The aim of this essay is to consider what it means to teach and learn philosophy in accordance with logotectonic thinking. The contemporary obsession with critical thinking, incessant questioning, and addressing “current problems” gains its genuine philosophical meaning only in the light of logotectonic building, which is able to differentiate philo-sophical thinking- as thanks-giving and learning·from the sofia and what has been thought – from the modern-”meditation” (Besinnung) and the submodern “anarchic” reflection.

La doctrina de la Idea, en el final de la Ciencia de la Lógica, se sirve de la noción de «espíritu» para explicar la naturaleza de la Idea misma, cuyas determinaciones lógicas son, a su vez, las determinaciones de lo espiritual. Nos proponemos mostrar en qué medida los pasajes de la doctrina de la Idea referidos al «espíritu» están lejos de poseer un significado episódico.

Recognize the “philo- sophia ” as such, this side of Postmodernism, means, starting from the surprising studies of Heribert Boeder, see it as a thought epochally built on a Wisdom, that is, on a initial Knowledge about the Destiny of Man. For the philo-sophical thought of the so-called “German Idealism”, that Wisdom is neither that of the Muses, as in the First epoch, neither the “Christian sapientia”, as in the Middle epoch, but the “Civil Consciousness” about Duty and Freedom.

Tanto la explicación de sentido de la modernidad como el lenguaje de la posmodernidad han rechazado la noción de presente intemporal conocida otrora por la filosofía. Aquí se quiere mostrar en qué sentido y por qué razón el novísimo pensamiento logotectónico permite recuperar aquella noción merced a una nueva distinción del presente.

The 1980 appearance of “Topologie der Metaphysik”, by Heribert Boeder, meant an absolute transformation in the ordinary way of conceiving the nature of philosophical knowledge. it meant above all a deep and fruitful transformation in two fundamental thesis of Modern Thought: that referred to the comprehension of the ἀλήθεια as “desheltering”, and that which makes the “being of beings” the unitary thing of the metaphysical learning. Thirty years after the apparition of the mentioned work, we have asked ourselves, considering the (...) writings published by the author since then, about the mission of his own thought. A thought that, developing up to a whole, came not only to illuminate the accomplishments of philosophy in the pursuit of its logical task, but to build the three Spheres of reason’s Present: History, World and Speech. (shrink)

The answer to the question about the relation between philosophy and poetry must be, after Boeder's Topologie der Metaphysik (1980), a differentiated one. Thus, she take into account first the epochally distinguished history of metaphysics, and later the sens-explications of the world of modernity, in order to show, why contemporary thinking instead to listen the voice of poetizing seek the access to the configuration of Wisdom of our tradition.

In dieser Marburger Vorlesung aus dem Wintersemester 1924/25 stellt sich Heidegger die Aufgabe, Platons Spatdialog "Sophistes" im Ausgang von Aristoteles verstandlich zu machen. Zentrum des einleitenden Aristoteles-Teils ist die Folge der dianoethischen Tugenden im VI. Buch der "Nikomachischen Ethik", in der Heidegger die sich aufsteigernde Stufenfolge eines Entbergens erkennt und demgemass den Primat der "Physis" aus der Uberlegenheit ihres Entbergens begrundet. Damit legt Heidegger die Zusammengehorigkeit von Sein und Wahrheit als Horizont des aristotelisch-griechischen Philosophierens frei und gewinnt so den "Boden", (...) aus dem die platonische Seinsforschung, wie sie im "Sophistes" vorliegt, erwachsen ist. Dementsprechend stellt sich Heidegger im Hauptteil die Aufgabe, in fortlaufender Interpretation des "Sophistes" konkret zu zeigen, dass und wie Platons Ontologie aus dem Entbergen erwachsen ist. Die Vorlesung bezeugt, dass Heidegger die in seinem fruhen Hauptwerk "Sein und Zeit" gestellte Frage nach dem "Sinn von Sein", d.h. nach der Un-verborgenheit des Seins in der Auseinandersetzung mit der philosophischen Uberlieferung gewonnen hat. (shrink)

This book explores a question central to philosophy--namely, what does it take for a belief to be justified or rational? According to a widespread view, whether one has justification for believing a proposition is determined by how probable that proposition is, given one's evidence. In this book this view is rejected and replaced with another: in order for one to have justification for believing a proposition, one's evidence must normically support it--roughly, one's evidence must make the falsity of that proposition (...) abnormal in the sense of calling for special, independent explanation. This conception of justification bears upon a range of topics in epistemology and beyond. Ultimately, this way of looking at justification guides us to a new, unfamiliar picture of how we should respond to our evidence and manage our own fallibility. This picture is developed here. (shrink)

Daniel Taylor and Dawn Goodwin present a case study of the Morecambe Bay Inquiry (MBI), which examined the high rate of maternal and neonatal deaths over a period of 9 years (2004–2013), within the small maternity unit of Furness General Hospital (FGH), one of the three hospitals comprising Morecambe Bay Hospitals Trust.1 They examine this through a conceptual lens, and provide a solution involving changes in medical education. This commentary explores both these elements. First, they use the lens of ‘Normalisation (...) of Deviance’ (NoD) to explain organisational failure. However, other available lenses such as ‘Sociology of Disasters’, ‘Organisational Silence’ and ‘Comfort-seeking Behaviour’ may point to different problems and solutions. More justification for their choice of the lens of NoD would have been useful. Similarly, more justification for their focus on a cluster of five ‘serious untoward incidents’ (SUIs) occurring in 2008 would also have been useful. They suggest that before 2008, the perinatal mortality rate was low, patient satisfaction was high and recent level 2 accreditation of maternity services by the Clinical Negligence Scheme for Trusts all suggested standards of care within the obstetric department were adequate. This stream of positive signals is likely to have contributed towards a genuine belief of safe operation within the maternity unit by staff and board members. However, as they acknowledge, the first problem can be seen in 2004. According to the MBI,2 there were SUIs in the years before and after 2008, but this …. (shrink)

Die Abhandlung "Vom Wesen der Wahrheit" enthalt den von Heidegger mehrfach uberpruften Text eines Vortrags, der 1930 u. A. In Marburg und Freiburg gehalten wurde. DIe 8. AUflage der Einzelausgabe ist wort- und seitengleich mit dem Abdruck des Textes in der 3., durchgesehenen Auflage der Einzelausgabe der "Wegmarken" sowie mit dem Abdruck in der 2., durchgesehenen Auflage der "Wegmarken" als Band 9 der Gesamtausgabe. SIe enthalt damit erstmals auch die Randbemerkungen Heideggers aus seinen Handexemplaren.

Human and animal interests are often in conflict. In many situations, however, it is unclear how to evaluate and weigh competing human and animal interests, as the satisfaction of the interests of one group often inevitably occurs at the expense of those of the other group. Human-animal conflicts of this kind give rise to ethical questions. If animals count morally for their own sake, then we must ask in which cases the satisfaction or frustration of the interests of humans and (...) animals in conflict situations is justified or unjustified from an ethical perspective. In this article, we argue that limited aggregation accounts represent a promising means for resolving interspecies conflicts. The reason for this is that they can appropriately consider the qualitative relevance of interests, their relative importance to each other, and the number of individuals affected. For our argument, we start from the premise that animals count morally for their own sake, albeit to a lesser extent than humans. That is, we accept the view that animals may be used, for example, as a source of food or in animal research. However, as we will show, many basic interests of animals are sufficiently similar to human interests and can thus be compared to them. Hence, they ought to be aggregated in cases of conflict with human interests. We illustrate our account and its practical implications with the real-world example of a human-animal conflict during the outbreak of a zoonotic disease among farmed animals. We conclude that, in many cases, animal interests ought to be given more importance than they currently receive, which includes distributing the burdens and risks of farming practices more fairly. (shrink)

In this paper we present an overview, with historical and critical remarks, of two articles by S. Jaśkowski ([20, 21] 1948 and [22, 23] 1949), which contain the oldest known formulation of a paraconsistent logic. Jaśkowski has built the logic – he termed discussive (D2) – by defining two new connectives and by introducing a modal translation map from D2 systems into Lewis’ modal logic S5. Discussive systems, for their formal details and their original philosophical justification, have attracted discrete attention (...) among experts. Indeed, in what follows, after having introduced Jaśkowski methodology of building D2 and his main philosophical motivations for providing such a system, we will explore some of the main contributions to the development of D2. (shrink)

A rejection system, also referred to as a complementary calculus, is a proof system axiomatising the invalid formulas of a logic, in contrast to traditional calculi which axiomatise the valid ones. Rejection systems therefore introduce a purely syntactic way of determining non-validity without having to consider countermodels, which can be useful in procedures for automated deduction and proof search. Rejection calculi have first been formally introduced by Łukasiewicz in the context of Aristotelian syllogistic and subsequently rejection systems for many well-known (...) logics have been proposed. In this paper, we deal with rejection systems for so-called non-deterministic finite-valued logics, a special case of non-deterministic many-valued logics which were introduced by Avron and Lev as a generalisation of traditional many-valued logics. More specifically, we introduce a systematic method for constructing sequent-style rejection systems for any given non-deterministic finite-valued logic. Furthermore, as special instances of our method, we provide concrete calculi for specific paraconsistent logics which can be characterised in terms of non-deterministic two- and three-valued semantics, respectively. (shrink)

'Relativism versus absolutism' is one of the fundamental oppositions that have dominated reflections about science for much of its history. Often these reflections have been inseparable from wider social-political concerns regarding the position of science in society. Where does this debate stand in the philosophy and sociology of science today? And how does the 'relativism question' relate to current concerns with 'post truth' politics? In Relativism in the Philosophy of Science, Martin Kusch examines some of the most influential relativist proposals (...) of the last fifty years, and the controversies they have triggered. He argues that defensible forms of relativism all deny that any sense can be made of a scientific result being absolutely true or justified, and that they all reject 'anything goes' – that is the thought that all scientific results are epistemically on a par. Kusch concludes by distinguishing between defensible forms of relativism and post-truth thinking. (shrink)

This article develops an ecological framework for understanding collective action. This is contrasted with approaches familiar from the collective intentionality debate, which treat individuals as fundamental units of collective action. Instead, we turn to social ecological psychology and dynamical systems theory and argue that they provide a promising framework for understanding collectives as the central unit in collective action. However, we submit that these approaches do not yet appreciate enough the relevance of social identities for collective action. To analyze this (...) aspect, we build on key insights from social identity theory and synthesize it with embodied and ecological accounts of perception and action. This results in the proposal of two new types of affordances. For an individual who enacts her "embodied social identity" of being a member of a particular collective, there can be what we call embodied social identity affordances. Moreover, when several individuals dynamically interact with each other against the background of their embodied social identities, this might lead to the emergence of a collective, which we understand as a dynamically constituted and ecologically situated perception-action system consisting of several individuals enacting relevant embodied social identity affordances. Building on previous work in social ecological psychology, we suggest that there can be genuine collective affordances, that is, affordances whose subject is not an individual, but a collective. (shrink)

Recent empirical findings from social psychology, ecological psychology, and embodied cognitive science indicate that situational factors crucially shape the course of human behavior. For instance, it has been shown that finding a dime, being under the influence of an authority figure, or just being presented with food in easy reach often influences behavior tremendously. These findings raise important new questions for the philosophy of action: Are these findings a threat to classical conceptions of human agency? Are humans passively pushed around (...) by situational factors, or are there agential aspects in the way we spontaneously experience and react to situations? How can one conceptualize the pervasive influence of situational factors on human action? What are situations in the first place, and how should the influence of these situations on action be thought of? This paper sets out to develop a new conceptual repertoire for thinking about the influence of situations on action, drawing on research from ecological psychology as well as from embodied and enactive cognitive science. The key proposal is the development of a philosophical sensorimotor account of agency: Action, it is proposed, should be conceived of as constant dynamical interaction of agential and environmental factors – factors which should all be conceptualized in new ways. (shrink)

Orr and Dentith argue that a recurrent problem in much of the wider academic literature on conspiracy theories is either conceptual confusion or a refusal to put theory before practice. Orr and Dentith show that a naive empiricism pervades much of the social science literature when it comes to these things called ‘conspiracy theories’ which not only runs at odds with the philosophical literature but also the general tenor of the social sciences over the latter part of the 20th Century (...) and beyond. Orr and Dentith argue that central to these confusions or refusals is not just a lack of philosophical rigour when it comes to defining and presenting views, but an active disinterest in such conceptual work. (shrink)

Die theatralische Verkörperung der imagines agentes im Shakespeareschen Oeuvre, die noch für die bildhaften Denkformen bei Thomas Hobbes prägend wirkte, bezieht in Titus Andronicus und in Julius Caesar besondere Suggestivität durch die intertextuelle Einverleibung antiker Nationalerzählungen. Den dramatischen Aufzug bildmagisch aufgeladener Staatskörper konterkarieren bei Shakespeare, genauso wie in der vergleichend herangezogenen Faerie Queene, ikonoklastisch ausgestaltete Gegenbewegungen, die letztlich auf das frühneuzeitliche Dilemma der an Bedeutung überdeterminierten Körperbildlichkeit hinweisen. Die Metaphorik der zwei Körper des Königs implodiert, wo sie — wie schließlich (...) in Hamlet — den Ansprüchen der Legitimation von Herrschaft nicht mehr genügt. (shrink)