Since more than 50 years Kant scholars debate the question whether the Law of Right as introduced in the Metaphysics of Morals by Kant can be justified by the Categorical Imperative. On the one hand we have those who think that Kant's theory of right depends from the Categorical Imperative, on the other hand we find a growing group of scholars who deny this. However, the debate has been flawed by confusion and misunderstanding of the crucial terms and principles. Therefore, (...) my first task will be to clarify these terms and principles by introducing distinctions that have been neglected too often. After this I try to show a) that the Law of Right can in fact be justified by using the testing method the Categorical Imperative prescribes and b) that there is no other way to justify it. Doing this I criticize in detail the new arguments adherents of the independence thesis have recently put forward. (shrink)
In der 1970 gegründeten Reihe erscheinen Arbeiten, die philosophiehistorische Studien mit einem systematischen Ansatz oder systematische Studien mit philosophiehistorischen Rekonstruktionen verbinden. Neben deutschsprachigen werden auch englischsprachige Monographien veröffentlicht. Gründungsherausgeber sind: Erhard Scheibe, Günther Patzig und Wolfgang Wieland. Von 1990 bis 2007 wurde die Reihe von Jürgen Mittelstraß mitherausgegeben.
Es gibt zwei Versionen von Naturalismus in der Ethik: Der erste (Praktischer Naturalismus I) behauptet, daß jeder praktische Satz (der eine Norm oder ein Werturteil ausdrückt) äquivalent zu einem deskriptiven Satz ist. Der zweite (Praktischer Naturalismus II) sagt, daß die Gültigkeit von praktischen Sätzen ausschließlich von kontingenten empirischen Tatsachen abhängt. Um scharf zwischen diesen beiden Versionen zu unterscheiden, wird der Begriff der praktischen Gültigkeit eingeführt und in einer Form definiert, die sich radikal von Tarskis Konvention T unterscheidet. Die erste Version (...) des Naturalismus wird generell als durch die Argumente von Moore und Hare widerlegt angesehen. Die zweite Spielart wurde bislang nicht widerlegt. Es wird versucht zu zeigen, daß der Praktische Naturalismus II, wenn er als radikaler Naturalismus formuliert wird, einen circulus vitiosus oder infiniten Regreß impliziert. Der einzige Weg, dies zu verhindern ist, zumindest ein praktisches Prinzip zuzulassen, dessen GüUigkeit nicht von kontingenten Tatsachen abhängt. Auf diese Weise hängt der Naturalismus in der Ethik von wenigstens einem transzendenten Prinzip ab. (shrink)
Kant distinguishes two kinds of knowledge of one-self: empirical self-knowledge due to inner sense and a priori self-knowledge achieved by transcendental apperception. This conception encounters a host of problems. I try to solve these problems from the perspective of today’s phenomenology and analytical philosophy. I first introduce a new conception of inner sense and time-consciousness and argue that empirical self-knowledge must be based on the category of person, a category Kant did not list in his table of categories. I explain (...) how the schematism of this category works. Then I introduce the a priori notion of the subject which corresponds to Kant’s ‘I think’. However, unlike Kant I hold that the notion of the subject is the notion of a being which has certain a priori capacities. Kant did not see that the term ‘I’ must be conceived of as an indexical. I argue that this indexical refers to both, the subject who does the thinking and the person who is thought. On this basis I give an answer to the question how genuine de-se knowledge is possible. I further defend—against Wittgenstein and others—the use of a private thought language. Finally, I show that what I have developed is—notwithstanding the refutation of important elements of Kant’s theory—still essentially a Kantian approach. (shrink)
Aristotle has a rather extreme concept of change: Alteration is the change of a sensible quality in a thing. This is produced when a thing comes into immediate contact with another thing and is affected by the opposite sensible quality of the latter. Book VII, chapter 3 of the Aristotelian Physics is the crucial text to explore this topic. The present volume sets out to analyze and clarify the reason of this approach.
Since the end of the 18th century philosophy has been going through an identity crisis which threatens its very existence. This crisis is due to the emancipation of the empirical sciences in the course of which philosophy has lost nearly all its traditional objects. We fi rst examine four traditional ways to overcome this crisis: philosophy as the all embracing universal science, philosophy as a priori knowledge, philosophy as common sense, philosophy as small talk. We show that these conceptions have (...) grave shortcomings and therefore are not convincing. Instead we propose the following conception of philosophy: philosophy has to put and to answer radical questions, questions that spring from the conditions of human existence itself. We fi nally justify this conception by a refl ection on the history of philosophy and an analysis of the deep motivation of its founder, Socrates. This leads us to the insight that to engage in moral philosophy is itself a moral duty. (shrink)
As an introduction to the plenary session “Metaphysics and Aesthetics” in my article I try to describe the state of philosophy of art today and give an outlook to its future development. In the last century analytical philosophy of art has been occupied with the following four questions: What is the essence of art? What is the ontological status of works of art? What are aesthetic qualities and how do we come to know them? Have aesthetic value judgments objective validity? (...) In the first step I explain why analytical philosophy of art failed to answer these questions and what this failure has to do with the end of art. In the second step I attempt to give a definition of art myself which allows to show that this failure and the end of art were inevitable. Finally I try—as a consequence—to define the general features of the art of the future. (shrink)
Following Richard M. Hare1 I think that we use practical sentences as decision criteria. We understand their meaning if we know what decision to take according to them. But it is not clear, how exactly decision criteria are related to decisions and how they function as criteria. To fully understand this role, we need a formal semantics of practical sentences. For this I have to introduce a formal language and give an interpretation of it. This language has to be constructed (...) in such a way that a translation into ordinary language is always possible in principle. Thus, we make sure that our semantics and logic will have an impact on the solution of concrete practical problems. According to this program I will first introduce the formal language ‘LP1’. To give an interpretation of it I will then clarify what a decision is and show how practical sentences function as decision criteria. On this basis I give an interpretation of the primitive two-place operator ‘PT p,q’ and the one-place operator ‘VTp’. I further argue that we make meta-decisions concerning the application of first-order decision-criteria. This allows me to introduce a new concept of practical validity, which differs radically from the concept of truth. Using this concept, I then give an interpretation of the deontic operators ‘OTp’, ‘FTp’, ‘ATp’ and ‘ITp’. The concept of practical validity makes it also possible to introduce practical logical connectors and mixed logical connectors on the basis of practical or mixed value tables. These connectors are used – among others – in bridge-principles, which play an important role in ethical and juridical theories. Finally, I shortly explain the semantics of the main kinds of practical sentences, i.e. value judgments, imperatives, norms and intentions, and I argue that we need a deontic logic in order to use practical sentences in a correct way. (shrink)
The article discusses a responsibility game which is, in fact a ‘question-answer-game’. Firstly, the characteristic of the responsibility game is made. Secondly, the ontology of the responsibility game is settled. Thirdly, the causality of our intentions and the process of decision making are analysed in-depth. Fourthly, the importance of a decision criterion for the process of decisionmaking is proven; whereby, a definition of an action an agent is morally responsible for is finally formulated.
Es gibt zwei Versionen von Naturalismus in der Ethik: Der erste behauptet, daß jeder praktische Satz äquivalent zu einem deskriptiven Satz ist. Der zweite sagt, daß die Gültigkeit von praktischen Sätzen ausschließlich von kontingenten empirischen Tatsachen abhängt. Um scharf zwischen diesen beiden Versionen zu unterscheiden, wird der Begriff der praktischen Gültigkeit eingeführt und in einer Form definiert, die sich radikal von Tarskis Konvention T unterscheidet. Die erste Version des Naturalismus wird generell als durch die Argumente von Moore und Hare widerlegt (...) angesehen. Die zweite Spielart wurde bislang nicht widerlegt. Es wird versucht zu zeigen, daß der Praktische Naturalismus II, wenn er als radikaler Naturalismus formuliert wird, einen circulus vitiosus oder infiniten Regreß impliziert. Der einzige Weg, dies zu verhindern ist, zumindest ein praktisches Prinzip zuzulassen, dessen GüUigkeit nicht von kontingenten Tatsachen abhängt. Auf diese Weise hängt der Naturalismus in der Ethik von wenigstens einem transzendenten Prinzip ab. (shrink)
