position. The central complication when dealing with the ad hominem: direct is that while ad hominem arguments are often fallacious, they are also often legitimate. Fallacious uses of the ad hominem argument type are pernicious, in part, because of how difficult it can be to respond to them in an effective way. (shrink)

This chapter deals with fallacies that appeal to pity. Sometimes evoking pity can be a legitimate part of arguing, particularly if emotion is part of what is at issue. However, often appeals to pity in Western philosophy are irrelevant to the point at issue and are fallacious attempts to convince an audience to accept one's argument/position. Thus, a central problem in regard to appeal to pity arguments is figuring out when such appeals are legitimate and when they're fallacious. The two (...) basic issues relevant to considering whether an appeal to pity is fallacious are: what exactly is the conclusion, and what is the understood point of the dialogue. The chapter looks at some examples to illustrate the meaning and use of these questions. (shrink)