v. 1-32. Mou Zongsan xian sheng quan ji -- [33] Mou Zongsan xian sheng quan ji. Zong xu xiang mu.

本书论述中国哲学之特殊性问题、儒家系统之性格、法家所开出的政治格局之意义、佛教中圆教底意义、宋明儒学概述等。.

本书是著名哲学家牟宗三先生关于人生问题的一部名著,针对技术时代的种种偏颇,探索人生的正途,旨在提高人的历史文化意识,点醒人的真实生命。.

本书收录了作者讲授宋明儒学、反映学者思想发展的讲辞文本形式,以及对于明代名儒刘蕺山的学术及刘氏区分“心宗”与“性宗”进行研究的文章等。.

Many historians of philosophy, with all their intended praise, let the philosophers speak mere nonsense. They do not guess the purpose of the philosophers.… They cannot see beyond what the philosophers actually said, to what they really meant to say.Mou Zongsan (1909–1995) is one of the key figures of contemporary New Confucianism (當代新儒家) who to this day remains largely unknown and grossly understudied in the West.1 This neglect by the Western academy contrasts sharply with the ever-growing output of literature (...) by Chinese and Taiwanese scholars in which Mou Zongsan emerges as one of the most discussed and most controversial Chinese philosophers of the twentieth century. Given this unfortunate East-West divide—as .. (shrink)

Mou Zongsan was one of the most important Chinese philosophers of the twentieth century, yet his political thought is given little attention. This is unfortunate, because his political philosophy presents significant challenges to liberal views on freedom and the basis for democracy. Mou rejects the liberal understanding of freedom as absence of interference, and instead argues for a limited conception of positive freedom in government that includes teaching basic moral values. He bases democracy on the Confucian idea of respect (...) for humanity's universal moral potential. At the same time, Mou also provides an alternative to many current conceptions of Confucian democracy, which favor pragmatist and communitarian interpretations. Mou's thought thus illustrates how Chinese conceptions of Confucian democracy frequently differ from those in English-language scholarship. The goal of this article is to examine how Mou creatively interpreted Confucian thought to develop a unique New Confucian theory of democracy that neither uncritically accepts liberalism nor discounts the importance of liberal features such as individual freedom and rights. It also considers major objections to Mou's view of democracy and his possible responses. (shrink)

Mou Zongsan uses the highest moral principle “autonomy” to interpret Confucius’ benevolence and Mencius’ “inherent benevolence and righteousness”, focuses on the self-rule of the will. It does not do any harm to Mencius’ learning, on the contrary, it is conducive to the communication between Chinese and Western philosophies. If we stick to Kant’s moral self autonomy and apply it to interpreting Zhu Xi’s moral theory, similarly we will discover the implications of Zhu Xi’s “autonomy” in his moral learning. Therefore, (...) it is inappropriate for Mou Zongsan to say that Zhu Xi’s ethics belongs to the autonomous one. (shrink)

Mou Zongsan 牟宗三 contends that Confucianism is an ethics of autonomy. It is maintained that Mou’s version of ethics of autonomy differs from Kant’s in that Mou comprehends subjectivity differently than Kant in such a way that he, unlike Kant, locates the ethical a priori in moral feelings instead of reason. This paper will explore Mou’s metaphysical grounding of morality to show that Kant’s notions of autonomy and subjectivity undergo more radical modifications in Mou’s contention.

In this essay, we discuss a perspective remote from German academics on the examination of Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant, which was developed by Mou Zongsan (牟宗三). Mou focuses his interpretation of Kant on the infinite aspect of human morality and he praises Heidegger’s interpretation of the essence of human existence as “being-able-to-be”. Although, like Heidegger, he emphasizes the recognition of human finiteness as the basic premise of Kant’s philosophy, he refuses to apply this premise to Kant’s entire philosophy. He (...) addresses the fact that for Kant man is “finite but can be infinite”. Furthermore, he criticises Heidegger, on the one hand, for withdrawing the dimension of independence, infinity, supersensibility and timelessness from morality, and Kant, on the other hand, for rejecting the possibility of a positive use of intellectual intuition. By making use of a general insight from the schools of Chinese philosophy that positively recognise the intellectual intuition, one can, Mou believes, change the downsides of Kantian philosophy and organically connect Western and Asian philosophy. (shrink)

In this essay, we discuss a perspective remote from German academics on the examination of Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant, which was developed by Mou Zongsan (牟宗三). Mou focuses his interpretation of Kant on the infinite aspect of human morality and he praises Heidegger’s interpretation of the essence of human existence as “being-able-to-be”. Although, like Heidegger, he emphasizes the recognition of human finiteness as the basic premise of Kant’s philosophy, he refuses to apply this premise to Kant’s entire philosophy. He (...) addresses the fact that for Kant man is “finite but can be infinite”. Furthermore, he criticises Heidegger, on the one hand, for withdrawing the dimension of independence, infinity, supersensibility and timelessness from morality, and Kant, on the other hand, for rejecting the possibility of a positive use of intellectual intuition. By making use of a general insight from the schools of Chinese philosophy that positively recognise the intellectual intuition, one can, Mou believes, change the downsides of Kantian philosophy and organically connect Western and Asian philosophy. (shrink)

本书以形而上学文体为背景,通过对康德哲学与牟氏哲学的比较研究,重构了牟氏的道德形上学体系,逻辑地再现了牟氏对良知作为意义本体的构筑过程。.

On connaît peu la pensée chinoise contemporaine. Annie Boisclair s'intéresse ici tout particulièrement au philosophe Mou Zongsan (1909-1995) au parcours singulier. D'origine modeste, il quitte le milieu rural de Shandong pour aller étudier à l'université de Pékin en 1929. Juste avant la prise du pouvoir par les communistes en 1949, Mou fuit à Taïwan puis, plus tard, à Hong Kong. Il enseignera dans diverses universités et les turbulences sociales et politiques de la Chine seront intimement liées à l'approfondissement de (...) sa connaissance de la tradition intellectuelle chinoise qu'il mettra en relation avec les courants philosophiques occidentaux. C'est le dialogue entre les deux traditions et leur fécondation mutuelle que Annie Boisclair fait apparaître en suivant la pensée du philosophe. De tous les penseurs de ce courant, peu ont eu autant d'influence que Mou Zongsan. Mou supposait que les Chinois subiraient une perte d'identité culturelle s'ils ne valorisaient que le savoir étranger et, en même temps, que la civilisation chinoise ne survivrait pas à un enfermement sur elle-même. La pensée de Mou intégrait déjà plusieurs traditions fondamentales chinoises comme le confucianisme, le taoïsme et le bouddhisme, il était donc naturel d'y inclure des courants de philosophie occidentale. Rarement traduit en français, l'auteure propose en annexe de l'ouvrage quelques pages du philosophe. (shrink)

This chapter contains section titled: The Quintessence of Chinese Philosophy Intellectual Intuition and Moral Metaphysics Perfect Teaching and the Summum Bonum Chinese Philosophy versus Western Philosophy.

Mou Zongsan (牟宗三) extols Heidegger’s interpretation of human Dasein as “being-capable” and admits that he was inspired by Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant in many ways; however, although he, like Heidegger, emphasizes that human finitude is the basic premise of Kantian philosophy, he refuses to apply this premise to Kant’s philosophy as a whole. He argues, for Kant, “human beings are finite but can be infinite.” Moreover, he, on the one hand, criticizes Heidegger for withdrawing the dimension of absolute spontaneity, (...) infinitude, supersensibility and supratemporality from morality and, on the other hand, criticizes Kant for rejecting the possibility of a positive use of intellectual intuition. By the general insight of Chinese philosophy, which positively recognize the intellectual intuition, Mou believes that one can change the downside of Kantian philosophy and organically combine Western and Asian philosophy. (shrink)

Mou Zongsan (牟宗三) extols Heidegger’s interpretation of human Dasein as “being-capable” and admits that he was inspired by Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant in many ways; however, although he, like Heidegger, emphasizes that human finitude is the basic premise of Kantian philosophy, he refuses to apply this premise to Kant’s philosophy as a whole. He argues, for Kant, “human beings are finite but can be infinite.” Moreover, he, on the one hand, criticizes Heidegger for withdrawing the dimension of absolute spontaneity, (...) infinitude, supersensibility and supratemporality from morality and, on the other hand, criticizes Kant for rejecting the possibility of a positive use of intellectual intuition. By the general insight of Chinese philosophy, which positively recognize the intellectual intuition, Mou believes that one can change the downside of Kantian philosophy and organically combine Western and Asian philosophy. (shrink)

作為現代新儒家第二代的重鎮，牟宗三著力凸顯“現代性在中國”的民族文化特質，並與西方現代性展開“吸收”與“批判”的雙向互動。本書將牟宗三哲學置於“古今”“中西”的交會點上，探析他立足儒家思想建構“中國現 代性”的哲學思考，揭示其積極貢獻與內在問題。以牟宗三這一個案審視現代新儒家應對全球化及現代化的理論思考，其意義在於一方面以現代哲學的話語對傳統儒學予以詮釋和重構，另一方面以儒家價值為西方現代性補偏救弊 。.

本書撰寫目的在講明牟宗三哲學體系之性格，對牟宗三哲學之架構作一客觀的理解並作出客觀的衡定。本書研究提出：牟先生哲學之成果應分為兩大方面：一是以絕對的唯心論為奠基而通儒釋道三教的精神哲學之體系，此體系即 牟先生名之為「圓善論」的圓善學說系統；一是以儒家道德的形而上學為拱心石的純粹的哲學體系。牟先生本人以「圓善論」為其哲學體系命名，視之為「人極之極則」，並且對康德多有批評。本書之工作是消除牟先生對康德的 誤解，以論明：牟先生提出的儒家道德的形而上學，其義與康德之形而上學新論相通，乃客觀的、最高的而且是最根源的通識與洞見。此通識與洞見正是二十一世紀人類發展急需要之純粹哲學的根基所在。.

Recent years have witnessed a growth in the literature in Western languages devoted to Mou Zongsan 牟宗三.1 Among the New Confucians, Mou's writings are regarded as the most argumentative and the most systematic. He is also one who has engaged with Western philosophers such as Kant, Wittgenstein, Russell, Whitehead, Hegel, and Heidegger. This essay addresses a more primordial theme: how does Mou Zongsan compare with Heidegger when they come to the central issue of the self-transformation of traditions and (...) the question of cultural communication and integration? In relation to these concerns, they respectively formulate the notion of the self-reversal of moral reason (or of liangzhi 良知... (shrink)

本书内容包括:“一切综合判断的最高原理”与逻辑的两层涉指格——牟宗三哲学思想演进的一条轴线、前逻辑起点的考察等。.

Volume 33, Issue 1, February 2023, Page 1-14.

Fuzhi’s philosophies of qi. In this essay, both the strength and weakness of their interpretations will be critically examined. As a contrast, an alternative interpretation of the School of qi in Song-Ming Neo-Confucianism will be outlined. This new interpretation will uncover that, like Leibniz, Zhang Zai and Wang Fuzhi introduced a non-substantivalist approach in natural philosophy in terms of an innovative concept of force. This interpretation not only helps to show the limitations of Mou Zongsan’s and Tang Junyi’s understandings (...) of Zhang Zai’s and Wang Fuzhi’s doctrines of qi, but also indicates a way to bridge the traditional Chinese philosophy of nature and modern physics. More generally, our critical discussions will bring to light a new angle with which to re-appreciate Mou Zongsan’s and Tang Junyi’s contributions to the development of Confucianism. (shrink)

This paper examines the meaning and importance of the concept of immanent-transcendence in Mou’s assertion that Chinese philosophy is unique and superior, through his engagement with the philosophy of Immanuel Kant and his comparisons of Chinese and Western philosophical traditions. Rejecting Kant’s “epistemological path” as deficient, Mou argues that knowledge of the transcendent is possible through moral practice, as demonstrated by the Confucian tradition. His merging of immanence and transcendence implies a different relation between ethics and religion compared with the (...) way Kant himself conceived that relation. Despite the emphasis on practice in his understanding of Confucian spirituality, Mou’s approach is significantly different from a Dewey inspired Pragmatist approach to claims about transcendence. The paper contextualizes the theoretical choices in the development of Mou’s philosophy within China’s historical encounter with Dewey’s Pragmatism, and Mou’s own perception of his mission in a period of cultural crisis. (shrink)

This article will first give an account of Mou's judgment of the transcendental character of Huayan School by tracing his understanding of the doctrinal relationship between the “One Mind Opens Two Doors” in the Awakening of Faith in the Mahāyāna and the “Simply True Mind” of Huayan School. Second, Mou's interpretation of “the co-dependent origination of tathagatgarbha” of Huayan School will be analyzed so as to identify the sense in which Mou considers that the teaching of Huayan School is perfect. (...) This will be explicated in detail in the second and third parts. However, Mou's interpretation of the “Perfect” Doctrine of Huayan School draws our attention to the fact that the “distinctive” ontological explanation of all dharmas in Huayan teaching is different from that of the Tiantai School. Mou argues that the Huayan School is not the final and authentic “Perfect” Doctrine of Buddhism. In the fourth part we will discuss this in detail. Finally, does Mou's transcendental interpretation do justice to the Huayan School? Wing-cheuk Chan (Chen Rongzhuo inline image) criticizes such a reading as a mere step toward a proper understanding of the dialectical essence of Huayan School. We will introduce this in the last part of this article. (shrink)

Çin anakarasında yirminci yüzyılın başları; dilden edebiyata, geleneksel düşünceden eğitim sistemine ve hatta siyasal rejime dek pek çok alanda modernleşmeye gidilen süreci kapsar. Kültürel çaptaki bu yenilikçi hareketler arasında; antik çağa tarihlenen, Konfuçyüs (MÖ 479-551) tarafından ilkeleştirilen ve Mengzi’nın (MÖ 372-289) insan doğası görüşü sayesinde geniş kitlelerce benimsenen düşünce akımının “Yeni Konfuçyanizm” adı altında kurulması oldukça mühimdir. Konfuçyüs’ün normatif ahlak anlayışının aksine bu yeni akım, Mengzi’nın doğuştancı kuramına daha yakın durmaktadır. Yeni Konfuçyanizm’in temellerini atan Xiong Shili (1885-1968), Mengzi öğretisinde okunabilen (...) ve akılkalp ilgileşimi karşılığını verebilen “benlik” kavramını merkeze alır. Akımın sonraki temsilcilerinden Mou Zongsan (1909-1995) ise, gerek akıl-kalp ilgileşimine gerekse benliğin beslenmesine getirdiği çarpıcı yorumlarıyla dönemin en etkili fikir adamı olarak dikkatleri üzerine çekmektedir. Mou felsefesi; Mengzi’nın bütünleşik kabul ettiği bilişsel ve duyuşsal süreçleri tamamen farklı aşamalarda açıklayan, bu aşamaları benliğin iki katmanlı yapısıyla eşleştiren ve varoluşsal özü insan doğasının özüne özdeş sayan bazı varsayımsal yargılar içermektedir. Bu çalışmada, Mou felsefesinin onto-kozmolojik yaklaşımından hareketle benlik algısının nasıllığı incelenecek; doğuştan var olduğu farzındaki bilginin ve erdemin özümsenmesinde bilişsel farkındalığa karşı çıkan önermenin ayrıntıları analiz edilecektir. (shrink)

The New Confucian philosopher Mou Zongsan once compared the ethics of Mengzi to that of Kant, claiming that Mengzi’s ethics shares the same fundamental features with Kant’s and can therefore be better understood through a Kantian lens. This paper aims to argue against Mou by elaborating on two important but hitherto insufficiently addressed differences between Kant’s and Mengzi’s ethics. First, the paper shows that, as opposed to what Mou suggests, passages 6A1 to 6A3 of the Mengzi demonstrate Mengzi’s adoption (...) of an a posteriori approach to ethics that stands in direct contrast to Kant’s a priori approach. Second, the paper argues that even if we read Kant’s ethics in a non-rigorous way that works in favor of Mou’s interpretation, ren (humaneness), yi (optimal appropriateness), li (observance of rites), and zhi (wisdom), as the core concepts of Mengzi’s ethics, can still hardly be regarded as Kantian moral laws. (shrink)