Believing in Others

Philosophical Topics 46 (1):75-95 (2018)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Suppose some person 'A' sets out to accomplish a difficult, long-term goal such as writing a passable Ph.D. thesis. What should you believe about whether A will succeed? The default answer is that you should believe whatever the total accessible evidence concerning A's abilities, circumstances, capacity for self-discipline, and so forth supports. But could it be that what you should believe depends in part on the relationship you have with A? We argue that it does, in the case where A is yourself. The capacity for "grit" involves a kind of epistemic resilience in the face of evidence suggesting that one might fail, and this makes it rational to respond to the relevant evidence differently when you are the agent in question. We then explore whether similar arguments extend to the case of "believing in" our significant others -- our friends, lovers, family members, colleagues, patients, and students.

Links

PhilArchive

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Grit.Sarah K. Paul & Jennifer M. Morton - 2018 - Ethics 129 (2):175-203.
Justification-Skepticism.Todd Rudolph Long - 2003 - Dissertation, The University of Rochester
On justifying and being justified.Adam Leite - 2004 - Philosophical Issues 14 (1):219–253.
Evidentialism and pragmatic constraints on outright belief.Dorit Ganson - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 139 (3):441 - 458.
A paradox of justified believing.Colin Cheyne - 2009 - Ratio 22 (3):278-290.
Free belief.Josefa Toribio - 2003 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2 (4):327-36.
Responsibilist Evidentialism.Christopher Michael Cloos - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (11):2999-3016.
Obedience and Believing a Person.Benjamin McMyler - 2015 - Philosophical Investigations 39 (1):58-77.
Justification and Cognitive Algorithms.Luis Rosa - 2014 - Philosophia 42 (2):503-515.
Believing in things.Zoltán Gendler Szabó - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (3):584–611.

Analytics

Added to PP
2018-07-25

Downloads
962 (#15,055)

6 months
166 (#20,293)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author Profiles

Sarah Paul
New York University, Abu Dhabi
Jennifer M. Morton
University of Pennsylvania

Citations of this work

Varieties of Moral Encroachment.Renée Jorgensen Bolinger - 2020 - Philosophical Perspectives 34 (1):5-26.
Can Beliefs Wrong?Rima Basu - 2018 - Philosophical Topics 46 (1):1-17.
What We Epistemically Owe To Each Other.Rima Basu - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (4):915–931.
A Tale of Two Doctrines: Moral Encroachment and Doxastic Wronging.Rima Basu - 2021 - In Jennifer Lackey (ed.), Applied Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 99-118.

View all 25 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Freedom and Resentment.Peter Strawson - 1962 - Proceedings of the British Academy 48:187-211.
Sour grapes: studies in the subversion of rationality.Jon Elster - 1983 - Paris: Editions de la Maison des sciences de l'homme.
1. Freedom and Resentment.Peter Strawson - 1993 - In John Martin Fischer & Mark Ravizza (eds.), Perspectives on moral responsibility. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. pp. 1-25.
Epistemic permissiveness.Roger White - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):445–459.

View all 22 references / Add more references