Starting from a behavioural-economics critique of standard rational choice theory Sugden seeks to restate the case for classical liberalism. That case has three strands: a refutation of libertarian...

Classifying accounts of institutionalized social norms that rely on individual rule-following as ‘sociological’ and accounts based on individual opportunity-seeking behavior as ‘economic’, the paper rejects purely economic accounts on theoretical grounds. Explaining the realworkings of institutionalized social norms and social order exclusively in terms of self-regarding opportunityseeking individual behavior is impossible. An integrated sociological approach to the so-called Hobbesian problem of social order that incorporates opportunityseeking along with rule-following behavior is necessary. Such an approach emerges on the horizon if economic (...) methods are put to good sociological use on the basis of recent experimental economic findings on rule-following behavior. (shrink)

Libertarian views on rights tend to rule out coercive redistribution for purposes of public health care guarantees, whereas liberal conceptions support coercive funding of potentially unlimited access to medical services in the name of medical needs. Taking the “priority of liberty” seriously as supreme political value, a plausible prudential argument can avoid these extremes by providing systematic reasons for both delivering and limiting publicly financed guarantees. Given impending demographic change and rapid technical progress in medicine, only a two-tier system with (...) explicitly limited public guarantees and optional privately financed health services seems acceptable. (shrink)

"Philosophy and Economics I," treats "Methods and Models" of "Economic Philosophy." "Philosophy and Economics II" deals with "Morals." In both cases an effort to integrate many strands of modern philosophy and economics via decision theoretic language is made. Regardless of this decision theoretic background the treatment is non-technical. The aspiration is to sketch some tools that may be used in search of what philosophers call a "wide reflective equilibrium" on foundational matters of economics as well as of philosophy. The presentation (...) will enable an advanced undergraduate or beginning graduate student from fields like, philosophy, economics, law, political science and sociology to use the tools, arguments and paradigm examples provided to search for her or his own reflective equilibrium on matters of economic philosophy. Specialists from the aforementioned fields may find the text useful, too, as an accessible account of an increasingly elaborate intellectual discourse on "philosophy, politics and economics.". (shrink)

Looking at the world through the window of opportunity costs directs attention to the good forgone rather than the good done by our decision making. In the paper it is illustrated by means of several examples that it may be useful for judicial decision makers to be better aware of this aspect of their choices. When they decide in favor of the realization of some good they should not neglect the shadow of the good that is thereby not done. Such (...) implications of living in a world of scarcity are driven home on the level of law enactment (de lege ferenda) as well as in the interpretation and application of the law (de lege lata) in our discussion of opportunity costs and the law. (shrink)

The increasingly wide spread use of RCM, rational choice modeling, and RCT, rational choice theory, in disciplines like economics, law, ethics, psychology, sociology, political science, management facilitates interdisciplinary exchange. This is a great achievement. Yet it nurtures the hope that a unified account of rational active choice making might arise from ‘reason’ in terms of intuitively appealing axioms. Such ‘rationalist’ characterizations of rational choice neglect real human practices and empirical accounts of those practices. This is theoretically misleading and practically dangerous. (...) Searching for a wide reflective equilibrium, WRE, on RCT in evidence-oriented ways can explicate ‘rational’ without rationalism. (shrink)

A universalist conception of immigration, assuming that all humans have a fundamental ethical right to equal consideration (Brücker), is contrasted with a particularist ethical conception that restricts equal consideration to members of a given community (Osterloh/Frey). It is argued that within the limits of Robbinsian economics only a communitarian conception is acceptable while an ethical theorist might lean towards a universalist view.

It is argued that a truly Humean approach to social interaction and to normative reflection on how we should interact needs to get even closer to the facts than the Binmore program suggests. In view of the facts Binmore’s normative conclusions on bargaining as well as on the nature of the equilibria of the game of life both seem precarious.

In the Eurotransplant region transplantable kidneys from cadaveric donors are allocated according to the Wujciak-Opelz algorithm. This paper shows that the algorithm as it stands fulfils certain normative standards of a more formal nature while violating others. In view of these insights, it is explored how the algorithm could perhaps be improved. Even if issues of substantial rather than formal adequacy need to be addressed separately, analyses as presented in this paper can prepare the ground for a discussion of substantive (...) normative issues. In any event, axiomatic accounts can tell us something about what we are in fact doing when using a procedure like the Wujciak-Opelz algorithm. (shrink)

In the Eurotransplant region transplantable kidneys from cadaveric donors are allocated according to the Wujciak-Opelz algorithm. This paper shows that the algorithm as it stands fulfils certain normative standards of a more formal nature while violating others. In view of these insights, it is explored how the algorithm could perhaps be improved. Even if issues of substantial rather than formal adequacy need to be addressed separately, analyses as presented in this paper can prepare the ground for a discussion of substantive (...) normative issues. In any event, axiomatic accounts can tell us something about what we are in fact doing when using a procedure like the Wujciak-Opelz algorithm. (shrink)

To combine some views of 'Diskursethik' and Constitutional Political Economy seems to be promising. In our comments on Frey's and Kirchgässner's attempt to join the forces of Discourse theory and Political Economy in defending the wider spread use of referenda we direct attention to three points. Firstly, the normative basis of both concepts is unsettled. Secondly, an economic approach contrary to the supposition of Frey and Kirchgässner provides substantial insights into the processes which precede collective decisions. Thirdly, the 'veil of (...) insignificance' in referenda will not necessarily increase altruism in voting behavior. (shrink)

To combine some views of 'Diskursethik' and Constitutional Political Economy seems to be promising. In our comments on Frey's and Kirchgässner's attempt to join the forces of Discourse theory and Political Economy in defending the wider spread use of referenda we direct attention to three points. Firstly, the normative basis of both concepts is unsettled. Secondly, an economic approach contrary to the supposition of Frey and Kirchgässner provides substantial insights into the processes which precede collective decisions. Thirdly, the 'veil of (...) insignificance' in referenda will not necessarily increase altruism in voting behavior. (shrink)

(No abstract is available for this citation).

Government by unanimous consent, following discussion, seems an attractive vision because it renders coercion legitimate or avoids coercion entirely.

In Buchanan’s broad “constitutional contractarian” framework ultimate justification depends on the institutional arrangements under assessment being universally accepted. Accordingly, market arrangements have the same status as in-period collective decision-making rules: both equally hang or fall on whether they emerged from constitutional consensus. The paper underlines this ‘equivalence’ by showing that the constitutional calculus over market ‘rights’ follows the same analytic structure as the derivation of in-period collective decision rules. This means that Buchanan’s view of the virtues of markets is essentially (...) rooted in a collective decision and despite his self-professed “classical liberal” inclinations, his relation to standard defences of the market order is at best equivocal. (shrink)

There is an ever increasing shortage of human organ transplants in Germany. This paper aims at understanding the reasons for that shortage better and then discusses various ways to overcome it. After estimating the potential supply of donor organs it is discussed why actual supply remains far below potential supply. Insufficient reimbursement for hospitals, a lack of incentives to donate, and mistaken donation rules are diagnosed to cause the shortage. Thus, organ shortage is due not to natural constraints but to (...) inappropriate social institutions. Introducing a presumed consent rule, reciprocity in organ allocation, better payments for hospitals and for donors seem potential remedies. (shrink)

The implementation of a new kidney allocation algorithm by Eurotransplant was a ‘rule choice’ with serious ethical, legal, and political implications. Eurotransplant made that choice in view of a careful analysis of empirically predictable consequences of alternative rule specifications. This paper studies in a stylized way how the decision on the allocation algorithm emerged. Hopefully an understanding of central features of the described successful case of initiating improvements may be helpful in other cases with a similar structure.

Simple game experiments of the reward allocation, dictator and ultimatum type are used to demonstrate that true explanations of social phenomena cannot conceivably be derived in terms of the perfect rationality concept underlying neo-classical economics. We explore in some depth, if speculatively, how experimental game theory might bring us closer to a new synthesis or at least the nucleus of a general theory of ‘games and boundedly rational economic behavior’ with enhanced explanatory power.

The main results of our indirect evolutionary approach to trust in large interactions suggest that trustworthiness must be detectable if good conduct in trust-relationships is to survive. According to theoretical reasoning there is a niche then for an organization offering a (possibly) costly service of keeping track of the conduct of participants on the net. We compare traits of an organizational design as suggested by economic reasoning with those that actually emerged and ask whether institutions like eBay will increasingly have (...) to ‘economize on virtue’ although so far they could rely on its spontaneous provision. (shrink)

The paper tries to relate classical liberal intuitions about rights and liberties to some of the more formal discussions of the putative impossibility of a Paretian liberal. Its focus is on the interpretation of formal modelling rather than on formal analysis. The theoretical concepts of the formalized approaches more often than not distort the meaning of the non-formalized concepts of classical liberal theory. Using proper explications of the concepts of liberties and rights respectively the alleged paradoxes of liberalism lose their (...) paradoxical character. (shrink)

The implementation of the Wujciak algorithm as a new rule for organ allocation by Eurotransplant is of considerable interest for the theorist of choice making. In the process reformers accepted the status quo in principle but expected that their potential opponents would be willing to make minimal or 'tolerable' concessions. Thereby the consensual introduction of new dimensions of value and reforms of allocation practices based thereupon became viable. The paper characterizes a decision procedure based on ‘almost lexicographically pre-ordering established values (...) and practices’ in a stylized manner, presents a formal reconstruction of it and points out some of its potential implications for rule choices in general. (shrink)

The greatest risks of Covid-19 are not arising from its direct effects on morbidity and mortality but from exaggerated aspirations to control such effects politically. A swift transformation from an epidemic to an endemic state of affairs may in case of a disease with comparatively low and unequally distributed mortality like covid-19 be an option, too. This needs to be laid out but it is not the task of science to plead for this or any other option.

In this article sociobiology is ‘put into perspective’, from a history of ideas and a systematical point of view. It is argued that it would be foolish to regard biology as irrelevant to our concept of man and society. At the same time it would be grossly inadequate too to ignore the characteristics of human kind.

Die Bedeutung des kritischen Rationalismus für die Entwicklung vornehmlich der deutschsprachigen Nachkriegswirtschaftswissenschaften wird diskutiert. Die kritisch-rationalistische These von der einheitlichen nomologischen Ausrichtung aller Realwissenschaften wird mit Reinhard Seltens „methodologischem Dualismus“ einerseits und der Rolle unrealistischer Annahmen in der mathematischen Ökonomik andrerseits konfrontiert. Ungeachtet aller Bewunderung die Seltens „mathematische Praxeologie“ als Formalwissenschaft verdient, haftet dieser doch so viel des Misesschen Apriorismus an, dass sie aus Sicht des kritischen Rationalismus als Teil der empirischen Wissenschaft ebenso zurückgewiesen werden muss wie weite Teile der (...) mathematischen „reinen“ Ökonomik. (shrink)

This is a somewhat simplistic introduction to some of the topics related to the so called ‘paradox of liberalism’. It tries to serve the twin purpose of facilitating access to the papers printed in this issue of Analyse & Kritik and putting them into a broader perspective.

The fact that Peter Singer was prevented from lecturing in Germany as well as the fact that the discussion of his book ‘Practical Ethics’ was rendered impossible raises important questions about freedom. Surprisingly some philosophers have joined the political factions which strive to suppress free discussion. In this quite polemical article some of their views are rejected. The only way to weed out error is free discussion.

Hans Albert bin ich zum ersten Mal zu Beginn der 1970er Jahre begegnet. Werner Becker, ein früherer Adorno-Assistent, der „zum Feind der kritischen Rationalität übergelaufen“ war, nahm mich mit nach Karlsruhe zu Veranstaltungen, die von Hans Albert und Hans Lenk organisiert wurden. Dort traten „Größen“ wie Georg Henrik von Wright oder Karl Popper auf; aber für mich erwies sich Hans Albert als die eigentliche Größe. Er war die unsichtbare Hand im Hintergrund, durch deren Wirken sich mein eigener Weg in die (...) und durch die Philosophie und auch die Politische Ökonomik gestaltete. (shrink)

This paper suggests that libertarian and (related) contractarian ideas would be less vulnerable to certain forms of criticism if they would more carefully disentangle their legal and moral standards for the assess­ment of institutions from empirical, methodological, and epistemological assumptions about individualism and non-cognitivism. Holding apart several meanings of individualism different issues can be treated separately. It will be shown that the justification of libertarian norms raises some problems which are not too easily solved within a non-cognitivist approach. No attempt (...) to solve them is made subsequently but how far in principle the ‘argumentation possibility frontier’ might be shifted out for that purpose is outlined. In this respect the paper might be regarded as a companion to Viktor Vanberg’s brillant reconstruction of contractarian liberalism in this issue of Analyse & Kritik (pp. 113–149). (shrink)

Mit der Gründung der Zeitschrift The Journal of Law and Economics im Jahr 1958 hatte sich die neuere ›ökonomische Theorie des Rechts‹ endgültig als Spezialdisziplin etabliert. Im gleichen Jahr schloss sich Ronald Coase der University of Virginia, UVA, Charlottesville an. Am dortigen Economics Department wirkte bereits James M. Buchanan. Mag die persönliche Chemie zwischen den beiden späteren Nobelpreisträgern auch nicht ideal gewesen sein, gemeinsam war ihnen das Interesse an der Behandlung sogenannter ›Externalitäten‹ und damit inter-individueller Auswirkungen menschlichen Verhaltens, die nicht (...) durch inter-individuelle Vereinbarungen autorisiert und in diesem Sinne vertraglich ›internalisiert‹ worden sind. (shrink)

Anthony de Jasay's work has been enormously influential, describing both a theoretical philosophical model for a stateless, liberal, free market order and offering analysis of and solutions to many of the technical economic problems associated with such a vision of society. In this book, ten significant scholars in philosophy and political economy pay tribute to the man and his work in a series of essays at once both respectful and critical.

To facilitate access for the wider international audience interested in issues of organ allocation the texts in this volume are all in English. But in view of the fact that Analyse & Kritik, though an international journal, is published in Germany it seemed appropriate to provide a German introduction and overview. This overview outlines the background of organ donation and transplantation as seems useful for the ‚uninitiated‘ reader and positions the papers of the volume on the intellectual map. In the (...) end the articles of the volume speak for themselves while the comments that conclude it may be helpful as springboards for further critique. (shrink)

(1993). Perfect and workable rationality: A comment on Raymond Boudon's paper. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science: Vol. 7, No. 1, pp. 41-43.