Ninety-two Japanese elementary school sixth-graders (46 boys and 46 girls; 11–12 years old) learned the quota system as part of gender equality education. We used a group performance implicit association test (Mori, Uchida, and Imada, 2008) to evaluate the lesson's effect by assessing the children's image of “woman” before and after the class. The results showed that the image of “woman” among boys improved significantly from neutral to positive through the lesson. We also found that girls’ implicit image of (...) “woman” was statistically higher than that of boys before learning, and was raised considerably after the class. (shrink)

The Christian philosopher Muto Kazuo contributed substantially to the predominantly Buddhist “Kyoto School of Philosophy.” Through critical exchange with its representatives, he opened up new perceptions of Christian faith, enabled mutual understanding between Buddhism and Christianity, and challenged the Western dialectical method.

Aunque el uso no problematizado en el lenguaje ordinario de los términos "consenso" y "consentimiento" sugiere que debe haber alguna comprensión compartida de su significado, no hay un acuerdo generalizado sobre el uso de estos conceptos entre los filósofos políticos. De hecho, el significado filosófico de estos conceptos sigue siendo elusivo y controvertido; tal vez precisamente a causa de su amplitud y centralidad. Teniendo en cuenta los numerosos intentos de explicar satisfactoriamente consenso y consentimiento -que con el tiempo se han (...) vuelto más sofisticados-, este artículo recoge algunos usos filosóficos fundamentales de estos dos multifacéticos conceptos y sugiere una estrategia para bosquejar un mapa que parece un rompecabezas cuyas piezas están moldeadas de tal forma que se necesita un enfoque multidisciplinario para poder identificar adecuadamente sus significados e implicaciones. Although the unproblematic use of the terms "consensus" and "consent" in ordinary language suggests that there must be some shared understanding of their meaning, there is no widespread assent on the use of these concepts among political philosophers. In fact, the philosophical meaning of these concepts remains elusive and controversial, perhaps exactly because of their extension and centrality. Taking note of the numerous attempts to provide a satisfactory account of "consensus" and "consent" - that have become increasingly sophisticated in time - this article recollects some fundamental philosophical uses of the two many-faceted concepts, and suggests a strategy for delineating a map that looks like a puzzle, whose pieces are shaped in such a way that we need a multidisciplinary approach in order to adequately identify their meanings and implications. (shrink)

In lowland South America, breath animates human and non-human bodies, pulsating through the materialities of organisms. Humans, however, should manage their bodies to recast and reconfigure breath in its most life-enhancing manifestations: singing and smoking. These are the specialized domains of those able to manage their vitalities in such a way as to produce potent effects in themselves and in the world around them, including influencing atmospheric conditions, the lives of animals and plants and the harming and healing of others. (...) In these relational onto-epistemologies, intersubjectivity, intercorporality and states of non-cognitive interaffection find new depths. Breath, properly managed, can make and unmake worldly forms, including bodies and the societies they come together in. Focusing on two Amerindian communities, the Warekena of northwestern Rio Negro, Brazil and the Shipibo-Konibo of the Ucayali valley in Eastern Peru, this article examines the interface between human and non-human subjectivities, and how resonant interaffective atmospheric conditions are induced to promote health. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:A Short ReplyGianluca MoriWhile thanking Thomas Lennon for the interest he has shown in my work—and without going into details of interpretation which cannot bear discussion in this context—I would like to make a few remarks on factual questions raised by his response.1) Lennon's text (p. 338): "The text that Bayle and Mori erroneously take to be Saint-Evremond's is in fact from Jean-François Sarasin."While it is not certain (...) that Bayle and I "erroneously" take this text to be Saint-Evremond's, it is certain that Lennon erroneously takes it to be Sarasin's. In fact, the text quoted by Bayle is not taken from Sarasin's Discours sur Epicure, but, as Bayle explicitly points out ("Xénophanes," K, note 124), from a "Discours des ennuis et des déplaisirs." This "Discours" is chapter 5 of De l'usage de la vie, a text published in many editions of Saint-Evremond's works (see the Barbin 1692 in-4° ed., Seconde Partie, p. 326). The paternity of De l'usage de la vie is doubtful and controversial, but it possibly contains some passages taken from Saint-Evremond's unpublished manuscripts, especially in chapters 3-6, as reported by an important source quoted by Ternois in Saint-Evremond, Œuvres en prose, IV, 3-4, note 1.2) Lennon's text (pp. 338-39): "The significance of two of the other texts advanced by Mori is fully vitiated, for in them Bayle makes the same mistake."In my article, I did not fail to state that these texts (OD I, 158 and Dict., "Epicure," M) are taken from an apocryphal source. On page 329 I wrote: "[Bayle] mistakenly attributes to [Saint-Evremond] a text on Epicurus's morals [i.e., Sarasin's Discours] included in that volume." However, it was absolutely impossible, for seventeenth-century readers, to distinguish between Saint-Evremond's original and apocryphal texts: the author himself—as is widely known—did not want to clarify this point (with a few exceptions, including the Saint-Evremoniana, which, as we have seen, Bayle never attributed to Saint-Evremond). [End Page 343] And this is true for all editions: there is no significant difference between genuine and pirated editions, since no official edition, authorized and revised by the author, existed before Des Maizeaux's posthumous one. From this point of view, virtually nobody (before 1705) could "study" Saint-Evremond's texts. (On this connection it should be added that I never claimed that Bayle "studied" Saint-Evremond, but only that he read his available works and made up his mind on them, and particularly on the Conversation du Maréchal d'Hocquincourt—which should be at the core of the present debate—long before reading Cotolendi).3) Lennon's text (p. 336): "As Mori acknowledges elsewhere, Labrousse thinks Le Vassor was a left-wing Anglican who failed to understand Bayle's calvinist perspective."Concerning Le Vassor, I "acknowledge" Labrousse's opinion only to reject it with a detailed argument (Bayle philosophe, 262, note 341).Gianluca MoriUniversità del Piemonte OrientaleCopyright © 2004 The Journal of the History of Ideas, Inc.... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Bayle, Saint-Evremond, and Fideism:A Reply to Thomas M. LennonGianluca MoriIn a recent article published in this journal Thomas M. Lennon returns to the controversial question of Bayle's attitude towards religion. The point he debates is the particular use that, in expounding his conception of the relationship between faith and reason, Bayle makes of a passage from Saint-Evremond. In Lennon's view the correct interpretation of this point would show that (...) Bayle's fideism is to be "taken at face value" without any hint of irony and with no suspicion of dissimulation or insincerity.1 This would cast doubt on and greatly weaken the interpretation I proposed in my Bayle philosophe.2 My aim here is to respond briefly to Lennon's arguments and to clarify even more briefly what in my opinion is the right perspective in which to consider Bayle's position on this topic.The context in which Bayle quotes Saint-Evremond is to be found in the Eclaircissements he added to the second edition of his Dictionnaire historique et critique (1702) to counter the Dutch religious authorities' harsh criticism of the first edition. In particular the Walloon Consistory accused Bayle of taking a skeptical position that undermined the most important dogmas of Christian faith. In response Bayle wrote the Eclaircissement sur les Pyrrhoniens, a clumsy mosaic of quotations from the Scriptures and from patristic and profane texts, with which he sought to show that his skeptical fideism was not in the least heterodox but indeed the position that most closely reflected true Christianity. The quotation from Saint-Evremond, almost at the end of this text, is taken [End Page 323] from the Conversation du Maréchal d'Hocquincourt et du Père Canaye (written in about 1654).3 The final passage gives a clear idea of the general tone: after having disputed with a churchman the need to subject one's intellect to the yoke of faith, the marshal concludes by saying that he is ready to be crucified "without knowing why." Father Canaye replies: "No reason! That is the true religion. No reason! God has granted you a fine grace, mylord." So, and here Lennon obviously agrees (229), Saint-Evremond's is a text with no shadow of mystical inspiration, indeed strongly tending in the libertine direction, as is clear from the blatant way it pours scorn on the fideist approach.In my interpretation Bayle's use of this quotation does not at all demonstrate his atheism or unbelief, for in my view that question is undecidable. However, the quotation from Saint-Evremond is sufficient—and this is the onlyreason I mentioned it4 —to show that Bayle's approach to fideism is in no way innocent and naive as is sometimes claimed. On the contrary, his texts on this subject contain what amounts to provocations aimed at orthodox readers (to which they immediately reacted). This, together with other more important reasons, leads me to believe that Bayle's professions of Christian faith, though frequent, are generally far from being above suspicion: indeed, almost every line of them raises questions about their actual significance.The provocation contained in the quotation from Saint-Evremond appears in all its rhetorical weight if we associate this text with three other passages from Bayle's works. The first is from the Nouvelles de la république des lettres of December 1686, in which Bayle stresses the unedifying nature of the religious maxims contained in Saint-Evremond's Conversation (which, incidentally, he himself had just had printed in the collection Le Retour des pièces choisies).5 The second is taken from a letter by Jean d'Oulès to Bayle, written in 1696, in which the author deals with exactly the same passage from the Conversation that was later to be reproduced in the Eclaircissement. In this letter d'Oulès quotes the full passage which he considers to be a "naughty text" deliberately written to throw ridicule on the fanatical fideism of Pierre Jurieu.6 The third passage is from Bayle's Continuation des pensées diverses of 1704 in which, shortly after the death of Saint-Evremond, he publicly reveals the poet... (shrink)

São muitas as abordagens do fenômeno religioso surgidas nos últimos dois séculos. Algumas recorrem aos métodos elaborados pelas ciências humanas, sobretudo a historiografia, a sociologia, a etnologia/antropologia, a psicologia e a fenomenologia. Outras tratam a religião numa perspectiva filosófica, como se pode ver nos grandes autores que, sobretudo a partir do século XIX, se consagraram à elaboração de uma filosofia da religião. Nas últimas décadas, com a renovação da filosofia hermenêutica, novas leituras da religião têm surgido, renovando profundamente esse campo (...) do saber. O texto aqui proposto apresenta alguns elementos da grande síntese do filósofo luxemburguês Jean Greisch, pouco conhecido no Brasil, mas cuja contribuição ao estudo da religião é original, privilegiando uma hermenêutica da passagem. Após uma breve apresentação de sua obra consagrada à filosofia da religião, serão apresentados os cinco “paradigmas” dos estudos da religião segundo ele: o especulativo, o crítico, o fenomenológico, o analítico e o hermenêutico, o último seguido pelo próprio autor. (shrink)

京都を知る，アルゴリズムを知る。アルゴリズムとはそもそも，何か物事を行うときの“具体的手順”のことである。私たちは日々，意識するかしないかに関わらず，次々とアルゴリズムの設計をしながら生活をしている。 本書は，岩間一雄教授が京都の町を題材にアルゴリズムの思考を伝える，読み物的手法をとった数学書である。読者はその奥深い世界へと誘われてゆくだろう。 巻末には本書で取り上げた京都関連の名所・行事などの索引があり，逆引きで読んでいくことができる。 【目次】 1．斜め横断 2．アイドルタイム 3．人事部長の悩み 4．チームワーク 5．神様との勝負 6．アルゴリズムからメカニズムへ 7．一番でなくとも 8．千年に1回も起こらない 9．自分のページランクを上げたい 10．対話のアルゴリズム 11．ビットコインの素晴らしさ 12．P対NP問題：ノーベル賞以上？ 13．アルゴリズムから見た進化論.

日本古来の神々の色、陰陽五行説の色、武将たちに愛された色、雅な平安の色、粋な大江戸の色彩から、昭和の流行色まで、ビジュアルで辿る日本の色を探る旅。.

H. Putnam has been considered the most Peircean philosopher among the neopragmatists. This note sugests that Putnam pays great atention to the problems Peirce tackled, but he does not share Peirce's thesis on the relation between "practical interests" and science. Therefore, Putnam's realism is more Deweyan and Jamesian than Peircean.

Fuzzy logic has become an important tool for a number of different applications ranging from the control of engineering systems to artificial intelligence. In this concise introduction, the author presents a succinct guide to the basic ideas of fuzzy logic, fuzzy sets, fuzzy relations, and fuzzy reasoning, and shows how they may be applied. The book culminates in a chapter which describes fuzzy logic control: the design of intelligent control systems using fuzzy if-then rules which make use of human knowledge (...) and experience to behave in a manner similar to a human controller. Throughout, the level of mathematical knowledge required is kept basic and the concepts are illustrated with numerous diagrams to aid in comprehension. As a result, all those curious to know more about fuzzy concepts and their real-world application will find this a good place to start. (shrink)

>Engelhardt’s After God gives a comprehensive perspective on the deepest and hardest issues in both moral philosophy and bioethics of our time. Although the book is an intelligent critique of contemporary moral philosophy in favor of a kind of traditionalism rooted in the perspective of the Orthodox Church, containing numerous forceful arguments, I ultimately disagree with Engelhardt on several main points stemming from his pessimistic view of our current culture and society. I have neither the pretense to open new perspectives, (...) nor to put forward new arguments, and I am aware that I might be wrong. I simply want to present a different position on the quest for meaning. (shrink)