§1. Introduction. After the pioneering work of Mostowski [29] and Lindström [23] it was Jon Barwise's papers [2] and [3] that brought abstract model theory and generalized quantifiers to the attention of logicians in the early seventies. These papers were greeted with enthusiasm at the prospect that model theory could be developed by introducing a multitude of extensions of first order logic, and by proving abstract results about relationships holding between properties of these logics. Examples of such properties areκ-compactness.Any set (...) of sentences of cardinality ≤ κ, every finite subset of which has a model, has itself a model.Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem down toκ.If a sentence of the logic has a model, it has a model of cardinality at most κ.Interpolation Property.If ϕ and ψ are sentences such that ⊨ ϕ → Ψ, then there is θ such that ⊨ ϕ → θ, ⊨ θ → Ψ and the vocabulary of θ is the intersection of the vocabularies of ϕ and Ψ.Lindstrom's famous theorem characterized first order logic as the maximal ℵ0-compact logic with Downward Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem down to ℵ0. With his new concept of absolute logics Barwise was able to get similar characterizations of infinitary languagesLκω. But hopes were quickly frustrated by difficulties arising left and right, and other areas of model theory came into focus, mainly stability theory. No new characterizations of logics comparable to the early characterization of first order logic given by Lindström and of infinitary logic by Barwise emerged. What was first called soft model theory turned out to be as hard as hard model theory. (shrink)

§1. Introduction. After the pioneering work of Mostowski [29] and Lindström [23] it was Jon Barwise's papers [2] and [3] that brought abstract model theory and generalized quantifiers to the attention of logicians in the early seventies. These papers were greeted with enthusiasm at the prospect that model theory could be developed by introducing a multitude of extensions of first order logic, and by proving abstract results about relationships holding between properties of these logics. Examples of such properties areκ-compactness.Any set (...) of sentences of cardinality ≤ κ, every finite subset of which has a model, has itself a model.Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem down toκ.If a sentence of the logic has a model, it has a model of cardinality at most κ.Interpolation Property.If ϕ and ψ are sentences such that ⊨ ϕ → Ψ, then there is θ such that ⊨ ϕ → θ, ⊨ θ → Ψ and the vocabulary of θ is the intersection of the vocabularies of ϕ and Ψ.Lindstrom's famous theorem characterized first order logic as the maximal ℵ0-compact logic with Downward Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem down to ℵ0. With his new concept of absolute logics Barwise was able to get similar characterizations of infinitary languagesLκω. But hopes were quickly frustrated by difficulties arising left and right, and other areas of model theory came into focus, mainly stability theory. No new characterizations of logics comparable to the early characterization of first order logic given by Lindström and of infinitary logic by Barwise emerged. What was first called soft model theory turned out to be as hard as hard model theory. (shrink)

Dependence is a common phenomenon, wherever one looks: ecological systems, astronomy, human history, stock markets - but what is the logic of dependence? This book is the first to carry out a systematic logical study of this important concept, giving on the way a precise mathematical treatment of Hintikka’s independence friendly logic. Dependence logic adds the concept of dependence to first order logic. Here the syntax and semantics of dependence logic are studied, dependence logic is given an alternative game theoretic (...) semantics, and results about its complexity are proven. This is a graduate textbook suitable for a special course in logic in mathematics, philosophy and computer science departments, and contains over 200 exercises, many of which have a full solution at the end of the book. It is also accessible to readers, with a basic knowledge of logic, interested in new phenomena in logic. (shrink)

We take a fresh look at the logics of informational dependence and independence of Hintikka and Sandu and Väänänen, and their compositional semantics due to Hodges. We show how Hodges’ semantics can be seen as a special case of a general construction, which provides a context for a useful completeness theorem with respect to a wider class of models. We shed some new light on each aspect of the logic. We show that the natural propositional logic carried by the (...) semantics is the logic of Bunched Implications due to Pym and O’Hearn, which combines intuitionistic and multiplicative connectives. This introduces several new connectives not previously considered in logics of informational dependence, but which we show play a very natural rôle, most notably intuitionistic implication. As regards the quantifiers, we show that their interpretation in the Hodges semantics is forced, in that they are the image under the general construction of the usual Tarski semantics; this implies that they are adjoints to substitution, and hence uniquely determined. As for the dependence predicate, we show that this is definable from a simpler predicate, of constancy or dependence on nothing. This makes essential use of the intuitionistic implication. The Armstrong axioms for functional dependence are then recovered as a standard set of axioms for intuitionistic implication. We also prove a full abstraction result in the style of Hodges, in which the intuitionistic implication plays a very natural rôle. (shrink)

We discuss the differences between first-order set theory and second-order logic as a foundation for mathematics. We analyse these languages in terms of two levels of formalization. The analysis shows that if second-order logic is understood in its full semantics capable of characterizing categorically central mathematical concepts, it relies entirely on informal reasoning. On the other hand, if it is given a weak semantics, it loses its power in expressing concepts categorically. First-order set theory and second-order logic are not radically (...) different: the latter is a major fragment of the former. (shrink)

To support the sustainability of future cities, residents’ living spaces need to be built and used efficiently, while supporting residents’ communal wellbeing. Nordic superblock is a new planning, housing, and living concept in which residents of a neighborhood—a combination of city blocks—share yards, common spaces and utilities. Sharing living spaces is an essential element of this approach. In this study, our goal was to study the ways in which intelligent technology solutions—such as proactive, data-driven Artificial Intelligence (AI) applications—could support and (...) even motivate the use of common areas in superblocks. To this end, we conducted a two-phase qualitative study: in the first phase, potential superblock residents (N = 12) shared their perspectives of sharing of living spaces in general, and more specifically of how intelligent technologies could support sharing spaces. In the second phase, two workshops with experts (N = 7) were held to gather understanding of possibilities of intelligent technologies in meeting the residents’ expectations of space sharing. The results illustrate space sharing and communality as supportive factors for one another, enabled but also complicated by social interaction. Major possibilities for intelligent technologies to advance space sharing were seen in organizing the use of spaces and facilitating social interaction in the community. As an outcome, four roles incorporating several use purposes of intelligent technologies were found. The findings can inform the Human-Centered AI (HCAI) research and design improving sustainable living in future urban neighborhoods. (shrink)

We study generalized quantifiers on finite structures.With every function : we associate a quantifier Q by letting Q x say there are at least (n) elementsx satisfying , where n is the sizeof the universe. This is the general form ofwhat is known as a monotone quantifier of type .We study so called polyadic liftsof such quantifiers. The particular lifts we considerare Ramseyfication, branching and resumption.In each case we get exact criteria fordefinability of the lift in terms of simpler quantifiers.

First-order logic is known to have a severely limited expressive power on finite structures. As a result, several different extensions have been investigated, including fragments of second-order logic, fixpoint logic, and the infinitary logic L∞ωω in which every formula has only a finite number of variables. In this paper, we study generalized quantifiers in the realm of finite structures and combine them with the infinitary logic L∞ωω to obtain the logics L∞ωω, where Q = {Qi: iε I} is a family (...) of generalized quantifiers on finite structures. Using the logics L∞ωω, we can express polynomial-time properties that are not definable in L∞ωω, such as “there is an even number of x” and “there exists at least n/2 x” , without going to second-order logic. We show that equivalence of finite structures relative to L∞ωω can be characterized in terms of certain pebble games that are a variant of the Ehrenfeucht—Fraïssé games. We combine this game-theoretic characterization with sophisticated combinatorial tools from Ramsey theory, such as van der Waerden's Theorem and Folkman's Theorem, in order to investigate the scope and limits of generalized quantifiers in finite model theory. We obtain sharp lower bounds for expressibility in the logics L∞ωω and discover an intrinsic difference between adding finitely many simple unary generalized quantifiers to L∞ωω adding infinitely many. In particular, we show that if Qis a finite sequence of simple unary generalized quantifiers, then the equicardinality, or Härtig, quantifier is not definable in L∞ωω. We also show that the query “does the equivalence relation E have an even number of equivalence classes” is not definable in the extension L∞ωω of L∞ωω by the Härtig quantifier I and any finite sequence Q of simple unary generalized quantifiers. (shrink)

We introduce an atomic formula ${\vec{y} \bot_{\vec{x}}\vec{z}}$ intuitively saying that the variables ${\vec{y}}$ are independent from the variables ${\vec{z}}$ if the variables ${\vec{x}}$ are kept constant. We contrast this with dependence logic ${\mathcal{D}}$ based on the atomic formula = ${(\vec{x}, \vec{y})}$ , actually equivalent to ${\vec{y} \bot_{\vec{x}}\vec{y}}$ , saying that the variables ${\vec{y}}$ are totally determined by the variables ${\vec{x}}$ . We show that ${\vec{y} \bot_{\vec{x}}\vec{z}}$ gives rise to a natural logic capable of formalizing basic intuitions about independence and dependence. (...) We show that ${\vec{y} \bot_{\vec{x}}\vec{z}}$ can be used to give partially ordered quantifiers and IF-logic an alternative interpretation without some of the shortcomings related to so called signaling that interpretations using = ${(\vec{x}, \vec{y})}$ have. (shrink)

We try to answer the question which is the “right” foundation of mathematics, second order logic or set theory. Since the former is usually thought of as a formal language and the latter as a first order theory, we have to rephrase the question. We formulate what we call the second order view and a competing set theory view, and then discuss the merits of both views. On the surface these two views seem to be in manifest conflict with each (...) other. However, our conclusion is that it is very difficult to see any real difference between the two. We analyze a phenomenon we call internal categoricity which extends the familiar categoricity results of second order logic to Henkin models and show that set theory enjoys the same kind of internal categoricity. Thus the existence of non-standard models, which is usually taken as a property of first order set theory, and categoricity, which is usually taken as a property of second order axiomatizations, can coherently coexist when put into their proper context. We also take a fresh look at complete second order axiomatizations and give a hierarchy result for second order characterizable structures. Finally we consider the problem of existence in mathematics from both points of view and find that second order logic depends on what we call large domain assumptions, which come quite close to the meaning of the axioms of set theory. (shrink)

We show that the categoricity of second-order Peano axioms can be proved from the comprehension axioms. We also show that the categoricity of second-order Zermelo–Fraenkel axioms, given the order type of the ordinals, can be proved from the comprehension axioms. Thus these well-known categoricity results do not need the so-called “full” second-order logic, the Henkin second-order logic is enough. We also address the question of “consistency” of these axiom systems in the second-order sense, that is, the question of existence of (...) models for these systems. In both cases we give a consistency proof, but naturally we have to assume more than the mere comprehension axioms. (shrink)

Theoria, Volume 87, Issue 4, Page 986-1000, August 2021.

Background:Moral courage is required at all levels of nursing. However, there is a need for development of instruments to measure nurses’ moral courage.Objectives:The objective of this study is to develop a scale to measure nurses’ self-assessed moral courage, to evaluate the scale’s psychometric properties, and to briefly describe the current level of nurses’ self-assessed moral courage and associated socio-demographic factors.Research design:In this methodological study, non-experimental, cross-sectional exploratory design was applied. The data were collected using Nurses’ Moral Courage Scale and analysed (...) statistically.Participants and research context:The data were collected from a convenience sample of 482 nurses from four different clinical fields in a major university hospital in Finland for the final testing of the scale. The pilot comprised a convenience sample of 129 nurses.Ethical considerations:The study followed good scientific inquiry guidelines. Ethical approval was obtained from the university ethics committee and permission to conduct the study from the participating hospital.Findings:Psychometric evaluation showed that the 4-sub-scale, 21-item Nurses’ Moral Courage Scale demonstrates good reliability and validity at its current state of development showing a good level of internal consistency for a new scale, the internal consistency values ranging from 0.73 to 0.82 for sub-scales and 0.93 for the total scale, thus well exceeding the recommended Cronbach’s alpha value of >0.7. Principal component analysis and confirmatory factor analysis supported the theoretical construct of Nurses’ Moral Courage Scale. Face validity and expert panel assessments markedly contributed to the relevance of items in establishing content validity.Discussion and conclusion:Nurses’ Moral Courage Scale provides a new generic instrument intended for measuring nurses’ self-assessed moral courage. Recognizing the importance of moral courage as a part of nurses’ moral competence and its assessment offers possibilities to develop interventions and educational programs for enhancement of moral courage. Research should focus on further validation measures of Nurses’ Moral Courage Scale in international contexts. (shrink)

We study descriptive set theory in the space ω1 ω 1 by letting trees with no uncountable branches play a similar role as countable ordinals in traditional descriptive set theory. By using such trees, we get, for example, a covering property for the class of Π 1 1 -sets of ω1 ω 1 . We call a family U of trees universal for a class V of trees if $\mathscr{U} \subseteq \mathscr{V}$ and every tree in V can be order-preservingly mapped (...) into a tree in U. It is well known that the class of countable trees with no infinite branches has a universal family of size ℵ 1 . We shall study the smallest cardinality of a universal family for the class of trees of cardinality ≤ℵ 1 with no uncountable branches. We prove that this cardinality can be 1 (under ¬CH) and any regular cardinal κ which satisfies ℵ 2 ≤ κ ≤ 2 ℵ 1 (under CH). This bears immediately on the covering property of the Π 1 1 -subsets of the space ω1 ω 1 . We also study the possible cardinalities of definable subsets of ω1 ω 1 . We show that the statement that every definable subset of ω1 ω 1 has cardinality $ or cardinality 2 ω1 is equiconsistent with ZFC (if n ≥ 3) and with ZFC plus an inaccessible (if n = 2). Finally, we define an analogue of the notion of a Borel set for the space ω1 ω 1 and prove a Souslin-Kleene type theorem for this notion. (shrink)

Let κ be a singular cardinal. Karp's notion of a chain model of size κ is defined to be an ordinary model of size κ along with a decomposition of it into an increasing union of length cf. With a notion of satisfaction and -isomorphism such models give an infinitary logic largely mimicking first order logic. In this paper we associate to this logic a notion of a dynamic EF-game which gauges when two chain models are chain-isomorphic. To this game (...) is associated a tree which is a tree of size κ with no κ-branches -branches). The measure of how non-isomorphic the models are is reflected by a certain order on these trees, called reduction. We study the collection of trees of size κ with no κ-branches under this notion and prove that when cf = ω this collection is rather regular; in particular it has universality number exactly κ+. Such trees are then used to develop a descriptive set theory of the space cf κ. The main result of the paper gives in the case of κ strong limit singular an exact connection between the descriptive set-theoretic complexity of the chain isomorphism orbit of a model, the reduction order on the trees and winning strategies in the corresponding dynamic EF games. In particular we obtain a neat analog of the notion of Scott watershed from the Scott analysis of countable models. (shrink)

The semantics of the independence friendly logic of Hintikka and Sandu is usually defined via a game of imperfect information. We give a definition in terms of a game of perfect information. We also give an Ehrenfeucht-Fraïssé game adequate for this logic and use it to define a Distributive Normal Form for independence friendly logic.

The Craig Interpolation Theorem is a fundamental property of rst order logic L!!. What happens if we strengthen rst order logic? Second order logic L 2 satises Craig for trivial reasons but on the other hand, L 2 is not very interesting from a fundational point of view.

This book comprises revised full versions of lectures given during the 9th European Summer School in Logic, Languages, and Information, ESSLLI'97, held in Aix-en-Provence, France, in August 1997. The six lectures presented introduce the reader to the state of the art in the area of generalized quantifiers and computation. Besides an introductory survey by the volume editor various aspects of generalized quantifiers are studied in depth.

We study the expressive power of open formulas of dependence logic introduced in Väänänen [Dependence logic (Vol. 70 of London Mathematical Society Student Texts), 2007]. In particular, we answer a question raised by Wilfrid Hodges: how to characterize the sets of teams definable by means of identity only in dependence logic, or equivalently in independence friendly logic.

We show that, assuming the consistency of a supercompact cardinal, the first inaccessible cardinal can satisfy a strong form of a Löwenheim–Skolem–Tarski theorem for the equicardinality logic L, a logic introduced in [5] strictly between first order logic and second order logic. On the other hand we show that in the light of present day inner model technology, nothing short of a supercompact cardinal suffices for this result. In particular, we show that the Löwenheim–Skolem–Tarski theorem for the equicardinality logic at (...) κ implies the Singular Cardinals Hypothesis above κ as well as Projective Determinacy. (shrink)

We show that if $$ satisfies the first-order Zermelo–Fraenkel axioms of set theory when the membership relation is ${ \in _1}$ and also when the membership relation is ${ \in _2}$, and in both cases the formulas are allowed to contain both ${ \in _1}$ and ${ \in _2}$, then $\left \cong \left$, and the isomorphism is definable in $$. This extends Zermelo’s 1930 theorem in [6].

We ask, when is a property of a model a logical property? According to the so-called Tarski–Sher criterion this is the case when the property is preserved by isomorphisms. We relate this to model-theoretic characteristics of abstract logics in which the model class is definable. This results in a graded concept of logicality in the terminology of Sagi [46]. We investigate which characteristics of logics, such as variants of the Löwenheim–Skolem theorem, Completeness theorem, and absoluteness, are relevant from the logicality (...) point of view, continuing earlier work by Bonnay, Feferman, and Sagi. We suggest that a logic is the more logical the closer it is to first order logic. We also offer a refinement of the result of McGee that logical properties of models can be expressed in $L_{\infty \infty }$ if the expression is allowed to depend on the cardinality of the model, based on replacing $L_{\infty \infty }$ by a “tamer” logic. (shrink)

Let U and B be two countable relational models of the same first order language. If the models are nonisomorphic, there is a unique countable ordinal α with the property that $\mathfrak{U} \equiv^\alpha_{\infty\omega} \mathfrak{B} \text{but not} \mathfrak{U} \equiv^{\alpha + 1}_{\infty\omega} \mathfrak{B},$ i.e. U and B are L ∞ω -equivalent up to quantifier-rank α but not up to α + 1. In this paper we consider models U and B of cardinality ω 1 and construct trees which have a similar relation (...) to U and B as α above. For this purpose we introduce a new ordering T ≪ T' of trees, which may have some independent interest of its own. It turns out that the above ordinal α has two qualities which coincide in countable models but will differ in uncountable models. Respectively, two kinds of trees emerge from α. We call them Scott trees and Karp trees, respectively. The definition and existence of these trees is based on an examination of the Ehrenfeucht game of length ω 1 between U and B. We construct two models of power ω 1 with 2 ω 1 mutually noncomparable Scott trees. (shrink)

We introduce a generalization of Independence Friendly logic in which Eloise is restricted to a finite amount of information about Abelard’s moves. This logic is shown to be equivalent to a sublogic of first-order logic, to have the finite model property, and to be decidable. Moreover, it gives an exponential compression relative to logic.

Let K 0 λ be the class of structures $\langle\lambda, , where $A \subseteq \lambda$ is disjoint from a club, and let K 1 λ be the class of structures $\langle\lambda, , where $A \subseteq \lambda$ contains a club. We prove that if $\lambda = \lambda^{ is regular, then no sentence of L λ+κ separates K 0 λ and K 1 λ . On the other hand, we prove that if $\lambda = \mu^+,\mu = \mu^{ , and a forcing axiom (...) holds (and ℵ L 1 = ℵ 1 if μ = ℵ 0 ), then there is a sentence of L λλ which separates K 0 λ and K 1 λ. (shrink)

Dependence logic, introduced in Väänänen [11], cannot be axiomatized. However, first-order consequences of dependence logic sentences can be axiomatized, and this is what we shall do in this paper. We give an explicit axiomatization and prove the respective Completeness Theorem.

I will give a brief overview of Saharon Shelah’s work in mathematical logic. I will focus on three transformative contributions Shelah has made: stability theory, proper forcing and PCF theory. The first is in model theory and the other two are in set theory.

Let K$^0_\lambda$ be the class of structures $\langle\lambda,<, A\rangle$, where $A \subseteq \lambda$ is disjoint from a club, and let K$^1_\lambda$ be the class of structures $\langle\lambda,<,A\rangle$, where $A \subseteq \lambda$ contains a club. We prove that if $\lambda = \lambda^{<\kappa}$ is regular, then no sentence of L$_{\lambda+\kappa}$ separates K$^0_\lambda$ and K$^1_\lambda$. On the other hand, we prove that if $\lambda = \mu^+,\mu = \mu^{<\mu}$, and a forcing axiom holds, then there is a sentence of L$_{\lambda\lambda}$ which separates K$^0_\lambda$ and (...) K$^1_\lambda$. (shrink)

We show that a coherent theory of partially ordered connectives can be developed along the same line as partially ordered quantification. We estimate the expressive power of various partially ordered connectives and use methods like Ehrenfeucht games and infinitary logic to get various undefinability results.

Trees are natural generalizations of ordinals and this is especially apparent when one tries to find an uncountable analogue of the concept of the Scott-rank of a countable structure. The purpose of this paper is to introduce new methods in the study of an ordering between trees whose analogue is the usual ordering between ordinals. For example, one of the methods is the tree-analogue of the successor operation on the ordinals.