According to the expertise defense, practitioners of the method of cases need not worry about findings that ordinary people’s philosophical intuitions depend on epistemically irrelevant factors. This is because, honed by years of training, the intuitions of professional philosophers likely surpass those of the folk. To investigate this, we conducted a controlled longitudinal study of a broad range of intuitions in undergraduate students of philosophy (n = 226), whose case judgments we sampled after each semester throughout their studies. Under the (...) assumption, made by proponents of the expertise defense, that formal training in philosophy gives rise to the kind of expertise that accounts for changes in the students’ responses to philosophically puzzling cases, our data suggest that the acquired cognitive skills only affect single case judgments at a time. There does not seem to exist either a general expertise that informs case judgments in all areas of philosophy, or an expertise specific to particular subfields. In fact, we argue that available evidence, including the results of cross-sectional research, is best explained in terms of differences in adopted beliefs about specific cases, rather than acquired cognitive skills. We also investigated whether individuals who choose to study philosophy have atypical intuitions compared to the general population and whether students whose intuitions are at odds with textbook consensus are more likely than others to drop out of the philosophy program. (shrink)

In this paper I present how the normative inferentialist can make the distinction between sentence meaning and content of the utterance. The inferentialist can understand sentence meaning as a role conferred to that sentence by the rules governing inferential transitions and content of the utterance as just a part of sentence meaning. I attempt to show how such a framework can account for prominent scenarios presented by contextualists as a challenge to semantic minimalism/literalism. I argue that inferentialism can address contextualist (...) challenges in a simple and effective manner by understanding sentence meaning as broad, but invariant. (shrink)

A first-order language with a defined identity predicate is proposed whose apparatus for atomic predication is sensitive to grammatical categories of natural language. Subatomic natural deduction systems are defined for this naturalistic first-order language. These systems contain subatomic systems which govern the inferential relations which obtain between naturalistic atomic sentences and between their possibly composite components. As a main result it is shown that normal derivations in the defined systems enjoy the subexpression property which subsumes the subformula property with respect (...) to atomic and identity formulae as a special case. The systems admit a proof-theoretic semantics which does not only apply to logically compound but also to atomic and identity formulae—as well as to their components. The potential of the defined systems for a meticulous first-order analysis of natural inferences whose validity crucially depends on expressions of some of the aforementioned categories is demonstrated. (shrink)

We prove that the theory of the extensional compositional truth predicate for the language of arithmetic with \Delta 0 -induction scheme for the truth predicate and the full arithmetical induction scheme is not conservative over Peano Arithmetic. In addition, we show that a slightly modified theory of truth actually proves the global reflection principle over the base theory.

In the presented article, I consider what the process of designing the future can be. In detail, I am interested in what role touch plays in this process, combined with the practice of speculative imagination. In order to better understand this phenomenon, I use the transdisciplinary model of knowledge production, whose specific feature is the crossing and blurring of boundaries between fields of knowledge. The goal of this activity is to produce new forms of knowledge by combining methods and cognitive (...) tools derived from science, art, humanities, and crafts. In such a context, I am interested in how discursive practices and body practices are complementary. As a research perspective, I adopt the currents of posthumanism and new materialism oriented toward the analysis of human and nonhuman expressions of agency and processes of self-organization of matter. The starting point for the considerations presented here is a critical analysis of the vision of the future in the form of the absence of any future inscribed in the concept of the Anthropocene. Referring to the considerations of feminist thinkers such as Rosi Braidotti, Donna Haraway, and Karen Barad, I analyze what the future, understood as the commonality of the human and nonhuman, in the perspective of planetary changes, can be. (shrink)

Problematyka artykułu skupia się wokół zagadnienia awataryzacji w kontekście transhumanistycznej koncepcji cyberimmortalizmu. Awataryzacja jest omawiana jako proces uobecniania się człowieka pod postacią cyfrową, czego ostatecznym etapem ma być – według niektórych transhumanistów i futurystów – wyłonienie się cyfrowego post-człowieka. Celem artykułu jest charakterystyka cyberimmortalizmu na tle innych transhumanistycznych nurtów oraz omówienie wyzwań związanych z ideą transferu umysłu (antropologicznych, metafizycznych oraz społecznych).

"Realitas formalis/realitas obiectiva. The Paradox of Descartes’ Representationism" The paper discusses some aspects of the highly original theory of representation, developed by Descartes in his ‘Meditations’, and based on the ontological isomorphism of ideas and their material correlates. In the course of the analysis it is shown that the Cartesian theory involves unavoidable problems with discrimination or correlation of the objects in question, which is connected with the problem of constitutiveness of their modes of existence. Consequently, the conclusion of the (...) paper is that representationism based on the isomorphistic theory of representation turns out to be self-contradictory. (shrink)

The paper develops a proof-theoretic semantics for belief reports by extending the constructive type-theoretical formalism presented in Więckowski with a specific kind of set-forming operator suited for the representation of belief attitudes. The extended formalism allows us to interpret constructions which involve, e.g., iteration of belief, quantifying into belief contexts, and anaphora in belief reports. Moreover, constructive solutions to canonical instances of the problem of hyperintensionality are suggested. The paper includes a discussion of Ranta’s constructive account of belief reports.

In this article I am going to argue that despite the fact that (1) there is nothing specific to the form of constitutive rules and (2) that in some broad sense every rule has a constitutive aspect, there is a substantial difference between what might be called trivially and genuinely constitutive rules, and the difference can be spotted by looking at practices that rules are supposed to constitute, not at these rules.

The operators of first-order logic, including negation, operate on whole formulae. This makes it unsuitable as a tool for the formal analysis of reasoning with non-sentential forms of negation such as predicate term negation. We extend its language with negation operators whose scope is more narrow than an atomic formula. Exploiting the usefulness of subatomic proof-theoretic considerations for the study of subatomic inferential structure, we define intuitionistic subatomic natural deduction systems which have several subatomic operators and an additional operator for (...) formula negation at their disposal. We establish normalization and subexpression property results for the systems. The normalization results allow us to formulate a proof-theoretic semantics for formulae composed of the subatomic operators. We illustrate the systems with applications to reasoning with combinations of sentential negation, predicate term negation, subject term negation, and antonymy. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to suggest how the internal logic and dynamics of the development of Cartesian philosophy can be reconstructed by means of the historical-theoretical analysis of one of the most forgotten lines of reception of Cartesianism, leading through the philosophy of British thinkers minorum gentium: Arthur Collier, John Norris, Richard Burthogge etc. Such analysis of the particular stages of the evolution of post-Cartesian thought – within one intellectual-cultural context, makes it possible to situate Berkeley’s system (considered (...) as a culminating point of the development of post-Cartesian British idealism) in the stream of the widely understood Cartesian thought. At the same time the analysis provides sufficient data to draw some general conclusions regarding the logic of the development of Cartesian-inspired philosophical systems. (shrink)

The Yearbook 2021 for Global Ethics, Compliance & Integrity offers an upto- date overview of the recent and most significant developments in the interdisciplinary area of organizational Ethics, Compliance & Integrity Management. The 2021 Yearbook focuses on (but is not limited to) integrity and ethics and consists of 40 highly valuable articles submitted by 55 experts. The authors include excellent ethics, compliance and integrity professionals, scholars and advisors from 20 different countries. As conceived, the publication offers exclusive insights both from (...) practical and theoretical perspectives. This year's edition consists of seven carefully arranged chapters dealing with governance and compliance management, integrity management, organizational ethics and culture, anti-bribery management, whistleblowing, the challenges of digitalization, and - last but not least - corporate incentives and sanctions. In each chapter, the yearbook provides a comprehensive range of views and expertise regarding Ethics, Compliance and Integrity in all kind of organizations. (shrink)

The article concerns the situation of the judicial application of the law where the entity applying the law refers in a decision-making process to moral principles. The decision should be based on the directives of interpretation, which indicate the need for such a determination of the meaning of the applicable norms so that it remains in harmony with commonly accepted moral rules of the society. The equity has one more purpose; namely, it allows for the process of decision-making—and not just (...) for the process of unifying the decisions—since the mere rule does not specify the algorithm of undertaking them. This rule thus assumes that it will be further specified by phronesis judge who in a given situation will determine—for the purposes of a particular decision—a hierarchy between the criteria of substantive justice “embedded” in this rule. The reference to equity stands for the concretization of an unspecified general rule. We deal here with an indefinite general rule, the application of which is facilitated by a reference to rightness. (shrink)

The article concerns the situation of the judicial application of the law where the entity applying the law refers in a decision-making process to moral principles. The decision should be based on the directives of interpretation, which indicate the need for such a determination of the meaning of the applicable norms so that it remains in harmony with commonly accepted moral rules of the society. The equity has one more purpose; namely, it allows for the process of decision-making—and not just (...) for the process of unifying the decisions—since the mere rule does not specify the algorithm of undertaking them. This rule thus assumes that it will be further specified by phronesis judge who in a given situation will determine—for the purposes of a particular decision—a hierarchy between the criteria of substantive justice “embedded” in this rule. The reference to equity stands for the concretization of an unspecified general rule. We deal here with an indefinite general rule, the application of which is facilitated by a reference to rightness. (shrink)

The history of the research on peptic ulcer disease is characterized by a premature abandonment of the bacterial hypothesis, which subsequently had its comeback, leading to the discovery of Helicobacter pylori—the major cause of the disease. In this paper we examine the received view on this case, according to which the primary reason for the abandonment of the bacterial hypothesis in the mid-twentieth century was a large-scale study by a prominent gastroenterologist Palmer, which suggested no bacteria could be found in (...) the human stomach. To this end, we employ the method of digital textual analysis and study the literature on the etiology of PUD published in the decade prior to Palmer’s article. Our findings suggest that the bacterial hypothesis had already been abandoned before the publication of Palmer’s paper, which challenges the widely held view that his study played a crucial role in the development of this episode. In view of this result, we argue that the PUD case does not illustrate harmful effects of a high degree of information flow, as it has frequently been claimed in the literature on network epistemology. Moreover, we argue that alternative examples of harmful effects of a high degree of information flow may be hard to find in the history of science. (shrink)

In proof-theoretic semantics the meaning of an atomic sentence is usually determined by a set of derivations in an atomic system which contain that sentence as a conclusion (see, in particular, Prawitz, 1971, 1973). The paper critically discusses this standard approach and suggests an alternative account which proceeds in terms of subatomic introduction and elimination rules for atomic sentences. A simple subatomic normal form theorem by which this account of the semantics of atomic sentences and the terms from which they (...) are composed is underpinned, shows moreover that the proof-theoretic analysis of first-order logic can be pursued also beneath the atomic level. (shrink)

In this paper we consider a claim that in the natural world there is no fact of the matter about the spatio-temporal separation of events. In order to make sense of such a notion and construct useful models of the world, it is proposed to use elements of a non-classical logic. Specifically, we focus here on causality, as a concept tightly related with the assumption of there being distinct, separate events, proposing a model according to which it can be considered (...) to be spatio-temporally graded. It is outlined how this can be described using the formalism of fuzzy sets theory, with the degree of causality varying between 1, that is no separation between causes and effects, and 0, that is perfect separation between causes and their effects as in classical ’billiard balls’ models of physical systems, namely such based on the notion of ideal mathematical point. Our model posits that subjective moments of time are like fuzzy sets, with their extension determined by local degrees of causality, resulting from information integration processes extended gradually in space and time. This, we argue, is how a notion of causality could be, to a certain degree, spared and reconciled with a variant of Bergsonian duration theory as formulated in the theory of continuous change. Relation of the proposed viewpoint to other theories, as well as possible solutions it suggests to various problems, in particular the measurement problem, are also discussed. (shrink)

The paper presents an alternative substitutional semantics for first-order modal logic which, in contrast to traditional substitutional (or truth-value) semantics, allows for a fine-grained explanation of the semantical behavior of the terms from which atomic formulae are composed. In contrast to denotational semantics, which is inherently reference-guided, this semantics supports a non-referential conception of modal truth and does not give rise to the problems which pertain to the philosophical interpretation of objectual domains (concerning, e.g., possibilia or trans-world identity). The paper (...) also proposes the notion of modality de nomine as an alternative to the denotational notion of modality de re. (shrink)

The history of the research on peptic ulcer disease is characterized by a premature abandonment of the bacterial hypothesis, which subsequently had its comeback, leading to the discovery of Helicobacter pylori – the major cause of the disease. In this paper we examine the received view on this case, according to which the primary reason for the abandonment of the bacterial hypothesis in the mid-twentieth century was a large-scale study by a prominent gastroenterologist Palmer, which suggested no bacteria could be (...) found in the human stomach. To this end, we employ the methodof digital textual analysis and study the literature on the etiology of PUD published in the decade prior to Palmer’s article. Our findings suggest that the bacterial hypothesis had already been abandoned before the publication of Palmer’s paper, which challenges the widely held view that his study played a crucial role in the development of this episode. In view of this result, we argue that the PUD case does not illustrate harmful effects of a high degree of information flow, as it has frequently been claimed in the literature on network epistemology. Moreover, we argue that alternative examples of harmful effects of a high degree of information flow may be hard to find in the history of science. (shrink)

"Berkeley’s Doctrine of Existence. A Linguistic Approach" The paper focuses on a linguistic analysis of Berkeley’s doctrine of existence. It has been shown that the traditional, relational-operational interpretation of Berkeley's existential claims must be expanded by adding a predicative element, which requires that they also be interpret as definitional copulas. The standard interpretation of Berkeley’s claims has been indicated as one of the main causes of misinterpretations of his metaphysics. The new, philosophically intriguing use of the verb ‘to be’, combining (...) features of the definitional copula and the auxiliary verb for the passive voice, is also described in this paper. (shrink)

Brandom (Citation1994) made inferentialism an intensely debated idea in the philosophy of language in the last three decades. Inferentialism is a view that associates the meaning of linguistic expression with the role said expression plays in inferences. It seems rather uncontroversial that the correct theory of meaning should distinguish between linguistic correctness and factual correctness. For instance, speaker S can be wrong in saying ‘I have arthritis’ in two distinct ways: (i) S fails to apply a word correctly to make (...) a true statement due to having made a factual error, and (ii) S uses an expression incorrectly because they are wrong about its meaning. In this paper, I show that properly understood normative inferentialism can make room for such a distinction. I propose that linguistic correctness is a structural issue: linguistic mistakes stem from the improper or insufficient acquisition of an inferential role. Factual correctness, on the other hand, is a one-off issue of the correct application of inferential rules to a particular situation. I argue that, by tying the issue of correctness to the game of giving and asking for reasons, inferentialism can establish a reliable method for distinguishing between two types of correctness (and mistakes). (shrink)

In this paper I argue that logical multivalency is necessary for epistemology and has desirable structural properties. In support of this claim, I discuss the nonclassical logical values from an epistemological point of view. The question addressed is how many logical values logicians and philosophers need. Two standpoints are usually adopted regarding this issue: the fundamentality of bivalence and the necessity of multivalence. The first position, supported by Suszko, is summarized in the statement that due to the very nature of (...) logic, bivalency is all we need. The second position, motivated by research practice which requires making inferences under imperfect conditions, admits the multivalence. In the first part of the article, I focus on the very first manyvalued system L3, invented and explored by Jan Łukasiewicz. I recount the critique of L3, and then discuss Suszko’s thesis and Malinowski’s response. I also analyze the epistemological background of the Suszko-Łukasiewicz controversy which was related to the relation between logic, antirealism and externalism. I conclude fundamentalism regarding logical bivalence generates more problems than the adoption of multivalency. (shrink)

Artykuł jest próbą konceptualizacji procesu przekształcania się rzeczywistości człowieka pod wpływem rozwoju technologii cyfrowych. Ich wzrastająca obecność w codziennym życiu doprowadziła do zatarcia granic między tym, co wirtualne, a tym, co realne. Proces ten postępuje, w wyniku czego można mówić o przekształceniu się ludzkiej rzeczywistości w bimodalną hybrydę. Jest to efektem, z jednej strony, procesu przenikania tego, co charakterystyczne dla realności, do rzeczywistości wirtualnej, z drugiej – procesu łączenia się wirtualności i realności w jednym bycie (tzw. hybrydyzacja bimodalna.

In this paper, I focus on the idea that language is a rule‐constituted and rule‐governed practice. This notion has been criticised recently. It has been claimed that, even if linguistic meaning is determined by rules, these rules are not genuinely normative because they do not govern actions within the practice by themselves. It has been emphasised that one needs to consent (e.g., has relevant intention or desire) to be a part of that practice. First, I distinguish between two issues: (1) (...) How do rules come to life? (and the answer to that question is by enactment or communal acceptance), and (2) does being assessed by the standards set by the rules require some form of consent for one's actions to be evaluated by these standards? Then, I demonstrate how, by introducing the notion of “default normativity”, one can defend the idea that there are normative practices that are constituted and governed by rules and that language is one of them. (shrink)

Several experimental studies on moral judgment and moral decision-making show that in virtual reality people tend to make more “characteristically utilitarian” decisions than when responding to standard questionnaires. An explanation of this phenomenon that has been considered by many authors states that the feature of VR studies that is responsible for this effect is the visual salience of the harmful consequences of “deontological” decisions. The present paper makes three points, the first of which is theoretical: we argue that this explanation, (...) which draws from Cushman’s dual-process account of moral judgment, is in fact not coherent with this account’s predictions with respect to behavior in VR. The second point is that this explanation does not sufficiently explain the existing empirical findings concerning the footbridge dilemma because these studies differ in important aspects of experimental design from studies on the switch dilemma. The third point is empirical: we present two original VR studies that were designed to check the robustness of the increased “utilitarian” tendency and directly test the explanation that is based on the visual salience of harmful consequences. The results of the experiments provide evidence that the effect is quite robust but the proposed explanation is inadequate. (shrink)

We define intuitionistic subatomic natural deduction systems for reasoning with elementary would-counterfactuals and causal since-subordinator sentences. The former kind of sentence is analysed in terms of counterfactual implication, the latter in terms of factual implication. Derivations in these modal proof systems make use of modes of assumptions which are sensitive to the factuality status of the formula that is to be assumed. This status is determined by means of the reference proof system on top of which a modal proof system (...) is defined. The introduction and elimination rules for counterfactual (resp. factual) implication draw on this status. It is shown that derivations in the systems normalize and that normal derivations have the subexpression/subformula property. An intuitionistically acceptable proof-theoretic semantics is formulated in terms of canonical derivations. The systems are applied to so-called counterpossibles and to related constructions. (shrink)

Surveys are the most widely used research tool in experimental philosophy. In this paper, I analyze two types of criticism of the questionnaire method put forward in the literature. The first type is metaphilosophical. It asserts that the surveys used by experimental philosophers are based on a flawed and unproductive method of cases. The second type is methodological. It argues that currently used questionnaires are unfit to measure philosophically relevant phenomena. I show that these objections can be met by a) (...) improving questionnaires used in research practice and b) expanding the methodological repertoire of experimental philosophy. (shrink)

This essay aims to show that the recent development of quantum theory may provide us with an answer to one of the most compelling metaphysical problems, namely the problem of determinism. First, I sketch the conceptual background and draw the distinction between metaphysical and epistemological determinisms. Then, on the ground of the analysis of the problem of determinism in quantum mechanics, I argue that (1) metaphysical determinism is independent of quantum-mechanical formalism, and (2) that quantum nonlocality makes epistemological determinism impossible. (...) I also try to show that metaphysical determinism should be regarded as a Kantian regulative idea which sets the horizon for scientific inquiry but which at the same time lacks what Kant calls “objective validity.” The main conclusion is that metaphysical determinism should be regarded as an idealization – a formal, cognitive principle that we a priori assume and not something that we discover through scientific inquiry. (shrink)

"Between Descartes and Berkeley: A Forgotten Chapter in the History of the British Early-Modern Philosophy" The aim of this paper is to suggest how the internal logic and dynamics of the development of Cartesian philosophy can be reconstructed by means of the historical-theoretical analysis of one of the most forgotten lines of reception of Cartesianism, leading through the philosophy of British thinkers minorum gentium: Arthur Collier, John Norris, Richard Burthogge etc. Such analysis of the particular stages of the evolution of (...) post-Cartesian thought – within one intellectual-cultural context, makes it possible to situate Berkeley’s system (considered as a culminating point of the development of post-Cartesian British idealism) in the stream of the widely understood Cartesian thought. At the same time the analysis provides sufficient data to draw some general conclusions regarding the logic of the development of Cartesian-inspired philosophical systems. (shrink)