The problem of self-consciousness has been an essential one for philosophy since the onset of modernity. Both E. Tugendhat and the Heidelberg School represented by D. Henrich have reflected critically upon the traditional theory of self-consciousness, and both have revealed the circular dilemma of the “reflection-model” adopted by the traditional theory. In order to avoid the dilemma, they both proposed substitute formulas, each of which has its advantages and disadvantages. Husserl also paid particular attention to the traditional theory of (...) self-consciousness in his phenomenology. Through the distinctions of “primal consciousness” and “reflection,” Husserl explored the core problem of the traditional theory of self-consciousness in two different dimensions. In his critique, Husserl clarified the founding relation between primal consciousness and reflection, and in contrast to Tugendhat’s semantic approach, he developed a new reflection-model of self-consciousness which effectively avoids the circular dilemma of the traditional theory and does not narrow the problem domain of that theory. (shrink)
A noção de ética defendida pela tradição analítica está baseada no pressuposto de que toda ética deve ser normativa e deve, portanto, justificar a adoção de qualquer princípio moral a partir de uma argumentação racional. No livro Lições sobre ética, Ernst Tugendhat procura dialogar com a tradição filosófica – Kant em especial – a fim de identificar os principais sistemas éticos e seus pontos positivos e negativos. A argumentação de Tugendhat tende para o contratualismo contemporâneo, embora ainda procure (...) manter alguns aspectos kantianos ligados à fundamentação dos imperativos categóricos. Este artigo argumenta que a interpretação de Tugendhat sobre o sistema ético kantiano é correta apenas no que tange à formulação dos imperativos. Ao ignorar a noção de liberdade, Tugendhat abre espaço para o ceticismo ético porque não pode aprofundar a discussão em âmbito ontológico, como o próprio Kant o fez. (shrink)
● Sergio Cremaschi, The non-existing Island. I discuss the way in which the cleavage between the Continental and the Anglo-American philosophies originated, the (self-)images of both philosophical worlds, the converging rediscoveries from the Seventies, as well as recent ecumenic or anti-ecumenic strategies. I argue that pragmatism provides an important counter-instance to both the familiar self-images and to the fashionable ecumenic or anti-ecumenic strategies. My conclusions are: (i) the only place where Continental philosophy exists (as Euro-Communism one decade ago) is America; (...) (ii) less obviously, also analytic philosophy does not exist, or does no more exist as a current or a paradigm; what does exist is, on the one hand, philosophy of language and, on the other, philosophy of mind, that is, two disciplines; (iii) the dissolution of analytic philosophy as a school has been extremely fruitful, precisely in so far as it has left room for disciplines and research programmes; (iv) what is left, of the Anglo-American/Continental cleavage is primarily differences in styles, depending partly on intellectual traditions, partly owing to sociology, history, institutional frameworks; these differences should not be blurred by rash ecumenism; besides, theoretical differences are alive as ever, but within both camps; finally, there is indeed a lag (not a difference) in the appropriation of intellectual techniques by most schools of 'Continental' philosophy, and this should be overcome through appropriation of what the best 'analytic' philosophers have produced. -/- ● Michael Strauss, Language and sense-perception: an aspect of analytic philosophy. To test an assertion about one fact by comparing it with perceived reality seems quite unproblematic. But the very possibility of such a procedure is incompatible with the intellectualistic basis of logical positivism and atomism (as it is for example to be found in Russell's Analysis of Mind). According to the intellectualistic approach pure sensation is meaningless. Sensation receives its meaning and order from the intellect through interpretation, which is performed with the help of linguistic tools, i.e. words and sentences. Before being interpreted, sensation is not a picture or a representation, it is neither true nor false, neither an illusion nor knowledge; it does not tell us anything; it is a lifeless and order-less matter. But how can a thought (or a proposition) be compared with such a lifeless matter? This difficulty confronts the intellectualist, if on the one hand he admits the necessity of comparing thought with sense-perception, and on the other hand presupposes that we possess only intellectual and no immediate perceptual understanding of what we see and hear. In this paper I give a critical exposition of three attempts, made by Russell, Neurath and Wittgenstein, to solve this problem. The first attempt adheres to strict conventionalism, the second tends to naturalism and the third leads to an amended, very moderate version of conventionalism. This amended conventionalism looks at sense impressions as being a peculiar language, which includes primary symbols, i.e. symbols not founded on convention and not being in need of interpretation. -/- ● Ernst Tugendhat, Phenomenology and language analysis. The paper, first published in German in 1970, by which Tugendhat gave a start to the German rediscovery of analytic philosophy. The author stages a confrontation between phenomenology and language analysis. He argues that language analysis does not differ from phenomenology as far as the topics dealt with are concerned; instead, both currents are quite different in method. The author argues that language-analytic philosophy does not simply lay out of the mainstream of transcendental philosophy, but that instead it challenges this tradition on the very level of foundations. The author criticizes the linguistic-analytic approach centred on the subject as well as any object-centred approach, while proposing inter-subjective understanding through language as the new universal framework. This is, when construed in so general terms, the same program of hermeneutics, though in a more basic version. -/- ● Jürgen Habermas, Language game, intention and meaning. On a few suggestions by Sellars and Wittgenstein. -/- The paper, first published in German in 1975, in which Habermas announces his own linguistic turn through a discovery of speech acts. In this essay the author wants to work out a categorical framework for a communicative theory of society; he takes Wittgenstein's concept of language game as a Leitfade and, besides, he takes advantage also of Wilfried Sellars's quasi-transcendental account of the genesis of intentionality. His goal is to single out the problems connected with a theory of consciousness oriented in a logical-linguistic sense. -/- ● Zvie Bar-On, Isomorphism of speech acts and intentional states. -/- This essay presents the problem of the formal relationship between speech acts and intentional states as an essential part of the perennial philosophical question of the relation between language and thought. I attempt to show how this problem had been dealt with by two prominent philosophers of different camps in our century, Edmund Husserl and John Searle. Both of them wrote extensively about the theory of intentionality. I point out an interesting, as it were unintended, continuity of their work on that theory. Searle started where Husserl left off 80 years earlier. Their meeting point could be used as the first clue in our search. They both adopted in effect the same distinction between two basic aspects of the intentional experience: its content or matter, and its quality or mode. Husserl did not yet have the concept of a speech act as contradistinguished from an intentional state. The working hypothesis, however, which he suggested, could be used as a second clue for the further elaboration of the theory. The relationship of the two levels, the mental and the linguistic, which remained for Husserl in the background only, became the cornerstone of Searle' s inquiry. He employed the speech act as the model and analysed the intentional experience by means of the conceptual apparatus of his own theory of speech acts. This procedure enabled him to mark out a number of parallelisms and correlations between the two levels. This procedure explains the phenomenon of the partial isomorphism of speech acts and intentional states. -/- ● Roberta de Monticelli, Ontology. A dialogue among the linguistic philosopher, the naturalist, and the phenomenological philosopher. -/- This paper proposes a comparison between two main ways of conceiving the role and scope of that fundamental part of philosophy (or of "first" philosophy) which is traditionally called "ontology". One way, originated within the analytic tradition, consists of two main streams, namely philosophy of language and (contemporary) philosophy of mind, the former yielding "reduced ontology" and the latter "neo-Aristotelian ontology". The other way of conceiving ontology is exemplified by "phenomenological ontology" (more precisely, the Husserlian, not the Heideggerian version). Ontology as a theory of reference ("reduced" ontology, or ontology as depending on semantics) is presented and justified on the basis of some classical thesis of traditional philosophy of language (from Frege to Quine). "Reduced ontology" is shown to be identifiable with one level of a traditional, Aristotelian ontology, namely the one which corresponds to one of the four "senses of being" listed in Aristotle's Metaphysics: "being" as "being true". This identification is justified on the basis of Franz Brentano's "rules for translation" of the Aristotelian table of judgements in terms of (positive and negative) existential judgments such as are easily translatable into sentences of first order predicate logic. The second part of the paper is concerned with "neo-Aristotelian ontology", i.e. with naturalism and physicalism as the main ontological options underlying most of contemporary discussion in the philosophy of mind. The qualification of such options as "neo-Aristotelian" is justified; the relationships between "neo-Aristotelian ontology" and "reduced ontology" are discussed. In the third part the fundamental tenet of "phenomenological ontology" is identified by the thesis that a logical theory of existence and being does capture a sense of "existing" and "being" which, even though not the basic one, is grounded in the basic one. An attempt is done of further clarifying this "more basic" sense of "being". An argument making use of this supposedly "more basic" sense is advanced in favour of a "phenomenological ontology". -/- ● Kuno Lorenz, Analytic Roots in Dialogic Constructivism. -/- Both in the Vienna Circle ad in Russell's early philosophy the division of knowledge into two kinds (or two levels), perceptual and conceptual, plays a vital role. Constructivism in philosophy, in trying to provide a pragmatic foundation - a knowing-how - to perceptual as well as conceptual competences, discovered that this is dependent on semiotic tools. Therefore, the "principle of method" had to be amended by the "principle of dialogue". Analytic philosophy being an heir of classical empiricism, conceptually grasping the "given", and constructive philosophy being an heir of classical rationalism, perceptually providing the "constructed", merge into dialogical constructivism, a contemporary development of ideas derived especially from the works of Charles S. Peirce (his pragmatic maxim as a means of giving meaning to signs) and of Ludwig Wittgenstein (his language games as tools of comparison for understanding ways of life). -/- 7. Albrecht Wellmer, "Autonomy of meaning" and "principle of charity" from the viewpoint of the pragmatics of language. -/- In this essay I present an interpretation of the principle of the autonomy of meaning and of the principle of charity, the two main principles of Davidson's semantic view of truth, showing how both principles may fit in a perspective dictated by the pragmatics of language. I argue that (I) the principle of the autonomy of meaning may be thoroughly reformulated in terms of the pragmatics of language, (ii) the principle of charity needs a supplement in terms of pragmatics of language in order to become really enlightening as a principle of interpretation. Besides, I argue that: (i) on the one hand, the fundamental thesis of Habermas on the pragmatic theory of meaning ("we understand a speech act when we know what makes it admissible") is correlated with the seemingly intentionalist thesis according to which we understand a speech act when we know what a speaker means; (ii) on the other hand, to say that the meaning competence of a competent speaker is basically a competence about a potential of reasons (or also of possible justifications) which is inherently connected with the meaning of statements, or with their use in utterances. -/- ● Rüdiger Bubner, The convergence of analytic and hermeneutic philosophy -/- This paper argues that the analytic philosophy does not exist, at least as understood by its original programs. Differences in the analytic camp have always been bigger than they were believed to be. Now these differences are coming to the fore thanks to a process of dissolution of dogmatism. Philosophical analysis is led by its own inner logic towards questions that may be fairly qualified as hermeneutic. Recent developments in analytic philosophy, e.g. Davidson, seem to indicate a growing convergence of themes between philosophical analysis and hermeneutics; thus, the familiar opposition of Anglo-Saxon and Continental philosophy might soon belong to history. The fact of an ongoing appropriation of analytical techniques by present-day German philosophers may provide a basis for a powerful argument for the unity of philosophizing, beyond its strained images privileging one technique of thinking and rejecting the remainder. Actual philosophical practice should take the dialogue between the two camps more seriously; in fact, the processes described so far are no danger to philosophical work. They may be a danger for parochial approaches to philosophizing; indeed, contrary to what happens in the natural sciences, Thomas Kuhn's "normal science" developing within the framework of one fixed paradigm is not typical for philosophical thinking. And in philosophy innovating revolutions are symptoms more of vitality than of crisis. -/- ● Karl-Otto Apel, The impact of analytic philosophy on my intellectual biography. -/- In my paper I try to reconstruct the history of my Auseinandersetzung mit - as I called it - "language-analytical" philosophy (including even Peircean semiotics) since the late Fifties. The heuristics of my study was predetermined by two main motives of my beginnings: the hermeneutic turn of phenomenology and the transformation of "transcendental philosophy" in the light of the "language a priori". Thus, I took issue with the early and the later Wittgenstein, logical positivism, and post-Wittgensteinian and post-empiricist philosophy of science (i.e. G.H. von Wright and the renewal of the "explanation vs understanding controversy" as well as the debate between Th. Kuhn and Popper/Lakatos); besides, with speech act theory and the debate about "transcendental arguments" since Strawson. The "pragmatic turn", started already by C.L. Morris and the later Carnap, led me to study also the relationship between Wittgensteinian "use" theory of meaning and of truth. This resulted on my side in something like a program of "transcendental semiotics", i.e. "transcendental pragmatics" and "transcendental hermeneutics". -/- ● Ben-Ami Scharfstein, A doubt on both their houses: the blindness to non-western philosophies. The burden of my criticism is that contemporary European philosophers of all kinds have continued to think as if there were no true philosophy but that of the West. For the most part, the existentialists have been oblivious of their Eastern congeners; the hermeneuticians have yet to stretch their horizons beyond the most familiar ones; and the analysts remain unaware of the analyses and linguistic sensitivities of the ancient non-European philosophers. Briefly, ignorance still blinds almost all contemporary Western philosophers to the rich, variegated philosophical traditions outside of their familiar orbit. Both Continental and Anglo-Americans have lost the breadth of view that once characterized such thinkers as Herder and the Humboldts. The blindness that has resulted is not simply that of individual Western philosophers but of our whole, still parochial philosophical culture. (shrink)
A Doutrina do direito é um dos últimos trabalhos de Kant. Recomposto para uma nova editoração, o texto tem merecido a atenção de e teóricos do direito. A presente contribuição examina a repercussão da obra jurídica de Kant nos escritos recentes de Tugendhat, um dos críticos mais notórios do pensamento kantiano. O artigo privilegia asrelações entre direito e moral, procura dar uma feição mais nítida à chamada razão trivial, tendo em vista as clássicas objeções de Hegel à razão prática (...) kantiana. (shrink)
Os três artigos seguintes correspondema três aulas proferidas pelo Prof. Dr. ErnstTugendhat. No primeiro artigo, o autor trata doconceito de moral em Kant. Na Segunda aula,Prof. Tugendhat concentra-se no problema daliberdade em Kant. Por último, no terceiro artigo,aborda o conceito de liberdade como imputabilidade.
O texto pretende explicitar como, segundo Tugendhat, se dá a justificação da moral, intrínseca aos juízos morais, através de uma imbricação dos elementos racional e emotivo. Os juízos morais, enquanto procedimento racional, contêm uma pretensão de objetividade, que se pode explicar pelo imperativo categórico kantiano, interpretado como um exigir mútuo do respeito universal e imparcial aos interesses de todos. A obrigatoriedade moral, porém, pressupõe também um querer fazer parte de uma comunidade moral, a partir da qual os juízos morais (...) passam a vincular emotivamente, através da interiorização dos sentimentos que acompanham o aprovar e o desaprovar moral. Essa explicação das exigências morais parece satisfatória para a justificação de um núcleo mínimo de normas morais partilhadas numa dada sociedade; o texto aponta para a problematicidade dessa justificação da obrigatoriedade moral nos casos em que faltam regras partilhadas ou quando se considera a não-identificação das exigências morais com o que é empiricamente aprovado na sociedade. (shrink)
Tugendhat propõe, em seu livro - üções sobre éUca - uma análise formal do que seja uma moral Nesse patamar busca-se estatuir as características de qualquer sistema que queira ser identificado como moral Ao delimitar o que é uma moral Tugendhat determina, não só um cnténo para o reconhecimento de um sistema moral, mas, também, o próprio signjficado das proposições morais. Nesse último ponto, mostraremos os imbricamentos, bem como as diferenças entre essa posição é aquela de Kant. No (...) tocante às éticas kantianas, ele aceita o que concerne ao conteúdo, configurado numa moral do respeito universal, mas recusa sua pretensa fundamentação absoluta. (shrink)
A conferência trata do conceito nietzschiano de vontade de poder,compreendendo-o como um ir além, ou seja, o que Tugenghat nomeia como atranscendência imanente, relacionando-o com uma certa tradição da antropologiafilosófica.This lecture deals with the Nietzschean concept of The Will to Power, assumingthat this is a “going further”, that is, that which is named by Trughendhat theimmanent transcendency, relating it to a certain tradition of the philosophicalanthropology.
O texto trata de três dificuldades relativas à moral, a saber: como, entre diferentes significações para a palavra “moral”, podemos entender que com ela se queira referir a uma só coisa; como entender que possamos falar de uma moral se sobre ela se podem ter tão diferentes concepções; e, finalmente, em que bases podemos perguntar como devemos ou queremos entender o que é a moral, se ela nos parece algo já dado. As respostas a essas questões estão baseadas na explicação (...) da moral como um sistema de exigências mútuas calcado na simetria de validade das justificações para cada um dos envolvidos. A partir dessa concepção de moral, o autor tenta uma reinterpretação do contratualismo. (shrink)
Reconstroem-se, neste artigo, as objeções de Daniel Dahlstrom e Rufus Duits à crítica de Tugendhat à tese heideggeriana de que o conceito primordial de verdade consiste na noção de desvelamento. De diferentes modos, ambos os autores mantêm que Heidegger, ao contrário das acusações de Tugendhat, seria capaz de dar conta da falsidade. Grosso modo, enquanto Dahlstrom propõe que Tugendhat não apreciou o caráter transcendental do conceito originário de verdade em Heidegger, Duits acusa Tugendhat de haver se (...) prendido à perspectiva metafísica da Vorhandenheit. O objetivo deste artigo é indicar, com a ajuda dessa discussão, a questão fundamental da crítica de Tugendhat que, como parte da literatura mostrou, reside não tanto na exigência de uma explicação para a falsidade, mas muito mais na exigência de uma justificação para a transição semântica de ‘verdade’. Após mostrar nas duas primeiras seções como, respectivamente, Dahlstrom e Duits não atingem o cerne da crítica de Tugendhat, defendo na terceira seção minha interpretação da crítica de Tugendhat contra certas reservas recentemente articuladas por Wrathall. Concluo indicando a consonância dessa interpretação com a concessão de Heidegger em Das Ende der Philosophie und die Aufgabe des Denkens e apontando algumas questões pendentes. (shrink)
Bei der kritischen Darstellung von Ernst Tugendhats Fichtekritik gehe ich in drei Schritten vor: I. skizziere ich Tugendhats Position, II. erörtere ich Tugendhats Kritik an Fichte. Ich schließe III. mit einer Kritik an Tugendhats Fichtekritik.
La cuestión de la identidad personal ha sido muy discutida durante los últimos años. La atención puesta sobre este problema es una clara evidencia de la relevancia que tiene, entre otros, para el ámbito práctico en general. En este horizonte, Habermas y Tugendhat han sostenido una larga e interesante polémica sobre el concepto de identidad personal, polémica no siempre bien dimensionada. Esta querella ha servido para clarificar las diferentes variables que ingresan en esta problemática. En este trabajo analizaré críticamente (...) cada una de las posturas con la finalidad de advertir el corazón argumental, buscar elementos en común y subrayar las insalvables diferencias. (shrink)
La aclaración de la estructura de la autoconciencia es crucial en el debate entre los partidarios del “giro lingüístico” y los defensores de la “filosofía de la conciencia”, pues si quedase probado que la autoconciencia tiene un fundamento lingüístico, el lenguaje se infiltraría hasta la raíz misma de la subjetividad. Teniendo presente esta pregunta fundamental, este artículo examina la polémica entre Ernst Tugendhat y los autores de la Escuela de Heidelberg (dieter Henrich y Manfred Frank). Tugendhat concibe la (...) autoconciencia como un fenómeno esencialmente lingüístico, mientras que la Escuela de Heidelberg detecta en la teoría de Tugendhat las dificultades de la concepción clásica de la autoconciencia como reflexión. Tras estudiar los argumentos de una y otra parte, el artículo concluye señalando la simetría de ambos enfoques, e indica brevemente las tareas que debería resolver una teoría alternativa: la distinción de diversos niveles de autoconciencia, y la aclaración de la relación entre el nivel prelingüístico y el nivel conceptual. (shrink)
In seiner Aufsatzsammlung Anthropologie statt Metaphysik behandelt Ernst Tugendhat große metaphysische Fragen mit nüchternem Blick auf uns Menschen. Tugendhat plädiert dort an mehreren Stellen für ein erkenntnistheoretisches Prinzip, nach dem wir uns z.B. dann zu richten haben, wenn wir uns fragen, ob wir an Gott glauben sollen. Das Prinzip lautet: Wenn die rationalen Gründe zugunsten einer Überzeugung genauso stark sind wie die rationalen Gegengründe, und wenn wir – unabhängig von Vernunft – das Bedürfnis verspüren oder den Wunsch oder (...) die Hoffnung, dass die Überzeugung wahr sein möge, dann sollen wir uns gegen die fragliche Überzeugung entscheiden. Ich halte dies Prinzip für zu pessimistisch und für überzogen rational. Meiner Ansicht nach wären wir nicht gut beraten, dem Prinzip in unserem geistigen Leben immer zu folgen; das ist nur in ganz speziellen Fällen ratsam. Um das plausibel zu machen, gehe ich verschiedene Alltagsbeispiele durch, bei denen das Prinzip greifen würde und bei denen sich seine Anwendung so ähnlich anfühlt wie bei der Frage nach Gott. Die Beispiele betreffen Fragen der künstlerischen Selbsteinschätzung, des Wetters, der Liebe sowie der menschlichen Qualitäten von Vor- und Nachfahren. Und da Tugendhats Prinzip schon bei solchen harmlosen Beispielen pessimistische, aber keineswegs zuverlässige Ratschläge erteilt, sollten wir es besser auch nicht auf die Frage nach Gott anwenden. (shrink)
O artigo tenciona estabelecer umparalelo entre a posição inicial de Tugendhatsobre a moral contratualista exposta em Liçõessobre Ética, então considerada uma "moralinsuficiente", e aquela assumida atualmente peloautor, segundo a qual a moral contratualista éentendida como o "núcleo de uma moral nãoautoritária". Este trabalho localiza na sua reinterpretaçãodo conceito de contrato moral a razãoda mudança do autor em relação a esta correnteética contemporânea.
Este artigo trata da definição das noções semânticas. A partir de uma reconsideração das propostas de A. Tarski e E. Tugendhat, defende-se que as noções semânticas são complementares às noções ontológicas, no sentido de que a definição destas pressupõe e completa a definição daquelas.
O presente artigo começa pela crítica do projeto de Tugendhat de tomar a análise da linguagem do segundo Wittgenstein como o método geral da filosofia, em particular, da filosofia moral, para em seguida, tentar decidir se o mesmo método pode ser usado como procedimento de leitura da analítica heideggeriana do Dasein. Na continuação, proponho-me a examinar se o programa de Tugendhat de racionalizar o agir humano, herdado do iluminismo, pode servir de quadro teórico para compreender a fenomenologia heideggeriana (...) da responsabilidade. (shrink)
O texto compõe-se de duas partes: 1) uma introdução sobre Ernst Tugendhat, seu percurso e seu trabalho, bem como seu envolvimento com o ensino da filosofia entre nós; e 2) um depoimento do filósofo alemão sobre o ensino de filosofia na universidade, apresentando suas opiniões e sua vasta experiência a respeito. Para ele, como para o introdutor, em vez de resumir-se essencialmente ao aprendizado da história da filosofia e à leitura dos grandes filósofos, o ensino dessa disciplina – algo (...) como uma “arte” – deveria incluir, desde o começo, o exercício da argumentação sobre temas e problemas e a redação de textos curtos nessa linha. (shrink)
Este artigo trata sobre as possíveis aproximações entre a filosofia de Heidegger e a filosofia de Heidegger. Essas aproximações são desenvolvidas em função do mundo cotidiano. Busca-se esclarecer quais são as dificuldades envolvidas no estudo de ambos os autores, quando a intenção visa diretamente o ser humano, sendo esses elementos identificados com cotidiano. Na primeira e na segunda parte apresentam-se os dois autores e na terceira parte é realizada uma interface através da filosofia de Tugendhat. Nela se destaca a (...) crítica à Heidegger e a adoção de uma posição naturalista. Conclui-se que tanto Heidegger quanto Hume possuem âmbitos subjacentes que determinam a suas análises do cotidiano. Estes âmbitos subjacentes se diferenciam e configuram a dificuldade fundamental nas tentativas de reunir elementos dos dois autores. (shrink)
In this collection of seven essays, Raymond Geuss brings his distinctive philosophical perspective to bear on the interrelations among the three issues announced in his title. At one point calling his approach an “excursion into conceptual history”, Geuss manages to keep his potentially intractable topic under control by integrating very broad thematic elements with extended moments of textual analysis, focusing on such thinkers as Kant, Hegel, Nietzsche, Theodor Adorno, and Ernst Tugendhat. Although the essays range fairly widely, it becomes (...) evident that the two central figures in Geuss’s loosely connected concerns are, in the end, Nietzsche and Adorno, signaling the volume’s chief preoccupation with the interrelations between art and morality in modern culture. In the pursuit of these and other complexities, the author’s deep learning is coupled with a style that is virtually crystalline. (shrink)
Resumen: A la luz de la distinción elaborada por E. Tugendhat entre religión y mística, retomada a su modo por el teólogo J. Ratzinger, se examina la idea hegeliana según la cual la filosofía eleva la forma representativa propia de la religión a concepto. ¿Significa esto que la religión cristiana es..
This paper argues that Tugendhat's critique of Heidegger's existential conception of truth as disclosedness is usually misunderstood. The main claim of this paper is that Tugendhat insists against Heidegger on certain conventional features of truth such as conformity of the law of non-contradiction, not because he adheres to an ideal of truth as correctness; rather, he proposes an alternative existential conception of truth in terms of an active, critical or self-critical, engagement with untruth. Various recent objections to (...) class='Hi'>Tugendhat's critique of Heidegger are discussed against the background of his alternative and are rejected. The paper concludes by outlining several challenges to Tugendhat's alternative existential conception of truth. (shrink)
One of the central concepts in Charles Taylor’s philosophy is that of strong evaluation. What is strong evaluation? The crucial idea is that human relations to the world, to self and to others are value-laden. In the first subsection the central features of the concept of strong evaluation are discussed, namely qualitative distinctions concerning worth and the role of strong evaluation for identity. The nature of strong evaluations both as background understandings and explicit judgements is clarified. It is also claimed (...) that strong evaluation is not precisely a matter of second-order desires, but of evaluative beliefs. In subsection 1.2, some additional and less central characterizations are scrutinized: contingent conflicts, articulacy, discriminacy, reflectivity, depth. The claim is that most of these are not criterial for the distinction between strong and weak evaluations. In the third subsection various criticisms are taken up (from Ernst Tugendhat, Jurgen Habermas, Owen Flanagan, Joel Anderson), which are relevant for defining strong evaluations and assessing the role strong evaluation has in ethics. The terminological solutions are here connected to substantive issues in moral theory. I will defend Taylor against three aspects of a Kantian critique that the notion of strong evaluation is too broad, and overlooks crucial distinctions. Should one distinguish between moral and other values more clearly? Should one distinguish between categorical and optional goods more sharply? Should one distinguish between the whole “moral map” and one’s own orientation more clearly? I think these are indeed essential questions, but they are to be answered within the realm of qualitative distinctions concerning worth. The Kantian attempts to segregate one type of issue as involving strong evaluation and another type of issue as not involving it are misguided. In the fourth subsection I put forward three critical claims in an attempt to show that the notion of strong evaluation as Taylor defines it is too narrow (or at least ambivalent about how narrow it is). These critiques are inspired by more comprehensives approaches to ethics (e. g. by Joseph Raz or Paul Ricoeur). First, is strong evaluation restricted strictly to second-order self-evaluation (as some formulations by Taylor seem to suggest), or does it cover value-judgement in general (as some other formulations by Taylor seem to suggest)? In the broad sense, strong evaluations also include first-order judgements made in various different situations, and background commitments to goods. I suggest that the broad sense be adopted. Second, how does the distinction between strong and weak evaluations relate to “small” values? Third, can self-evaluation succeed without the deontic layer of reasons and norms and if not, does the concept of strong evaluation cover that as well? I defend a different line from Taylor on the issues of small values and the deontic realm. This will lead to a suggestion of “strong evaluation in an extended sense”. (shrink)
With what right and with what meaning does Heidegger use the term 'truth' to characterize Dasein's disclosedness? This is the question at the focal point of Ernst Tugendhat's long-standing critique of Heidegger's understanding of truth, one to which he finds no answer in Heidegger's treatment of truth in §44 of Being and Time or his later work. To put the question differently: insofar as unconcealment or disclosedness is normally understood as the condition for the possibility of propositional truth rather (...) than truth itself, what does it mean to say - as Heidegger does - that disclosedness is the "primordial phenomenon of truth" and what justifies that claim? The central aim of this paper is to show that Tugendhat's critique remains unanswered. Recent Heidegger scholarship, though it confronts Tugendhat, has not produced a viable answer to his criticism, in part because it overlooks his basic question and therefore misconstrues the thrust of his objections. Ultimately, the paper suggests that what is needed is a re-evaluation of Heidegger's analysis of truth in light of a more accurate understanding of Tugendhat's critique. The paper concludes by sketching the profile of a more satisfactory reply to Tugendhat's critical question, advocating a return to Heidegger's 'existential' analyses in Being and Time in order to locate the normative resources Tugendhat finds lacking in Heidegger's concept of truth. (shrink)
This paper responds to Tugendhat's well-known and influential critique of Heidegger's concept of truth with the resources of Heidegger's texts, in particular §44 of Being and Time. To start with, Tugendhat's primary critical argument is reconstructed. It is held to consist firstly in the charge of ambiguity against Heidegger's formulations of his concept of truth and secondly in the claim that Heidegger's concept of truth is incompatible with an adequate concept of falsehood. It is shown that the supposedly (...) ambiguous meanings are, on the one hand, in fact clearly distinguished by Heidegger and, on the other, that they merely amount to different extensions of the same meaning of truth. It is then shown how this concept of truth is indeed compatible with an adequate, albeit post-metaphysical, concept of falsehood. Finally, the grounds of falsehood in the untruth of the existential of Verfallen are pursued and further objections are dismissed. (shrink)
Some, if not all statements containing the word 'I' seem to be 'immune to error through misidentification relative to the first-person pronoun' (Shoemaker). This immunity, however, is due to the fact that the pronoun 'I' plays no identifying role in the first place. Since no identification takes place here, the alleged immunity to misidentification should come as no surprise. But there is a second immunity thesis, which captures the peculiarity of 'I' better: The first-person pronoun is immune to reference-failure. Some (...) philosophers claim that this kind of immunity applies to the indexicals 'here' and 'now' as well. Which epistemic significance does such guaranteed reference have? Does it constitute infallible knowledge? No, the alleged immunity calls for a deflationary interpretation. It has grammatical reasons, in the Wittgensteinian sense. Therefore, the epistemic notions 'infallible knowledge' and 'immunity to error' are misleading here. (shrink)
G.E. Moore, more than either Bertrand Russell or Ludwig Wittgenstein, was chiefly responsible for the rise of the analytic method in twentieth-century philosophy. This selection of his writings shows Moore at his very best. The classic essays are crucial to major philosophical debates that still resonate today. Amongst those included are: * A Defense of Common Sense * Certainty * Sense-Data * External and Internal Relations * Hume's Theory Explained * Is Existence a Predicate? * Proof of an External World (...) In addition, this collection also contains the key early papers in which Moore signals his break with idealism, and three important previously unpublished papers from his later work which illustrate his relationship with Wittgenstein. (shrink)
Is God's foreknowledge compatible with human freedom? One of the most attractive attempts to reconcile the two is the Ockhamistic view, which subscribes not only to human freedom and divine omniscience, but retains our most fundamental intuitions concerning God and time: that the past is immutable, that God exists and acts in time, and that there is no backward causation. In order to achieve all that, Ockhamists distinguish ‘hard facts’ about the past which cannot possibly be altered from ‘soft facts’ (...) about the past which are alterable, and argue that God's prior beliefs about human actions are soft facts about the past. (shrink)
An important contribution to the foundations of probability theory, statistics and statistical physics has been made by E. T. Jaynes. The recent publication of his collected works provides an appropriate opportunity to attempt an assessment of this contribution.
Frege's notion of 'bedeutung' (b.) is here interpreted not as the object for which an expression stands but as its truth-Value potential. This is achieved by beginning with the b. Of sentences and defining the b. Of names as that property of them which remains constant when they are substituted in sentences without a change in truth-Value. This interpretation is shown to receive confirmation from what frege says in a recently published manuscript about the b. Of predicates; finally, It is (...) applied to frege's doctrine of oblique b. (shrink)