Wherever there is life, there are lies. Slick-suited politicians lie on the podium, ready to tell voters what they want to hear. Cheating lovers, swindling businessmen, double-crossing villains – all liars. But nature lies too – the cheetah crouching in the tall grass waiting to pounce, its spots and straw-coloured fur blending in with its surroundings, the chameleon with its adaptable skin, the octopus hiding in its cave. Juan Jacinto Muñoz-Rengel uncovers the slippery history of lies, some dark and elusive, (...) others thunderous and dazzling. From primeval forests to modern politics, he explores the uncomfortable truths of our white lies, fudged facts and blatant deceptions. For centuries, philosophers, writers and poets have grappled with the paradox of what’s fact and what’s fiction. So who can we really believe? Our friends? Our partners? Our leaders? Can we even trust ourselves? Truly, this is the only book in which the abundance of lies on its pages is a sign of success. Or maybe it isn’t. Who can really tell? (shrink)

In this book, Koo discusses political change in the view of Confucian thought. This study focuses on the Book of Change, which is one of the nine basic books of Confucius School; it has dominated oriental thought in this field for more than three thousand years. The aim of this study is to analyze and arrange its theory of change, and to apply it to political reality. Therefore, this book analyzes and summarizes the theories of change and applies those theories (...) to political change. From that process, the theories of political changes are developed. Their usefulness is tested in the real world and compared to the existing theories of political change. The result is to develop and present a new theory of political change. (shrink)

En opinión de Francisco Puy, el jurista debe ser una persona que agarre decidido una experiencia jurídica siempre conflictiva, la describa, la valores y ofrezca una solución para limpiarla, pacificando los problemas que presenta de apropiación, transmisión, reparto, violación y reposición de derechos. Una experiencia jurídica se inicia cuando un individuo le dice a otro que una cosa es suya y el otro o los otros asienten o consienten en que es suya. Una experiencia jurídica crece, tornándose problemática, cuando un (...) individuo o dos o todo el grupo rechazan la declaración de uno o varios que dijeron que algo es suyo, que tiene un derecho de uso, de disfrute o de propiedad; un interés legítimo o cualquier otra opción jurídica. El Derecho es la misma cosa justa, lo justo materializado en el caso concreto real y práctico; y no lo justo legal ni lo justo diseñado en grandes teorías. Este enfoque teñido de realismo abre un amplio horizonte filosófico-jurídico que Puy ha recorrido en muchas direcciones, ensayando nuevas soluciones para cuestiones viejas. Catedrático ce Filosofía del Derecho de la Universidad de Santiago de Compostela durante 45 años, Francisco Puy ha dedicado una buena parte de su pensamiento a desarrollar una forma de estudio y comprensión de la experiencia jurídica, la prudencial, diferente de la usualmente utilizada en las universidades públicas. Su camino lo ha conducido por las sendas de la Tópica, la Retórica y la Dialéctica clásicas, que ha actualizado en diálogo con la moderna teoría de la argumentación jurídica. En este libro, los colegas, amigos y discípulos del maestro dialogan con él y entre ellos, transitando un panorama temático tan complejo como sugestivo. (shrink)

Second, follow-up interview of Cecilea Mun by Shelley Tremain.

This book discusses political change in the view of Confucian thought. This study focuses on the Book of Change, which is one of the nine basic books of Confucius School, and has dominated oriental thought in this field for more than three thousand years.

Standard accounts of shame characterize shame as an emotion of global negative self-assessment, in which an individual necessarily accepts or assents to a global negative self-evaluation. According to non-standard accounts of shame, experiences of shame need not involve a global negative self-assessment. I argue here in favor of non-standard accounts of shame over standard accounts. First, I begin with a detailed discussion of standard accounts of shame, focusing primarily on Gabriele Taylor’s (1985) standard account. Second, I illustrate how Adrian Piper’s (...) ([1992] 1996) experience of groundless shame can be portrayed as 1) both a rational and an irrational experience of shame, in accordance with Taylor’s account as a paradigm model of standard accounts of shame, and 2) as a rational experience of shame when taken in its own right as a legitimate, rational account of shame. Third, without denying that some experiences of shame either are or can be irrational experiences of shame, I elucidate how standard accounts of shame can act as mechanisms of epistemic injustice, and in doing so can transmute the righteous indignation of the marginalized by recasting them as shameful experiences (i.e., by recasting them as experiences of the righteous shame of the marginalized). (shrink)

The structure of pluralist arguments -- The inadequacy of multiculturalism -- The incompatibility of subsidiarity -- Associative democracy and the corporatist temptation -- Two conceptions of sovereignty -- A positivist pluralism? -- Law as intelligibility -- Pluralist authority -- This unity of life and action -- The personality of associations -- Property, personality, and public justification -- The spectre of intractability.

Do emotions help explain our behaviors? Can they condemn us, excuse us, orr mitigate our moral responsibility orr blameworthiness? Can they explain our rationality and irrationality, orr warrant such attributions? Can they be justified orr warranted? Are they constitutive aspects of our consciousness, identity, characters, virtues, orr epistemic status? The answer to these questions, at least to a significant extent, depends on what emotions are. This illustrates the importance of what emotions are to academics across multiple disciplines, as well as (...) to members of governing bodies, organizations, communities, and groups. Given the great importance of emotions to various aspects of our lives, this dissertation is about the relevance of the topic of emotion as an area of study for the discipline of philosophy. This dissertation is also broadly about the need to bridge the interests, concerns, and collective bodies of knowledge between various distinct disciplines, thereby contributing to the process of unifying knowledge across the various disciplines within the realm of academia. The primary aim in this dissertation is to initiate the unification of the interests, concerns, and collective bodies of knowledge across disciplines of academia. To do so, however, this dissertation aims to bridge some disciplinary divides between the disciplines of philosophy and psychology. I fulfill this aim by first demonstrating that interdisciplinary research and theorizing is needed within the disciplines of philosophy and psychology. I do this by considering how the problem of skepticism arises within these two disciplines. I also derive, propose, and argue for the acceptance of a new foundation for academic research and theorizing in response to the problem of skepticism. I refer to my proposal, in general, as The Proposal for Unification without Consilience (UC). (shrink)

Cecilea discusses with Shelley Tremain her experience as a first-generation U.S. citizen and first-generation university graduate; why she was motivated to study philosophy and become a professional philosopher; the launching of the new, open access, online journal, the Journal of Philosophy of Emotions (JPE); the “mismatch” between what she seemed like “on paper” and what she is is capable of; how societal, institutional, professional, and philosophical practices and policies must be adjusted to enable others like her to flourish as professional (...) philosophers; and any resources—such as articles, books, and videos—that she would like to recommend on the topics and issues that she has addressed in this interview. (shrink)

Richard Nisbett's The Geography of Thought is one of several recent works that have highlighted purported differences in thinking patterns between East Asians and Westerners on the basis of empirical research. This has implications for teaching and for other issues such as cultural integration. Based on a framework consisting of three distinct notions of rationality, this paper argues that some of the differences alleged by Nisbett are either not real or exaggerated, and that his geography of thought fails to provide (...) an adequate account of thinking styles across cultures. The paper concludes with a discussion of the implications for teaching and learning critical thinking that can be drawn from the framework developed. (shrink)