. History of the concept of economic efficiency . INTRODUCTION James Buchanan won the Nobel Prize by proving that the process by which elected officials ...

"Law and Economics has become an established field worldwide and it may be argued that it is one of the few examples of a successful interdisciplinary project. This book explores whether, or to what extent, that interdisciplinarity has indeed been a success. It provides insights on the foundations and methods, achievements and challenges of Law and Economics, at a time when both the continuing challenges to academic economics and the growth of empirical legal studies raise questions about (...) the identity and possible further developments of the project. Through a combination of reflections on long-term trends and detailed case studies on current developments, contributors to this volume analyse whether and in which sense Law and Economics is a successful interdisciplinary endeavour. Inspired by insights from the philosophy of social sciences, the book shows how concepts travel between legal scholarship and economics, how they change meanings when applied elsewhere, how economic theories and models inform, and transform, judicial practice, and addresses whether the transfers of knowledge between economics and law are symmetrical exchanges between the two disciplines"--. (shrink)

The Law and Economics approach to law dominates the intellectual discussion of nearly every doctrinal area of law in the US and its influence is growing steadily outside America as well. 2013 marked the fortieth anniversary of the publication of Richard Posner's Economic Analysis of Law, the book that launched the Law and Economics movement. The eighth edition of the book was published in 2011, this time competing against over twenty textbooks, collections and casebooks on law and (...) class='Hi'>economics. Although there has been phenomenal growth in this area questions remain. Why has Law and Economics movement become so successful? What is the current status of the Chicago School? What are the alternative theories and how much influence do they exert? What can be considered mainstream today? What are the norms and values underlying this impressive body of research? These issues, amongst others, are thoroughly explored by the contributors. (shrink)

In a concise, compelling argument, one of the founders and most influential advocates of the law and economics movement divides the subject into two separate areas, which he identifies with Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill. The first, Benthamite, strain, "economic analysis of law," examines the legal system in the light of economic theory and shows how economics might render law more effective. The second strain, law and economics, gives equal status to law, and explores how the (...) more realistic, less theoretical discipline of law can lead to improvements in economic theory. It is the latter approach that Judge Calabresi advocates, in a series of eloquent, thoughtful essays that will appeal to students and scholars alike. (shrink)

This anthology illustrates how law and economics is developing in Europe and what opportunities and problems - both in general and specific legal fields - are associated with this approach within the legal traditions of European countries. The first part illuminates the differences in the development and reception of the economic analysis of law in the American Common Law system and in the continental European Civil Law system. The second part focuses on the different ways of thinking of lawyers (...) and economists, which clash in economic analysis of law. The third part is devoted to legal transplants, which often accompany the reception of law and economics from the United States. Finally, the fourth part focuses on the role economic analysis plays in the law of the European Union. This anthology with its 14 essays from young European legal scholars is an important milestone in establishing a European law and economics culture and tradition. (shrink)

In "Behavioral Law and Economics: The Assault on Consent, Will, and Dignity," Mark D. White uses the moral philosophy of Immanuel Kant to examine the intersection of economics, psychology, and law known as "behavioral law and economics." Scholars in this relatively new field claim that, because of various cognitive biases and failures, people often make choices that are not in their own interests. The policy implications of this are that public and private organizations, such as the state (...) and employers, can and should design the presentation of options and default choices in order to "steer" people to the decision they would make, were they able to make choices in the absence of their cognitive biases and failures. Such policies are promoted under the name "libertarian paternalism," because choice is not blocked or co-opted, but simply "nudged." White argues that such manipulation of choice is impossible to conduct in people's true interests, and any other goal pursed by policymakers substitutes their own ends, however benevolent they may be, for people's true ends. Normatively, such manipulation should not be conducted because it fails to respect the dignity and autonomy of persons, what some hold to be the central idea in Kant's ethical system, and which serves to protect the individual from coercion, however subtle, from other persons or the state. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: An Economic Model of Carroll Towing Relaxing the Model's Initial Assumptions Efficiency as a Norm Some Limitations of Law and Economics Conclusion References.

This book examines the most controversial issues concerning the use of pre-drafted clauses in fine print, which are usually included in consumer contracts and presented to consumers on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. By applying a multi-disciplinary approach that combines consumer's psychology and seller's drafting power in the logic of efficiency and good faith, the book provides a fresh and unconventional analysis of the existing literature, both theoretical and empirical. Moving from the unconscionability doctrine, it criticizes (and in some cases refutes) its (...) main conclusions based on criteria which are usually invoked to sustain the need for public intervention to protect consumers, and specifically related to Law (contract complexity), Psychology (consumer lack of sophistication criterion) and Economics (market structure criterion). It also analyzes the effects of different regulations, such as banning vexatious clauses or mandating disclosure clauses, showing that none of them protect consumers, but in fact prove to be harmful when consumers are more vulnerable, that is whenever sellers can exploit some degree of market power. In closing, the book combines these disparate aspects, arguing that the solution (if any) to the problem of consumer exploitation and market inefficiency associated with the use of contracts of adhesion in these contexts cannot be found in removing or prohibiting hidden clauses, but instead has to take into account the effects of these clauses on the contract as a whole. (shrink)

This anthology discusses important issues surrounding environmental law and economics and provides an in-depth analysis of its use in legislation, regulation and legal adjudication from a neoclassical and behavioural law and economics perspective. Environmental issues raise a vast range of legal questions: to what extent is it justifiable to rely on markets and continued technological innovation, especially as it relates to present exploitation of scarce resources? Or is it necessary for the state to intervene? Regulatory instruments are available (...) to create and maintain a more sustainable society: command and control regulations, restraints, Pigovian taxes, emission certificates, nudging policies, et cetera If regulation in a certain legal field is necessary, which policies and methods will most effectively spur sustainable consumption and production in order to protect the environment while mitigating any potential negative impact on economic development? Since the related problems are often caused by scarcity of resources, economic analysis of law can offer remarkable insights for their resolution. Part I underlines the foundations of environmental law and economics. Part II analyses the effectiveness of economic instruments and regulations in environmental law. Part III is dedicated to the problems of climate change. Finally, Part IV focuses on tort and criminal law. The twenty-one chapters in this volume deliver insights into the multifaceted debate surrounding the use of economic instruments in environmental regulation in Europe. (shrink)

In a published debate between Law and Economics avatar Judge Richard Posner and Professor Robin Malloy entitled ‘Is Law and Economics Moral?’, Malloy argued that the dominant methodology of Law and Economics is immoral. Malloy likened it to the Frankenstein Monster – an unholy, undead abomination that can go berserk despite its ostensibly benign provenience. Malloy claimed that wealth maximization applied to social discourse ‘reduces people to an human existence to imaginary variables for calculation’.

ECONOMICS AND LAW HAVE HISTORICALLY ATTENUATED THE CONTRIBUtion of ethics in their putative separation of fact and value. In this essay I argue that reconceptualizing the relationships between law, economics, and ethics reveals the shortcomings of positions that disavow ethics. In the first section I contend that thinkers must reread Adam Smith as an economist and a moral philosopher to appreciate his extended treatment of sympathy, conscience, and social justice. In the second section I appropriate the work of (...) Amartya Sen to examine the entanglement of fact and value in deliberating economic choices, including moral motivations and social evaluations that problematize reductive images of economic actors. Finally, I interrogate legal regulation of corporate governance with respect to the Enron scandal and the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act. I argue that legal regulation is a necessary but not sufficient resolution to corporate misconduct because it too enervates ethics and bifurcates fact and value. (shrink)

This anthology highlights the theoretical foundations as well as the various applications of Behavioural Law and Economics in European legal culture. By the same token, it fosters the dialogue between European and American Law and Economics scholars. The traditional neo-classical microeconomic theory explains human behaviour by using Rational Choice. According to this model, people tend to maximize the difference between expected utility and cost ("expected utility theory"). This theory includes three assumptions: (1) unbounded rationality, (2) unbounded self-interest, and (...) (3) unbounded willpower. Behavioural Economics questions these assumptions and endeavours to render economic analysis more realistic by underpinning it with psychological insights. In recent years, the influence of Behavioural Economics on the Economic Analysis of Law has gained momentum. Behavioural Law and Economics generates a better theoretical understanding of legal phenomena and offers a multitude of applications in legislation and legal adjudication. This volume is testament to the growing and thriving Law and Economics movement in Europe. The European Law and Economics community has steadily grown and the yearly Law and Economics Conference at the law faculty of the University of Lucerne has successfully become a guiding star in the vast sky of Law and Economics. (shrink)

The moral heart of normative law and economics is efficiency, especially dynamic efficiency that takes incentive effects into account. In the economic theory, justificatory argument is inherently at the institutional- or rule-level, not an the individual- or case-level. InMarkets, Morals, and the Law Jules Coleman argues against the efficiency theory on normative grounds. Although he strongly asserts the need to view law institutionally, he frequently grounds his criticisms of law and economics in arguments from little more than direct (...) moral intuition about individual cases. He evidently holds that consent provides a better normative basis for law than does efficiency and he uses consent arguments to attack recommendations from scholars in law and economics. His own chief contribution, however, is to law and economics rather than to any alternative theory. (shrink)

This is an introductory book that targets the reader who has the ambition to apply economic analysis but may be missing a technical introduction to its mathematical techniques or seeks a structured elaboration of its philosophical principles. The book juxtaposes economic analysis with moral philosophy, political theory, egalitarianism, and other methodological principles and then passes to the details of methods such as model-building, derivatives, differential equations, statistical tests, and the use of computer programs.

Modern law and economics received much of its impetus from Ronald Coase's analysis in ‘The Problem of Social Cost,’ and a goodly amount of that comes from the Coase theorem, which states that, absent transaction costs, externalities will be efficiently resolved through bargaining. The fact that the analysis that came to be codified in the Coase theorem was an exercise in pure fiction on Coase's part did not deter the erection of a substantial edifice of positive and normative analysis (...) on this foundation, nor, for that matter, has subsequent elaboration of Coase's intent done anything to abate the interest in the theorem and its implications. (shrink)

This anthology provides an in-depth analysis and discusses the issues surrounding nudging and its use in legislation, regulation, and policy making more generally. The 17 essays in this anthology provide startling insights into the multifaceted debate surrounding the use of nudges in European Law and Economics. Nudging is a tool aimed at altering people's behaviour in a predictable way without forbidding any option or significantly changing economic incentives. It can be used to help people make better decisions to influence (...) human behaviour without forcing them because they can opt out. Its use has sparked lively debates in academia as well as in the public sphere. This book explores who decides which behaviour is desired. It looks at whether or not the state has sufficient information for debiasing, and if there are clear-cut boundaries between paternalism, manipulation and indoctrination. The first part of this anthology discusses the foundations of nudging theory and the problems associated, as well as outlining possible solutions to the problems raised. The second part is devoted to the wide scope of applications of nudges from contract law, tax law and health claim regulations, among others. This volume is a result of the flourishing annual Law and Economics Conference held at the law faculty of the University of Lucerne. The conferences have been instrumental in establishing a strong and ever-growing Law and Economics movement in Europe, providing unique insights in the challenges faced by Law and Economics when applied in European legal traditions. (shrink)

"Philosophy and Economics I," treats "Methods and Models" of "Economic Philosophy." "Philosophy and Economics II" deals with "Morals." In both cases an effort to integrate many strands of modern philosophy and economics via decision theoretic language is made. Regardless of this decision theoretic background the treatment is non-technical. The aspiration is to sketch some tools that may be used in search of what philosophers call a "wide reflective equilibrium" on foundational matters of economics as well as (...) of philosophy. The presentation will enable an advanced undergraduate or beginning graduate student from fields like, philosophy, economics, law, political science and sociology to use the tools, arguments and paradigm examples provided to search for her or his own reflective equilibrium on matters of economic philosophy. Specialists from the aforementioned fields may find the text useful, too, as an accessible account of an increasingly elaborate intellectual discourse on "philosophy, politics and economics.". (shrink)

ABSTRACT Following recent scholarship, this article investigates the relationship among Adam Smith's lectures on rhetoric and belles lettres, his Wealth of Nations, the Theory of Moral Sentiments, and his lectures on jurisprudence. According to Smith, the rhetorical theory regarding genre and style improves practical judgment that is central to both economic and legal affairs. Though Smith's lectures on rhetoric feature no overt mention of these legal or commercial applications, when we read these lectures alongside his lectures and writings on jurisprudence (...) and economics, we see that Smith had developed numerous applications for the practical judgment that he taught his students when, under his guidance, they analyzed literary texts. Noting the interrelation among Smith's work on rhetoric, law, and economics allows us to see that others in the Scottish Enlightenment, such as Hugh Blair and Henry Home Lord Kames, similarly found connections among jurisprudence, political economy, and rhetorical theory. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that differences between the ‘new moral science’ of the seventeenth century and scholastic natural law theory originated primarily from the skeptical challenge the former had to face. Pufendorf’s project of a scientia practica universalis is the paramount expression of an anti-skeptical moral science, a ‘science’ that is both explanatory and normative, but also anti-dogmatic insofar as it tries to base its laws on those basic phenomena of human life which, supposedly, are immune to skeptical doubt. (...) The main scholastic legacy to the new moral science is the dichotomy between an ‘intellectualist’ and a ‘voluntarist’ view of natural law (or between lex immanens and lex imposita). Voluntarism lies at the basis of both theological views, such as Calvinism, and political views, such as those of Hobbes and Locke. The need to counterbalance the undesirable implications of extreme voluntarism may account for much of the developments in ethics and politics during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.Scottish natural jurisprudence, which tried to find a middle way between skepticism and extreme voluntarism, is less secular and more empirical than received wisdom admits. There emerged, as one of its ‘accidental’ outcomes, a systematic, self-contained and empirical economic theory from the search for an empirically based normative theory of social life. The basic assumption of such a theory, namely, the notion of societal laws as embedded in trans-individual mechanisms, derives from the voluntarist view of natural law as ‘imposed’ law.Later discussions of social issues in terms of ‘economic’ and ‘ethical’ reasons originated partly from a misreading ofthe Scottish natural jurisprudential framework of economic theory. Starting with this reconstruction, I try to shed some light on recent discussions about the role of ethics in economics. (shrink)

How can tort law be justified? There are well-known difficulties with the three traditional theories of tort law dominating the literature (namely, economic theory, corrective justice theory, and civil recourse theory). Recently, some have turned to moral contractualism in search of tort law’s foundation. One of the most prominent attempts was made by Gregory Keating. Keating’s account, however, has been subjected to powerful objections. In a recent paper, John Oberdiek, through a sympathetic critique of Keating’s account, develops a new version (...) of contractualist tort theory that is alleged to be at once superior to the three traditional theories of tort law and immune to the objections to Keating’s account. The aim of my paper is to critically assess Oberdiek’s account; I will argue that, while Oberdiek’s account does improve upon Keating’s in some important respects, it is ultimately unsatisfactory. (shrink)

Economics differs from physics, we are told, in that the laws economics studies hold only ceteris paribus whereas those of physics are supposed to obtain universally and without condition. Does this point to a metaphysical difference between the laws the two disciplines study or does it reflect merely a deficiency in the level of accomplishment of economics as compared to physics?

This is the first book to comprehensively analyze the work of Hans Micklitz, one of the leading scholars in the field of EU economic law. It brings together analysts, academic friends and critics of Hans Micklitz and results in a unique collection of essays that evaluate his work on European Economic Law and Regulation. The contributions discuss a wide range of Micklitz' work: from his theoretical work on private law beyond party autonomy, with a special focus on its regulatory function, (...) to the illustration of how his work has built the basis for current solutions such as used in solving the financial crisis. The book is divided into sections covering foundations of private law, regulatory law, competition and intellectual property law, product safety law, consumer contract law and the enforcement of law. This book clearly shows the enormous impact of Hans Micklitz' work on the EU legal system in both scholarship and practice. (shrink)

International economic law is peculiar. It claims universal character, yet eschews engagement with many, if not all, the racialised features of the global political economy. Its scholars mostly ignore imperialism, colonialism, and capitalism; they exclude slavery, predation, and racism altogether. In the following article, we draw upon Walter Rodney’s dialectics of development to offer a racial capitalist critique of international economic law. The disciplinary boundaries and operative logic normalised by its denizens corral us in a white, Eurocentric episteme. Ahistoricism, decontextualisation, (...) and externalisation are three epistemic devices at the forefront of the exclusionary discourse of IEL. In this space, the histories and epistemologies of Black peoples are ghettoised, treated as alien to the framework. After identifying this bias, we use the Black Radical Tradition to evaluate IEL’s amenability to the racial capitalism critique. (shrink)

"What is a military aircraft? John Law shows in his beautiful analysis that it is a constant oscillation between multiplicity and singularity.

The meaning of an expression resides not in the expression itself but in the experience of a person’s engagement with it. Meaning will be different not only to different people but also to the same person at different times. This book offers a way of attending to these different meanings. This way is a version of a trans-cultural activity that Richard Dawson calls attunement. The activity of attunement involves a movement of self-adjustment to a language, which a person transforms in (...) her or his use of it. Consciously performing the activity can enable understanding of the processes by which we constitute ourselves and others when we use a language. This directly connects to the topic justice, which is concerned with constituting appropriate selves and relations. Justice as Attunement engages with a wide range of texts – legal, literary, economic, philosophical, among others – and illuminates many useful and fascinating connections between them. There is a sense in which this book transcends disciplinary boundaries, for, in addition to students and scholars of law, literature, economics, and philosophy, it is written to a general reader who is interested in reflecting on and doing justice to their experiences in life. (shrink)

Rarely in the short history of liberal-democratic government has a primer on basic liberal-democratic values and institutions been more needed than now. Popular discontent, even anger, with democratic governments has grown steadily over the past twenty years. And not since the 1930s have citizens and their elected officials been so baffled about their respective roles in the maintenance of both democratic governments and liberal economies. This book attempts to address this growing need. Especially written as a primer for courses in (...) Philosophy, Politics and Economics (PPE), it has introductory chapters on all three main disciplines. It also has chapters on the rule of law and on three important public-policy areas: Corruption, Climate, and Civil Society. Individual topics discussed include free and fair elections, populism, responsible government, republican and Westminster systems of government, regulated free markets, the Great Recession of 2008, globalization, greenwashing, identity politics, academic freedom, utilitarianism, social contract theory, positive and negative liberty, and the good life. Historically informed, The Ethics and Economics of Liberal Democracies: Foundations for PPE is sure to be of interest to students who are interested in public-policy work, as well as those who are interested in both the theory and practice of democratic government. (shrink)

The descriptive viewpoint in rational choice has generated an important Standard Rational Choice Theory revision. This viewpoint has meant the introduction of relevant psychological considerations that Rational Choice Theory tied to the neoclassical economics is unable to heed In this paper I suggest a way to expand the descriptive viewpoint by theorizing how some factors, coming from the social and cultural environment, operate within rational choice. That troublesome issue concerning the overall validity of economic laws is also a question (...) here; specifically, if these descriptive proposals expand the explanation of the disturbing causes of economic laws, or if they actually call into question their fundamental principles, encouraging consideration of some economic issues in a quite new, different manner. (shrink)

Stipulating universal propositions with a ceteris paribus clause is normal practice in science and especially in economics. Yet there are several problems associated with the use of ceteris paribus clauses in theorising and in policy matters. This paper first investigates three questions: how can ceteris paribus clauses be non-vacuous? How can ceteris paribus laws be true? And how can they help in formulating successful policy interventions in a diversity of contexts? It turns out that ceteris paribus clauses are not (...) always used legitimately. They are meant to fence off a theory from disturbing factors, but economists who do not specify the clause well enough tend to fence variables in rather than off. In such cases, it would be better to use theoretical abstraction, which is something very different from the use of ceteris paribus clauses. However, abstract theorising conceptually leads one away from the concrete detail of real world situations in which policies take place. Hence, a fourth question arises: how can policy interventions be properly designed on the basis of abstract laws? To answer this question, I defend interdisciplinarity in concept choice. (shrink)

This essay draws upon Gramsci’s understandings of law and of the philosophy of praxis to develop a critical analysis of international law in the constitution and potential revolutionary transformation of the contemporary global political economy. The analysis illustrates the analytical utility of Gramscian conceptions of historical bloc and hegemony in capturing the significance of international law as an effective historical force. It also extends these conceptions, theoretically, by arguing that the global political economy is undergoing a process of juridification in (...) which a commodified legal form provides the template for economic and political regulation. The commodity form theory of law is presented as the key to understanding the significance of international law under the culture of global capitalism. (shrink)

"E. B. Pashukanis was the most significant contemporary to develop a fresh, new Marxist perspective in post-revolutionary Russia. In 1924 he wrote what is probably his most influential work, The General Theory of Law and Marxism. In the second edition, 1926, he stated that this work was not to be seen as a final product but more for ""self-clarification"" in hopes of adding ""stimulus and material for further discussion."" A third edition was printed in 1927. Pashukanis's ""commodity-exchange"" theory of law (...) spearheaded a perspective that traced the form of law, not to class interests, but to capital logic itself. Until his death, he continued to argue for the ideal of the withering away of the state, law, and the juridic subject. He eventually arrived at a position contrary to Stalin's who, at that time, was attempting to consolidate and strengthen the state apparatus under the name of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Inevitably, Pashukanis was branded an enemy of the revolution in January 1937. His works were subsequently removed from soviet libraries. In 1954, Pashukanis was ""rehabilitated"" by the Soviets and restored to an acceptable position in the historical development of marxist law. In Europe and North America, a number of legal theorists only rediscovered Pashukanis's work in the late 1970s. They subjected it to careful critical analysis, and realized that he offered an alternative to the traditional Marxist interpretations, which saw law simply and purely as tied to class interests of domination. By the mid-1980s the instrumental Marxist perspective in vogue in Marxist sociology, criminology, politics, and economics gave way, to a significant extent due to Pashukanis's insights, to a more structural Marxist accounting of the relationship of law to economics and other social spheres." --Descripción del editor. (shrink)

Aus dem Inhalt: Justice in General: E. Attwooll: Is the Idea of Justice Asymmetric? u C. L. Sheng: Injustice in Law Caused by Conflict between Equality and Equity u G. Barden: Approaches to Justice: The Economy and the State u C. Schmidt: The Concept of Justice in Economic Theory u M. Milde: Rawls, Pluralism and the Value of Contract Theory u J. Tasioulas: M. Walzer on Justice u L. Cedroni: An Ethological Approach to Law, Justice and the State uaR. Kevelson: (...) Justice as Artifice and Sign u A. Makolkin: Semiotics and Poeticity of Law and Justice u D. Ginev: Law and Morality from a Hermeneutic-Semiotic Perspective Rights in General: F. Viola: Personal Identity in the Human Rights Perspective u J.-R. Sieckmann: Justice and Rights u P. Comanducci: Justice and Rights u D. Wayand: Aboriginal Rights - Then and Now u M. Pavcnik: Argument der Grundrechte u D. B. Boersema: What's Wrong with Rights? u E. E. Dais: A Kantian Critique of Justice Holmes's Rights Theory Social and Environmental Rights: B. M. Baker: The Welfare State: Objectives, Subordinate Principles and Justifying Grounds u U. Penski: Zur Begruendung und Struktur sozialer Rechte u H. LaFolette: Two Forms of Paternalism u L. J. Mazor: Social Justice / Asocial Injustice u D. Wood: Constitutional Minimalism and the Discretionary Power of the Welfare State u u.a. (shrink)

Life, the universe, and everything -- Thinking robots and mysterious minds -- The good, the bad, and the ugly -- Is seeing believing?

In his inaugural lecture, Peter Mascini takes issue with the goal of scientific purity in the behavioral study of law conceived as the deliberate choice to postulate a limited number of universally applicable behavioral principles. The guiding principle of behavioral sociology is that law behaves in correspondence to social space, while the guiding principle of law and economics is that individuals behave rationally. Behavioral economics has challenged the principle of the rational actor and, consequently, has also challenged the (...) desire for scientific purity in law and economics. Peter Mascini defends a two-fold thesis: first, that the purification of sociology proposed by behavioral sociology is a blind alley that can only be exited by allowing impurity. Second, that the behavioral economics movement has offered law and economics an opportunity to reinvigorate by embracing impurity. The combination of the two parts of his thesis lead him to the claim that we need less purity in the behavioral study of law rather than more. He ends his lecture by stating that the introduction of impurity that has been started by behavioral economics needs to be extended in several respects. He proposes to replace the behavioral study of law by an approach that not only takes empirical research seriously, but also adopts a modest attitude by surrendering the ambition to come up with universally applicable predictions and by taking seriously meaningful behavior. (Series: Erasmus Law Lectures, Vol. 41) [Subject: Behavioral Sociology, Law and Economics, Behavioral Economics, Private Law]. (shrink)