Philosophical Topics 46 (1):75-95 (2018)

Authors
Sarah Paul
New York University, Abu Dhabi
Jennifer M. Morton
City College of New York (CUNY)
Abstract
Suppose some person 'A' sets out to accomplish a difficult, long-term goal such as writing a passable Ph.D. thesis. What should you believe about whether A will succeed? The default answer is that you should believe whatever the total accessible evidence concerning A's abilities, circumstances, capacity for self-discipline, and so forth supports. But could it be that what you should believe depends in part on the relationship you have with A? We argue that it does, in the case where A is yourself. The capacity for "grit" involves a kind of epistemic resilience in the face of evidence suggesting that one might fail, and this makes it rational to respond to the relevant evidence differently when you are the agent in question. We then explore whether similar arguments extend to the case of "believing in" our significant others -- our friends, lovers, family members, colleagues, patients, and students.
Keywords Analytic Philosophy  General Interest  Philosophy of Mind
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ISBN(s) 0276-2080
DOI 10.5840/philtopics20184615
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References found in this work BETA

How Truth Governs Belief.Nishi Shah - 2003 - Philosophical Review 112 (4):447-482.
Epistemic Permissiveness.Roger White - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):445–459.
Evidence Can Be Permissive.Thomas Kelly - 2013 - In Matthias Steup & John Turri (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Blackwell. pp. 298.

View all 21 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

What We Epistemically Owe To Each Other.Rima Basu - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (4):915–931.
Beliefs That Wrong.Rima Basu - 2018 - Dissertation, University of Southern California
Can Beliefs Wrong?Rima Basu - 2018 - Philosophical Topics 46 (1):1-17.
Three Varieties of Faith.Ryan Preston-Roedder - 2018 - Philosophical Topics 46 (1):173-199.

View all 9 citations / Add more citations

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