Several attempts have been made to apply the choice-sensitive theory of distributive justice, luck egalitarianism, in the context of health and healthcare. This article presents a framework for this discussion by highlighting different normative decisions to be made in such an application, some of the objections to which luck egalitarians must provide answers and some of the practical implications associated with applying such an approach in the real world. It is argued that luck egalitarians should address distributions of health rather (...) than healthcare, endorse an integrationist theory that combines health concerns with general distributive concerns and be pluralist in their approach. It further suggests that choice-sensitive policies need not be the result of applying luck egalitarianism in this context. (shrink)

The method of reflective equilibrium focuses on the relationship between principles and judgments. Principles are relatively general rules for comprehending the area of enquiry. Judgments are our intuitions or commitments, ‘at all levels of generality’ (Rawls 1975: 8), regarding the subject matter. The basic idea of reflective equilibrium is to bring principles and judgments into accord. This can be achieved by revising the principles and/or the judgments. -/- I first look at normative political judgments (Section 2) before considering the role (...) of principles, arguments, devices of representation and background theory in wide reflective equilibrium (Section 3). I then consider two of the main challenges to the method (Section 4), and show how to use it to deliberate about substantive political principles (Section 5). I conclude with an extended example of the method in action (Section 6). (shrink)

In [8], the third author defined a reducibility$\le _w^{\rm{*}}$that lets us compare the computing power of structures of any cardinality. In [6], the first two authors showed that the ordered field of reals${\cal R}$lies strictly above certain related structures. In the present paper, we show that$\left \equiv _w^{\rm{*}}{\cal R}$. More generally, for the weak-looking structure${\cal R}$ℚconsisting of the real numbers with just the ordering and constants naming the rationals, allo-minimal expansions of${\cal R}$ℚare equivalent to${\cal R}$. Using this, we show that (...) for any analytic functionf,$\left \equiv _w^{\rm{*}}{\cal R}$. $is noto-minimal.). (shrink)

Social practices are widely regarded as the bedrock that turns one’s spade, beneath which no further justifications for action can be found. Followers of the later Wittgenstein might therefore be right to agree with Heideggerians and neo-pragmatists that philosophy’s traditional search for first principles should be abandoned. However, the concept of practices has played a very different role in the philosophy of Alasdair MacIntyre. Having once helped lead the assault on foundationalism in both moral and social philosophy, his elaboration of (...) an Aristotelian’ concept of practices in After Virtue has since led him to embrace a metaphysical teleology. This paper attempts to outline MacIntyre’s Aristotelian concept, and to identify its ethical, political and philosophical significance. (shrink)

Examining sources and case studies, this fascinating book explores early Christianity, how it was studied, how it is studied now, and how Judaeo-Christian values came to form the ideological bedrock of modern western culture. Looking at the diverse source materials available, from the earliest New Testament texts and the complex treaties of third century authors such as Lactantius, to archaeology, epigraphy and papyrology, the book examines what is needed to study the subject, what materials were available, how useful they were, (...) and how the study of the subject may be approached. Also including a comprehensive guide for students that lists major collections of literary and non-literary sources, major journals and series, and major text books. (shrink)

This article provides an empirically based, interdisciplinary approach to the following two questions: Do animals possess behavioral and cognitive characteristics such as culture, language, and a theory of mind? And if so, what are the implications, when long-standing criteria used to justify differences in moral consideration between humans and animals are no longer considered indisputable? One basic implication is that the psychological needs of captive animals should be adequately catered for. However, for species such as great apes and dolphins with (...) whom we share major characteristics of personhood, welfare considerations alone may not suffice, and consideration of basic rights may be morally warranted—as for humans. Although characteristics supporting the status of personhood are present to differing degrees among the diverse array of animal species, this is a barrier to moral consideration only if anthropocentric, exclusive, and monolithic viewpoints about the necessary prerequisites for personhood are applied. We examine the flaws inherent within such positions and argue for inalienable species-appropriate rights. (shrink)

In this paper, we give an example of a complete computable infinitary theory T with countable models ${\mathcal{M}}$ and ${\mathcal{N}}$ , where ${\mathcal{N}}$ is a proper computable infinitary extension of ${\mathcal{M}}$ and T has no uncountable model. In fact, ${\mathcal{M}}$ and ${\mathcal{N}}$ are (up to isomorphism) the only models of T. Moreover, for all computable ordinals α, the computable ${\Sigma_\alpha}$ part of T is hyperarithmetical. It follows from a theorem of Gregory (JSL 38:460–470, 1972; Not Am Math Soc 17:967–968, 1970) (...) that if T is a Π 1 1 set of computable infinitary sentences and T has a pair of models ${\mathcal{M}}$ and ${\mathcal{N}}$ , where ${\mathcal{N}}$ is a proper computable infinitary extension of ${\mathcal{M}}$ , then T would have an uncountable model. (shrink)

The assertion by Yu and Nikolic that the delayed choice quantum eraser experiment of Kim et al. empirically falsifies the consciousness-causes-collapse hypothesis of quantum mechanics is based on the unfounded and false assumption that the failure of a quantum wave function to collapse implies the appearance of a visible interference pattern.

In the Critique of So-called Practical Knowledge Alf Ross wishes to show that ethical judgments are nonsensical. He begins by asserting that when people speak about practical knowledge they mean knowledge which contains an unconditional command to the will, and this, he points out, involves a confusion between knowledge and volition. Thus, since all ethical theories are forms of practical knowledge, they are doomed to failure. All ethical theories can be classified into two types: they all belong to the ethics (...) of value or the ethics of duty. These differ very radically, since the one takes value and the other duty as its fundamental concept; but they are inadequate for the same reasons. Both value and duty are self-contradictory concepts, and both awareness of value and awareness of duty are quite different from what ethical theories suppose. (shrink)

SummaryThis survey deals with Contemporary [German] Philosophy, vol. vii, by several contributors; The Machine-Theory of Life, by Julius Schultz; Bernard Bolzano, by Heinrich Fels; The Theory of Classes, by Adolf Fraenkel; Anof Logistic, by Rudolf Carnap.

SummaryThis survey deals with Contemporary [German] Philosophy, vol. vii, by several contributors; The Machine-Theory of Life, by Julius Schultz; Bernard Bolzano, by Heinrich Fels; The Theory of Classes, by Adolf Fraenkel; Anof Logistic, by Rudolf Carnap.

In his introduction to the logic of morals Karl Menger maintains that only two kinds of ethical inquiry are fruitful—the psychology or biology of morals and the logic of morals. The first of these is an empirical science which discovers what value judgments have actually been made and correlates them with various other factors. In this way it provides material for the logic of morals, which neither discovers empirical facts nor analyses them, but simply points out logical relations. In this (...) book Menger discusses the nature of ethical judgments and carries out some investigations of the logical type. (shrink)