The classical models of epidemics dynamics by Ross and McKendrick have to be revisited in order to incorporate elements coming from the demography (fecundity, mortality and migration) both of host and vector populations and from the diffusion and mutation of infectious agents. The classical approach is indeed dealing with populations supposed to be constant during the epidemic wave, but the presently observed pandemics show duration of their spread during years imposing to take into account the host and vector population changes (...) as well as the transient or permanent migration and diffusion of hosts (susceptible or infected), as well as vectors and infectious agents. Two examples are presented, one concerning the malaria in Mali and the other the plague at the middle-age. (shrink)

This paper begins by calling attention to a puzzling feature of our deep past: an apparent mis-match between morphological evolution in our lineage, including the expansion of our brain and neocortex, and changes in material culture. Three ideas might explain this mis-match. The apparent mis-match is an illusion: change in material culture is indeed driven by biological evolution, but of a kind difficult to identify in the fossil record; the mismatch is caused by the fact that material culture is sensitive (...) to the social and demographic environment, not just the native cognitive capacities of individual agents. Innovation and its uptake is more reliable in larger social worlds. The mis-match is made possible by adaptive phenotypic plasticity; in particular, cognitive plasticity. Just as material culture evolves through cumulative cultural learning, so too do cognitive skills, including ones which make innovations in, and the transmission of, material culture more efficient. This paper is targeted on the second of these ideas, and distinguishes three different versions of the view that increases in social scale support increases in the complexity of material culture. Those are: cultural selection is more efficient in larger social worlds; larger social worlds support more specialisation, which in turn supports a more complex material culture; cultural learning is more efficient in larger social worlds. The paper argues that the first two of these pathways are probably more important than the third in explaining otherwise puzzling features of the archaeological and ethnographic record. (shrink)

Utilizing social rhetorical criticism and social cultural texture, this exegetical analysis of John 4 examines the transformational interaction of Jesus and a Samaritan woman. Previous research focuses on the woman’s demographic profile without fully investigating the significance of relational demography in the context of first century Mediterranean culture. This analysis of the social cultural texture of John 4 presents a model for Christian leadership that crosses gender, race, and geographic barriers and capitalizes on the benefits of relational demography for organizational (...) success. (shrink)

The origins of demography as a scientific discipline are usually seen as intimately connected to the organisational and economic needs of the early modern state. This paper, by contrast, presents an early demographic enterprise that falls outside this framework. The calculations performed by the Italian Jesuit Giovanni Battista Riccioli in an appendix to his Geographia et hydrographia reformata are the first systematic attempt presently known to arrive at an estimate of the entire world population. Yet they appear to have no (...) political purpose and rather belong to a learned, bookish tradition of demographical thinking that may be termed “humanist”. The article starts from a summary of Riccioli’s life, of the book wherein his demographic exercise is contained and of this exercise itself. Thereafter, Riccioli’s motives, sources, methodology and results are discussed. By way of conclusion, some preliminary reflections on the place of Riccioli and the humanist tradition in the early modern history of demography as a whole are offered. Two appendices present a translation of the Coniectura and tabulate its literary sources in order to provide some possible starting points for a study of the aforementioned tradition. (shrink)

This article was prepared for the International Demographic History Congress on ‘Malthus Yesterday and Today’ which took place in Paris, 27–29 May 1980.

In this article I examine recent debates concerning the emergence of cosmopolitan norms that protect individuals’ rights regardless of their citizenship status, and the spread of what some have called “global law without a state.” I distinguish between the spread of human rights norms and the emergence of deterritorialized legal regimes, by focusing on the relationship between global capitalism and legal developments arguing that “cosmopolitan norms” can enhance popular sovereignty while other forms of global law do not do so. The (...) latter “fragment the public sphere” and create “privatized” norms of justification. I suggest that Israel inhabits three spatio-temporal modalities of sovereignty simultaneously, and this accounts for the enormously complex and existential nature of the dilemmas it faces: First, Israel is in a pre-Westphalian zone; second, for the Jewish population within its borders and for its one and a half million Arab citizens, Israel is a Westphalian state, which in fact exhibits strong features of a liberal, social democracy; and third, Israel is part of the global techno-economic complex. Within the three distinct spatio-temporal zones of sovereignty inhabited by contemporary Israel, one can detect new reconfigurations of sovereignty and citizenship that have not been exhausted. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Theories of the influence of technology on modern Western society have failed to take into account the important role played by a widespread pattern of sociotechnical practice. The pattern in question involves the interplay of technology, rights, and numbers. This paper argues that in the context of an ever more potent technological arsenal and an ever increasing number of individuals who have access to its elements and believe themselves entitled to use them in maximalist ways, adherence to the traditional (...) notion of individual human rights is anachronistic and increasingly problematic for the quality of life in contemporary society. To combat this situation, I criticise the idea of human rights as timelessly valid and offer a contextualised account of these constructs, one able to take on board the implications of their maximalist exercise in a populous technological society. I conclude by illustrating the struggles being waged over the adaptation of human rights to techno‐demographic reality in two areas of contemporary Western society: urban planning and medicine. (shrink)

In the Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals' Kant is explicit, sometimes to the point of peevishness, in denying anthropology and psychology any part or place in his moral science. Recognizing that this will strike many as counterintuitive he is unrepentant: ‘We require no skill to make ourselves intelligible to the multitude once we renounce all profundity of thought’. That the doctrine to be defended is not exemplified in daily experience or even in imaginable encounters is necessitated by the very (...) nature of morality which cannot be served worse ‘… than by seeking to derive it from examples’. Thus, the project of the moral philosopher begins with the recognition that the moral realm is not mapped by anthropological data and does not get its content therefrom. Rather, moral philosophy must be ‘completely cleansed’ of everything that is appropriate to anthropology. (shrink)

En partant principalement du recueil de R. Sugranyes de Franch , Économie et développement. Répertoire des documents épiscopaux des cinq continents , Fribourg , 1997, l’auteur analyse quelques déclarations des Conférences épiscopales en matière démographique . Privilégiant l’approche systémique des problèmes, les évêques refusent toute analyse causale simpliste, amenant à modifier un seul facteur, indépendamment des autres, à savoir la fécondité. Réfléchissant à partir de la création de l’homme, créé à l’image et à la ressemblance de Dieu, et à partir (...) de la théologie de l’incarnation, toutes deux inspiratrices d’une éthique de responsabilité , ils réprouvent les moyens qui portent atteinte au droit à la vie, à l’intégrité corporelle, à la responsabilité individuelle en matière de parenté responsable et à la dignité humaine en tant que « fin en soi ». Mais l’unanimité des conférences épiscopales se fissure à propos des méthodes contraceptives modernes, ce qui amène l’auteur à faire quelques propositions pour sortir de l’impasse. (shrink)

This paper uses diversity management as a placeholder for human rights policy. By diversity management, I mean those policy techniques that a society can use to deal with diversity, which include not only decisions to make diversity a subject of active legal and governmental intervention, but also decisions to leave diversity to informal, unregulated choices by individuals or civil society institutions. My discussion proceeds with particular reference to the United States, in part because it has been relatively successful in managing (...) its diversity in recent decades—relative, that is, both to its own past and to the record of other countries today. An approach to diversity management “works,” in my view, if and to the extent that the country’s vulnerable minorities enjoy some social mobility, are integrated into the major institutions of society, have access to political influence roughly proportional to their limited numbers, are free to live according to their own group values and practices, and do not feel deep alienation from the dominant cultural norms. By this definition, the American system works relatively well—with the qualifications and exceptions noted just above. The paper proceeds in three parts. Part I seeks to sharpen our understanding of diversity by analyzing several different ways of understanding and defining that idea, with a view to underscoring the significance of choosing one or another measure of it. Part II discusses two examples— multiracial individuals and anti-profiling laws—to illustrate the inevitable politicization of certain demographic categories when used for politicallysensitive purposes. Part III presents some distinctive and, in some cases, unique features of the American approach to diversity management. Most of these features, I argue, effectively advance the cause of minority mobility and integration, whereas some tend to undermine these goals. (shrink)

Neanderthal extinction is a matter of intense debate. It has been suggested that demography (as opposed to environment or competition) could alone provide a sufficient explanation for the phenomenon. We argue that demography cannot be a ‘stand-alone’ or ‘alternative’ explanation of token extinctions as demographic features are entangled with competitive and environmental factors, and further because demography should not be conflated with neutrality.

Rise of populist politics in the 21s century calls scholars and politicians alike to reflect upon the question of how politics and democracy have been understood. Drawing on the theory of hegemony, this article establishes a distinction between democracy and ‘demography’ as a key line of conceptualization in politics. It highlights a central misunderstanding at the core of the demonization of populism: For radical democratic theory, ‘the people’ is not a demographic, socio-economic, or historically sedimented category tied to some characteristics, (...) but a performative process of ‘being’ and ‘becoming’ ‘the people’ as a self-consciously enacted polity. This statement challenges the taken-for-granted status of subjectivities of political struggle and links this approach to other contemporary discussions of politics, democracy, and populism. After discussing how anti, neo and post-foundational theoretical accounts on populism reveal a dimension of politics and representation, this article emphasizes action and performativity over static categories and models characteristic of political realism and political system approaches. (shrink)

The success of historical demography in establishing through statistical means the existence of family limitation in the past demonstrates that the methods of the quantitative social sciences can explain some problems better than traditional historiographical tools. In this case no literary evidence was available, and even if evidence existed it would have been too distorted to be reliable. Such findings may help historians understand broader issues such as the origins of the Industrial Revolution. Historical demography also may provide clues about (...) the revolutionary process in Western Europe. At the same time, the transition within demography itself from a "transversal" to a "longitudinal" style of analysis suggests that it is as important for the social scientist to become "historical" as it is for the historian to become "social-scientific.". (shrink)

Late in a career of more than sixty years, Thomas Burch, an internationally known social demographer, undertook a wide-ranging methodological critique of demography. This open access volume contains a selection of resulting papers, some previously unpublished, some published but not readily accessible [from past meetings of The International Union for the Scientific Study of Population and its research committees, or from other small conferences and seminars]. Rejecting the idea that demography is simply a branch of applied statistics, his work views (...) it as an autonomous and complete scientific discipline. When viewed from the perspective of modern philosophy of science, specifically the semantic or model-based school, demography is a balanced discipline, with a rich body of techniques and data, but also with more and better theories than generally recognized. As demonstrated in this book, some demographic techniques can also be seen as theoretical models, and some substantive/behavioral models, commonly rejected as theory because of inconsistent observations, are now seen as valuable theoretical models, for example demographic transition theory. This book shows how demography can build a strong theoretical edifice on its broad and deep empirical foundation by adoption of the model-based approach to science. But the full-fruits of this approach will require demographers to make greater use of computer modeling [both macro- and micro-simulation], in the statement and manipulation of theoretical ideas, as well as for numerical computation. This book is open access under a CC BY license. (shrink)

One of the main objections to life extension is that life extension will cause severe overpopulation. This objection presents both moral and demographic issues. To explore the demographic issue, we present an updated and improved version of the formula in chapter six of _New Methuselahs_ for projecting the demographic impact of life extension. The new version includes additional demographical factors such as non-aging related causes of death. According to projections generated with this revised formula, moderate life extension (a life expectancy (...) of 120 years) will not significantly increase population at the fertility rates current in the developed world, but radical life expectancy (halting aging completely, leading to an average life expectancy of 1000 years) can lead to severe overpopulation even at very low fertility rates. This formula also enables us to ascertain what fertility rate and birth spacing will prevent life extension from causing severe overpopulation. The moral issues arise if radical life extension causes overpopulation severe enough to outweigh the benefits it brings. _New Methuselahs_ proposed a reproductive policy for avoiding severe overpopulation by limiting reproduction for those who use life extension. We then consider a moral objection to this policy that was not discussed in _New Methuselahs_: it is not likely that society will succeed in imposing limits to reproduction, therefore, it is likely that radical life extension is morally wrong. We respond to this objection and defend our response against two further objections. (shrink)

The “Assyrian Century,” the period of Assyrian rule in the Levant, is usually regarded as an era of prosperity and economic progress. As far as the southern Levant is concerned, this reconstruction more or less reflects the reality on the southern edge of the region—in the areas of Philistia, Judah, and Edom. But what was the situation in the northern part of the country, in the territories of the former kingdom of Israel and adjacent territories, regions that had become Assyrian (...) provinces? It is the aim of this paper to scrutinize the archaeological data from these regions in order to shed light on the settlement and demographic reality in those provinces, and furthermore to reassess Assyrian policy in the west. After summarizing previous research, the article will present the available archaeological data, which will then be compared with that from the southern part of the country in order to enable a reexamination of the Assyrian empire’s policy in the west. (shrink)

In his evaluation of the major social reform movements of his era, Mill chastised well-meaning reformers for their reluctance to elevate Malthusianism to a position of prominence in their efforts. He was convinced that the key to the material, mental, and moral improvement of the poor and the workers lay in a reduction of their physical numbers and in the behavioural modifications entailed by such a diminution, whereas most other reformers looked elsewhere for solutions. A favourite assumption about the proper (...) means for effecting social reform was that economic growth served as an effective and almost automatic instrument for improving society. Then, as now, an unquestioned faith in the capacity of a progressive economy to stimulate gains in per capita income for the lower classes set the terms for the discussion.1 However, by suggesting that broader and more intensive economic development without a corresponding reduction in the rate of population increase would not generate material gains for those living in indigence, let alone the broader socio-cultural progress that was to have followed closely upon its heels, Mill casts aspersions upon the ‘false ideal’ of economic growth which informed many grand programmes for social progress. (shrink)

It has been commonly claimed that prehistoric warfare in Japan began in the Yayoi period. Population increases due to the introduction of agriculture from the Korean Peninsula to Japan resulted in the lack of land for cultivation and resources for the population, eventually triggering competition over land. This hypothesis has been supported by the demographic data inferred from historical changes in Kamekan, a burial system used especially in the Kyushu area in the Yayoi period. The present study aims to examine (...) the previous claim by using an expanded dataset of human skeletal remains and Kamekan. First, in order to quantify the intensity of warfare, we developed a database of injured individuals found in the middle phase of the Yayoi period in two large populations in the northern Kyushu area, the Fukuoka plain and the upperand middle-stream of the Homan River. Second, we collected Kamekan data from site reports published after 1990 and constructed a comprehensive database to infer the demography in these areas. Finally, we compared the frequency of injured individuals and the inferred demography. The results suggest that the frequency of injured individuals and the population increase tended to be higher at the upper- and middle-stream of the Homan River than on the Fukuoka plain. Different assumptions of the lifetime of each type of Kamekan can produce mixed results on the relationship between demography and the frequency of injured individuals. They were positively correlated under the traditional assumption of constant time intervals, while there was no correlation using time intervals based on carbon dating by the National Museum of Japanese History. Thus, our results are partially consistent with the previous claim that the population increase and the lack of land and resources due to the introduction of agriculture were causes of warfare in the northern Kyushu area in the middle phase of the Yayoi period. (shrink)