Prima parte. Genealogia heideggeriana del pensiero di Luig Pareyson e di Gianni Vattimo -- Seconda parte. Ontologie ed ermeneutiche del cristianesimo -- Conclusione -- Appendice I. Intervista a Gianni Vattimo -- Appendice II. Intervista a Claudio Ciancio -- Bibliografia. Martin Heidegger ; Luigi Pareyson ; Gianni Vattimo ; Altri autori.

Cumulative Prospect Theory is the modern version of Prospect Theory and it is nowadays considered a valid alternative to the classical Expected Utility Theory. Cumulative Prospect theory implies Gain-Loss Separability, i.e., the separate evaluation of losses and gains within a mixed gamble. Recently, some authors have questioned this assumption of the theory, proposing new paradoxes where the Gain-Loss Separability is violated. We present a generalization of Cumulative Prospect Theory which does not imply Gain-Loss Separability and is able to explain the (...) cited paradoxes. On the other hand, the new model, which we call the bipolar Cumulative Prospect Theory, genuinely generalizes the original Prospect Theory of Kahneman and Tversky, preserving the main features of the theory. We present also a characterization of the bipolar Choquet Integral with respect to a bi-capacity in a discrete setting. (shrink)

When Jesus meets the Samaritan Woman at Jacob’s well in John 4, it is a meeting between two colonial subjects in the Roman Empire. In this encounter we find the Samaritan Woman as a triply marginalised body, a woman subject to multiple, intersecting forms of oppression within her patriarchal context. Identified as a Samaritan Woman, Jewish rabbis regarded her as unclean, impure, and being menstruous from birth. It can also be deduced that she is an outcast in her own society (...) because she comes to draw from the well at noon, the hottest part of the day when people did not usually fetch water. This Samaritan Woman is nameless, landless and powerless in an imperial, colonial and patriarchal context. The poem of Diana Ferrus, I’ve come to take you home, in memory of Sarah Baartman, highlights how Baartman was dehumanised and treated as a sexual object by European colonisers. Through a postcolonial reading of John 4, I consider the intersections between the Samaritan Woman and the early life of Sara Baartman in their respective colonial contexts and invite the reader, as the poem invites Baartman, to come home to Africa and resist Western European imperial and colonial patterns and tendencies.Contribution: This article has interdisciplinary implications. This is an interdisciplinary study in the sense that it offers a biblical interpretation of John 4 that is informed by the life of Sara Baartman that has been uncovered through anthropology, history and sociology. It is also integrating the field of postcolonial biblical hermeneutics with the theory of intersectionality. (shrink)

For decades the papal tradition has renounced the term ‘war’ as something around which to build an ethical approach. One can sympathize with this: resort to war seems the consequence of ethical failure and brings in its train a host of brutalities including rape, torture, and murder that harm both victims and perpetrators. But that view of ‘war’ is an incomplete representation of the possibilities of the uses of force to secure legitimate political goods. Thus the popes have struggled to (...) maintain a clear voice in the face of abject tragedies like the Russian invasion of Ukraine: on the one hand, Pope Francis condemns war in an almost absolute manner; on the other, he recognizes the legitimacy of Ukrainian defensive uses of force. In so doing, of course, he merely abides the so-called ‘just war theory’ he seems to have discarded. My contribution will focus on the current state of the just war in Catholic teaching. I will maintain the state remains where it has been since at least the middle of the twentieth century: skeptical about the capacity of states to judge in terms of international law, but cognizant of their right to defend themselves against ongoing aggression. (shrink)

Growing concern has been expressed that we have entered a “post-truth” era in which each of us willfully believes whatever we choose, aided and abetted by alternative and social media that spin alternative realities for boutique consumption. A prime example of the belief in alternative realities is said to be acceptance of “conspiracy theories”—a term that is often used as a pejorative to indict claims of conspiracy that are so obviously absurd that only the unhinged could believe them. The epistemological (...) standard often involved in this indictment, however—the standard of “obvious” falsity—invites subjectivity in its application, because what is obviously false to one person can be common sense to another. This is not just a truism; considerable research suggests that people’s political beliefs, in general, and their acceptance or rejection of conspiracy theories in particular, tends in large part to be determined by partisan, ideological, and other priors. (shrink)

This article investigates why the Ecumenical Church in South Africa has not responded effectively to social issues such as bad governance, corruption, inequality, crime, and ethical decline. It uses contextual and comparative analysis to examine the historical, political, and theological factors that influence the church’s role and identity. It draws on missiology, practical theology, and ecclesiology to argue that the church is neglecting its moral and prophetic duty to uphold human dignity and value, and to offer hope and healing to (...) all. The investigation identified six reasons for the church’s social failure and proposes some practical and theological ways to improve its social responsibility and witness.Contribution: This article challenges the church to be a prophetic voice and witness for social transformation in South Africa. It calls for a national convention of Christian leaders to craft a unified vision for the country’s future and foster dialogue, cooperation, and social responsibility among diverse and complex churches. (shrink)

This book brings together in one place the work of one of our most respected economic theorists, on a field in which he has played a large part in originating: the New Institutional Economics. Transaction cost economics, which studies the governance of contractual relations, is the branch of the New Institutional Economics with which Oliver Williamson is especially associated.Transaction cost economics takes issue with one of the fundamental building blocks in microeconomics: the theory of the firm. Whereas orthodox economics describes (...) the firm in technological terms, as a production function, transaction cost economics describes the firm in organizational terms, as a governance structure. Alternative feasible forms of organization--firms, markets, hybrids, bureaus--are examined comparatively. The analytical action resides in the details of transactions and the mechanisms of governance.Transaction cost economics has had a pervasive influence on current economic thought about how and why institutions function as they do, and it has become a practical framework for research in organizations by representatives of a variety of disciplines. Through a transaction cost analysis, The Mechanisms of Governance shows how and why simple contracts give way to complex contracts and internal organization as the hazards of contracting build up. That complicates the study of economic organization, but a richer and more relevant theory of organization is the result. Many testable implications and lessons for public policy accrue to this framework. Applications of both kinds are numerous and growing.Written by one of the leading economic theorists of our time, The Mechanisms of Governance is sure to be an important work for years to come. It will be of interest to scholars and students of economics, organization, management, and law. (shrink)

Introducing Dialogic Pedagogy presents some of the ideas of Russian philosopher Mikhail Bakhtin concerning dialogism in a way that will engage and inspire those studying early childhood education. By translating the growing body of dialogic scholarship into a practical application of teaching and learning with very young children, this book provides readers with alternative ways of examining, engaging and reflecting on practice in the early years to provoke new ways of understanding and enacting pedagogy. This text combines important theoretical ideas (...) with a practical application to support practitioners who are keen to promote creativity and agency through ethical self-other relations. It provides unique insights into the amazing world of the youngest child, and offers enriched understandings of the profound impact of adults in their journey of becoming (or bildung). Key points covered include: Investigating dialogic philosophy and its application to early childhood education, with an emphasis on notions of justice, democracy, ethics and answerability Considering the relationship between dialogism and pedagogical approaches Theorising a range of approaches to relevant early childhood practice, as pedagogy This accessible and readable guide offers sound theoretical principles with practical suggestions for early years' settings. The book is supplemented by an extensive online video resource website that will bring these revolutionary ideas to life.. (shrink)

Ethical youth work is ‘good' youth work but how do youth work practitioners collectively determine what is ‘good'? This article presents findings from four-country surveys of youth workers' attitudes and understandings of what constitutes ‘good', that is to say ‘ethical’ practice. The article presents the principles that youth workers say underpin ethical practice in Australia, Estonia, Iceland, and Ireland. The first three countries have well established Codes of Ethics and/or Practice and Professional Associations, while Ireland does not. A survey of (...) youth work practitioners funded by Erasmus Plus, was conducted across the four countries (n = 405). A comparative analysis of data across countries revealed consensus around key characteristics of youth work practice such as the participation, empowerment, and safety of young people. These core principles form the basis of good and ethical action by practitioners. In countries which have codified these principles, these Codes were reported to be useful tools to support practitioners in their work. The survey further suggests that reflective practice is important in the application of ethical codes to concrete practice situations acting as a form of collective accountability and praxis. To conclude, we consider the implications of these findings for professionalism, and professionalisation in youth work nationally and internationally. (shrink)

This paper extends the discourse on the importance of the relationship between practitioner and young person as a defining tenet of effective youth work practice, recognising the privileged position occupied by Youth Workers in the social ecology of the young people with whom they work. Reflecting the ethical obligations inherent in this relationship, particularly its focus on enhancing young people’s agency and developmental outcomes, the paper outlines how youth work practice infused with professional love aligns with conceptualizations of an ethic (...) of care. Reporting on interviews conducted with Youth Workers practicing in different settings across one local authority area in the UK, the paper articulates how practitioners’ ethic of care shapes their work with young people, and the extent to which love features as an element of their professional practice. Practitioners describe their motivation to express care that extends beyond legalistic interpretations of their ‘duty of care’ towards young people, using the language of care, love and nurture almost interchangeably. The paper demonstrates the importance of inclusion and reciprocity as fundamental elements of ethical practice, as well as the need to infuse practice with hope, suggesting the value of an affirmative ethic to complement a focus on love and care. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Interpretation of Plato's Parmenides: Zeno s Paradox and the Theory of Forms R. E. ALLEN PLATO'S Parmenides is divided into three main parts, of uneven length, and distinguished from each other both by their subject matter and their speakers. In the first and briefest part (127d-130a), Socrates offers the Theory of Forms in solution of a problem raised by Zeno. In the second (130a-135d), Parmenides levels a series (...) of objections against Socrates' theory, objections putatively meant as refutation. Then, after an interlude to explain an unfamiliar method of dialectic (135d-137c), that method is applied in the third part by Parmenides, with the help of the young Aristoteles (137c-166c). This final part forms more than two-thirds of the whole. I propose here to examine the first part of the dialogue, the interchange between Zeno and Socrates, and to examine it with special attention to the bearing which questions of dialectical structure and dramatic characterization may have upon its interpretation. It is perhaps here proper to indicate the general view of the dialogue which this discussion will help serve to recommend. Briefly, it is this. The Parmenides is a sustained examination of Plato's Theory of Forms, and the manner of examination is Socratic: the student is presented, not with a body of conclusions, but with a series of arguments whose implications he is left to think through for himself. When he has done so, he will realize that the Theory of Forms is proof against the objections here brought against it: the Parmenides provides no direct support for the thesis, currently popular, that Plato in later life ceased to believe that Forms exist. But though sound as far as it goes, the Theory of Forms does not go far enough: the Parmenides demonstrates that there is a range of problems, bound up with the application of unrestricted predicates, which Forms do not solve but are prey to. A broader theory is required, though a theory which may well contain the Theory of Forms as a part. The Parmenides, whose purpose is critical, leaves unanswered the question of what that theory may be. Zeno's Paradox and the Theoryof Forms (127d-130a) It is Zeno who begins the dialectic of the Parmenides,and fittingly, he begins it with a paradox. If there are many things, the same things must be both [143] 144 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY like and unlike. But this is impossible: unlike things cannot be like, nor like things unlike. Therefore, there cannot be many things (127e). Socrates' reply begins with a solution, and ends with a challenge. There exists, alone by itself, a Form of Likeness, and also a Form of its opposite, Unlikeness. The things we call 'many' are both like and unlike; but in this they differ from the Forms in which they partake. For things which are just alike (abr& r& 6uoLa)1 cannot be unlike, nor things just unlike alike. But it is no more surprising that the same things should partake both in Likeness and Unlikeness than it is that a thing should be both one and many by partaking in both Unity and Plurality. Still, Unity itself is not many, nor Plurality one. And so with other Forms: Socrates would be filled with wonder if someone could show that Likeness and Unlikeness, Unity and Plurality, Rest and Motion, and the other Forms, can be combined with (~v'rK~p&vvwOaO and separated from (SLaKotp~0a,) each other. Forms cannot be qualified by their opposite. 2 Socrates' denial is a conjunction. Several translators, including Cornford and Taylor, have rendered ~v3,~p&vvvaOa~ ~as &aKps as though it were a disjunction, 'combined or separated'. The reason for this was no doubt stylistic; but the Greek means, not 'or' but 'and', and logically, the difference is important. Zeno and Parmenides are challenged to prove, not one of two alternatives, but both together. This conclusion rests on more than a Kas In the Sophist, knowing how to separate (&a~ps 253e 3) according to kinds is equivalent to distinguishing (&a~m~a0a~ 253d 1) according to kinds, and both are equivalent to not believing that the same Form is different or a different Form the same (253d 1... (shrink)

Insufficient attention has been paid to the ways in which Newtonian conceptualizations of time encourage the view in contemporary psychology that only efficient causal explanations are viable, explanations that ultimately render meaningful, purposive, morally rich human actions and relationships illusory. In short, psychology’s pervasive adoption of Newtonian assumptions about time and causation renders the discipline incapable of understanding human behavior, its primary focus of study, in any but fundamentally inhuman ways. This paper aims (1) to provide a critique of the (...) Newtonian conception of time and its commitment to efficient causality, particularly as commonly present in contemporary psychological theory and practice, and (2) to examine the phenomenological account of time provided in the work of Emmanuel Levinas. Specifically, we will explore some of the ways in which Levinas’ account of time as fundamentally intersubjective provides an alternative conceptual grounding for understanding the therapeutic relationship as one of infinite ethical responsibility. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Unpacking the Chalcedonian Formula:From Studied Ambiguity to Saving MysteryBrian E. Daley, S.J.One of the central questions Christian theologians continue to ask themselves, as they confront the mystery of the person of Christ, is, what is the significance for us today of the Council of Chalcedon? For generations of modern scholars, especially those in the West, the dense and rather technical phrases forged at that fifth-century gathering of Christian bishops (...) and appended to a restatement of what we know as the “Nicene creed” represented a major milestone in the Churches’ ongoing clarification of how disciples are to understand the person of Jesus the Savior.In J. N. D. Kelly’s widely used survey, Early Christian Doctrines,1 for instance, Chalcedon’s “settlement” of the twenty-four-year dispute between Nestorius and his Antiochene supporters and Cyril of Alexandria and the Church of Alexandria was the culmination of “the decisive period for Christology”2 in the early Church, an attempt to define an understanding of Christ that could be accepted by all Christians throughout the Empire, but which nevertheless—surprisingly, perhaps—“failed to bring permanent peace.”3 Aloys Grillmeier, in his foundational study of the growth of early Christian understandings of Jesus, speaks of the years up to Chalcedon as [End Page 165] temporally defining “the development of belief in Christ from its beginning to its first climax in a council of the Church.”4 In an influential study of the theology of the seventh-century monk and theologian Maximus the Confessor, Hans Urs von Balthasar emphasizes the centrality of Chalcedon’s formulaic, classically dialectical picture of the person of Christ as central to Maximus’s whole approach to God, the world, and the human spirit. The reason, Balthasar argues, lies in Chalcedon’s ability to affirm both unity and abiding difference in Christ as the dominant pattern of God’s relationship to creation:From the moment that Chalcedon, in its sober and holy wisdom, elevated the adverbs ‘indivisibly’ (ἀδαιρέτως) and ‘unconfusedly’ (ἀσυγχύτως) to a dogmatic formula, the image of a reciprocal indwelling of two distinct poles of being replaced the image of mixture. This mutual ontological presence (περιχώρησις) not only preserves the being particular to each element, to the divine and the human natures, but also brings each of them to its perfection in their very difference, even enhancing that difference. Love, which is the highest level of union, only takes root in the growing independence of the lovers; the union between God and the world reveals, in the very nearness it creates between these two poles of being, the ever-greater difference between created being and the essentially incomparable God.5With a little help from German Romantic philosophy, and perhaps from his Jesuit confrère Erich Przywara, Balthasar here sees in the Chalcedonian picture of Christ not only Maximus’s central inspiration, but the early Church’s final paradigm for conceiving how the transcendent God can be present and crucially active in the world.One might multiply examples. But does this understanding of Chalcedon’s portrait of Christ really represent its intent or its lasting meaning? What led to its articulation? What was, one may ask, the real achievement of this gathering of over 500 Eastern bishops, mainly from the Greek-speaking East, called by the new emperor Marcian and his long-influential spouse, the [End Page 166] Empress Pulcheria, in a port suburb across the Bosporus from Constantinople, in October of 451? On the level of Church politics, at least, it was a step towards restoring a balance, however briefly, between major centers of influence in the Church of the mid-fifth century, and the theological traditions with which they had become associated: a balance precariously achieved in 433, after the bitter controversy over Nestorius’s views on how to conceive the person of Christ, by what is often called the “Formula of Reunion,” which sketched the outlines of traditional faith in the Savior—a formula apparently drafted at that time by Theodoret of Cyrus and proposed by the Church of Antioch, but which was also warmly embraced by Theodoret’s principal rival, Cyril of Alexandria. After heated debates between the bishop of Constantinople, the... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 377 Parmenides: Being, Bounds, and Logic. By S. AUSTIN. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986. Pp. xi + 203. $20.00. Within carefully drawn limits Austin conducts a rigorous analysis of Parmenides's poem that is both creative and forceful. His analysis reveals a logical structure to the poem that is more intricate and subtle than has previously been acknowledged. The result is a deeper insight into Parmenides 's (...) accomplishments in logic and methodology. Austin's view is that Parmenides first establishes criteria for the formation of judgments, and then uses a consciously systematic and comprehensive method to determine the sort of judgments that can describe being. Thus, Austin argues, all the arguments and distinctions of the " Truth " section-and to some extent those of " Opinion "-are necessary for a complete description of being. The argumentation is rigorous and Austin's thesis is certainly plausible, though some modifications are in order. The charge of anachronism presents the most fundamental challenge to Austin's thesis. For him, Parmenides is not only the "first logician" and " ontologist ", but the " founder of Western rational theology as well as of scientific explanation." These accolades are commonplace, but nonethe less misleading. More serious is Austin's claim that Parmenides employs the principles of noncontradiction and excluded middle, and displays an understanding-albeit a partial one-of the functions of negation, double negation, copula and predicate. Austin sees countless anticipations of Parmenides's successors from Plato to the present, and has no qualms about rendering parts of the poem in contemporary philosophical jargon. For example, the phrase "not the same" in fr. 8.22 should, on Austin's reading, be taken to mean, " having its numerical nonidentity secured by means of qualitative difference" (p. 88). Austin recognizes the charge of anachronism, but believes his interpretation best accounts for the poem's logical structure. More specific anticipations of Plato and Aristotle are tackled in chapter 5. Chapter 1 ("Why Not 'Is Not'~") contains an ingenious solution to a problem that has puzzled scholars and students alike for centuries. The goddess of Parmenides's poem proclaims (fr. 2) : "that it is not and that it is right for it not to be, this I point out to you as a completely uninformative track." Why, then, do nearly all the signposts of being in fr. 8 use negative language and indirect prooH This problem, Austin suggests, has not been sufficiently appreciated. Austin shows forcefully that no interpretation of fr. 8 can stand which explains away the goddess 's use of negative language. Austin's own explanation results from careful scrutiny of the grammar of predications and assertions in fr. 8. Curiously, of all the negative expressions in fr. 8, the expression ovK e. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 381 Nature and Motion in the Middle.Ages. By FR. JAMES A. WEISHE,IPL. Edited by William E. Carroll. Studies in Philosophy and the History of Philosophy, v. 11. Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of American Press, 1985. Pp. xii + 292. In this book the editor brings together some articles previously published by Fr. James Weisheipl which deal with various questions relating to Aristotle's natural philosophy along with (...) some medieval interpretations, mainly by St. Thomas Aquinas. The volume was not originally intended to be a posthumous offering, but Fr. James's untimely death has made it into one, and the editor provides a warm ' In Memoriam' at the end. During his fruitful scholarly career in medieval studies Weisheipl devoted much of his efforts to correcting what he took to be some basic modern misunderstandings of Aristotelian and medieval natural philosophy. A long-standing and still commonly held view has it that modern science became possible only after a total and unequivocal rejection of Aristotle's understanding of physical science. According to this theory, science as we now understand it appeared only in the seventeenth century. which is to say long after the close of the Middle Ages (pp. 261 ff.) and therefore, apart from purely historical interest, there remains nothing to be gained from a study of the medieval view of science. In the last century, however, Pierre Duhem argued that heretofore unrecognized linkages exist between modern science and the much earlier efforts by Aristotle and his medieval interpreters. Following Duhem's pioneering work, more recent scholarship has increased still further our knowledge of the relationship between early and modern science, with some (e.g. A. Maier) emphasizing elements of discontinuity and others (e.g. Weisheipl ) pointing out some long neglected but nonetheless philosophically sound and therefore still valuable insights of Aristotle and his medieval disciples. Weisheipl argues that the Aristotelian/medieval notion of nature is perfectly compatible with what he terms the physico-mathematical approach so profitably adopted by modern science. (ch. 11) He rejects the idea that the scientist, after the weleome advances of men like Galileo and Newton, is henceforward correct in replacing the earlier concept of nature with a purely mechanistic model of the universe. The more recent fruitful application of the physico-mathematieal method in science, far from requiring the rejection of Aristotle's concept of nature in favor of a nature-less mechanical model, finds a needed complimentarity with its inclusion as a sure foundation. Taking Aristotle's lead, Albert the Great, Aquinas, and others in fact, Weisheipl argues, were quite well aware of 38~ BOOK REVIEWS the more mathematically grounded method in studying nature. The work they did especially in astronomy, optics, and harmonics, W eisheipl points out, clearly reveals their belief in the heuristic power of mathematics. He readily admits that the earlier attempts to ' save the appearances ' with relatively primitive mathematical tools pale in comparison with the modern achievement, but he thinks the fundamental instinct so remarkably exploited by later scientists is already evident in earlier times. At the core of Weisheipl's exposition of Aristotelian/medieval science is the basic concept of nature, and the frequent failure of scholars to understand this concept conectly is, in his view, the major underlying reason for so much confusion. " For Aristotle..., v. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS El Primer Principia del Obrar Moral y las Normas Especificas en el Pensamiento de G. Grisez y!. Finnis. By AURELIO A.NSALDO. Roma: Pontificia Universita Lateranense, 1990. Pp. xiii+ 255. This unusually excellent and important doctoral dissertation was written in Rome at the Istituto Giovanni Paolo II per Studi su Matrimonio e Famiglia, a component of the Lateran University. The author currently teaches at the Ateneo Romano della (...) Santa Croce in Rome. The volume is of special importance for three reasons: (1) it provides a comprehensive, detailed, and accurate account of the moral theory developed by Germain Grisez and John Finnis over the past quarter century (Joseph Boyle has also made important contributions to this theory, and Ansaldo has noted these); (2) it defends Grisez and Finnis against many of the criticisms which have been unjustly leveled against their thought; and (3) it raises some critically import· ant issues by way of constructive criticism. In what follows I will briefly comment on the first and second features of Ansaldo's work and discuss more fully the third important component of his scholarly study. In the first part of his work (pp. 3-100), Ansaldo offers readers a splendid synthesis of the thought of Grisez and Finnis. He has carefully studied everything written by these authors from 1964 to 1988. He has included important material from Finnis that had escaped even my attention, and I have tried to study everything these authors have written. He has also succeeded in presenting their thought comprehensively and faithfully. He understands what they think, appreciates it, and presents it accurately. In short, he does justice to their thought. In this respect his study is quite superior to another doctoral dissertation, Russell Hittinger's A Critique of the New Natural Law Theory. Hittinger's work has been severely criticized, and rightly so, not only by Grisez but by others (e.g., Robert George and William Marshner) ; it seriously misrepresents the work of Grisez and Finnis. A criticism of this sort cannot be levelled against Ansaldo's work; it provides an accurate and very scholarly account of their thought. In the second part of his study (pp. 103-229) Ansaldo offers a critical assessment of the work of Grisez and Finnis. Here he first shows that many of the criticisms leveled against their thought are unjust and unfounded, particularly those offered by such writers as Veatch, Rittinger, Flicken, Bourke, et al. These writers charge that Grisez and Finnis fail to show how moral principles are rooted in metaphysics and anthropology, that they completely separate ethics from metaphysics, natural law from human nature, etc. Ansaldo, by a patient and thorough BOOK REVIEWS 888 examination of their thought and the thought of St. Thomas, defends Grisez and Finnis from these misguided criticisms. He shows, first of all,,that Grisez and Finnis are correct (and fully in accord with St. Thomas) in holding that our krwwledge of the primary principles of natural law is not derived from our knowledge of metaphysics or of human nature. By referring to appropriate texts of Grisez and Finnis, Ansaldo shows conclusively that these authors explicitly recognize the intimate rela· tionship between ethics and metaphysics, between natural law and human nature. They fully and explicitly recognize that, were our na· ture other than it is, namely, the nature of human beings, the goods pedective of us would be other than what they actually are. When these goods are grasped by practical reason, they serve as starting points or principles of purposeful human action. Nonetheless, our practical krwwledge of these goods, is not epistemologically derived from or dependent upon prior knowledge, speculative in character, of human nature. In short, in contrast to their critics and in conformity with St. Thomas, Grisez and Finnis are correct in holding that our practical understanding of the primary principles of natural law is not dependent upon our prior understanding of metaphysics or human nature. At the same time they explicitly acknowledge and defend the truth that onto· logically ethics is grounded in metaphysics and anthropology. "Our authors," Ansaldo writes, " have always sought not only to respect but even more to defend and explain the fact that the basis... (shrink)

One of the greatest challenges facing democracies is how to live together with difference. The growth of globalisation and international migration has presented schools with increased opportunities and challenges related to learning from and living with superdiversity. Yet within current policy settings and educational practices, the alignment between superdiversity and democratic education is not explicitly foregrounded. In this paper I examine how teachers (n = 24) from four superdiverse secondary schools in Aotearoa New Zealand’s responded to growing cultural, linguistic and (...) religious diversity in their classrooms. By examining empirical evidence from teacher’s practices, the paper illustrates how Dewey’s philosophy of learning by living together with difference, placing a priority on shared interests and developing a socio-political awareness of inequalities provides valuable insights for democratic education. The study illustrates the importance of recognising the complexity of interactions in superdiverse contexts and the significant role that teachers can play in creating conditions for inclusive classrooms where democracy can be lived and learned. It also highlights how teachers themselves, can undergo a journey toward developing more inclusive and justice-oriented pedagogical practices that support both Indigenous and ethnic minority groups in their schools. (shrink)

Bernat (2024) and Busch (2024) both argue that the clamping of cerebral vasculature in NRP-cDCD ensures sufficient diagnostic certainty of death that the procedure does not violate the Dead Donor R...

Utilitarianism, the great reforming philosophy of the nineteenth century, has today acquired the reputation for being a crassly calculating, impersonal philosophy unfit to serve as a guide to moral conduct. Yet what may disqualify utilitarianism as a personal philosophy makes it an eminently suitable guide for public officials in the pursuit of their professional responsibilities. Robert E. Goodin, a philosopher with many books on political theory, public policy and applied ethics to his credit, defends utilitarianism against its critics and shows (...) how it can be applied most effectively over a wide range of public policies. In discussions of such issues as paternalism, social welfare policy, international ethics, nuclear armaments, and international responses to the environment crisis, he demonstrates what a flexible tool his brand of utilitarianism can be in confronting the dilemmas of public policy in the real world. (shrink)

This is the first full-length survey of current work which examines the compatibility of microeconomics and macroeconomics. Its particular distinction is that it makes accessible, to non-specialists, those extensive modern refinements of general equilibrium theory which are linked to macroeconomics and monetary theory. Part I traces the development and interlocking nature of two scientific research prgrams, macroeconomics and neo-Walrasian analysis. The five chapters in this part examine general equilibrium theory, Keynes' contribution, the 'neoclassical synthesis', and the Clower–Leijonhufvud contributions to questions (...) of systemic coordination. The four chapters of Part II place recent work on the micro-foundations of macroeconomics within a taxonomic scheme of Walrasian equilibrium, Walrasian disequilibrium, Edgeworthian equilibrium, and Edgeworthian disequilibrium. Part III, a single chapter, provides an overview of the subject and ventures some conclusions. (shrink)

Frances Kamm's characteristically subtle paper in response to Michael Sandel is an intriguing intervention in the long-standing and increasingly frustrating debate over the morality of enhancement...

Wojtasiewicz (2006) brings up an important topic in medical ethics: end-of-life care for the terminally ill. This issue came to the public eye most recently in the Terri Schiavo case. Wojtasiewicz...

There is consensus that children have questionable decisional capacity and, therefore, in general a parent or a guardian must give permission to enroll a child in a research study. Moreover, freedom from duress and coercion, the cardinal rule in research involving adults, is even more important for children. This principle is embodied prominently in the Nuremberg Code (1947) and is embodied in various federal human research protection regulations. In a program named "SATURN" (Student Athletic Testing Using Random Notification), each school (...) in the Oregon public-school system may implement a mandatory drug-testing program for high school student athletes. A prospective study to identify drug use among student-athletes, SATURN is designed both to evaluate the influence of random drug testing and to validate the survey data through identification of individuals who do not report drug use. The enrollment of students in the drug-testing study is a requirement for playing a school sport. In addition to the coercive nature of this study design, there were ethically questionable practices in recruitment, informed consent, and confidentiality. This article concerns the question of whether research can be conducted with high school students in conjunction with a mandatory drug-testing program, while adhering to prevailing ethical standards regarding human-subjects research and specifically the participation of children in research. (shrink)

There have been many attempts to determine what makes a natural kind real, chief among them is the criterion according to which natural kinds must be mind-independent. But it is difficult to specify this criterion: many supposed natural kinds have an element of mind-dependence. I will argue that the mind-independence criterion is nevertheless a good one, if correctly understood: the mind-independence criterion concerns the unification principles for natural kinds. Unification principles determine how natural kinds unify their properties, and only those (...) natural kinds that have a mind-independent unification principle should be considered real. (shrink)

According to perdurantist accounts of persistence, transtemporal aggregates of stages, ‘worms’, are ‘the referents of ordinary terms, members of ordinary domains of quantification, subjects of ordinary predications, and so on…on the stage view…it is instantaneous stages rather than worms that play this role’. I argue the stage theory should be preferred as an account of personal persistence. I consider the way in which four‐dimensionalist accounts of personal persistence are organized and the conditions which, arguably, any plausible account of personal persistence (...) should satisfy. I sketch a semantics for the stage theory which yields a stage‐theoretical account of personal persistence that satisfies these conditions. I argue that standard purdurantist accounts do not. I conclude that standard purdurantist accounts fail because, while persons view themselves and their worlds from the time‐bound first‐person perspective of stages, purdurantist accounts privilege the atemporal view of persons as four‐dimensional aggregates of stages or ‘worms’. Perdurantist accounts produce counterintuitive results in fission cases because there is a discrepancy between a person's time‐bound first‐person perspective and the purdurantist view from nowhen. (shrink)

The fact that genes and environment contribute differentially to variation in human behaviors, traits and attitudes is central to the field of behavior genetics. Perceptions about these differential contributions may affect ideas about human agency. We surveyed two independent samples (N = 301 and N = 740) to assess beliefs about free will, determinism, political orientation, and the relative contribution of genes and environment to 21 human traits. We find that lay estimates of genetic influence on these traits cluster into (...) four distinct groups, which differentially predict beliefs about human agency, political orientation, and religiosity. Despite apparent ideological associations with these beliefs, the correspondence between mean lay estimates and published heritability estimates for the surveyed traits is large (r = .77). Belief in genetic determinism emerges as a modest predictor of accuracy in these lay estimates. Additionally, educated mothers with multiple children emerge as particularly accurate in their estimates of the genetic contribution to these traits. (shrink)

With increased visibility of trans people comes increased philosophical interest in gendered language. This chapter aims to look at the research on gendered language in analytic philosophy of language so far, which has focused on two concerns: (1) determining how to define gender terms like ‘man’ and ‘woman’ such that they are trans inclusive and (2) if, or to what extent, we should use gendered language at all. We argue that the literature has focused too heavily on how gendered language (...) can harm trans people, and has not considered how trans people use gendered language to create meaning and joy for ourselves. Pulling from the literature in sociolinguistics, we look at examples of how trans people use language to make their lives better by gaining recognition, playing with gendered language, finding joy in gendered language, and taking control of definitional power, concluding that debates about gendered language need to consider not only how such language harms trans people but also how trans people use it for our own liberation. (shrink)

The second edition of The Great Psychotherapy Debate has been updated and revised to include a history of healing practices, medicine, and psychotherapy, an expanded theoretical presentation of the contextual model, an examination of therapist effects, and a thorough review of the research on common factors such as the alliance, expectations, and empathy.