Marian Przełęcki defends the semantical conception of truth against involving it in difficulties of the said controversy.

Semantics may be said to be relevant to ontology in, at least, two ways: semantic considerations may pertain to meaning, or to justication of ontological statements. An ontological thesis may be given a semantic paraphrase, or only a semantic reason. The analysis of the doctrine of transcendental idealism provided by Ajdukiewicz illustrates the rst case. Its eect is a semantic paraphrase of the allegedly ontological idealistic thesis. In contradistinction to it, the exposition of the doctrine of reism as contained in (...) Kotarbinski's work may serve as an example of the second case. Ascribing a genuinely ontological meaning to the reistic thesis, the author adduces for it reasons of explicitly semantic nature. It is on this case that I shall concentrate in the present paper. The problem is a general one. It pertains to the whole class of so-called reductionistic ontological doctrines, which, as a rule, are being justied in a similar way. Generally speaking, it is a way that involves an inference from the nature of language to the nature of the world. Let us analyze that kind of argumentation on the example of the reistic thesis. (shrink)

The model theoretic concept of truth has thus far been applied mainly to mathematical languages and theories. The paper presents an attempt to apply it to languages of empirical theories. Such an application must do justice to some characteristic features of empirical discourse. The paper outlines the main problems which a model theoretic theory of truth for empirical languages is bound to face and suggests some solutions to those problems.

The law of excluded middle is usually considered as intrinsically connected with the realistic standpoint and incompatible with the idealistic position. This is just what Ajdukiewicz claims in his critique of transcendental idealism. The analysis of Ajdukiewicz's argumentation raises the problem of validity of the law of excluded middle for vague (or incomplete) languages. The problem is being solved by differentiating between the logical (or ontological) and the metalogical (or semantical) law of excluded middle: in contrast to the former, the (...) latter is claimed to be invalid for the languages in question, without thereby embracing the idealist position. (shrink)

An answer to the question whether belief is a proper object of moral appraisal is shown to depend on some assumptions concerning the notion of moral judgement and belief. Different categories of morally appraisable objects are discussed and two concepts of belief are distinguished: a feeling of confidence and an act of assertion. It is claimed that an appraisal of beliefs with regard to their rationality has a moral aspect and that moral beliefs are liable to a moral valuation with (...) respect to their moral content. Both kinds of moral valuation are illustrated by the case of the racist view. (shrink)

Realizm praktyczny jest koncepcją etyczną Tadeusza Kotarbińskiego, która spotkała się z poważną krytyką — głównie ze strony Henryka Elzenberga. Autor artykułu, uznając słuszność niektórych zarzutów Elzenberga, stara się ich uniknąć dzięki interpretacji postulatu realizmu praktycznego, sugerowanej przez pewne wcześniejsze teksty Kotarbińskiego. Postulat ten, tak rozumiany, nie wyznacza naczelnego ideału naszego postępowania, tylko podaje warunek moralnej dopuszczalności dążenia do przyjętego przez nas ideału. Warunkiem tym ma być nasza troska o dobro innych ludzi, w szczególności — „obrona ich przed nieszczęściem”.

Proceedings of the Conference for Formal Methods in the Methodology of Emperical Sciences, Warsaw, June 17-21, 1974, Poland.

The model theoretic concept of truth has thus far been applied mainly to mathematical languages and theories. The paper presents an attempt to apply it to languages of empirical theories. Such an application must do justice to some characteristic features of empirical discourse. The paper outlines the main problems which a model theoretic theory of truth for empirical languages is bound to face and suggests some solutions to those problems.

The law of excluded middle is usually considered as intrinsically connected with the realistic standpoint and incompatible with the idealistic position. This is just what Ajdukiewicz claims in his critique of transcendental idealism. The analysis of Ajdukiewicz's argumentation raises the problem of validity of the law of excluded middle for vague (or incomplete) languages. The problem is being solved by differentiating between the logical (or ontological) and the metalogical (or semantical) law of excluded middle: in contrast to the former, the (...) latter is claimed to be invalid for the languages in question, without thereby embracing the idealist position. (shrink)

This is an attempt to meet the objections made by Anna and Andrzej Jerzy Jedynak in their article criticizing the views of this author concerning truth value of evaluative propositions. Replying to this criticism the author tries to show that his views do not lead to the elimination of the evaluative predicates like “morally good” by descriptive predicates like “considered to be morally good”, as the critics have claimed.

As the answer to the question clearly depends on its precise meaning, the paper aims at presenting some explications of the problem and the conclusions entailed by each of them. If mathematical entity is taken in a narrow sense, the answer turns out to be negative; on some broader conceptions, it is positive. Though irreducible to a numerical structure, a scientific domain is identifiable with some set theoretic entity.

The thesis of the inexpressibility of certain kinds of philosophical knowledge, as ascribed to plato, is subjected to an analysis and, in consequence, interpreted in such a way which does not charge plato's position with any kind of mysticism or irrationalism. The interpretation propounded assumes that it is only some vague philosophical ideas that are said to be not expressible in a definite way.