Questions and answers from two great philosophers Why is laughter contagious? Why do mountains exist? Why do we long for the past, even if it is scarred by suffering? Spanning a vast array of subjects that range from the philosophical to the theological, from the philological to the scientific, The Philosopher Responds is the record of a set of questions put by the litterateur Abu Hayyan al-Tawhidi to the philosopher and historian Abu 'Ali Miskawayh. Both figures were foremost contributors (...) to the remarkable flowering of cultural and intellectual life that took place in the Islamic world during the reign of the Buyid dynasty in the fourth/tenth century. The correspondence between al-Tawhidi and Miskawayh holds a mirror to many of the debates and preoccupations of the time and reflects the spirit of rationalistic inquiry that animated their era. It also provides insight into the intellectual outlooks of two thinkers who were divided as much by their distinctive temperaments as by the very different trajectories of their professional careers. Alternately whimsical and tragic, wondering and brooding, trivial and profound, al-Tawhidi’s questions provoke an interaction as interesting in its spiritedness as in its content. This new edition of The Philosopher Responds is accompanied by the first full-length English translation of this important text, bringing this interaction to life for the English reader. (shrink)

Questions and answers from two great philosophers Why is laughter contagious? Why do mountains exist? Why do we long for the past, even if it is scarred by suffering? Spanning a vast array of subjects that range from the philosophical to the theological, from the philological to the scientific, The Philosopher Responds is the record of a set of questions put by the litterateur Abu Hayyan al-Tawhidi to the philosopher and historian Abu 'Ali Miskawayh. Both figures were foremost contributors (...) to the remarkable flowering of cultural and intellectual life that took place in the Islamic world during the reign of the Buyid dynasty in the fourth/tenth century. The correspondence between al-Tawhidi and Miskawayh holds a mirror to many of the debates and preoccupations of the time and reflects the spirit of rationalistic inquiry that animated their era. It also provides insight into the intellectual outlooks of two thinkers who were divided as much by their distinctive temperaments as by the very different trajectories of their professional careers. Alternately whimsical and tragic, wondering and brooding, trivial and profound, al-Tawhidi’s questions provoke an interaction as interesting in its spiritedness as in its content. This new edition of The Philosopher Responds is accompanied by the first full-length English translation of this important text, bringing this interaction to life for the English reader. (shrink)

MEDIEVAL ARABIC PHILOSOPHICAL ETHICS is a much neglected field. Not many texts have survived. Some of them are rather popular and belie the assumption that Medieval Arabic philosophy is essentially Aristotelian. For instance, al-Kindi, Abu Bakr al-Razi, Avicenna, and Miskawayh all wrote about treating sadness. Were philosophers at the time subject to acute bouts of depression? or did they have some serious philosophical reasons to deal with this topic? How can one conciliate the popular and highly successful genre of (...) the "Spiritual Medicine," which considers passions as diseases of the soul that are badly in need of eradication, with the need for a rigorous normative ethics? As Islam and its Shari'a provide detailed ethical prescriptions and prohibitions, as well as guidance for any situation in the life of pious Muslims, how can philosophy vindicate the autonomy and importance of philosophical ethics? Can it be done on Aristotelian grounds? Why do serious philosophers devote such efforts to "Spiritual Medicine," a very un-Aristotelian enterprise? Such questions are puzzling. To even begin answering them, we need to study carefully the works of each philosopher in order to understand on their own terms what place and what role they assign to ethics, and then to analyze their ethical works to determine their purpose, audience, and philosophic worth. (shrink)

Rāzī, Fakhr al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn ʻUmar; 1149 or 1150-1210; criticism and interpretation; Islamic ethics; Islamic philosophy.

RésuméTard dans sa vie intellectuelle, Faḫr al-Dīn al-Rāzī a adopté une position dualiste sur la nature de l’âme, niant que l’âme est en tout sens un corps matériel. Ce point de vue, qui, de manière générale, concorde avec celui d’Avicenne, oppose al-Rāzī à la position matérialiste des théologiens. Pour clarifier sa position, dans son dernier ouvrage, Al-maṭālib, al-Rāzī expose un argument approfondi en faveur du matérialisme des théologiens, avant de critiquer cette position. Cet article offre une reconstruction (...) des arguments d’al-Rāzī en faveur du matérialisme des théologiens, offrant une perception des arguments dans la philosophie de l’esprit pendant le Moyen Âge islamique. (shrink)

This article argues that a fragment from a lost treatise by Abū Bakr al-Rāzī (d. 925) is preserved in the Book on Morphology Kitāb al-Taṣrīf) by Ps-Ǧābir ibn Ḥayyān. Paul Kraus reached the conclusion that the collection to which this book belongs was written between the end of the ninth and the beginning of the tenth century AD. This fragment represents the first attempt – to our knowledge – to analyze the logical structure of sign-based inference in Arabic, which (...) is known as istidlāl bi-al-šāhid ʿalā al-ġāʾib among theologians and philosophers. The author distinguishes between sign-inferences based on homogeneity (al-muǧānasa), course of habit (maǧrā al-ʿāda) and traces (āṯār). After providing a translation of the fragment, the first part of this paper argues that its author is Abū Bakr al-Rāzī. My argument is based on a comparison between this text and a passage from the Doubts About Galen, which is also by Abū Bakr al-Rāzī. I hypothesize that at least two other fragments from the same work or from different works by Abū Bakr al-Rāzī are preserved in the corpus attributed to Ps-Ǧābir. The second part of the paper aims to reconstruct Abū Bakr al-Rāzī’s theory of sign-inference. In so doing, I show the historical influence that Hellenistic debates on sign-inference might have had on al-Rāzī, and I situate al-Rāzī’s theory in the context of the prominent use that the theologians of the kalām made of the istidlāl bi-al-šāhid ʿalā al-ġāʾib. To offer a more comprehensive reconstruction of al-Rāzī’s theory of sign-inference, this article compares the critical approach presented in the newly identified fragment with the epistemological framework outlined in the Doubts About Galen. Finally, this article shows that Abū Bakr al-Rāzī’s theory of sign-inference had a strong influence on al-Fārābī’s logical developments especially in his Epitome of the Prior Analytics, even if he does not acknowledge this intellectual debt. (shrink)

As there are several famous al-Rāzī relevant to philosophy, I need first to specify that this remarkable book deals with Abū Bakr Muhammad ibn Zakariyyā' al-Rāzī, also known as "Galen of the Arabs," and in Latin as well as in the Canterbury Tales as "al-Rhazes." He proudly presented himself as both a philosopher and a physician taking Galen as his model. Just as in Hellenistic times Galen was highly valued as a physician but demeaned as a philosopher, so (...) often was al-Rāzī. This book reinstates al-Rāzī as an interesting philosopher, who claims to be a disciple of Galen and Plato but clearly understands that discipleship implies following Galen's own example of avoiding uncritical... (shrink)

RésuméCet article se propose de reconstruire une partie du livre IV du traité perdu Sur la démonstration de Galien à partir des témoignages transmis par Abū Bakr al-Rāzī dans les Doutes sur Galien, et d'une source encore jamais exploitée, la Solution aux Doutes sur Galien de Abū al-ʿAlāʾ ibn Zuhr. L'hypothèse à laquelle nous sommes parvenue est que, dans le livre IV, Galien revient sur le caractère indécidable de la question de l’éternité du monde, et critique la démonstration donnée (...) par Aristote dans le traité Du Ciel, I. Seul un des arguments d'Aristote, qui occupe le court passage I, 3, 270b12–17, lui semble pouvoir être sauvé, car il est fondé sur des indications empiriques. C'est sur ce passage que se concentre al-Rāzī. Cette reconstruction permet de réduire les contradictions entre les fragments du livre IV transmis par Philopon dans Contre Proclus sur l’éternité du monde et le compte rendu d'al-Rāzī. Enfin, cet article montre que si al-Rāzī porte autant d'intérêt à ce passage chez Galien, ce n'est pas seulement à des fins polémiques, mais afin de servir ses propres objectifs philosophico-théologiques. Les objections d'al-Rāzī montrent qu'il considère que la téléologie galénique est adossée à un arrière-fond éternaliste qui ne lui permet pas de reconnaître la primauté de la théodicée pour la cosmologie comme pour la biologie. (shrink)

This paper initiates a dialogue between classical Islamic philosophy and late modern European thought, by focusing on two peripheral, ‘heretical’ figures within these traditions: Abū Bakr Muḥammad ibn Zakariyāʾ al-Rāzī and Friedrich Nietzsche. What affiliates these thinkers across the cultural and historical chasm that separates them is their mutual fascination with, and profound indebtedness to, ancient Greek and Hellenistic philosophy. Given the specific themes, concerns and doctrines that they appropriate from this common source, I argue that al-Rāzī and (...) Nietzsche should be read as Epicureans and seen in relation to their predecessor as part of the subterranean tradition of philosophical naturalism. However, while each figure appropriates the philosophy of Epicurus, they ultimately transform it in important ways: al-Rāzī offers us a qualified “Platonic” Epicureanism, while Nietzsche forges a radicalized “Dionysian” Epicureanism. The point of such a comparative examination is twofold. First, analyzing the divergent paths of these “wayward” Epicureans sheds new light on the historical trajectory of naturalism as a philosophical stance (as well as its current prospects and limitations). Second, by initiating a dialogue between the classical Islamic and modern European philosophical traditions, we can better understand the antagonisms and shared concerns between these two horizons, as well as the ambiguities and self-questioning that occur within them. (shrink)

Abū Bakr al-Rāzī (d. 925), a doctor known not only for his medical expertise but also for his notorious philosophical ideas, has not yet been given due credit for his ideas on the ethical treatment of animals. This paper explores the philosophical and theological background of his remarks on animal welfare, arguing that al-Rāzī did not (as has been claimed) see animals as possessing rational, intellectual souls like those of humans. It is also argued that al-Rāzī probably (...) did not, as is usually believed, endorse human-animal transmigration. His ethical stance does not in any case depend on shared characteristics of humans and animals, but rather on the need to imitate God’s providence and mercy. (shrink)

Ethics plays an essential role in the philosophical framework of Abū Bakr al-Rāzī. Although most of his philosophical works have become extinct, two surviving works serve as primary sources for understanding his ethical theory. Although sharing certain foundational principles, these two works diverge in terms of ethical standards and exhibit distinct logical approaches to ethics, a facet that has largely remained unexplored within contemporary scholarly discourse. I aim to extract and reconstruct both of his ethical decision-making systems by shedding (...) light on the place of ethics in his philosophy, explaining the interconnection of the two ethical frameworks, reconstructing both of these ethical systems, and finally presenting them in patterns. (shrink)

The present article explores the views of al-Jāḥiẓ, Abū Bakr al-Rāzī, and Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī - three pre-modern thinkers of the Islamic world outside the Peripatetic tradition - on the question o...

According to Tāj al-Dīn al-Subkī, al-Ghazālī was the renewer of the Muslim faith at the end of the 5th / 11th century, whereas al-Rāzī was the renewer of faith at the end of the 6th / 12th century. That al-Ghazālī deserves such an honour can hardly be disputed, and his importance in the history of Islamic thought is generally recognised. However, the same cannot, as easily, be said of al-Rāzī, whose historical significance is far from being truly appreciated, (...) and some of the most important books of whom still await publication. Much is known about his views on particular philosophical and theological problems, and about the historical backgrounds to, and the relations amongst, some of these views. Some rather general observations on his thought are also common; for instance, that he is a heavily philosophising Ash‘arī mutakallim, a master dialectician, and an influential critic of Ibn Sīnā. (shrink)

Nuestro propósito aquí es el de dar cuenta, de un modo sumario, de la figura de Abu Bakr Zakariyya al-Razi (el Rhazes de los latinos) y los posibles orígenes de su pensamiento, así como presentar la originalidad de su pensamiento filosófico en el contexto de su tiempo y su cultura.

The twelfth century philosopher-theologian Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī is well known for his critique of Avicennan metaphysics. In this paper, I examine his critique of Avicenna's physics, and in particular his rejection of the Avicennan and Aristotelian theory of place as the inner boundary of a containing body. Instead, Fakhr al-Dīn defends a definition of place as self-subsisting extension, an idea explicitly rejected by Aristotle and Avicenna after him. Especially in his late work, theMaṭālib, Fakhr al-Dīn explores a number of (...) important philosophical issues with reference to this theory of place, including the principle that two indiscernible things must be identical and the idea that motion and rest are always relative.RésuméLe philosophe-théologien du XIIesiècle Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī est bien connu pour sa critique de la métaphysique avicennienne. Nous examinons, dans cet article, sa critique de la physique d'Avicenne, et en particulier son rejet de la théorie avicennienne et aristotélicienne du lieu – lieu comme limite interne du corps englobant. Alternativement, Fakhr al-Dīn défend une théorie du lieu comme extension auto-subsistante, doctrine explicitement révoquée par Aristote et Avicenne à sa suite. En particulier dans son œuvre tardive, lesMaṭālib, Fakhr al-Dīn explore plusieurs questions philosophiques importantes en rapport avec cette théorie du lieu, dont: le principe voulant que deux choses indiscernables soient identiques, et l'idée selon laquelle mouvement et repos sont toujours relatifs. (shrink)

This article tries to show that Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, one of Ash‘arī theologians of the contracting period, showed a Mu‘tazila tendency regarding the ontic value of divine attributes and his successors followed him in this regard. The problem of divine attributes, a heated discussion area of theology, has been interpreted differently by the theological sects over centuries. Mu‘tazila scholars before Abu Hāshim al-Jubbāī regarded those attributes as nominally attributed to God. For the first time, with Abu Hāshim, this relation (...) was approached with a realistic attitude: Although divine attributes are not accepted as particular realities, they are viewed as states/ahwāl, the universal model of kalam atomism. The pre-Gazzālī Ash‘arī theologians, on the other hand, ascribed real existence to divine attributes as particular properties, whether they adopted this universal model or not. According to Abū al-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī, the founder of Ashʿarism, which does not include the universal category in any way, the attributes carried by God’s essence consist of particular qualities. al-Bāqillānī and al-Juwaynī, who, like Abu Hāshim, made room for universals under the name of states, accepted particular qualities that led to universal attributes in a system compatible with Ashʿarism. Muta’akhkhirūn Ash‘arī theologians, building their thought system within the framework of the particular-universal dichotomy, felt the need to apply the theories of universals and predication to overcome the paradox caused by the famous motto “Attributes are neither Him nor other than Him”. On the basis of universal properties that have a lower degree of existence compared to particular properties, Abū al-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī’s theory of particular attributes is intended to be associated with Abu Hāshim’s theory of universal (state). In this context, the value of divine attributes discussed on the ontic ground by the mutaqaddimūn theologians was drawn to the epistemic ground in the muta’akhkhirūn period. From the first kalām works of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī to the last kalām works, he was distant from the ontic value of divine attributes. The statement that the derived word “knower”, which is appropriate for being a predicate in the propositional structure, and the infinitive “knowledge”, which is not appropriate for being a predicate, meet the same purpose, and that divine attributes are considered divine essence are the most important indications of this distance. Reviewing the works of prominent theologians, scholars of the time such as Fakhr al- Dīn al-Rāzī, Aḍud al-Dīn al-Ījī, Sa‘d al-dīn al-Taftāzānī, al-Jurjānī, and al-Dawānī, this article aims to demonstrate that Abu Hāshim’s view of the divine attributes in the ontic context was welcomed and that the evaluation of divine attributes shifted from particular realities to universal ones in the ontic context. The meaning of “God is knower” proposition according to the pre-Mu‘tazila in the ontic context will be analyzed. Then, its meaning according to Ash‘arite theologians from their framework of universals, will be investigated. (shrink)

Los falasifa no se mantuvieron tan imparciales en el tema de la Su`ubiyya como sugiere Goldziher, pues, al menos, en el caso del médico y filósofo al-Razi (m. 932?) ataca éste el núcleo más genuinamente árabe al polemizar contra la `arabiyya, adab, zarf, nahw, si`r... y al situar por encima de las ciencias filológicas árabes a las ciencias filosófico-científicas características del Helenismo. Por ello puede considerarse este ataque de al-Razi como un capítulo más de la polémica de la Su`ubiyya. Todo (...) esto lo expone al-Razi en el capítulo cinco de su tratado Fi l-tibb al-ruhani, que es el que se presenta y traduce en este trabajo. (shrink)

Los falāsifa no se mantuvieron tan imparciales en el tema de la Šu‛ūbiyya como sugiere Goldziher, pues, al menos, en el caso del médico y filósofo al-Rāzī ataca éste el núcleo más genuinamente árabe al polemizar contra la ‛arabiyya, adab, zarf, naḥw, ši‛r... y al situar por encima de las ciencias filológicas árabes a las ciencias filosofico-científicas características del Helenismo. Por ello puede considerarse este ataque de Al-Rāzī como un capítulo más de la polémica de la Šu‛übiyya. Todo (...) esto lo expone al-Rāzī en el capítulo cinco de su tratado Fī l-ṭibb al-rūḥānī, que es el que se presenta y traduce en este trabajo. (shrink)

The book investigates how Avicenna's doctrine of efficient causality relates to his general ontology, as well as how the two are interpreted, defended, and challenged in the early phase of Avicenna's Islamic reception (the eleventh and twelfth centuries).

This paper is devoted to a fascinating passage in Faḫr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 1210), in which he argues that non-human animals have rational souls. It is found in his Mulaḫḫaṣ fī l-manṭiq wa-l-ḥikma (Epitome on Philosophy and Logic). Following a discussion of the afterlife, Faḫr al-Dīn suggests that animals should, like humans, be capable of grasping universals, and that they are aware of their own identity over time. Furthermore, animal behavior shows that they are capable of rational planning and (...) problem-solving. We contextualize these arguments with reference to Faḫr al-Dīn’s other philosophical works, and also compare the considerations he raises to ideas found in modern-day animal ethics, drawing here especially on the work of Mark Rowlands. The paper concludes with a translation of the passage. (shrink)

Avicenna is a strong proponent of what some of the later ones call qāʻidat al-wāḥid or ‘rule of the one’ (RO). The gist of RO states: from the one only one directly proceeds. In the secondary literature, discussion of this Avicennian rule is usually limited to a particular application of it i.e., the issue of emanation. As result, it’s not really clear what RO means, nor why Avicenna endorsed it. In this paper, I try and remedy this situation by doing (...) two things – one on the taṣawwur front, the other on the tasdīq. First, explain just what the terms of RO amount to – that is, its subject and predicate. In doing this, I distinguish between a narrow and a broad understanding of RO, and the show that, on the Avicennian view, the scope of RO is broad; it is meant to be a general principle of efficient causality. This is why it is appealed to in various contexts to establish substantial philosophical theses. Second, I consider an argument Avicenna offers for RO in the Mubāḥathāt. In unpacking it, I uncover some of its realist presuppositions, and then further clarify it in light of a critique first raised by Bahmanyār and then later made famous by Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī. I then conclude by seeing whether the Avicennian has the resources within the initial premises of the argument to meet the objection that’s raised. (shrink)