In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reading History: On Jacob Burckhardt as Source-ReaderJürgen GroßeThere is a gap between the reputation Jacob Burckhardt (1818–97) has enjoyed among the educated public and among professional historians—a discrepancy that has become commonplace in the century-long reception of the Swiss cultural historian’s work. 1 Nevertheless, in the light of recent appraisals of Burckhardt as an ancestor of a different—perhaps a new—cultural history, and with the rediscovery of his contributions to (...) the history of art, aesthetics, and historical anthropology, the gap seems to be ever-narrowing. 2 However, let us keep it open in the following few pages.The chasm between assessments of Burckhardt as an historian-writer and as an historian-researcher appears roughly analogous to his above-mentioned respective reputations among laymen and professional scholars. As a historian Burckhardt did not want to be a scientific researcher. From the time he began writing history he admitted that he felt little commitment to the predominating concept of scientific progress as a continuous accumulation of facts and theories. Thus, as an outsider to the profession he had only one option, which was to [End Page 525] attain a place of honor as an esteemed writer of historical books for the educated public—a “master historian.” Yet it is precisely this characterization of Burckhardt that makes a curious fact appear all the more baffling: the act of writing books made Burckhardt feel thoroughly tormented. Throughout his career, he lamented historical authorship as a thankless occupation—a form of “slavery.” Just four years after finishing Die Cultur der Renaissance in Italien (1860) Burckhardt wrote to his friend Paul Heyse:I now consider my modest literary career as finally closed, and feel much better and content reading sources, as I only study and make notes for teaching and not for possible book-making. The historical market is tremendously overcrowded as things are, and it will be worse if peace lasts. 3Books like Die Zeit Constantins des Großen, Die Cultur der Renaissance in Italien, and Der Cicerone—works that gained the Basler historian fame that has endured to the present day—were either not prepared by the author for further editions or abandoned for colleagues to revise. Thus, Burckhardt seemed to regard himself neither as a researcher nor as a writer but rather as a reader of history. His dislike of research and authorship deserves our attention not only because it stands in sharp contrast to the mores of the scientific community, both in his and our times; for it might also elucidate yet another interesting paradox: Burckhardt, who celebrated the “reading of sources” and “the insights accessible from sources” as no other nineteenth-century historian, was soon to be charged with failing to meet the accepted standards of source-criticism. This essay examines these problems in terms of a series of questions concerning Burckhardt’s reading of history.Why Burckhardt Prefers ReadingBurckhardt clearly abhorred what he called the “history of the events.” Already as a student, he felt himself confronted with a barrage of events, not so much as matters of real history as rather as products of historical science—the ever-increasing facts that historians produced in relation to actual events. Unlike the humanistic and enlightenment paradigms of history, mainstream nineteenth-century scholarship no longer relied on the eyewitness to guarantee authenticity. The focus had shifted from remembrance to reconstruction; events were now narrated in terms of newly conceived abstractions like “development,” “process,” “spirit of an age,” and “spirit of a nation.” This increasing detachment from eyewitnessed experience paved the way for an endless production of information, [End Page 526] which had become an occupation in its own right. Every newcomer to the study of history now encountered a huge mass of mere historical facts, largely devoid of content—“a desperate prospect at the beginning of the study of history,” according to Burckhardt. Furthermore, the dynamism of modern history itself continued to produce more and more “events,” which were then to be reproduced as “facts.” This mire of facts burdened the reader of historiography even more than the student of history. “Even the most well-meaning of contemporary historians,” Burckhardt... (shrink)

'History' in the modern sense of the word refers to both the way in which human beings develop in time and the way in which this is interpreted. Thus 'Critique of History' concerns a way of life as well as a mode of reflection.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Rhetoric, Narrative, and the Lifeworld: The Construction of Collective IdentityAlan G. GrossAt the beginning of King Lear, at the point of ceding his throne to his three daughters, Lear asks each for a public acknowledgment of her love. Goneril and Regan flatter their father with effusive declarations, but Lear’s youngest, and his favorite, Cordelia, refuses to do so:I love your Majesty According to my bond; no more or less...................... (...) Good my lord, You have begot me, bred me, lov’d me; I Return those duties back as are right fit, Obey you, love you, and most honour you. Why have my sisters husbands, if they say They love you all? Haply, when I shall wed, That lord whose hand must take my plight shall carry Half my love with him, half my care and duty. Sure I shall never marry like my sisters, To love my father all.(1936, 1.1.94–107) [End Page 118]Furious, Lear disinherits his daughter.Cordelia’s speech is remarkable only in its articulation of what Lear should have known; its dramatic impact is a consequence of Lear’s reaction to his daughter’s argument for divided loyalty that is based on a string of commonplaces that are part of the lifeworld that Lear and his daughter—and every other person in the play—inhabit. Any part of this lifeworld may be thematized, of course; it may be brought out into the open as a topic of discussion. That is what Cordelia does; under duress, she shifts from what Jürgen Habermas calls communicative action to a level he calls discourse, a level that reveals the relationship between the personal and the social as well as their underlying cultural presuppositions. Because Lear refuses to grasp the obvious, the narrative progress of the play is temporarily interrupted and permanently veers off course. Although on occasion we can thematize aspects of our lifeworld, the lifeworld as a whole cannot be subject to scrutiny; it is the totality of certainties, skills, practices, and interpretative frames that we take for granted as we each find our way in the everyday worlds that form the changing horizons of our experience. I take it for granted that too many cooks spoil the broth; telephoning is a skill I do not puzzle over; waiting patiently in line is a social behavior I practice without thinking; with no special effort, I interpret the intimacy of a couple’s relationship by the way they publicly behave toward each other.The lifeworld, a concept initiated by Edmund Husserl and elaborated by Alfred Schütz, Martin Heidegger, and Jürgen Habermas, has been largely neglected by rhetorical theorists and critics. It is the purpose of this paper to show that remedying this neglect opens up fruitful avenues of critical practice and theory. I proceed, first, by defining the lifeworld. Next, I shift perspectives: I analyze how collectivities make sense of their lives by telling stories about themselves grounded in their lifeworld values. It is in the lifeworld’s role in storytelling that, I claim, Aristotle’s Rhetoric becomes an important part of the picture. This is because the Rhetoric is, at bottom, a theory of the way lifeworld values enter into the public sphere. This characterization of the Rhetoric permits us to reconcile two important instantiations of the lifeworld, Habermas’s and Aristotle’s, a reconciliation in which communicative action becomes a special case of rhetorical interaction. Finally, from the perspective of the lifeworld, I reflect on the significance of an exemplary case of the construction of collective identity, the Selma march. [End Page 119]Defining the LifeworldEdmund Husserl’s The Crisis of the European Sciences contains the first explicit philosophical analysis of the lifeworld as “the world that is constantly pregiven, valid constantly and in advance as existing.... Every end presupposes it; even the universal end of knowing it in scientific truth presupposes it, and in advance” (1970, 382). Because the lifeworld is presupposed in everyday communication, it can be entered only by disciplined reflection: “Contemplation is privileged to the extent that it reveals the structures of the world and has them as theme” (1973, 65). Although the lifeworld... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Rhetoric, Narrative, and the Lifeworld: The Construction of Collective IdentityAlan G. GrossAt the beginning of King Lear, at the point of ceding his throne to his three daughters, Lear asks each for a public acknowledgment of her love. Goneril and Regan flatter their father with effusive declarations, but Lear’s youngest, and his favorite, Cordelia, refuses to do so:I love your Majesty According to my bond; no more or less...................... (...) Good my lord, You have begot me, bred me, lov’d me; I Return those duties back as are right fit, Obey you, love you, and most honour you. Why have my sisters husbands, if they say They love you all? Haply, when I shall wed, That lord whose hand must take my plight shall carry Half my love with him, half my care and duty. Sure I shall never marry like my sisters, To love my father all.(1936, 1.1.94–107) [End Page 118]Furious, Lear disinherits his daughter.Cordelia’s speech is remarkable only in its articulation of what Lear should have known; its dramatic impact is a consequence of Lear’s reaction to his daughter’s argument for divided loyalty that is based on a string of commonplaces that are part of the lifeworld that Lear and his daughter—and every other person in the play—inhabit. Any part of this lifeworld may be thematized, of course; it may be brought out into the open as a topic of discussion. That is what Cordelia does; under duress, she shifts from what Jürgen Habermas calls communicative action to a level he calls discourse, a level that reveals the relationship between the personal and the social as well as their underlying cultural presuppositions. Because Lear refuses to grasp the obvious, the narrative progress of the play is temporarily interrupted and permanently veers off course. Although on occasion we can thematize aspects of our lifeworld, the lifeworld as a whole cannot be subject to scrutiny; it is the totality of certainties, skills, practices, and interpretative frames that we take for granted as we each find our way in the everyday worlds that form the changing horizons of our experience. I take it for granted that too many cooks spoil the broth; telephoning is a skill I do not puzzle over; waiting patiently in line is a social behavior I practice without thinking; with no special effort, I interpret the intimacy of a couple’s relationship by the way they publicly behave toward each other.The lifeworld, a concept initiated by Edmund Husserl and elaborated by Alfred Schütz, Martin Heidegger, and Jürgen Habermas, has been largely neglected by rhetorical theorists and critics. It is the purpose of this paper to show that remedying this neglect opens up fruitful avenues of critical practice and theory. I proceed, first, by defining the lifeworld. Next, I shift perspectives: I analyze how collectivities make sense of their lives by telling stories about themselves grounded in their lifeworld values. It is in the lifeworld’s role in storytelling that, I claim, Aristotle’s Rhetoric becomes an important part of the picture. This is because the Rhetoric is, at bottom, a theory of the way lifeworld values enter into the public sphere. This characterization of the Rhetoric permits us to reconcile two important instantiations of the lifeworld, Habermas’s and Aristotle’s, a reconciliation in which communicative action becomes a special case of rhetorical interaction. Finally, from the perspective of the lifeworld, I reflect on the significance of an exemplary case of the construction of collective identity, the Selma march. [End Page 119]Defining the LifeworldEdmund Husserl’s The Crisis of the European Sciences contains the first explicit philosophical analysis of the lifeworld as “the world that is constantly pregiven, valid constantly and in advance as existing.... Every end presupposes it; even the universal end of knowing it in scientific truth presupposes it, and in advance” (1970, 382). Because the lifeworld is presupposed in everyday communication, it can be entered only by disciplined reflection: “Contemplation is privileged to the extent that it reveals the structures of the world and has them as theme” (1973, 65). Although the lifeworld... (shrink)

Inhalt "Rund um Sokrates" Thomas Alexander Szlezak: Platon und die Pythagoreer: Das Zeugnis des Aristoteles Eva-Maria Kaufmann: Reconsidered: Gigons Abschied von Sokrates. Das Buch "Sokrates. Sein Bild in Dichtung und Geschichte" Detlef Thiel: Sokrates der Idiot." Friedlaender/Mynonas Rehabilitation Ulrich Kuhn: Das Liebesverhaltnis zwischen Alkibiades und Sokrates. Der platonische Bericht Heinz-Gerd Schmitz: Alkibiades, die Athener und die politische Torheit "Wissen und Skepsis" Rebecca Paimann: Beim Wissen ist jeder der erste. Zur Stellung der Individualitat in der spaten Wissenschaftslehre Fichtes Jurgen-Eckardt Pleines: Philosophieren (...) oder eine letzte Wahrheit. Das anhaltende Problem eines Neuplatonismus Klaus Neugebauer: Dasein und ewiges Sein. Wie Edith Stein Martin Heidegger liest Jurgen Grosse: Radikalskepsis und Philosophiekritik. Zum 100. Geburtstag von E. M. Cioran Jutta Georg: Traumlose Zeiten. Das Unbewusste im Kernspin "Gluck und Erfullung" Edgar Fruchtel: Gluck allein macht nicht glucklich. Was fuhrt zu einem erfullten Leben? Tim Gollasch: Adieu Welt"? Die vermeintliche Abkehr vom Diesseits in der Barocklyrik Georges Goedert: Vom zweifelhaften Gluck der Utilitaristen. Eine kritische Untersuchung utilitaristischen Denkens "Buchbesprechung" Harald Seubert: Vom Geist - die Wiederkehr des vergessenen Grundes der Philosophie. Aus Anlass eines bedeutenden Sammelwerke. (shrink)

Four areas have emerged as especially important foci for discussions of Buddhism and gender. First is simply gathering the information about women and gender – given that most Buddhists, especially Western Buddhists, were quite unaware of how male‐dominated Buddhism has traditionally been. Second, especially for Asian Buddhists, deep concern about the status of nuns and the need to restore full ordination for them in some parts of the Buddhist world has taken center stage. Third, especially for Western Buddhists, who are (...) usually converts to Buddhism and are generally lay practitioners, a whole gamut of questions about how to live as Buddhists in a non‐Buddhist culture became dominant. Finally, Buddhists, especially in the West, have taken up the issue of why there have been so few women teachers and leaders throughout Buddhist history and have begun to change that situation dramatically. (shrink)

Zu den wohl unbestritten durch Fichte eingebrachten Fortschritten in das philosophische Denken der Neuzeit gehört die in der ICH-Konzeption geleistete Vereinigung von theoretischer und praktischer Philosophie. Bekanntlich hatte Kant mit der Formulierung des kategorischen Imperativs die Forderung aufgestellt, dass das Unbedingte, das Sittengesetz, sein soll, weil die Vernunft es erfordere. Deren praktische Selbstverwirklichung ist das Ziel, insofern sich die Vernunft nicht anders als durch sich selbst zu realisieren vermag. Das Unbedingte ist folglich nicht ein Seiendes, sondern ein Aufgegebenes, Gegenstand eines (...) hervorbringenden Handelns. Damit war die Priorität der praktischen vor der theoretischen Vernunft gesetzt. (shrink)

In spite of accelerated economical growth disadvantaged groups might be »non-winners« of a European Single Market now determinating the structures of any future »European House«. The responsibility of diaconia is to prevent a split between those citizens who are able to of T er mobility and flexibility and rely on effective multinational pressure-groups and those who do not. With help from concerned organs of the E. C. diaconia might benefit from an enhanced exchange of experiences, define the social responsibility of (...) the churches in Europe and participate in the shaping of a common future. (shrink)

Emotion Review, Volume 14, Issue 2, Page 116-120, April 2022. To make progress related to long-standing questions related to the nature of emotion, we offer the Interactive Activation and Competition framework for Emotion. The IAC-E is not another conventional theory of emotion. Rather, it offers a neural-network-based, algorithmic account of how emotion instances and categories arise. Our approach suggests that there need not be a contradiction between instances of the same emotion being sometimes consistent and sometimes variable. Similarly, there need (...) not be a contradiction between observations of homogeneity and heterogeneity within emotion categories. (shrink)

After the question “how could Hobbes write the natural law, if it is nowritten law?” I’ll try to approach the relationship between natural and civil law after the instauration of the commonwealth. In this sense, I’ll pay attention to the hobbesian distinction among “written law” and “written register” of law and a few consequences after this distinction. For example, if, how Hobbes says, the correct interpretation of natural law doesn’t depend on philosophers, but only on the authority of commonwealth, would (...) include itself the legitimation of the formulation of the natural laws? The paradox of the first question seems to be important, however, negligenced from hobbesian critical literature. Its intent is to investigate this negligence into better understanding his philosophical postulate, that includes important points like the “silence of law”, the right of self-defense, foro interno and foro externo, State and government. (shrink)

Jürgen Habermas; XIV*—On the Cognitive Content of Morality, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 96, Issue 1, 1 June 1996, Pages 335–358, https://doi.

Linguists often advert to what are sometimes called linguistic intuitions. These intuitions and the uses to which they are put give rise to a variety of philosophically interesting questions: What are linguistic intuitions – for example, what kind of attitude or mental state is involved? Why do they have evidential force and how might this force be underwritten by their causal etiology? What light might their causal etiology shed on questions of cognitive architecture – for example, as a case study (...) of how consciously inaccessible subpersonal processes give rise to conscious states, or as a candidate example of cognitive penetrability? What methodological issues arise concerning how linguistic intuitions are gathered and interpreted – for example, might some subjects' intuitions be more reliable than others? And what bearing might all this have on philosophers' own appeals to intuitions? This paper surveys and critically discusses leading answers to these questions. In particular, we defend a ‘mentalist’ conception of linguistics and the role of linguistic intuitions therein. (shrink)

This symposium examines how various discursive frameworks inform Jewish and non-Jewish interpretations of Jewishness. Although the specific characteristics of these frameworks are context-dependent, the underlying themes remain the same: Jewish identification entails identifying “difference,” and this process of drawing distinctions between Jews and non-Jews gets developed in discursive frameworks of temporality, “race thinking,” nationalism, and genetics, among others. In the broader contexts within which Jewish identification is formulated, these frameworks serve to: delineate categories of people on the basis of socially (...) salient qualities associated with human and other bodies; evaluate these categorical “types” in regard to their determined “desirable” and “undesirable” qualities; implement institutionally sanctioned measures that facilitate the privileging of the people who apparently embody desired qualities; and enforce structural constraints within which people may choose to contest, re-inscribe, re-appropriate, and/or attempt to transform components of the other three networks mentioned above. It also emphasizes the significance of who mobilizes these discourses, with what objectives in mind, and how both factors instantiate discursive and discursively informed concretized outcomes. (shrink)

To make progress related to long-standing questions related to the nature of emotion, we offer the Interactive Activation and Competition framework for Emotion. The IAC-E is not another con...

Emotion Review, Ahead of Print. To make progress related to long-standing questions related to the nature of emotion, we offer the Interactive Activation and Competition framework for Emotion. The IAC-E is not another conventional theory of emotion. Rather, it offers a neural-network-based, algorithmic account of how emotion instances and categories arise. Our approach suggests that there need not be a contradiction between instances of the same emotion being sometimes consistent and sometimes variable. Similarly, there need not be a contradiction between (...) observations of homogeneity and heterogeneity within emotion categories. (shrink)

Mit dem Anfang der 1990er Jahre für kommerzielle Zwecke entwickelten World Wide Web hat die Nutzung digitaler Kommunikationsmedien rasant zugenommen; deren Einsatz ist zu einem Massenphänomen geworden. Das hat erhebliche Auswirkungen auf das Gesundheitswesen, die Psychotherapie und nicht zuletzt auch die Psychoanalyse. Neben der grundsätzlichen Frage nach dem gesellschaftlichen Umgang mit Gesundheits- bzw. Krankheitsdaten, dem Persönlichkeitsrecht der Bürger sowie dem Datenschutz bei der Nutzung digitaler Medien stellen sich auch grundlegende ethische Fragen in der Psychotherapie und in der Psychoanalyse. Unabdingbar für (...) die implizite Ethik der Psychoanalyse bzw. der psychoanalytisch begründeten Verfahren ist der geschützte therapeutische Raum, dessen Vorhandensein (nach innen und außen) überhaupt erst ermöglicht, vor- und unbewusstes Material zu untersuchen. Auch wenn die digitale therapeutische Kommunikation geeignet ist, bei Analytiker und Analysand das Phantasma der Omnipräsenz zu befördern, greift die radikale Ablehnung ihres Einsatzes zu kurz. Umgekehrt muss man sich der Frage stellen, ob und wie das, was Psychoanalyse ausmacht, im »Bereich des Virtuellen« bzw. mit den Mitteln digitaler Kommunikationsmedien möglich ist. (shrink)