Resumen El presente ensayo explora el alcance que poseen para la pregunta fundamental por la vida buena las reflexiones que Harry Frankfurt ha elaborado acerca de la importancia que atribuimos a ciertas cosas en general, y acerca del amor como una forma señalada en que alguien o algo puede sernos importante. Comienzo examinando las razones por las que, según el autor, resulta imposible ofrecer una respuesta no circular a dicha pregunta, razones que vuelven necesario un modo indirecto de abordarla. A (...) partir de la noción frankfurtiana de importancia propongo a continuación una crítica a la llamada teoría del deseo, el enfoque más influyente en las discusiones actuales en torno al bienestar o la vida buena. Finalmente, y luego de referirme a la necesidad, apuntada por Susan Wolf, de tomar en cuenta el valor objetivo de aquello que nos importa, presento dos consideraciones mediante las cuales intento, con y contra Frankfurt, destacar lo que me parece más valioso de sus ideas acerca del amor.This essay explores the impact of Harry Frankfurt’s reflections on the importance we attach to certain things in general, as well as on love as a marked way in which something or someone can be important to us, to the fundamental question of the good life. I begin by examining the reasons why, according to the author, it is impossible to offer a non-circular answer to this question, reasons that make necessary an indirect way of approaching it. Starting from the Frankfurtian notion of importance, I then propose a critique of the so-called theory of desire, the most influential approach in current discussions about well-being or the good life. Finally, and after referring to the need, pointed out by Susan Wolf, to take into account the objective value of what matters to us, I present two considerations through which I try, with and against Frankfurt, to highlight what seems most valuable to me of his ideas about love. (shrink)

Desarrollo en este artículo tres planteamientos en torno a la cuestión del sentido de la vida, cada uno de ellos asociado a las nociones que figuran en su título: ambigüedad, disolución y latencia. 1) La expresión “sentido de la vida” posee al menos cuatro significados y de ello se siguen consecuencias no menores. 2) En su acepción habitual, la pregunta por el sentido puede disolverse o dejar de plantearse, cuando es sustituida por la pregunta práctica por la vida buena. 3) (...) Ello no significa que la pregunta por el sentido desaparezca del todo: ella continua latente. Pero cuando vuelve a tornarse manifiesta, ya no demanda de nosotros una respuesta. Es esa la experiencia del asombro, a la que me refiero hacia el final del texto. (shrink)

The present text follows three general objectives, which, at the same time, build its structure. Firstly, I would like to present and question Bernard Williams’ description of the virtue of accuracy. Secondly, I´ll try to complement Williams’ description by analyzing two dimensions of accuracy: care, on one side, and what I call “proximity to the problem”, on the other side. Related to that last issue, I add an excursus about writing. The third and last part of this article is an (...) attempt to relate the discussion about the so called virtues of truth —sincerity as well as accuracy— with the issue of self-deception. Specifically, I try to a) support Mele´s deflationary account of self-deception as motivationally biased belief, b) make an adjustment to this conception, and c) complement it with another aspect which has not received enough consideration in the discussion about self-deception, namely some beliefs we don´t generate or that manifest a high lack of accuracy. (shrink)

The title and subtitle entail the main claims of this article. In the face of the present debate on the question whether Wittgenstein was a foundationalist, a coherentist, or both things, I suggest that, at least in a certain important sense, he didn’t adopt either of these positions. The point concerns the status of propositions that I characterize as “unheard-of propositions” and that constitute the most important subclass of so called “Moore-type propositions”. Unheard-of propositions (and the corresponding beliefs) are neither (...) doubted nor justified, they are not said and not even thought. We simply count on them or we take them for granted. In calling our attention on these primitive, spontaneous and instinctive certainties Wittgenstein is trying to correct an intellectualist bias in traditional conceptions of human being. This reading is confirmed through an analysis of the origin of our basic certainties: we have some of them naturally or instinctively, we acquire others by training, but in neither case there are rational processes at stake (nor irrational ones, of course). The debate between foundationalism and coherentism conceals precisely what Wittgenstein is trying to uncover: a stratum of certainties that, being objective, precede the order of knowledge and justification. (shrink)

Davidson's thesis that the notion of a rule is dispensable in regard to a theoretical explanation of linguistic communication is here critically investigated. First I put Davidson's into question and thereby arrive at the conclusion that instances of communication in two languages pose no threat and that Davidson invokes a dubious concept of a rule in his treatment of so called malapropisms. Then I investigate his My thesis is that Davidson does not succeed-in taking into account appropriately the, as he (...) himself concedes, important distinction between "using words correctly" and "believing that one uses words correctly". Finally I try to formulate of the later Davidson in such a manner that they do not fall prey to his rule-criticism. (shrink)

In this “Letter from Chile” I describe and comment the main features of philosophical activity in Chile. My perspective is related to my own academic experience: that of a Chilean academic, who earned his doctorate at the Free University of Berlin, worked in that same university for six years as an Assistant Professor, and has been an Associate Professor at the Department of Philosophy at the Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile in Santiago for the last eleven years. The first part (...) of the text offers a review of the historical development of philosophy in Chile. Afterwards, I refer to the current situation of our academic philosophy, analyzing various aspects: issues, currents, institutions, publications, research system, among others. Finally, I outline, from the above, some assessments and a general diagnosis of the present situation of philosophy in my country. (shrink)

Artificial intelligence plays an important role and has been used by several countries as a health strategy in an attempt to understand, control and find a cure for the disease caused by Coronavirus. These intelligent systems can assist in accelerating the process of developing antivirals for Coronavirus and in predicting new variants of this virus. For this reason, much research on COVID-19 has been developed with the aim of contributing to new discoveries about the Coronavirus. However, there are some epistemological (...) aspects about the use of AI in this pandemic period of Covid-19 that deserve to be discussed and need reflections. In this scenario, this article presents a reflection on the two epistemological aspects faced by the COVID-19 pandemic: The epistemological aspect resulting from the use of patient data to fill the knowledge base of intelligent systems; the epistemological problem arising from the dependence of health professionals on the results/diagnoses issued by intelligent systems. In addition, we present some epistemological challenges to be implemented in a pandemic period. (shrink)

“On Why in Philosophy Examples Matter”. The purpose of the article is to show the need of using examples in philosophy, associating to them four functions: to illustrate, explain, argue and show. Among other assertions, we attempt to justify the following: a) Examples are, as well as illustrations, evidences; such that what may be seen as an act of didactic generosity may be considered properly as the response to an always possible demand. b) The introduction of philosophical concepts requires frequently (...) a mutual cooperation between definition and example; the need of the latter in conceptual explanation is condoned by a reflection on the following of rules. c) A certain overrating of the counterexample and underrating of the example are tokens of a notion of philosophy put here into question. d) In Wittgenstein and other authors, a little heeded function of some examples is detected: of showing an alternative way of viewing the matter, of re-describing ancient philosophical themes. Towards the end, the issue of the example is assumed –this time– as an example of a more general issue: that of the relation between rhetoric and philosophy. (shrink)

El objetivo del artículo es describir rasgos estructurales de la comprensión de metáforas mediante una comparación con la comprensión de otras culturas, tal como ésta ha sido comentada por Wittgenstein y Geertz. El fenómeno de estudio es la comprensión enfática de metáforas fuertes. La comparación entre ambos tipos de comprensión sirve para plantear y dar respuesta a tres preguntas desatendidas en la profusa literatura sobre la metáfora: 1) ¿En qué sentido nos sorprenden las metáforas fuertes? 2) ¿En qué sentido pueden (...) ser profundas? 3) ¿En qué sentido hablamos de la riqueza de este fenómeno lingüístico? /// This paper sets out to describe the structural features of metaphor comprehension through a comparison with the process of understanding other cultures construed along the lines proposed by Wittgenstein and Geertz. The phenomenon under analysis is the emphatic understanding of strong metaphors. The comparison between understanding metaphors and cultures serves to raise and answer three questions that have been neglected in the vast literature on metaphors: 1) In which sense do strong metaphors surprise us? 2) In which sense can a metaphor be profound? 3) In which sense do we speak of the richness of this linguistic phenomenon? (shrink)

https://revistes.uab.cat/enrahonar/article/view/v27-fermandois.

Resumen Según la tesis principal de este artículo, para articular el alcance e interés del tema wittgensteineano de los parecidos de familia se requiere ver en él, no una respuesta a la pregunta por lo que sea un concepto en general, sino una propuesta de carácter metodológico. Dos preguntas orientan la parte central del texto: (1) ¿Qué significa “conceptos de parecidos de familia”? (2) ¿Cuáles serían los conceptos en cuestión? Con respecto a (1), intento mostrar que el término no es (...) unívoco: un primer sentido dice relación con el dictum de los “parecidos que se superponen y entrecruzan” (IF 67) y se diferencia de un segundo sentido asociado al tema de los “bordes borrosos” (IF 71). Con apoyo en esta distinción ofrezco una respuesta a (2): en el primer sentido del término, no existe ningún concepto de familia, mientras que de acuerdo con el segundo todos los conceptos lo son. En la parte final propongo reinterpretar el tema en clave metodológica. Afirmar que conceptos como los de lenguaje, comprender, pensar, etc., son conceptos de familia significa que la reflexión filosófica sobre ellos no pasa fundamentalmente por buscar definiciones; que tanto o más importante es la cuidada descripción de ejemplos paradigmáticos, como “centros de variación” (EPB 190). Abstract According to the main thesis of this article, in order to articulate the scope and interest of Wittgenstein’s family resemblances topic, we should see into it not an answer to the question what concepts in general are, but a methodological proposal. Two questions guide the central part of the text: (1) What does “family-resemblances concepts” mean? (2) What concepts fall within the corresponding class? Regarding (1) I try to show that “family-resemblances concepts” is not an unequivocal term: a first sense has to do with the dictum of “similarities overlapping and criss-crossing” (IF 67) and is to be distinguished from a second sense associated with the topic of “blurred edges” (IF 71). This distinction lies behind the answer I offer to (2): in the first sense of the term, there is no family concept at all, while according to the second sense all concepts are of this kind. In the final part I propose a reinterpretation of the issue from a methodological perspective. To say that concepts like language, understanding, thinking, etc. are family concepts means that the philosophical reflection on them should not centre on the praxis of looking for definitions. As important ―maybe more important― as that it’s the careful description of paradigmatic examples, as “centers of variation” (EPB 190). (shrink)

This article focuses on two largely ignored aspects of the understanding of strong metaphors: the visual dimension and the emotional factors. Particularly, I intend to offer answers to the following questions: 1) What does it mean to understand a visual metaphor? 2) Can Wittgenstein’s ideas about the vision of aspects help to better understand this understanding? 3) In what sense does his notion of secondary sense enrich the philosophical reflection on the understanding of metaphors? 4) In what sense may emotions (...) be an important factor in the understanding of certain metaphors? The article is framed in a methodological proposal: I defend a phenomenology of the metaphor, that is, an accurate description of our experiences with metaphors, and in this case, its understanding. (shrink)

Este trabajo se centra en dos aspectos poco estudiados de la comprensión de metáforas fuertes: la dimensión visual y factores emocionales. En concreto, intento responder las siguientes preguntas: 1) ¿Qué significa comprender una metáfora visual? 2) ¿Es posible que las ideas de Wittgenstein sobre la ..

Resumen Dada la renovada vigencia que la antigua pregunta socrática: ¿cómo se debería vivir? goza en nuestros días -en particular, en el ámbito anglosajón y alemán-, no extraña que los diferentes enfoques vengan acompañados a menudo por con sideraciones de índole metodológica. ¿Cómo abordar hoy la proverbial pregunta? ¿Con qué criterios de corrección debería cumplir una teoría de la vida buena? ¿Es siquiera posible una tal teoría? El propósito de la presente reflexión es contribuir al esclarecimiento de estas cuestiones mediante (...) lo que propongo llamar una apro ximación indirecta a la cuestión de la vida buena. En el texto se describen y justifican los rasgos centrales de dicha aproximación, la que se distancia del debate actual entre teorías de la vida buena, al no asumir una serie de pretensiones metodológicas características de dicho debate.Given the renewed interest that the old Socratic question “How should we live?” has taken in the present day -in particular, in the Anglo-Saxon and in the Germán world- it is not surprising that the different approaches are often accompanied by methodological considerations. How to deal with the old question today? What correction criteria should a theory of the good life meet? Is such a theory even possible? The aim of this essay is to contribute to the clarification of these issues through what I propose to call “an indirect approach” to the question of the good life. The paper describes and justifies the central features of this approach, which distances itself from the current debate between good life theories, by not assuming a series of methodological claims characteristic of this debate. (shrink)

Modern zoos strive to educate visitors about zoo animals and their wild counterparts’ conservation needs while fostering appreciation for wildlife in general. This research review examines how zoos influence those who visit them. Much of the research to-date examines zoo visitors’ behaviors and perceptions in relation to specific exhibits, animals and/or programs. In general, visitors have more positive perceptions and behaviors about zoos, their animals and conservation initiatives the more they interact with animals, naturalistic exhibits, and zoo programming/staff. Furthermore, zoo (...) visitors are receptive to conservation messaging and initiatives at zoos, and are more likely to participate in on-site conservation opportunities as opposed to after their visits. The research also suggests that repeat visitors are even more inclined to seek out conservation efforts compared to those visiting zoos for the first time. While current research suggests that repeat-visitors are more likely to engage in conservation efforts, little is known about causal factors related to such findings, and almost no research exists to-date comparing the conservation efforts of visitors vs. non-visitors. This latter comparison will likely play a greater role in future zoo visitor research, since it poses one of the most important metrics for evaluating the specific effects visiting a zoo can have on people engaging in conservation efforts in general. (shrink)

Although sustainable and responsible investment (SRI) has quite recently become a hot research topic, scarcely any systematic research has been paid to the performance of this non-conventional approach to investment during the financial crisis that emerged in mid-2008 when the resilience of the financial markets was sorely tested. Such real-world resilience in practice is the subject of the current research which tests whether environmental, social and governance screens provides ethical investors with adaptive resilience in bull and bear market conditions by (...) focussing on the SRI equity index of one of the most active markets in Europe in terms of ethical investment, the FTSE4Good-Ibex in Spain. Multivariate Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity (M-GARCH) analysis indicates that ethical investors in the equity market examined with evidence that greater resilience in severe business cycle shocks could be attributable to SRI by companies. Although limited to a single country study, the results have implications for investors seeking resilience in crisis: when individual values and beliefs towards sustainability tie with personal investment strategy, the end result is adaptive financial resilience, social well-being and environmental defence. (shrink)

We agree with Rendell and Whitehead that cetaceans acquire knowledge from caretakers and peers, and that a clear understanding of this process can provide insight into the evolution of mammalian cognition. The passive observational methods they advocate, however, are inadequate for determining what cetaceans know. Only by experimentally investigating the cognition of cetaceans can we hope to understand what they learn through social interactions.

The article analyses innovative ethno-geographical systems of the first century BC. During Hellenistic times, the science of geography made use of increasingly advanced mathematical and astronomical skills to ensure a scientific basis for the cartographical project; however, this geographical research apparently disregarded the natural and human environments. There is a paradigm change in the referred century. The Stoic Posidonius focuses on the concept of zones found in the early philosophers and finds a compromise between the ‘scientific’ and the ‘descriptive’ geographies. (...) Likewise, Vitruvius conveys a geographical system which associates climatic, somatic, and psychic features. (shrink)

The relationship between individuals and communities — all manner of communities, but especially the state — is a central preoccupation of property theory. Even though the relationship between individuals and community stands at the conceptual center of property theory, the theories of community underlying discussions of property are frequently left implicit. The dominant approaches to property in Anglophone scholarship, utilitarian and classical liberal theories, treat communities as agglomerations of individuals. Moreover, they eschew substantive accounts of justice, favoring what Charles Taylor (...) has called "procedural" conceptions. In this Article, we offer an ontological conception of community that views the individual and community as mutually dependent. In contrast with the two competing theories we describe, we favor a substantive conception of justice built around the notion of human flourishing. Although we are reluctant to embrace any particular label for our view, it is broadly Aristotelian in its framework. Once we have sketched the outlines of our theory, we will describe how our ontological theory might operate, using State v. Shack and a prominent South African property case as our central examples. (shrink)

This book surveys the leading modern theories of property - Lockean, libertarian, utilitarian/law-and-economics, personhood, Kantian and human flourishing - and then applies those theories to concrete contexts in which property issues have been especially controversial. These include redistribution, the right to exclude, regulatory takings, eminent domain and intellectual property. The book highlights the Aristotelian human flourishing theory of property, providing the most comprehensive and accessible introduction to that theory to date. The book's goal is neither to cover every conceivable theory (...) nor to discuss every possible facet of the theories covered. Instead, it aims to make the major property theories comprehensible to beginners, without sacrificing accuracy or sophistication. The book will be of particular interest to students seeking an accessible introduction to contemporary theories of property, but even specialists will benefit from the book's lucid descriptions of contemporary debates. (shrink)

In this article, based on a critical metaphor analysis, we identify and describe multimodal metaphors involving the human body and its conceptualizations in five auteur films of the 2010s. Studies on the human body in cinema have documented how it changes according to underlying ideologies. Our research focuses on the role of image schemas and metaphors as they embody meanings and sociocultural paradigms. Metaphors also frame how the body is conceptualized according to dominating ideological practices such as (a) commodification, (b) (...) the integration between artificial and organic, (c) dissatisfaction, (d) dynamics of beautification and idealization, and (e) politicization of the human body. We show how metaphors are creative tools to reframe meanings and representations of the body and how the body is a construct refashioned within the cinematic discourses of these films. (shrink)

Animals have always been important for human life due to the ecological, cultural and economic functions that they represent. This has allowed building several kinds of relationships that have promoted different emotions in human societies. The objective of this review was to identify the main emotions that humans show towards wildlife species and the impact of such emotions on animal populations’ management. We reviewed academic databases to identify previous studies on this topic worldwide. An analysis of the emotions on wildlife (...) and factors causing them is described here. We identified a controversy about these emotions. Large predators such as wolves, coyotes, bears, big felids, as well as reptiles such as snakes and geckos promote mainly anger, fear, and disgust. This is likely due to the perceptions, beliefs and experiences that societies have historically built around them. However, in some social groups these animals have promoted emotions such as happiness due to their values for people. Likewise, sadness is an emotion expressed for the threatening situations that animals are facing nowadays. Furthermore, we associated the conservation status of wildlife species identified in the study with human emotions to discuss their relevance for emerging conservation strategies, particularly focused on endangered species promoting ambiguous emotions in different social groups. (shrink)