Results for 'G. Rodriguez-Pereyra'

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  1. DODD, J.-An Identity Theory of Truth.G. Rodriguez-Pereyra - 2001 - Philosophical Books 42 (4):305-305.
     
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  2.  19
    Mellor's Facts and Chances of Causation.G. Rodriguez-Pereyra - 1998 - Analysis 58 (3):175-181.
  3. The Disjunction and Conjunction Theses.G. Rodriguez-Pereyra - 2009 - Mind 118 (470):427-443.
    This paper is a response to replies by Dan López de Sa and Mark Jago to my ‘Truthmaking, Entailment, and the Conjuction Thesis’. In that paper, my main aim was to argue against the Entailment Principle by arguing against the Conjunction Thesis, which is entailed by the Entailment Principle. In the course of so doing, although not essential for my project in that paper, I defended the Disjunction Thesis. López de Sa has objected both to my defence of the Disjunction (...)
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  4.  40
    There Might Be Nothing: The Subtraction Argument Improved.G. Rodriguez-Pereyra - 1997 - Analysis 57 (3):159-166.
  5.  56
    Lowe's argument against nihilism.G. Rodriguez-Pereyra - 2000 - Analysis 60 (4):335-340.
    By nihilism I shall understand the thesis that it is metaphysically possible that there are no concrete objects. I think there is a version of an argu- ment, the subtraction argument, which proves nihilism nicely (see Baldwin 1996 and Rodriguez-Pereyra 1997). But E. J. Lowe, who is no nihilist, has a very interesting argument purporting to show that concrete objects exist necessarily (Lowe 1996, 1998). In this paper I shall defend nihilism from Lowe’s argument.
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  6.  14
    Metaphysical nihilism defended: reply to Lowe and Paseau.G. Rodriguez-Pereyra - 2002 - Analysis 62 (2):172-180.
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  7.  42
    Resemblance nominalism and abstract nouns.G. Rodriguez-Pereyra - 2015 - Analysis 75 (2):223-231.
    This is a reply to Byeong-Uk Yi who argued that my _Resemblance Nominalism_ fails to account for sentences featuring abstract nouns like Carmine resembles vermillion more than it resembles French Blue and Scarlet is a colour. I accept his criticism of what I said in my book on Resemblance Nominalism about, but then I go on to show how can be accounted for. I reject his criticism of what I said in my book about. I also show how Resemblance Nominalism (...)
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  8.  14
    Resemblance Nominalism and counterparts: reply to Bird.G. Rodriguez-Pereyra - 2003 - Analysis 63 (3):229-237.
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  9.  14
    Leibniz: Discourse on Metaphysics.Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - 2020 - Oxford University Press.
    Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereya provides a new English translation of G. W. Leibniz's Discourse on Metaphysics, complete with a critical introduction and a comprehensive philosophical commentary. In this fundamental work, Leibniz sets out a metaphysics for Christianity and provides answers to the central metaphysical questions.
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  10. Review of G. Rodriguez-Pereyra's Resemblance Nominalism. [REVIEW]Fraser MacBride - unknown
     
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  11. RODRIGUEZ-PEREYRA, Gonzalo. Two Arguments for the Identity of Indiscernibles. (Oxford University Press, 2022, 144 pages). [REVIEW]Leonardo G. S. Videira - 2024 - Manuscrito 47 (3):2024-0010.
    A critical review of Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra’s Two Arguments for the Identity of Indiscernibles.
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  12. The Bundle Theory is compatible with distinct but indiscernible particulars.Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - 2004 - Analysis 64 (1):72-81.
    1. The Bundle Theory I shall discuss is a theory about the nature of substances or concrete particulars, like apples, chairs, atoms, stars and people. The point of the Bundle Theory is to avoid undesirable entities like substrata that allegedly constitute particulars. The version of the Bundle Theory I shall discuss takes particulars to be entirely constituted by the universals they instantiate.' Thus particulars are said to be just bundles of universals. Together with the claim that it is necessary that (...)
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  13. Infinite analysis, lucky proof, and guaranteed proof in Leibniz.Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra & Paul Lodge - 2011 - Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 93 (2):222-236.
    According to one of Leibniz's theories of contingency a proposition is contingent if and only if it cannot be proved in a finite number of steps. It has been argued that this faces the Problem of Lucky Proof , namely that we could begin by analysing the concept ‘Peter’ by saying that ‘Peter is a denier of Christ and …’, thereby having proved the proposition ‘Peter denies Christ’ in a finite number of steps. It also faces a more general but (...)
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  14.  37
    Facing Facts.Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - 2003 - Mind 112 (448):780-786.
  15. Critical Notices 241.Rodriguez-Pereyra Oxford - unknown
    The final chapter of the book is devoted to the question of the epistemological status of holistic pragmatism itself. White thinks of it as a thesis, a statement that may have been originally a very generalized description of the methods of science but has become normative. Yet, in its own spirit, that does not make i t immune to correction. Still, as already noted, one is disinclined to modify or reject this sort of statement. White points out, correctly, that our (...)
     
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  16. Why Truthmakers?Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - 2005 - In Helen Beebee & Julian Dodd (eds.), Truthmakers: The Contemporary Debate. Oxford, GB: Clarendon Press. pp. 17-31.
    Consider a certain red rose. The proposition that the rose is red is true because the rose is red. One might say as well that the proposition that the rose is red is made true by the rose’s being red. This, it has been thought, does not commit one to a truthmaker of the proposition that the rose is red. For there is no entity that makes the proposition true. What makes it true is how the rose is, and how (...)
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  17. Grounding is not a strict order.Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - 2015 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 1 (3):517-534.
    The paper argues that grounding is neither irreflexive, nor asymmetric, nor transitive. In arguing for that conclusion the paper also arguesthat truthmaking is neither irreflexive, nor asymmetric, nor transitive.
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  18. Leibniz's Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles.Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - 2014 - Oxford: Oxford University Press UK.
    Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra presents an original study of the place and role of the Identity of Indiscernibles in Leibniz's philosophy. The Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles rules out numerically distinct but perfectly similar things; Leibniz derived it from more basic principles and used it to establish important philosophical theses. Rodriguez-Pereyra aims to establish what Leibniz meant by the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles, what his arguments for and from it were, and to assess those arguments and (...)
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  19. Resemblance Nominalism: A Solution to the Problem of Universals.Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (1):241-246.
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  20. Why Truthmakers?Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - 2005 - In Helen Beebee & Julian Dodd (eds.), Truthmakers: The Contemporary Debate. Oxford, GB: Clarendon Press.
     
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  21. The Razor and the Laser.Mark Fiddaman & Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - 2018 - Analytic Philosophy 59 (3):341-358.
    The Razor says: do not multiply entities without necessity! The Laser says: do not multiply fundamental entities without necessity! Behind the Laser lies a deep insight. This is a distinction between the costs and the commitments of a theory. According to the Razor, every commitment is a cost. Not so according to the Laser. According to the Laser, derivative entities are an ontological free lunch: that is, they are a commitment without a cost. Jonathan Schaffer (2015) has argued that the (...)
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  22. El hacer verdad, la implicación y la tesis de la conjunción.Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - 2007 - Revista Latinoamericana de Filosofia 33 (1):55-85.
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  23. La anotación 202 de las Investigaciones Filosóficas de Wittgenstein.Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - 1993 - Logos. Anales Del Seminario de Metafísica [Universidad Complutense de Madrid, España] 27 (2):25-3.
    The paper clarifies the sense of remark 202 of Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations* with respect to its relation to the private language argument. It argues, against what some have maintained, that remark 202 is not meant to reject the possibility of a private language as this is defined in remark 243.
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  24. Truthmakers.Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - 2006 - Philosophy Compass 1 (2):186–200.
    This bulletin contains a summary of the main topics of discussion in truthmaker theory, namely: the definition of truthmakers, problems with Truthmaker Necessitarianism and Truthmaker Maximalism, the ontological burden of truthmakers and the recalcitrant topic of truthmakers for negative truths.
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  25. Nominalism in metaphysics.Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  26.  19
    Correction to: The argument from almost indiscernibles.Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (7):1825-1825.
    In pages 3005, 3006 and 3019, there is a sentence that begins: “If the premise lacks support, the argument does not establish the possibility of almost indiscernibles…”.
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  27. Metaphysical nihilism defended: Reply to Lowe and Paseau.Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - 2002 - Analysis 62 (2):172–180.
    I believe in metaphysical nihilism, the thesis that there could have been no concrete objects, because I believe in a version of the subtraction argument, the subtraction argument*, that proves it. But both Jonathan Lowe (2002) and Alexander Paseau (2002) express doubts about the subtraction argument*. Paseau thinks the argument is invalid, and Lowe argues that invoking concrete* objects is unnecessary. Furthermore Lowe attempts to rebut my objections (Rodriguez-Pereyra 2000) to his anti-nihilist argument (Lowe 1998). In this paper (...)
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  28. Truthmaking, entailment, and the conjunction thesis.Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - 2006 - Mind 115 (460):957-982.
    In this paper I undermine the Entailment Principle according to which if an entity is a truthmaker for a certain proposition and this proposition entails another, then the entity in question is a truthmaker for the latter proposition. I argue that the two most promising versions of the principle entail the popular but false Conjunction Thesis, namely that a truthmaker for a conjunction is a truthmaker for its conjuncts. One promising version of the principle understands entailment as strict implication but (...)
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  29. There might be nothing: The subtraction argument improved.Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - 1997 - Analysis 57 (3):159–166.
  30. Indiscernible universals.Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - 2017 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 60 (6):604-624.
    Universals have traditionally thought to obey the identity of indiscernibles, that is, it has traditionally been thought that there can be no perfectly similar universals. But at least in the conception of universals as immanent, there is nothing that rules out there being indiscernible universals. In this paper, I shall argue that there is useful work indiscernible universals can do, and so there might be reason to postulate indiscernible universals. In particular, I shall argue that postulating indiscernible universals can allow (...)
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  31. What is the problem of universals?Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - 2000 - Mind 109 (434):255-273.
    In this article I address the Problem of Universals by answering questions about what facts a solution to the Problem of Universals should explain and how the explanation should go. I argue that a solution to the Problem of Universals explains the facts the Problem of Universals is about by giving the truthmakers (as opposed to the conceptual content and the ontological commitments) of the sentences stating those facts. I argue that the sentences stating the relevant facts are those like (...)
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  32. The Subtraction Arguments for Metaphysical Nihilism: Compared and Defended.Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - 2013 - In Tyron Goldschmidt (ed.), The Puzzle of Existence: Why is There Something Rather Than Nothing? New York: Routledge. pp. 197-214.
    The subtraction argument, originally put forward by Thomas Baldwin (1996), is intended to establish Metaphysical Nihilism, the thesis that there could have been no concrete objects. Some modified versions of the argument have been proposed in order to avoid some difficulties faced by the original argument. In this paper I shall concentrate on two of those versions, the so-called subtraction argument* (presented and defended in Rodriguez-Pereyra 1997, 2000, 2002), and Efird and Stoneham’s recent version of the argument (Efird (...)
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  33. Truthmaker maximalism defended.Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - 2006 - Analysis 66 (3):260–264.
    Peter Milne has tried to refure Truthmaker Maximalism. the thesis that every truth has a truthmaker, by producing a simple and direct counterexample to it, the sentence M: This sentence has no truthmaker. I argue that, contrary to what Milne argues, on Truthmaker Maximalism M is equivalent to the Liar, which gives the truthmaker maximalist a way to defend his position from Milne's counterexample: to argue that M expresses no proposition.
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  34.  33
    Indiscernible Universals.Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - 2020 - Humanities Journal of Valparaiso 16:89-110.
    Universals have traditionally thought to obey the identity of indiscernibles, that is, it has traditionally been thought that there can be no perfectly similar universals. But at least in the conception of universals as immanent, there is nothing that rules out there being indiscernible universals. In this paper, I shall argue that there is useful work indiscernible universals can do, and so there might be reason to postulate indiscernible universals. In particular, I shall argue that postulating indiscernible universals can allow (...)
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  35.  37
    A Defense Of Explanation-First Truthmaking: Some Thoughts On Jamin Asay’s A Theory Of Truthmaking.Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - 2022 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 1 (1):1-6.
    Jamin Asay’s A Theory of Truthmaking is one of the most important books on truthmaking, full of important ideas from beginning to end. One of the most interesting parts of the book is Asay's attack on the explanation-first truthmaking. Explanation-first truthmaking is the explanatory project of explaining why truths are true. This is in contrast with ontology-first truthmaking, the project defended by Asay, and which is the project of answering the fundamental ontological question “What is there?”. Asay thinks explanation-first truthmaking (...)
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  36. Why is There Something Rather Than Nothing? A Probabilistic Answer Examined.Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - 2018 - Philosophy 93 (4):505-521.
    Peter van Inwagen has given an answer to the question ‘Why is there something rather than nothing?’. His answer is: Because there being nothing is as improbable as anything can be: it has probability 0. Here I shall examine his argument for this answer and I shall argue that it does not work because no good reasons have been given for two of the argument’s premises and that the conclusion of the argument does not constitute an answer to the question (...)
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  37. How not to trivialise the identity of indiscernibles.Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - 2006 - In P. F. Strawson & A. Chakrabarti (eds.), Concepts, Properties and Qualities. Ashgate.
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  38. Descartes's substance dualism and his independence conception of substance.Gonzalo Rodríguez Pereyra - 2008 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 46 (1):69-89.
    Descartes maintained substance dualism, the thesis that no substance has both mental and material properties. His main argument for this thesis, the so-called separability argument from the Sixth Meditation (AT VII: 78) has long puzzled readers. In this paper I argue that Descartes’ independence conception of substance (which Descartes presents in article 51 of the Principles) is crucial for the success of the separability argument and that Descartes used this conception of substance to defend his argument for substance dualism from (...)
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  39.  24
    Indiscernible Universals.Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - 2020 - Revista de Humanidades de Valparaíso 16:89-110.
    Universals have traditionally thought to obey the identity of indiscernibles, that is, it has traditionally been thought that there can be no perfectly similar universals. But at least in the conception of universals as immanent, there is nothing that rules out there being indiscernible universals. In this paper, I shall argue that there is useful work indiscernible universals can do, and so there might be reason to postulate indiscernible universals. In particular, I shall argue that postulating indiscernible universals can allow (...)
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  40. The Principles of Contradiction, Sufficient Reason, and Identity of Indiscernibles.Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - 2013 - In Maria Rosa Antognazza (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Leibniz. New York: Oxford University Press.
    Leibniz was a philosopher of principles: the principles of Contradiction, of Sufficient Reason, of Identity of Indiscernibles, of Plenitude, of the Best, and of Continuity are among the most famous Leibnizian principles. In this article I shall focus on the first three principles; I shall discuss various formulations of the principles (sect. 1), what it means for these theses to have the status of principles or axioms in Leibniz’s philosophy (sect. 2), the fundamental character of the Principles of Contradiction and (...)
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  41.  25
    Class nominalism and resemblance nominalism.Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - 2024 - In A. R. J. Fisher & Anna-Sofia Maurin (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Properties. London: Routledge.
    This chapter is a discussion of Class and Resemblance Nominalism. According to the traditional versions of these theories, properties are classes of particulars. Thus, the property of being red is the class of red particulars, and the property of being square is the class of square particulars. Several objections have been advanced against these theories, and one of the most powerful of such objections is the so-called Coextension Difficulty, according to which Class and Resemblance Nominalism have to wrongly identify distinct (...)
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  42. What is wrong with the relational theory of change?Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - 2002 - In Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra & Hallvard Lillehammer (eds.), Real Metaphysics: Essays in Honour of D.H. Mellor. New York: Routledge. pp. 184--195.
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  43.  20
    Real Metaphysics: Essays in Honour of D. H. Mellor.Hallvard Lillehammer & Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (eds.) - 2002 - New York: Routledge.
    _Real Metaphysics_ brings together new articles by leading metaphysicians to honour Hugh Mellor's outstanding contribution to metaphysics. Some of the most outstanding minds of current times shed new light on all the main topics in metaphysics: truth, causation, dispositions and properties, explanation, and time. At the end of the book, Hugh Mellor responds to the issues raised by each of the thirteen contributors and gives us new insight into his own highly influential work on metaphysics.
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  44. Leibniz's Argument for the Identity of Indiscernibles in his Correspondence with Clarke.Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - 1999 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (4):429 – 438.
    In Section 21 of his fifth letter to Clarke Leibniz attempts to derive the Identity of Indiscernibles from an application of the Principle of Sufficient Reason to God´s act of creation, namely that God has a reason to create the world he creates. In this paper I argue that this argument fails, not just because the Identity of Indiscernibles is false, but because there is a counterexample to one of the premises that Leibniz cannot satisfactorily rule out.
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  45.  98
    The argument from almost indiscernibles.Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (12):3005-3020.
    What I call the argument from almost indiscernibles is an argument, put forward by Robert Adams in 1979, for the possibility of indiscernibles based on the possibility of almost indiscernibles. The argument is that if almost indiscernibles are possible, indiscernibles are possible, but since almost indiscernible are possible, indiscernibles are possible. The argument seems to be an improvement over the mere appeal to intuitions, like that suggested by Max Black, that situations in which there are indiscernibles are possible, for the (...)
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  46. Resemblance Nominalism and the Imperfect Community.Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - 1999 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (4):965-982.
    The object of this paper is to provide a solution to Nelson Goodman’s Imperfect Community difficulty as it arises for Resemblance Nominalism, the view that properties are classes of resembling particulars. The Imperfect Community difficulty consists in that every two members of a class resembling each other is not sufficient for it to be a class such that there is some property common to all their members, even if ‘x resembles y’ is understood as ‘x and y share some property’. (...)
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  47. Resemblance Nominalism and Russell's regress.Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - 2001 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (3):395 – 408.
    Bertrand Russell argued that any attempt to get rid of universals in favor of resemblances fails. He argued that no resemblance theory could avoid postulating a universal of resemblance without falling prey to a vicious infinite regress. He added that admitting such a universal of resemblance made it pointless to avoid other universals. In this paper I defend resemblance nominalism from both of Russell's points by arguing that (a) resemblance nominalism can avoid the postulation of a universal of resemblance without (...)
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    Real Metaphysics: Essays in Honour of D.H. Mellor.Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra & Hallvard Lillehammer (eds.) - 2002 - New York: Routledge.
    Real Metaphysics brings together new articles by leading metaphysicians to honour Hugh Mellor's outstanding contribution to metaphysics. Some of the most outstanding minds of current times shed new light on all the main topics in metaphysics: truth, causation, dispositions and properties, explanation, and time. At the end of the book, Hugh Mellor responds to the issues raised by each of the thirteen contributors and gives us new insight into his own highly influential work on metaphysics.
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  49. Modal realism and metaphysical nihilism.Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - 2004 - Mind 113 (452):683-704.
    In this paper I argue that Modal Realism, the thesis that there exist non-actual possible individuals and worlds, can be made compatible with Metaphysical Nihilism, the thesis that it is possible that nothing concrete exists. Modal Realism as developed by Lewis rules out the possibility of a world where nothing concrete exists and so conflicts with Metaphysical Nihilism. In the paper I argue that Modal Realism can be modified so as to be compatible with Metaphysical Nihilism. Such a modification makes (...)
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  50. Postscript to Why Truthmakers.Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - 2008 - In E. Jonathan Lowe & Adolf Rami (eds.), Truth and Truth-Making. Montreal: Mcgill-Queen's University Press.
    In this chapter I shall reply to a pair of articles in which the main contention of my “Why truthmakers” – namely, that an important class of synthetic true propositions have entities as truth-makers – is rejected. In §§1–5 I reply to Jennifer Hornsby’s “Truth without Truthmaking Entities” (2005) and in §§6–7 I reply to Julian Dodd’s “Negative Truths and Truthmaker Principles” (2007).
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