We report the results of a vignette study with an online sample of the German adult population in which we analyze the interplay between need, equity, and accountability in third-party distribution decisions. We asked participants to divide firewood between two hypothetical persons who either differ in their need for heat or in their productivity in terms of their ability to chop wood. The study systematically varies the persons’ accountability for their neediness as well as for their productivity. We find that (...) participants distribute significantly fewer logs of wood to persons who are held accountable for their disadvantage. Independently of being held accountable or not, the needier person is partially compensated with a share of logs that exceeds her contribution, while the person who contributes less is given a share of logs smaller than her need share. Moreover, there is a domain effect in terms of participants being more sensitive to lower contributions than to greater need. (shrink)

We report the results of a vignette experiment with a quota sample of the German population in which we analyze the interplay between need, equity, and accountability in third-party distributive decisions. We asked subjects to divide firewood between two hypothetical persons who either differ in their need for heat or in their productivity in terms of their ability to chop wood. The experiment systematically varies the persons’ accountability for their neediness as well as for their productivity. We find that subjects (...) distribute significantly fewer logs of wood to persons who are held accountable for their disadvantage. Independently of being held accountable or not, the needier person is always compensated with a share of logs that exceeds her contribution, while the person who contributes less is punished in terms of receiving a share of logs smaller than her need share. Moreover, there is a domain effect in terms of subjects being more sensitive to lower contributions than to greater need. (shrink)

We set out to find ways to help decision makers overcome the “winner’s curse,” a phenomenon commonly observed in asymmetric information bargaining situations, and instead found strong support for its robustness. In a series of manipulations of the “Acquiring a Company Task,” we tried to enhance decision makers’ cognitive understanding of the task. We did so by presenting them with different parameters of the task, having them compare and contrast these different parameters, giving them full feedback on their history of (...) choices and resulting outcomes, and allowing them to interact with a human opponent instead of a computer program. Much to our surprise, none of these manipulations led to a better understanding of the task. Our results demonstrate and emphasize the robustness of the winner’s curse phenomenon. (shrink)

Beneath the stylized violence and thrilling car crashes, the Mad Max films consider universal questions about the nature of human life, order and anarchy, justice and moral responsibility, society and technology, and ultimately, human redemption. In Mad Max and Philosophy, a diverse team of political scientists, historians, and philosophers investigates the underlying themes of the blockbuster movie franchise, following Max as he attempts to rebuild himself and the world. -/- This book guides you through the barren wastelands of a post-apocalyptic (...) future as you explore ethics and politics in The Wasteland, the importance of costumes and music, humankind's relationship with nature, commerce, gender, religion, madness, and more. (shrink)

Jakob von Uexküll (1864–1944) was a biologist, but the impact of his work has been perhaps stronger and more persistent in philosophy and the humanities than in the natural sciences. As one of the contributors to this book observes, Uexküll's conception of biology is “more at home among the disciplines composing the Geisteswissenschaften [humanities] than those included in the Naturwissenschaften [sciences], insofar as Uexküll's biology put Verstehen [understanding] before Erklären [explaining].” Uexküll began his career as an experimentalist of a “proto-behaviorist” (...) kind but came rapidly to be dissatisfied with the reduction of physiology to action-and-reaction chains. He argued that the animal-as-machine, the model that lies behind behaviorism, cannot be the starting point of biology. The relation between cause and effect in a machine is direct: the wings of a windmill, say, transfer their movement to a cog even if no one is there to perceive the transfer. In contrast, in the realm of the living, “a stimulus must be ‘noticed’ by a subject” to have any effect. Thus, Uexküll claims, “the first task of [the biologist] consists in seeking out the animal's perception signs”—in searching for what, in its surroundings, an animal perceives and of what it takes notice.Uexküll defined surroundings (Umgebung) as the whole physical reality in the vicinity of an animal, whereas by the term environment (Umwelt) he meant only that part of an animal's surroundings that it perceives. Given Uexküll's understanding of biology as the study of signs of perception (Merkmale), it is no surprise that his work has been a crucial source of inspiration for semiotics. Only one chapter of this new book is devoted to that topic, since Uexküll's presence in the field of semiotics (and in biosemiotics more particularly) is already well documented and analyzed in many publications, whereas his impact on the field of philosophy has been less studied (Brett Buchanan's Onto-Ethologies is, to date, perhaps the best study of that kind). Martin Heidegger was not the first to import the Umwelt theory into philosophy (Max Scheller, Helmuth Plessner, and Ernst Cassirer did so before him, and to each of them a chapter is devoted), but Heidegger is the most famous. It was by reworking an example of Uexküll's—“the rock on which the lizard lies is not given to the lizard as rock, in such a way that it could inquire into its mineralogical constitution for example”—that Heidegger characterized the divergent ways in which animals and humans approach the world. The former can use the things of the world, but humans are uniquely capable of conceiving things as independent of their use of them. We have no more direct access to our physical surroundings than other animals do, but, Heidegger held, we are at least able to imagine our surroundings and the things that fill them as independent of us (and eventually to examine them in the way that a mineralogist examines stones).Thus, Heidegger used Uexküll to set out an “ontological difference” between humans and animals. Gilles Deleuze, on the other hand, made use of Uexküll to advance a nondualistic ontology in which “the affects [that animals] are capable of” is given as the definition of bodies—a definition, he emphasized, “no less valid for us, for humans, than for animals.” Other philosophers whose understanding and use of Uexküll are examined in detail include Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Georges Canguilhem, Hans Blumenberg, and Giorgio Agamben; in addition to the complementary chapter on Uexküll and semiotics, already mentioned, there is one on his place in hermeneutics and one on the influence of Kant. The final chapter concerns the remaking of Uexküll by artists. In this way, this collection of studies offers a varied, detailed, well-structured, and engaging presentation of one of the most original biologists of the last century. As a whole, this book is an example of philosophy at its best—which is: when it specifies, pluralizes, and intensifies the thoughts and works of others. (shrink)

Die Münchener Texte und Untersuchungen zur deutschen Literatur des Mittelalters (MTU), seit Band 102 beim Max Niemeyer Verlag, machen bisher nicht oder ungenügend erschlossene Texte, Stoffe und Gattungen zugänglich. Neben höfischem und Heldenepos und der Lieddichtung des Hohen und Späten Mittelalters sind vor allem auch Prosaschriften des weltlichen und geistlichen Bereichs, vom theologischen Traktat über die Mystik bis zum Spiel und zur Sachliteratur aus der mittelalterlichen Alltagswelt vertreten. Die Auswahl der publizierten Werke besorgt ein internationales Gremium von Mediävisten verschiedener Disziplinen.

BackgroundUpper limb impairment is common after stroke, and many will not regain full upper limb function. Different technologies based on surface electromyography (sEMG) have been used in stroke rehabilitation, but there is no collated evidence on the different sEMG-driven interventions and their effect on upper limb function in people with stroke.AimSynthesize existing evidence and perform a meta-analysis on the effect of different types of sEMG-driven interventions on upper limb function in people with stroke.MethodsPubMed, SCOPUS, and PEDro databases were systematically searched (...) for eligible randomized clinical trials that utilize sEMG-driven interventions to improve upper limb function assessed by Fugl-Meyer Assessment (FMA-UE) in stroke. The PEDro scale was used to evaluate the methodological quality and the risk of bias of the included studies. In addition, a meta-analysis utilizing a random effect model was performed for studies comparing sEMG interventions to non-sEMG interventions and for studies comparing different sEMG interventions protocols.ResultsTwenty-four studies comprising 808 participants were included in this review. The methodological quality was good to fair. The meta-analysis showed no differences in the total effect, assessed by total FMA-UE score, comparing sEMG interventions to non-sEMG interventions (14 studies, 509 participants, SMD 0.14, P 0.37, 95% CI –0.18 to 0.46, I255%). Similarly, no difference in the overall effect was found for the meta-analysis comparing different types of sEMG interventions (7 studies, 213 participants, SMD 0.42, P 0.23, 95% CI –0.34 to 1.18, I273%). Twenty out of the twenty-four studies, including participants with varying impairment levels at all stages of stroke recovery, reported statistically significant improvements in upper limb function at post-sEMG intervention compared to baseline.ConclusionThis review and meta-analysis could not discern the effect of sEMG in comparison to a non-sEMG intervention or the most effective type of sEMG intervention for improving upper limb function in stroke populations. Current evidence suggests that sEMG is a promising tool to further improve functional recovery, but randomized clinical trials with larger sample sizes are needed to verify whether the effect on upper extremity function of a specific sEMG intervention is superior compared to other non-sEMG or other type of sEMG interventions. (shrink)

Thought Experiments in Historiographic Function: Max Weber on Eduard Meyer and the Question of Counterfactuality. Max Weber’s remarks on his colleague Eduard Meyer regarding counterfactual reasoning in history reflects a significant shift during the Methodenstreit around 1900. The question of attributing historical change strictly to either individual causes or abstract general laws has been tackled in a new way: By counterfactual reasoning a historian should be able to detect the most significant (and therefore meaningful) cause, event, or action (...) for a certain historical outcome. Following Fritz Ringer, this paper argues that given the predominating methods of the natural sciences, scholars of the humanities conducted historical research by counterfactual thought experiments. This way, Weber pried open contemporary narratives (e.g. historicism), and by employing a unique historical causal analysis he made way for refined concepts to offer a model of interpretation that gave hope for a more feasible, practice‐oriented approach to historical research than the epistemological discussions had hitherto offered. (shrink)

In this paper I put forward a reconstruction of the evolution of certain explanatory hypotheses on the neural basis of association and learning that are the premises of connectionism in the cybernetic age and of present-day connectionism. The main point of my reconstruction is based on two little-known case studies. The first is the project, published in 1913, of a hydraulic machine through which its author believed it was possible to simulate certain essential elements of the plasticity of nervous connections. (...) The author, S. Bent Russell, was an engineer deeply influenced by the neurological hypotheses on nervous conduction of Herbert Spencer, Max Meyer and Edward L. Thorndike. The second is the project, published in 1929, of an electromechanical machine in which the author, the psychologist J.M. Stephens, believed it was possible to embody Thorndike's law of effect. Thus both Bent Russell and Stephens referred to the principles of learning that Thorndike defined as connectionist . Their attempt was that of simulating by machines at least certain simple aspects of inhibition, association and habit formation that are typical of living organisms. I propose to situate their projects within the frame of thediscovery of a simulative (modelling) methodology which I believe might be considered an important topic of the Culture of the Artificial . Certain more recent steps toward such a methodology made by both connectionism of the 1950s and present-day connectionism are briefly pointed out in the paper. (shrink)

Na tentativa de resolver problemas concretos para a ciência, Max Weber toma por objeto de estudo o trabalho histórico, em especial o de um renomado historiador, Eduard Meyer. Para demonstrar e fundamentar o trabalho histórico, Eduard Meyer torna-se um exemplo para Weber da confusão lógica em que se encontram as ciências especializadas. Partindo deste fato, este artigo pretende mostrar como Max Weber fundamenta os conceitos lógico metodológicos que o auxiliam na construção da objetividade das ciências histórico-sociais. Nosso objetivo (...) é demonstrar como, através das operações lógicas, a metodologia weberiana distingue a conexão entre aqueles elementos “essenciais” da cadeia causal e outros elementos “acidentais” que se situam entre os infinitos momentos que compõem a determinação de um evento. (shrink)

In this article, we focus on the concept of leadership ethics and make observations about transformational, transactional and servant leadership. We consider differences in how each definition of leadership outlines what the leader is supposed to achieve, and how the leader treats people in the organization while striving to achieve the organization's goals. We also consider which leadership styles are likely to be more popular in organizations that strive to maximize short run profits. Our paper does not tout or degrade (...) any of these leadership theories. Instead, it points out which theories allow reason to play more than a minimal role in ethical decision-making, as well as those that are most consistent with a firm's desire to achieve efficiency in the short run. We explain our view that the way leadership is practiced in large, bureaucratic organizations suggests that ethics is often absent from the leader's decision-making process. Consequently, we suggest that before we engage in a meaningful dialogue about what kind of leaders we might really want in business, we must consider how much short-run profit we are willing to forego in exchange for more ethical corporate cultures. (shrink)

This book is a defense of the methods of analytic philosophy against a recent empirical challenge to the soundness of those methods. The challenge is raised by practitioners of “experimental philosophy” and concerns the extent to which analytic philosophy relies on intuition—in particular, the extent to which analytic philosophers treat intuitions as evidence in arguing for philosophical conclusions. Experimental philosophers say that analytic philosophers place a great deal of evidential weight on people’s intuitions about hypothetical cases and thought experiments. This (...) book argues that this view of traditional philosophical method is a myth, part of “metaphilosophical folklore.” Analytic philosophy makes regular use of hypothetical examples and thought experiments, but philosophers argue for their claims about what is true or not true in these examples and thought experiments. It is these arguments, not intuitions, that are treated as evidence for the claims. The book discusses xphi and some recent xphi studies; critiques a variety of other metaphilosophical claims; examines such famous arguments as Gettier’s refutation of the JTB theory and Kripke’s Gödel Case argument against descriptivism about proper names, and shows that they rely on reasoning rather than intuition; and finds existing critiques of xphi, the “Multiple Concepts” and “Expertise” replies, to be severely lacking. (shrink)