The redundant-signals paradigm (RSP) is designed to investigate response behavior in perceptual tasks in which response-relevant targets are defined by either one or two features, or modalities. The common finding is that responses are speeded for redundantly compared to singly defined targets. This redundant-signals effect (RSE) can be accounted for by race models if the response times do not violate the race model inequality (RMI). When there are violations of the RMI, race models are effectively excluded as a viable account (...) of the RSE. The common alternative is provided by co-activation accounts, which assume that redundant target signals are integrated at some processing stage. However, ‘co-activation’ has mostly been only indirectly inferred and the accounts have only rarely been explicitly modeled; if they were modeled, the RSE has typically been assumed to have a decisional locus. Yet, there are also indications in the literature that the RSE might originate, at least in part, at a non-decisional or motor stage. In the present study, using a distribution analysis of sequential-sampling models (ex-Wald and Ratcliff Diffusion model), the locus of the RSE was investigated for two bimodal (audio-visual) detection tasks that strongly violated the RMI, indicative of substantial co-activation. Three model variants assuming different loci of the RSE were fitted to the quantile reaction time proportions: a decision, a non-decision, and a combined variant both to vincentized group as well as individual data. The results suggest that for the two bimodal detection tasks, co-activation has a shared decisional and non-decisional locus. These findings point to the possibility that the mechanisms underlying the RSE depend on the specifics (task, stimulus, conditions, etc.) of the experimental paradigm. (shrink)

U radu se kritički osvjetljava pojam slobode u okviru filozofske misli Immanuela Kanta. Ovime se prvenstveno misli na njegov etički nauk, pa posredno i na epistemološki i estetički, koji na njega upućuju i kroz njega se utemeljuju. Cilj rada je pokazati da se sloboda, tumačena u oba svoja aspekta , dade izjednačiti s konceptima autonomije i spontaniteta. Ovim se pak putem, obzirom da je sloboda ratio essendi moralnoga zakona, može argumentirati i u korist teze o praktičkom jedinstvu slobode i moralnog (...) zakona. Dodatno, u radu se analiziraju interpretativne implikacije kao i teškoće koje se javljaju čak i u tumačenjima eminentnih poznavatelja Kantove misli, poput L. W. Becka i N. Hartmanna.This paper aims to critically examine and evaluate the whole of Kant’s philosophy from the perspective of the notion of freedom. Freedom, both in its negative and positive capacity, as well as in it’s purely practical sense, serves as a cornerstone of Kant’s philosophical enquiry and the one true medium of the mind both in the practical and theoretical sense. Along with the aforementioned negative-positive dichotomy, freedom can further be distinguished as being one with the concept of the autonomy of the mind. Through this connection, freedom becomes, as its ratio essendi, practically one with the moral law itself, the latter being a form of the former. From the idea of freedom, various implications emerge, which have been dealt with through the course of the essay. In this respect, particular attention is paid to Kant’s notion of will and some of the misunderstandings it managed to create among notable Kant scholars like L. W. Beck and N. Hartmann. (shrink)