The following text is a translation of Semyon Frank’s “L’intuition fondamentale de Bergson” published in Henri Bergson: Essais et témoignages inédits, edited by Albert Béguin and Pierre Thévenaz, Neuchâtel: Éditions de la Baconnière, 1941. In this article, Frank addresses Bergson’s notion of intuition, his anti-intellectualism, his mysticism, his closeness to Lebensphilosophie, the notion of lived experience, the distinction between intuition as pure contemplation and intuition as living knowledge, the distinction between cognition of the atemporal essence of reality (...) and cognition of the world of becoming, pragmatism, the disinterested and open intuitive spiritual attitude vs the utilitarian attitude of social groups closed in on themselves, the transrational vs the irrational, spiritual life, psychic life, the Absolute, and the temporal flux. The article contains criticisms of Bergson on the issues of time and intuition: the durée, the intuitive time, is incomprehensible without an atemporal foundation. Therefore, according to Frank, Plato was correct—contra Bergson—to define time as the moving image of eternity. And, if there is such an atemporal foundation, then, contrary to what Bergson seems to think, intuition as living knowledge cannot be the sole mode of intuition. Moreover, unlike what Bergson appears to think, an intuition of the Absolute would be an intuition of the transrational rather than of the irrational. The translation is preceded by an introduction tracing the genesis of the article, which was commissioned by the Swiss philosopher Pierre Thévenaz. (shrink)

Semyon Frank opposed the Neo-Kantian School and admitted the real existence of the objects of cognition. He treated ontologism as essential to the entire movement of Russian religious philosophy. For Frank, one can only know about something thanks to the absolute, which exists prior to the knowing subject. Ontologism, affirming the priority of being over cognition, has a great significance not only for metaphysics and epistemology, but also for the philosophy of religion. In particular, Frank taught (...) that the most privileged mode of cognition of God is intuition, an immediate experience of God or faith. Intuition is at the heart of the ontological proof, which can be found in St. Anselm, Descartes, and Frank himself. Frank dedicated a number of articles to this topic: “K istorii ontologicheskogo dokazatel’stva”, “Ontologicheskoe dokazatel’stvo bytiya Boga”, as well as texts recently discovered at the Bakhmeteff Archive, including “Dokazatel’stvo bytiya Boga”. In this way, Russian ontologism leads to a new interpretation of the traditional ontological proof, one which acknowledges the existence of God, not on the basis of arguments resting on His definition, but on the basis of the intuitive recognition of His being. (shrink)

Russian philosophy is “a sphere of conversation” in which thought is “divined”. It is a realm of search for “universal meaning” and “cultivation” of historical reality. Such a “conversation” around the work of Dostoyevsky took place in the 1920s among philosophers (including members of the Free Philosophical Association or Volfila in its abbreviated form). The theme takes on added significance at the hands of Ya. E. Golosovker and S. L. Frank whose intellectual affinity manifests itself today in the way (...) they interpret Kantian motives in the work of Dostoyevsky. Reflecting on “the logic of imagination” Golosovker draws attention to the fact that the concrete-metaphysical method of seeing the world is not identical to the amphiboly of Kant’s reflexive concepts. He made it the central theme of his book, Dostoyevsky and Kant, immersing the philosophical component of the novel The Brothers Karamazov in the context of Kant’s antinomies. The later Frank took up the subject of Dostoyevsky’s worldview in response, as it were, to the discussion of the problem of cultural crisis at Volfila (including at meetings “In Memory of Dostoyevsky”). Following Yakov Golosovker, Andrey Bely, Aron Steinberg, Semyon Lurie and others, he continued the discussion of the crisis in its organised forms. In this context, too, Kant is a significant presence. For Frank, as for Golosovker, Dostoyevsky’s world view has a “concrete-metaphysical character”. They come to this conclusion reflecting on the problem of freedom as seen by Dostoyevsky who sought to overcome Kant’s antinomies. (shrink)

The widespread assessment of the early period of Semyon L. Frank’s work as being influenced by German Neo-Kantianism is in need of a critical scrutiny. There are several reasons why the Russian philosopher’s interest in Neo-Kantianism merits a closer look. First, two systemic theories belonging to different trends exerted a decisive influence on Russian philosophy in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries: German Neo-Kantianism and Vladimir Solovyov’s school of all-unity. Second, Frank himself and the German Neo-Kantians (...) considered Nicholas of Cusa to be one of their forerunners and pointed out the importance of his mathematical ideas for their mathematical studies. Thirdly and lastly, Frank paid particular attention, especially in his formative period as a philosopher, to the leading trend in the early twentieth century, namely German Neo-Kantianism, which led some students of his work to believe that German Neo-Kantianism played the decisive role in Frank’s abandonment of Marxism in favour of religious ontology. Frank’s fundamental disagreement with German Neo-Kantianism was expressed in his work The Object of Knowledge in which he criticised the Neo-Kantian concepts of number and time. Although Frank rightly points out the one-sidedness of the Neo-Kantian definition of number, most notably in the works of the Marburg philosopher Paul Natorp, on the whole his criticism of the Neo-Kantian concept of number and time as being different from his own is not entirely convincing. In my opinion, Frank’s attempt to explain the abstract concept of number through a still more abstract concept of all-unity was not crowned with success because he ignored the experience of Christian theology and the Trinity dogma as well as the profound thoughts of the Rev. Pavel Florensky on this topic. (shrink)

This essay introduces Semyon Lyudvigovich Frank as a philosopher who deservedly may be called a revolutionary thinker: he introduced a remarkable social ontology that foregrounds service. His oeuvre presents service as the supreme principle of personal and hence social life. The singular personality is seen as being there to creatively serve itself: his view of man focuses on the human soul as being there to bring forth creative action—to serve those who will come after, the community, society, and (...) the Christian Churches. Service, then, is the source for freedom as a derivative principle. Consequently, and in opposition to the fundamental idea of the “Charter of Human Rights,” freedom in Frank has no absolute value, but only a functional one. It is justified by the ontological principle of service. All governmental organization is, ideally, the organization of freedom, the planned, systematic formation of free, spontaneous cooperation. Spontaneous cooperation makes up part of his concept of sobornost’, the empirical substrate of social culture. Frank would have agreed with Karl Popper’s notion of the “open society,” yet he would have certainly added that accessibility and transparency, be they spiritual or social, emanate from the principle of the universality of service. The true ontological meaning and the true source of democracy is, in his eyes, not the rule of all, but the service of all. (shrink)

This essay introduces Semyon Lyudvigovich Frank as a philosopher who deservedly may be called a revolutionary thinker: he introduced a remarkable social ontology that foregrounds service. His oeuvre presents service as the supreme principle of personal and hence social life. The singular personality is seen as being there to creatively serve itself: his view of man focuses on the human soul as being there to bring forth creative action—to serve those who will come after, the community, society, and (...) the Christian Churches. Service, then, is the source for freedom as a derivative principle. Consequently, and in opposition to the fundamental idea of the “Charter of Human Rights,” freedom in Frank has no absolute value, but only a functional one. It is justified by the ontological principle of service. All governmental organization is, ideally, the organization of freedom, the planned, systematic formation of free, spontaneous cooperation. Spontaneous cooperation makes up part of his concept of sobornost’, the empirical substrate of social culture. Frank would have agreed with Karl Popper’s notion of the “open society,” yet he would have certainly added that accessibility and transparency, be they spiritual or social, emanate from the principle of the universality of service. The true ontological meaning and the true source of democracy is, in his eyes, not the rule of all, but the service of all. (shrink)

The subject of the article is the problem of the crisis of ideals generated by the European Enlightenment and the Modern era, as interpreted by Russian thinkers of the first third of the 20th century. Building on the conception of Semyon Frank, the author analyzes the relationship between the socio-political ideals of the Enlightenment in the Russian version and false “idols” that led Russia and Europe to an unprecedented escalation of evil in the early 20th century, is analyzed. (...) Particular attention is paid to the assumption that the ideals of democracy as a true power of the people, as a result of uncritical imple­mentation, lead to revolutionary violence and further reproduction of tyranny. Two ver­sions of democracy are considered: according to Frank, one of them is genuine, based on the idea of disinterested service to the truth, and the second is “false”, oriented to­wards a totalitarian utopia, fundamentally hostile to freedom. The author also analyzes Frank’s views on the phenomenon of the “idol of culture”, which is based on the idea of linear progress. According to Frank, linear progress cannot prevent Russia and Europe from falling into barbarism. Moreover, it even significantly contributed to that break­down. It is concluded that Frank as a Christian philosopher and political thinker became one of the relatively few (along with, for example, Fyodor Stepun and Vladimir Weidle), but all the more significant conductors of the Russian cultural tradition in Europe and the European cultural tradition in Russia: that is, a genuine personification of the phe­nomenon of a “Russian European”. (shrink)

This article examines the philosophy of Semyon Frank and the theology of Karl Rahner in the light of transcendental themes. It demonstrates that the appeal to transcendental an­thropology and to anthropology in general is perceived by Franck and Rahner as a way of renewal of religious metaphysics, avoiding accusations of both «dogmatism» and re­moteness from living religious experience. Both thinkers, appealing to the Christian tradi­tion and Western philosophy, interpret the «non-thematic» and «non-conceptual» experience of being as a primordial (...) existential state. In the author’s opinion, Frank and Rahner offer original approaches to the problem of the foundations of religious experience by de­veloping a philosophical theology «from below» with a fundamental focus on phenomeno­logical and transcendental consideration of subjectivity. (shrink)

This article is devoted to Russian religious thinker Semyon L. Frank’s philosophical interpretation of Alexander S. Pushkin’s work. The article identifies the place and significance of the Pushkin...

Semën Frank (1877–1950) considered the Universe as the “all-unity.” According to him, everything is a part of the all-unity, which has a divine character. God is present in the world, but his nature is incomprehensible. In this article I analyze two consequences of Frank’s panentheistic view of the relation between science and theology. Firstly, the limits of scientific knowledge allow recognition of the mystery of the world and the transcendence of God. Secondly, Frank claimed that nature is (...) a “trace” of God and the manifestation of the absolute reality, i.e. the all-unity. As a result, both science and theology lead to the knowledge of God, although we cannot understand His essence. (shrink)

This article addresses the famous 1910 debate between Vladimir F. Ern and Semyon L. Frank centered around the problem of identifying the distinguishing features of Russian philosophy. The debate was a continuation of Ern’s debates with Russian philosophers associated with the international journal Logos (Sergei I. Hessen, Fyodor A. Stepun, Boris V. Yakovenko, and others). The author shows that Ern’s understanding of an original Russian philosophy is organically related to his overall philosophical doctrine. As for Frank, his (...) views during the 1910s on the distinguishing features of Russian philosophy were different in nature. It is worth noting that in the 1920s articles written during his émigré period, Frank’s views on the distinguishing features of Russian philosophy undergo a decisive change. Frank’s new ideas about Russian philosophy turn out to be extremely close to those of his late opponent, both on the whole and in the details. At the same time, Frank’s overall philosophical views do not undergo as dramatic a change and develop in a fully evolutionary mode. The author attempts to identify the reason for these changes. (shrink)

The article analyzes the problems of unknowability and total unity in the light of philosophy of Semyon L. Frank, set forth by him in the work The Unknowable. The author of the paper considers all the problems that arise as “icebergs” and tries to find the reasons for the distortion of the vision of the “top of the iceberg” and the “underwater part of the iceberg,” which is often unaware. The author examines the problems of the inadequate perception (...) of reality: a narrow “one’s own little world” of the world perception, passed off as the truth in the final instance; absolutization of the mind, which considers itself able to know everything; the cultivation of negative information and cruelty in society; the role of media forming world perception; antagonistic dichotomy of the world perception; lack of a sense of connection of everything that exists, in particular of a sense of unity of “I” and “Thou;” loss of the “culture of heart” and the ability to love. As a result of the analysis undertaken, the author concludes that only by changing the causes that give rise to the “world of evil and separation” can the lost integrity and harmony of man, society and world civilization be restored. The revival of the earth’s civilization is possible only in total unity. (shrink)

En 1937, le philosophe russe Simon Frank (1877-1950) publia la Connaissance et l’être, une traduction française abrégée de Predmet znanija, auprès de la maison d’édition parisienne Fernand Aubier. Grâce à cette traduction, il attira l’attention de philosophes francophones, parmi lesquels se trouvait le suisse Pierre Thévenaz (1913-1955), qui donna une présentation s’intitulant « Connaissance et être d’après Simon Frank » à une rencontre de la Société romande de philosophie à Lausanne le 7 décembre 1940. Ce qui suit est (...) une transcription du texte manuscrit de cette présentation. Dans ce texte, Thévenaz s’appuie principalement sur la Connaissance et l’être afin d’exposer la pensée de Frank. Cependant, son objectif n’est pas seulement de résumer la pensée de ce dernier, mais aussi d’en dégager quelques problèmes philosophiques. Le texte est précédé d’une introduction qui présente Thévenaz et qui décrit le contexte de sa réception de la philosophie de Frank. (shrink)

One of the key ethical debates in Russian religious thought, initiated by Leo Tolstoy, concerned the question of nonresistance to evil by force. The purpose of this article is to assess the influence of Kant’s ethics and philosophy of religion on the course of this debate and to determine the place and significance of the arguments and considerations expressed on this issue by Semyon Frank in the early and late periods (1908 and 1940s) of his work. To this (...) end I reconstruct the general course of the debate, notably the positions and arguments of Leo Tolstoy, Vladimir Solovyov, Ivan Ilyin and Nikolai Berdyaev. Beginning with Tolstoy, Russ­ian thinkers introduced the original ethical content of the idea of nonresistance derived from the Gospel into the ethics of duty borrowed from Kant. The Tolstoy version of this idea was challenged mainly from two directions: from the Kantian grounding of the legitimacy of coercion and attempts to bring in styles of moral thinking other than the ethic of duty. Ilyin’s apolo­gia for the use of force in the struggle against evil prompted Russian émigré thinkers to take a closer look at Tolstoy’s ethical concept and pay attention to its positive content. On this basis Berdyaev and especially Frank create their version of the Christ-centered ethic of salvation which, in the perspective of “protecting the world against evil” includes the ethic of duty and links it with the possibility of using force, always a wrongful act, but one justified “in a situation of extreme need”. (shrink)

In this article I will present and analyze the concept of all-unity of the two most famous Russian philosophers—Vladimir Soloviev and Semyon Frank. As will be argued, the concept of all-unity is part of an old philosophical tradition. At the same time, it is an original idea of the Russian thought of the Silver Age.

This is a translation from Russian to English of Nikolai Onufriyevich Lossky’s review of the first Russian translation of volume one of Husserl’s Logische Untersuchungen, which was translated by E. A. Berstein and published in 1909 by a Petersburgian editor. The review appeared in the Muscovite philosophical journal Pyccкaя мыcль in 1909. In this short text, Lossky expresses his agreement with Husserl’s early anti-psychologism in logic. He also manifests his stance against logical and axiological relativism and naturalism. As an ontological (...) realist, Lossky thought he had found in the author of the Logische Untersuchungen an ally against the subjectivistic trends then still prevalent in Germany. The review is significant in intellectual history for its vanguard role in the Rezeptionsgeschichte of Husserl’s thought in Russia. (shrink)

In this article I will present and analyze the concept of all-unity of the two most famous Russian philosophers—Vladimir Soloviev and Semyon Frank. As will be argued, the concept of all-unity is part of an old philosophical tradition. At the same time, it is an original idea of the Russian thought of the Silver Age.

In this article I will present and analyze the concept of all-unity of the two most famous Russian philosophers—Vladimir Soloviev and Semyon Frank. As will be argued, the concept of all-unity is part of an old philosophical tradition. At the same time, it is an original idea of the Russian thought of the Silver Age.

This paper analyzes the problem of Western perceptions of one of the most original branches of the Russian Philosophical Renaissance that occurred at the beginning of the 20th century: namely, the so called Russian Religious Philosophy. This problem still possesses contemporary relevance, owing to the fact that Russian philosophy continues to be engaged in a search for self-identification in respect of Western philosophical contexts. The paper shows that “Russian Religious Philosophy” is perceived by Western thinkers not only as “an exotic (...) cultural phenomenon,” but also as an equal partner in a dialogue: it is considered a significant philosophical achievement, meeting all generally accepted criteria of philosophical creativity. The German Catholic philosopher Peter Ehlen’s monograph on the subject of the religious philosophy of Semyon Lyudvigovich Frank will furnish us, here, with an example of just such an approach. The author of the monograph approaches his subject as something which he himself stands in an essential connection to—something which he, as a researcher, is in a peculiar spiritual communion with. A common spiritual experience of the religious perception of reality determines both Ehlen’s interest in Frank and the specific character of the research undertaken by him. The position of researcher, expected to maintain a certain distance from his or her subject matter, is replaced by that of a co-thinker, engaged in co-experiencing and understanding in depth the ideas of the particular philosopher under examination. The result of this approach is a new synthesis created by Ehlen on the basis of Frank’s philosophy. (shrink)

This paper analyzes the problem of Western perceptions of one of the most original branches of the Russian Philosophical Renaissance that occurred at the beginning of the 20th century: namely, the so called Russian Religious Philosophy. This problem still possesses contemporary relevance, owing to the fact that Russian philosophy continues to be engaged in a search for self-identification in respect of Western philosophical contexts. The paper shows that “Russian Religious Philosophy” is perceived by Western thinkers not only as “an exotic (...) cultural phenomenon,” but also as an equal partner in a dialogue: it is considered a significant philosophical achievement, meeting all generally accepted criteria of philosophical creativity. The German Catholic philosopher Peter Ehlen’s monograph on the subject of the religious philosophy of Semyon Lyudvigovich Frank will furnish us, here, with an example of just such an approach. The author of the monograph approaches his subject as something which he himself stands in an essential connection to—something which he, as a researcher, is in a peculiar spiritual communion with. A common spiritual experience of the religious perception of reality determines both Ehlen’s interest in Frank and the specific character of the research undertaken by him. The position of researcher, expected to maintain a certain distance from his or her subject matter, is replaced by that of a co-thinker, engaged in co-experiencing and understanding in depth the ideas of the particular philosopher under examination. The result of this approach is a new synthesis created by Ehlen on the basis of Frank’s philosophy. (shrink)

During the intense philosophical and theological renaissance of the Russian Silver Age, the German Cardinal Nicholas of Cusa (1401–1464) received a unique appraisal in the work of Semyon Liudwigovich Frank (1877–1950), hailed by some as ‘the greatest Russian philosopher’. This paper will show that five of Frank's central philosophical arguments can be traced directly to Cusa's writings. Once these key arguments are taken together with Frank's own comments about Cusa, it can be concluded that Frank (...) saw himself as Cusa's modern successor, presenting his ideas in a different intellectual context. In this sense, we can speak of Frank as the ‘Russian Cusanus’. The arguments in question include Cusa's docta ignorantia, our knowledge of being, the recognition of absolute being as ‘non‐other’, the identity of possibility and actuality in the absolute, and finally the coincidentia oppositorum. (shrink)

This study argues that the early philosophy of Semyon Liudvigovich Frank (1877–1950) exhibits significant intellectual correlations with nineteenth century German Idealist philosophy. The idealists in question are Immanuel Hermann Fichte (1796–1879), G.W.F. Hegel (1770–1831) and F.W.J. Schelling (1775–1854). It will be suggested that the critical tension of Frank’s early philosophy is precisely a tension between his Hegelian and Schellingian tendencies. The paper will first introduce Frank’s theory of a “personal absolute”, exploring its surprising parallels with the (...) religious philosophy of I. H. Fichte. The analysis then addresses the self-dispersal of Hegel’s absolute, before finally turning to Schelling’s immediate intuition of subject-object identity. (shrink)

Russian Philosophy has long been studied and admired in countries of what may broadly be termed the West. Translations into English, German, or French, of authors like Semyon Frank, Nikolai Berdayev, and Vladimir Solovyov, and of writers like Fyodor Dostoyevsky and Mikhail Bulgakov, are readily available these days. It is only natural that the works of these figures should have attracted the interest of Christian thinkers, who are able to see in them an excellent example of reflection being (...) not only inspired by faith but also applied to areas rarely at the focal point of theology—such as, for instance, proposals for organizing societies on the basis of personal ties, as advocated by Frank. Moreover, thinkers who have grown up in a Christian environment may find in their texts an important example of how faith can serve as an inspirational source of ideas that carry a significant appeal for non-believers, too. In this issue of Forum Philosophicum, we offer our readers some papers in which ideas of this kind, such as the kenotic theory of freedom of Berdayev, are discussed by scholars, and various influences in Russian philosophy are traced back to their antecedent influences. (shrink)

This article explores the question of literary criticism in the context of interactions between literature and philosophy. The best example of such interaction is the legacy of the early twentieth century Russian literary critic, Yuly Aykhenvald. This article gives a brief overview of his works of literary criticism and their thematic repertoire. Aykhenvald’s philosophical background, professional education, and personal connections with renowned Russian thinkers, including Vladimir Solovyov, Fyodor Stepun, and Semyon Frank, are included in an evaluation of Aykhenvald’s (...) position on one of the most discussed relationships in Russian culture—that of Russia and the West. The issue of relations between the West and Russia acquired a particular urgency after the October Revolution of 1917, when Russian culture split into two realms—Soviet and émigré. This article analyzes Aykhenvald’s position on this issue, which is present in both his philosophical responses to the Eurasianists and in his essays written on the occasion of the 125th anniversary of Pushkin’s birth. Throughout the mid-1920s Aykhenvald wrote that Pushkin was the ideal of spiritual and aesthetic balance. In Pushkin’s work Aykhenvald found the embodiment of his own historiosophical aspirations—the harmonious fusion of Russia and the West. (shrink)

This review is focused on the book Faith and Science in Russian Religious Thought written by Professor Teresa Obolevich and published by Oxford University Press in 2019. This book has become a landmark event among historians of Russian philosophy. The review examines the main ideas of each of the book’s chapters and shows that they all represent a new look at the problem of the relationship between faith and reason in the history of Russian thought. It is noted that the (...) author of the book follows the idea of Russian philosopher Semyon Frank, raised in his article “Religion and Science.” Obolevich shows that Russian religious thought was not on the side of confrontation between religion and science but on recognizing two parallel paths with two different subjects of knowledge: the world and God. At the same time, Obolevich analyzes the stages of essential knowledge in Russian thought as a form of synthesis of the scientific and religious path. The review also notes that this author’s approach to examining the history of Russian philosophy is a very successful attempt to substantiate the relevance of Russian thought in the 19th–20th century in the context of the sociocultural challenge of the current stage of European society’s development. (shrink)

The article explores the parallels between the theory of sympathy developed by Max Scheler and the understanding of the foreign I in Russian philosophy. Russian philosophy has been developing the topic of foreign psychic life since the 1880s, and it regards Scheler’s theory as unable to raise above the level of emotional contagion. True sympathy is possible, when the Other is already present to the I, or, according to Nikolay Lossky, there is an original gnoseological difference between “the lived” and (...) “the observed”. Russian philosophy emphasizes the hermeneutical aspect of the problem – the original division and the search for understanding, as does Vasily Rozanov, who also shifted the accent from the general to the individual, particular and even intimate. Semyon Frank pointed out that the feelings of another person will only form a shell of meaningless observation, if not connected to the living knowledge through the human ability to resonate with something transcendent. And Russian philosophy assumes the fact of the original collectiveness of consciousness. This is the impulse given to it by the philosophy of Sergei Trubetskoy and developed in the philosophy of Russian neo-Kantianism, with Ivan Lapshin depicting a creative person, taking up the collective function of experimenting over the psyche to create and expand the map of human feelings. (shrink)

This is a translation from Bulgarian into English of Nikolai Lossky’s “Razlichniiat smisul na dumata intuitsiia” (“The Different Senses of the Word Intuition”), published in the Sofianite journal Filosofski pregled (Philosophical Review), 1931, year III, book 1, pp. 1–9. In this article, solicited by the journal’s editor-in-chief, the Bulgarian philosopher Dimitar Mihalchev, Lossky surveys the different ways in which the word “intuition” (intuitsiia) has been used throughout the history of philosophy: Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Friedrich Jacobi, Ivan Kireevski, Alexei Khomyakov, (...) Vladimir Solovyov, Bergson, Husserl, and Hans Driesch. Lossky then situates his own use of the word within this philosophical tradition and compares his intuitivism with gnoseologies similar to his own, namely, those of Semyon Frank, Johannes Rehmke, Max Scheler, Paul Linke, Dimitar Mihalchev, the English realists (Samuel Alexander and John Laird), the American realists (Edwin Holt, Walter Marvin, William Montague, Ralph Perry, Walter Pitkin, and Edward Spaulding), and the Neo-Scholastic Josef Gredt. As such, the article makes a valuable addendum to his Obosnovanie intuitivizma (The Foundation of Intuitivism) (1906) and provides a helpful synopsis of his theory of knowledge, which, in accordance with the Russian terminological tradition, he calls “gnoseology”. (shrink)

Russian Philosophy has long been studied and admired in countries of what may broadly be termed the West. Translations into English, German, or French, of authors like Semyon Frank, Nikolai Berdayev, and Vladimir Solovyov, and of writers like Fyodor Dostoyevsky and Mikhail Bulgakov, are readily available these days. It is only natural that the works of these figures should have attracted the interest of Christian thinkers, who are able to see in them an excellent example of reflection being (...) not only inspired by faith but also applied to areas rarely at the focal point of theology—such as, for instance, proposals for organizing societies on the basis of personal ties, as advocated by Frank. Moreover, thinkers who have grown up in a Christian environment may find in their texts an important example of how faith can serve as an inspirational source of ideas that carry a significant appeal for non-believers, too. In this issue of Forum Philosophicum, we offer our readers some papers in which ideas of this kind, such as the kenotic theory of freedom of Berdayev, are discussed by scholars, and various influences in Russian philosophy are traced back to their antecedent influences. (shrink)

At the beginning of the twentieth century in the Russian-speaking philosophical space philosophical projects emerged which brought ontology and gnoseology closer together. One can observe this process, for example, in the philosophical doctrines of the Russian intuitivists Nikolay Lossky and Semyon Frank. I demonstrate that the emergence of these doctrines and the development of their onto-gnoseological categorial apparatus were mainly connected with the criticism of the Neo-Kantian theory of cognition and the possibility of transcendent knowledge as such. The (...) main sources of my study are The Intuitive Basis of Knowledge and The World as an Organic Whole by N. O. Lossky and The Object of Knowledge and The Unknowable by S. L. Frank. My investigation makes it possible to treat Lossky’s categorial framework as the representation of a system of levels of the universe each of which is characterised by two aspects: the ontological, i.e. it is part of the unity of the world, and the gnoseological, i.e. it has an independent cognitive significance. Frank considers categories to be an organic part of the ontological proof of intuitivism. A common trend in the construction of categorial schemes by Lossky and Frank is their striving to combine gnoseological and ontological descriptions of categories. The key difference is the way an onto-gnoseological system as a whole is justified. In revealing the contradictions in Lossky’s conception, I proceed from the critical remarks of S. A. Askoldov, pointing out that these contradictions stem from an absolutisation of intuition in cognition, the renunciation of the idea of gnoseological transcendence, incompleteness of the theory of immanence and discordance between onto-gnoseological categories. Askoldov’s critical comments clarify the substantive features of Lossky’s theory and the essence of the transformations carried out in Frank’s absolute ideal-realism. (shrink)

Leibniz’s philosophy enjoyed a Russian fandom that endured from the eighteenth century to the death of the last exiled Russian philosophers in the twentieth century. There was, to begin with, Leibniz’s direct impact on Peter the Great and on the scientific development of Saint Petersburg. Then there was, still in the eighteenth century, Mikhail Lomonosov, who was sent to study with Christian Wolff in Marburg, and who came back to Saint Petersburg with a watered-down Leibnizian worldview, which he applied to (...) the study of chemistry and physics. Another eighteenth century philosopher, Alexander Radishchev, who studied in Leipzig, displayed acquiescence with a number of key elements from Leibniz’s philosophy. Russian Lebnizianism as a continuous philosophical movement was considerably reinvigorated in the 1870s when the Leibnizian German philosopher Gustav Teichmüller took a position at the University of Dorpat (nowadays Tartu, Estonia), which was then located within the Russian Empire. Teichmüller influenced a number of Russian philosophers into adopting a “Teichmüllerian” version of Leibnizianism. Among these philosophers were Evgeny Bobrov and Alexei Kozlov. In Saint Petersburg, Kozlov influenced his own son, Askoldov, and the latter’s friend — Nikolai Lossky. In the meanwhile, in Moscow Lev Lopatin, Nikolai Bugaev, and Petr Astafiev developed their own Leibnizianism in seemingly relative independence from Teichmüller’s influence and presumably, in some cases, under the partial influence of Vladimir Solovyov. Despite this relative independence, however, the fact remains that there was in late nineteenth and early twentieth century Russia a network of more or less loosely interconnected Leibnizian philosophers who read each other and wrote about each other, who exchanged ideas, and who constituted a movement that we might characterize as “Russian Leibnizianism” or “Russian Neo-Leibnizianism.” In this chapter, I tell the story of the intellectual lineage of Russian Leibnizianism. (shrink)

An introduction to informal logic, critical thinking and rhetoric utilizing actual public discourse .

Current research on second-person relations has often overlooked that this is not a new topic. Addressed mostly under the heading of the “I–thou relation,” second-person relations were discussed by central figures of the phenomenological tradition, including Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger, but also quite extensively by much lesser-known authors, such as Karl Löwith, Ludwig Binswanger, and Semyon L. Frank, whose work has been undeservedly neglected in current research. This paper starts off by arguing that, in spite of the (...) rightly acknowledged differences between the Husserlian and the Heideggerian approaches to the investigation of the social world, both approaches converge in the claim that the I–thou relation is founded on more basic forms of sociality. In a second step, against the background of Frank’s and Binswanger’s challenges to that claim, I argue that Löwith’s proposal that the I–thou relation is a primordial form of sociality can be vindicated by conceptualizing I–thou relations as close personal relationships (paradigmatically exemplified by companion friendships and romantic partnerships). After assessing how Löwith’s approach to the I–thou relation stands vis-à-vis Heidegger’s and Husserl’s views, I conclude by suggesting how Löwith’s approach can contribute to current research on second-person relations. (shrink)

Some harms are such that they cannot be prevented by a single individual because she lacks the requisite control. Because of this, no individual has the obligation to do so. It may be, however, that the harm can be prevented when several individuals combine their efforts. I argue that in many such situations each individual has a duty to join forces: to approach others, convince them to contribute, and subsequently make a coordinated effort to prevent the harm. A distinctive feature (...) of this proposal is that, in the first instance, it focuses on mobilizing others rather than on preventing the outcome. As it ultimately concerns a collective harm, the duty to join forces is irreducibly collective. Furthermore, once enough people have been mobilized, they have a collective obligation to prevent the harm that is irreducibly collective also because it applies to the collective as such. (shrink)

Slovenian philosopher and psychoanalyst Slavoj Zizek explains with joke violence make a link between obvious violence and hidden violence. Subjective violence confronts on the television news with its often graphic coverage of wars, murders, assaults, and terrorism. When violence is objective it is less visible, operating under the surface, and is rarely, if ever, featured on the news. The city of Vinci is a place where corruption, immorality, and violence are so commonplace that they are not only tolerated also considered (...) essential parts of life in this forgotten slice of humanity's seedy underbelly. Gangsters, prostitutes, drugs, crooked cops. Frank Semyon is a gangster. Frank is betrayed by the gangsters he trusts, and the city administrator who was responsible for facilitating the land investment goes missing. Through these characters, True Detective taps into the whole system of violence that characterizes the United States—the violence and criminality of international wars. (shrink)

Institutions are norm-governed social practices, or so I propose. But what does it mean for a norm to govern a social practice? Theories that analyze institutions as equilibria equate norms with sanctions and model them as costs. The idea is that the sanctions change preferences and thereby behavior. This view fails to capture the fact that people are often motivated by social norms as such, when they regard them as legitimate. I argue that, in order for a social norm to (...) be perceived as legitimate, agents have to acknowledge reasons for conforming to it other than the sanctions they might incur for violating it. In light of this, I defend a theory of institutions that does not only invoke equilibria, but also normative rules that are supported by normative expectations and, in some cases, normative beliefs. (shrink)

How important is luck in economic success? No question more reliably divides conservatives from liberals. As conservatives correctly observe, people who amass great fortunes are almost always talented and hardworking. But liberals are also correct to note that countless others have those same qualities yet never earn much. In recent years, social scientists have discovered that chance plays a much larger role in important life outcomes than most people imagine. In Success and Luck, bestselling author and New York Times economics (...) columnist Robert Frank explores the surprising implications of those findings to show why the rich underestimate the importance of luck in success--and why that hurts everyone, even the wealthy. Frank describes how, in a world increasingly dominated by winner-take-all markets, chance opportunities and trivial initial advantages often translate into much larger ones--and enormous income differences--over time; how false beliefs about luck persist, despite compelling evidence against them; and how myths about personal success and luck shape individual and political choices in harmful ways. But, Frank argues, we could decrease the inequality driven by sheer luck by adopting simple, unintrusive policies that would free up trillions of dollars each year--more than enough to fix our crumbling infrastructure, expand healthcare coverage, fight global warming, and reduce poverty, all without requiring painful sacrifices from anyone. If this sounds implausible, you'll be surprised to discover that the solution requires only a few, uncontroversial steps. Compellingly readable, Success and Luck shows how a more accurate understanding of the role of chance in life could lead to better, richer, and fairer economies and societies. (shrink)

Research on corporate social responsibility has traditionally focused on managerial discretion and stakeholders’ influence. This study extends current research by addressing the effect of family firms and institutional owners on CSR performance, namely, CSR strengths and concerns. Based on stewardship theory and the socioemotional wealth perspective, we propose that family firms are more likely to value CSR performance. Next, drawing from multiple agency theory, we predict that institutional owners, unlike family owners, will influence a firm’s CSR performance differently. We tested (...) our hypotheses using a sample of 153 firms from 1994 to 2006 and found general support for our hypotheses. A higher percentage of family owned equity and the presence of a family CEO are found to increase CSR strengths, whereas transient institutional owners have an opposite effect. The presence of a family CEO and founding family are found to reduce CSR concerns. Contrary to our predictions, dedicated institutional owners are positively associated with CSR concerns. (shrink)