La categoria de passivitat és tan nuclear en la filosofia d’Emmanuel Levinas com en la de Paul Ricoeur. Aquesta categoria està intrínsecament vinculada a una altra que també és crucial: la d’alteritat. Per entendre la proximitat entre aquests dos autors, alhora que per veure’n la distància que els separa, resulta molt revelador prestar atenció, primer, a la manera com cadascun d’ells concep les dues categories i, després, al motiu pel qual mentre en el cas de Levinas el lloc de la (...) passivitat és exclusivament un —la relació amb l’altre—, en el de Ricoeur és triple: la carn o el cos propi, l’altre i la consciència. (shrink)

First, this article summarizes the way Jan Patocˇka thinks and updates the classic theme of philosophy as care for the soul. Then goes on to show Jacques Derrida’s significant and unexpected interest in the Czech thinker, and the manner as sharp and respectful as he reads it. Derrida argues that the core of Patocˇka’s approach, under the term “responsibility”, coincides in some sense with that of Emmanuel Levinas; nucleus that has to do, in both authors, with the essence of “religion”.

The Intimate Resistance is a keen, deeply beautiful reflection on the human condition. The author explains howwe ourselves can warm, protect and guide those around us.

Esquirol, Josep Maria Humà, més humà: Una antropologia de la ferida infinitaBarcelona: Quaderns Crema, 171 p.ISBN 978-84-7727-644-9.

Book review of Humano, más humano. Una antropología de la herida infinita Josep Maria Esquirol.

Se trata de un ensayo en el que Josep Maria Esqiurol reflexiona acerca de lo más profundo de lo humano, concluyendo que lo más característico del humano es una suerte de conmoción, un estar efectado por algo, y no algún tipo de poder o capacidad. El enfoque del libro nos presenta una antropología orientada hacia la compañía, el cuidado y el amparo.

This is a contribution to the discussion on the role of truth degrees in manyvalued logics from the perspective of abstract algebraic logic. It starts with some thoughts on the so-called Suszko’s Thesis (that every logic is two-valued) and on the conception of semantics that underlies it, which includes the truth-preserving notion of consequence. The alternative usage of truth values in order to define logics that preserve degrees of truth is presented and discussed. Some recent works studying these in the (...) particular cases of Łukasiewicz’s many-valued logics and of logics associated with varieties of residuated lattices are also presented. Finally the extension of this paradigm to other, more general situations is discussed, highlighting the need for philosophical or applied motivations in the selection of the truth degrees, due both to the interpretation of the idea of truth degree and to some mathematical difficulties. (shrink)

In this paper two deductive systems associated with relevance logic are studied from an algebraic point of view. One is defined by the familiar, Hilbert-style, formalization of R; the other one is a weak version of it, called WR, which appears as the semantic entailment of the Meyer-Routley-Fine semantics, and which has already been suggested by Wójcicki for other reasons. This weaker consequence is first defined indirectly, using R, but we prove that the first one turns out to be an (...) axiomatic extension of WR. Moreover we provide WR with a natural Gentzen calculus. It is proved that both deductive systems have the same associated class of algebras but different classes of models on these algebras. The notion of model used here is an abstract logic, that is, a closure operator on an abstract algebra; the abstract logics obtained in the case of WR are also the models, in a natural sense, of the given Gentzen calculus. (shrink)

ukasiewicz''s four-valued modal logic is surveyed and analyzed, together with ukasiewicz''s motivations to develop it. A faithful interpretation of it in classical (non-modal) two-valued logic is presented, and some consequences are drawn concerning its classification and its algebraic behaviour. Some counter-intuitive aspects of this logic are discussed in the light of the presented results, ukasiewicz''s own texts, and related literature.

Łukasiewicz’s infinite-valued logic is commonly defined as the set of formulas that take the value 1 under all evaluations in the Łukasiewicz algebra on the unit real interval. In the literature a deductive system axiomatized in a Hilbert style was associated to it, and was later shown to be semantically defined from Łukasiewicz algebra by using a “truth-preserving” scheme. This deductive system is algebraizable, non-selfextensional and does not satisfy the deduction theorem. In addition, there exists no Gentzen calculus fully adequate (...) for it. Another presentation of the same deductive system can be obtained from a substructural Gentzen calculus. In this paper we use the framework of abstract algebraic logic to study a different deductive system which uses the aforementioned algebra under a scheme of “preservation of degrees of truth”. We characterize the resulting deductive system in a natural way by using the lattice filters of Wajsberg algebras, and also by using a structural Gentzen calculus, which is shown to be fully adequate for it. This logic is an interesting example for the general theory: it is selfextensional, non-protoalgebraic, and satisfies a “graded” deduction theorem. Moreover, the Gentzen system is algebraizable. The first deductive system mentioned turns out to be the extension of the second by the rule of Modus Ponens. (shrink)

The “representation problem” in abstract algebraic logic is that of finding necessary and sufficient conditions for a structure, on a well defined abstract framework, to have the following property: that for every structural closure operator on it, every structural embedding of the expanded lattice of its closed sets into that of the closed sets of another structural closure operator on another similar structure is induced by a structural transformer between the base structures. This question arose from Blok and Jónsson abstract (...) analysis of one of Blok and Pigozzis’s characterizations of algebraizable logics. The problem, which was later on reformulated independently by Gil-Férez and by Galatos and Tsinakis, was solved by Galatos and Tsinakis in the more abstract framework of the category of modules over a complete residuated lattice, and by Galatos and Gil-Férez in the even more abstract setting of modules over a quantaloid. We solve the representation problem in Blok and Jónsson’s original context of M-sets, where M is a monoid, and characterise the corresponding M-sets both in categorical terms and in terms of their inner structure, using the notions of a graded M-set and a generalized variable introduced by Gil-Férez. (shrink)

Quins són els valors que regeixen la nostra vida? I per què vivim amb aquests valors i no amb uns altres? «Els valors van cap a on anem nosaltres perquè van amb nosaltres. ¬I mentre fem camí o mentre el busquem, els valors ens alimenten», diu el filòsof.

Daniel Bensaïd was a Marxist philosopher and author of an extensive body of works about political strategy. His writings combine a diversity of singular influences, such as Marx, Lenin, Trotsky and Che Guevara on the one hand, and Benjamin, Péguy and Blanqui on the other. In his work, religious heresies, Marranos, moles and emblematic figures of the resistance to oppression such as Joan of Arc meet with the classic figures of Marxism. The non-linear concept of time and messianic reason support (...) a strategic reading of history and an understanding of political commitment, following Goldmann’s interpretation of Pascal’s Wager as a wager of uncertain outcome. (shrink)

El cuidado de sí es cuidado de lo más humano de cada uno de nosotros. La convicción nuclear que lo rige es siempre la misma: que lo humano puede intensificarse y crecer. Y que el peligro reside siempre en la degeneración. Intensificar lo humano es ir hacia lo “más humano”. En absoluto se busca la “superación” o el “más allá” de lo humano. Este artículo es un intento de relacionar la lectura que hace Foucault del tema del cuidado de sí (...) con la urgente necesidad de repensar hoy el lugar de lo educativo como lugar propio para ese cuidado. Para tal fin, se propone el concepto de altertopía educativa, como lugar, no solo de resistencia al dominio de la banalidad contextual, sino de gestación de la fuerza revolucionaria. (shrink)

A pair of deductive systems (S,S’) is Leibniz-linked when S’ is an extension of S and on every algebra there is a map sending each filter of S to a filter of S’ with the same Leibniz congruence. We study this generalization to arbitrary deductive systems of the notion of the strong version of a protoalgebraic deductive system, studied in earlier papers, and of some results recently found for particular non-protoalgebraic deductive systems. The necessary examples and counterexamples found in the (...) literature are described. (shrink)

A filter of a sentential logic ? is Leibniz when it is the smallest one among all the ?-filters on the same algebra having the same Leibniz congruence. This paper studies these filters and the sentential logic ?+ defined by the class of all ?-matrices whose filter is Leibniz, which is called the strong version of ?, in the context of protoalgebraic logics with theorems. Topics studied include an enhanced Correspondence Theorem, characterizations of the weak algebraizability of ?+ and of (...) the explicit definability of Leibniz filters, and several theorems of transfer of metalogical properties from ? to ?+. For finitely equivalential logics stronger results are obtained. Besides the general theory, the paper examines the examples of modal logics, quantum logics and Łukasiewicz's finitely-valued logics. One finds that in some cases the existence of a weak and a strong version of a logic corresponds to well-known situations in the literature, such as the local and the global consequences for normal modal logics; while in others these constructions give an independent interest to the study of other lesser-known logics, such as the lattice-based many-valued logics. (shrink)

This paper contains a joint study of two sentential logics that combine a many-valued character, namely tetravalence, with a modal character; one of them is normal and the other one quasinormal. The method is to study their algebraic counterparts and their abstract models with the tools of Abstract Algebraic Logic, and particularly with those of Brown and Suszko's theory of abstract logics as recently developed by Font and Jansana in their "A General Algebraic Semantics for Sentential Logics". The logics studied (...) here arise from the algebraic and lattice-theoretical properties we review of Tetravalent Modal Algebras, a class of algebras studied mainly by Loureiro, and also by Figallo, Landini and Ziliani, at the suggestion of the late Antonio Monteiro. (shrink)

A definition and some inaccurate cross-references in the paper A Survey of Abstract Algebraic Logic, which might confuse some readers, are clarified and corrected; a short discussion of the main one is included. We also update a dozen of bibliographic references.

In her well-known book, Rasiowa states without proof that in implicative algebras there is a one-to-one correspondence between kernels of epimorphisms and the so-called special implicative filters, and that in the logic whose algebraic counterpart is the class of implicative algebras the deductive filters coincide with the special implicative filters. We show that neither claim is true, and how to repair the situation by redefining some of the notions involved. We answer other questions concerning special implicative filters, taking the theory (...) of algebraizable logics of Blok and Pigozzi as a framework to approach the question in a systematic way. (shrink)

In this paper we consider the structure of the class FGModS of full generalized models of a deductive system S from a universal-algebraic point of view, and the structure of the set of all the full generalized models of S on a fixed algebra A from the lattice-theoretical point of view; this set is represented by the lattice FACSs A of all algebraic closed-set systems C on A such that (A, C) ε FGModS. We relate some properties of these structures (...) with tipically logical properties of the sentential logic S. The main algebraic properties we consider are the closure of FGModS under substructures and under reduced products, and the property that for any A the lattice FACSs A is a complete sublattice of the lattice of all algebraic closed-set systems over A. The logical properties are the existence of a fully adequate Gentzen system for S, the Local Deduction Theorem and the Deduction Theorem for S. Some of the results are established for arbitrary deductive systems, while some are found to hold only for deductive systems in more restricted classes like the protoalgebraic or the weakly algebraizable ones. The paper ends with a section on examples and counterexamples. (shrink)

Presentación: critica y conceptos -- Primera parte. Movimientos fundacionales: la legitimación de los maestros de arquitectura moderna y las primeras teorizaciones, 1925-1969 -- Capítulo 1. Los inicios de la teoría de la arquitectura y el urbanismo en Argentina -- Capítulo 2. Los pioneros de la teoría de la arquitectura en Brasil y Chile -- Capítulo 3. Indicios de la teoría e historia de la arquitectura en mexico, venezuela y peru [sic] -- Segunda parte. La consolidación de la teoría de la (...) arquitectura en Latinoamérica -- Capítulo 4. La consolidación de la teoría de la arquitectura en Argentina -- Capítulo 5. La búsqueda de una arquitectura y una teoría propia -- Tercera parte. Las nuevas generaciones cosmopolitas de críticos -- Capítulo 6. La consolidación de una nueva generación cosmopolita de críticos de arquitectura en Argentina -- Capítulo 7. La nueva generación de críticos en Brasil, Chile, Perú y otros países --Conclusiones -- Bibliografía -- Anexo: reseña de 21 textos seleccionados. (shrink)

This paper has a very limited scope: it just presents some eIements which may introduce us into a wider investigation on vague predicates. Thus, webegin by pointing out our general conception of Iogic (as a descriptive science of linguistic phenomena). After that, we build up our approach by considering characteristic functions and by trying to make useful the model of logical extension which applies to classical quantifiers.

Argues that Merleau-Ponty’s thought grounds itself on “non-coincidence” or, as he puts it, on “divergence or écart”, “non-transparence” or “non-adequacy”, since neither perception nor knowledge, in his view, actually conveys the things perceived or known. Reality comes up drenched in transcendence, and likewise thought has to span the “uncanny distance” that severs the subject from itself and every object from its own identity. Thus appear groundless an array of received views on the “reversibility” ascribed by Merleau-Ponty to the doublet “distance (...) vs. immediacy”. (shrink)

The shortcomings of Merleau-Ponty’s crucial concept of “institution” led him into a turning point where the way out he selected was actually much inferior, as regards the prospects of fulfillment that were latent in his thought, to the alternative path he did not take.

Contends that Heideggerian “fundamental ontology” and Husserlian phenomenology, while linked by methodological affinities (hermeneutics would be the operational correlative to phenomenology’s transcendental embrace), are thematically incongruent. It also holds that the self-display of Being clashes with the un-methodical dimension assigned to immediacy by the phenomenological tradition. Through reshaping Husserl’s presentialist transcendentalism, Heidegger cast anew the methodology grounded upon “presentifying intuitiveness” and tailored it to an expanded notion of “phenomenon”.

Contends that Merleau-Ponty’s doctrine of the “philosophical shadow” that went together with all eminent doctrines of the past and which he discloses as their chief (though concealed) operative resource and the main cause of their ground-breaking viewpoints, both synthesizes and transcends all precedent phenomenological attempts (Heidegger’s and Fink’s prominent among them) to solve the theoretical and methodological puzzles uncovered by philosophical historiography.

Attempts to elucidate the tension between the finitist compromise and the ontological scaffolding in Heidegger’s early thought, while acknowledging that this twofold commitment entails a methodology of a bafflingly circular character. This pessimistic claim appears reinforced by the evidence that the grounding of “Being” upon “the beings” cannot exclude the “paradoxical grounding of Being” by “the beings” themselves.

The age-old controversy pitting explanation against understanding has amazingly mutated in our time because nowadays each of these procedures attempts to replicate and even occasionally mimetizes the features traditionally ascribed to the competing practice.

Thinking the Visual, Visualizing the Thought.A perceptual and Political Model of VisionMerleau-Ponty’s program of perceptivizing thought has depoliticizing effects that, though he does not recognize them, undermine his understanding of politics. These anti-political consequences, moreover, bring out the internal difficulties of his anti-intellectualist starting point. There are three areas in which Merleau-Ponty gave a thorough application, though with unequal success, of his perception-based model: the presentation of his own thought, in which his program of picturalization had a striking success; the (...) explanation of the historical process, in which his visualization model was only partly effective; and access to other people’s thought, in which his perceptivist views encountered an undeniable failure. Merleau-Ponty’s successive approaches to other people’s thought show, by two distinct paths, and beyond his own intentions, an unforeseen political defect. His perceptive model proves incompatible with his political ideas when it is applied in depth, and it thus breaks apart the cohesion of his thought. From a larger perspective, it disrupts reflective approaches to politics since it damages their conceptual bases. This article shows successively that Merleau-Ponty laid out a perceptive model of universal scope; that he applied it to several areas, including politics; that this model proves politically deficient when it serves to remove the autochthonous sources of sense; that these depoliticizing effects become more acute when Merleau-Ponty employs the perceptive model to elucidate other people’s thought; and that its frustration in this area not only devalues his political reflections, but also signals that the perceptive model simply prevents a “thinking of the political.”Pensare il visuale, visualizzare il pensiero.Un modello percettivo e politico della visioneIl programma di percettivizzazione del pensiero intrapreso da Merleau-Ponty comporta effetti spoliticizzanti che sconfessano nascostamente la sua comprensione della politica. Tali conseguenze antipolitiche mettono altresì in rilievo le difficoltà intrinseche alla sua posizione anti-intellettualista. Vi sono tre ambiti nei quali Merleau-Ponty, con diverso successo, ha applicato il suo modello percettivo : la presentazione del suo stesso pensiero, nella quale questo programma di pittoricizzazione incontra un successo trionfale; la chiarificazione del processo storico, dove tale modello “visualeˮ non è efficace che in parte; infine l’accesso al pensiero di altri autori, terreno sul quale questa prospettiva percettivista subisce uno scacco innegabile. Molti tentativi merleaupontiani di approcciare il pensiero di altri autori attestano in vario modo un imprevisto deficit politico. Il modello percettivo di Merleau-Ponty si rivela in altri termini incompatibile con le sue idee politiche, nel momento in cui viene applicato in profondità, e in ultima analisi mette a dura prova la coerenza del suo pensiero. In una prospettiva più ampia, esso ostacola un approccio riflessivo alla politica poiché ne degrada le stesse basi concettuali. Il nostro articolo mostra quindi che Merleau-Ponty ha articolato un modello percettivo di portata universale; che l’ha applicato a svariati ambiti d’indagine, tra cui la politica; che quel modello si rivela deficitario quando viene utilizzato per attingere a specifiche fonti di senso; che tali effetti spoliticizzanti si acuiscono nel momento in cui Merleau-Ponty adotta il modello percettivo per illuminare il pensiero di altri autori; che, per concludere, la sua incongruenza con questo peculiare ambito di riflessione non solo impoverisce le sue riflessioni politiche, ma attesta che in linea generale il modello percettivo sbarra la strada a un qualsiasi «pensiero del politico». (shrink)