This chapter takes a closer look at the doctrine of common notions and universal consent developed by Nathaniel Culverwell (1619–51) in his Elegant and Learned Discourse of the Light of Nature, a work based on lectures delivered at Cambridge in 1645–46, but only published posthumously in 1652. I study Culverwell’s doctrine of common notions and universal consent from the perspective of his critical discussion of two contemporary works, namely Descartes’s Discours de la méthode (1637) and Robert Greville’s The Nature of (...) Truth (1640). I argue that, contrary to Wallis who was indeed an Aristotelian who rejected innate ideas entirely, Culverwell adopted a characteristically stoic position, according to which common notions do not directly derive from sense experience, but are innate dispositions common to all which become present to the mind only under the impact of the senses. (shrink)

Emil Boesen.--Ilia Fibiger.--Mathilde Leiner.--Ernesto Dalgas.

In this chapter, I explore the complex and neglected tradition of the early modern common notion. I focus on three thinkers, two of them innatist in some sense, one of them not; all (mostly) products of the English context; all arguably part of the background for Locke’s critique of common notions and innate ideas in the first book of the Essay; and all related to each other in various and complicated ways. They are: Edward Herbert of Cherbury (1582–1648), Kenelm Digby (...) (1603–1665), and Nathaniel Culverwell (1619–1651). I show how they deployed three different theories of common notions that we can describe, respectively, as gnoseological, rhetorical, and allegorical. (shrink)

Udgivet i forbindelse med Mogens Pahuus's fratrædelse som professor ved Aalborg Universitet.

From new practices emerge new domains. And from new domains emerge new competencies and roles. This article investigates some of the new competencies and roles emerging from the trans-disciplinary practice of curators, artists, scientists, programmers etc., which are involved in media art practice. Our hypothesis is that these new domains have a more general existence and profile in the paradigm of media art even though the following is based on the process of creating the MAP Media Art Platform at the (...) Museum of Contemporary Art (MFSK) in Roskilde, Denmark, between 2005 and 2008, a process in which we both were involved as media artist and media art curator, respectively. Our focus in this article is to investigate further the status of these new competencies and roles, and to ask: what are these new domains that emerge with regard to the artist, the software developer, the academic, the scientist and the curator. (shrink)

This volume collects contributions from leading scholars of early modern philosophy from a wide variety of philosophical and geographic backgrounds. The distinguished contributors offer very different, competing approaches to the history of philosophy.

This paper discusses Baruch de Spinoza’s cosmological argument for the existence of God (CA) as it can be found in ’Ethics’, I, proposition 11, demonstration 3. The aim of the article is to provide a reconstruction of the argument by developing the underlying metaphysical framework governing it. It is partly motivated by Michael Della Rocca’s attempt to account of fundamental principles of Spinoza’s philosophy. According to him, all dependence relations in Spinoza can be reduced to conceptual ones. I argue to (...) the contrary that Spinoza’s theories of causation and power are more fundamental than his theory of concepts. I discuss the CA as a point of departure for arguing this, and for suggesting what I consider to be a more faithful approach to Spinoza’s metaphysics as a whole. (shrink)

This note establishes a new identification result for additive random utility discrete choice models. A decision-maker associates a random utility Uj+mj\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$U_{j}+m_{j}$$\end{document} to each alternative in a finite set j∈1,…,J\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$j\in \left\{ 1,\ldots,J\right\} $$\end{document}, where U=U1,…,UJ\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\mathbf {U}=\left\{ U_{1},\ldots,U_{J}\right\} $$\end{document} is unobserved by the researcher and random with an unknown joint distribution, while the perturbation m=m1,…,mJ\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} (...) \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\mathbf {m}=\left $$\end{document} is observed. The decision-maker chooses the alternative that yields the maximum random utility, which leads to a choice probability system m→Pr1|m,…,PrJ|m\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\mathbf { m\rightarrow }\left,\ldots,\Pr \left \right) $$\end{document}. Previous research has shown that the choice probability system is identified from the observation of the relationship m→Pr1|m\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$ \mathbf {m}\rightarrow \Pr \left $$\end{document}. We show that the complete choice probability system is identified from observation of a relationship m→∑j=1sPrj|m\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\mathbf {m}\rightarrow \sum _{j=1}^{s}\Pr \left $$\end{document}, for any sshrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook Jahrgang: 19 Heft: 1 Seiten: 135-152.

The paper shows the standard definition of time at a distance to be beset with ambiguities that may be solved by making a fresh start taking its point of departure in the idea of a cosmic time as proposed by the British tradition of relativistic cosmology.

The paper shows the standard definition of time at a distance to be beset with ambiguities that may be solved by making a fresh start taking its point of departure in the idea of a cosmic time as proposed by the British tradition of relativistic cosmology.

The paper shows the standard definition of time at a distance to be beset with ambiguities that may be solved by making a fresh start taking its point of departure in the idea of a cosmic time as proposed by the British tradition of relativistic cosmology.

Text in French. On distingue dans la philosophie politique moderne une préoccupation particulière, á savoir le conflit entre individu et état. Quelle philosophie morale pourrait trancher entre ces deux concepts? Qu'on donne á chacun le droit á la contestation, et l'on voit se dresser immédiatement le spectre de l'anarchie. Si nous refusons ce droit, la souveraineté de l'état peut sans conteste tourner au despotisme. Avec sa théorie de la souveraineté, Jean Bodin joue un rôle clé dans l'histoire de ce dilemme. (...) Le rapport entre sa théorie du droit naturel et celle de la souveraineté est au centre des recherches presentées dans cette étude portant en particulier sur son ouvrage La République de 1576. (shrink)

Ce livre s'efforce de clarifier ce que sont "les droits de l'homme" et d'en proposer une conceptualisation qui correspondrait mieux aux besoins contemporains. Il faut d'abord dégager la vision morale à la base des principaux discours sur lesdits droits. Ce faisant, l'auteur soumet une nouvelle conceptualisation des théories morales - elle permet de mieux comprendre l'histoire de la morale, de rééquilibrer les rapports entre théories dites "déontologiques" et "téléologiques". Mais les théories morales ne sont-elles pas, dans un certain sens, téléologiques? (...) Les droits de l'homme du XVIIIe siècle étaient conçus comme la transposition sous forme de règles traçant les limites de la liberté ; ceux établis par l'ONU, au XXe siècle (1948), visaient les biens nécessaires à la perfection de l'homme. Il faut reconnaître que les deux traditions ne s'harmonisent pas dans l'actuel cadre international des droits de l'homme. Dans ses réflexions, l'auteur esquisse quelques solutions."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

This paper is a contribution to the conceptual history of subjective rights. The subjective right is generally understood as an individual right in contradistinction to the system of legal rules, which are named the ‘objective right.’ These notions have enjoyed immense popularity among Continental legal scholars and historians. This article gives an explanation of how the terms “subjective” and “objective” right came into usage in Germany, and it shows how these terms were elaborated within a metaphysical context. This paper suggests (...) that the origin of this terminology is to be found in the philosophy of Christian Wolff and in particular in that of one of his pupils, Joachim Georg Darjes. The notion of a subjective right thus has its origin in an intellectualistic and perfectionist philosophy, where rights in a primary sense are at the same time conceived as duties. (shrink)

Introduction -- Theses and discussions -- Analytical concepts -- General approach -- Moral philosophy in antiquity -- Christian moral philosophy -- Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas -- William of Ockham -- From William of Ockham to Francisco Suarez -- Protestant natural law -- John Locke -- The American and French declarations of rights -- Early critique of the Declaration of Rights -- Immanuel Kant and modern moral philosophy -- Human rights today.

Summary At the beginning of this century most scholars believed that the document inserted in Dem. 24.20–23 was authentic. It regulated the legislative procedure practiced by the Athenians in the fourth century B.C. which was introduced shortly after the restoration of the democracy in 404/403 B.C. But in his monograph “The Documents in the Attic Orators” (Oxford 2013), 80–102, Mirko Canevaro rejected the document at Dem. 24.20–23 as a late forgery. I responded with the article “The Authenticity of the Law (...) about nomothesia Inserted in Demosthenes Against Timokrates 20–23”, Greek Roman and Byzantine Studies 56 (2016), 438–476. In Klio 100 (1) (2018), “The Authenticity of the Document at Demosth. or. 24.20–3, the Procedures of nomothesia and the so-called ἐπιχɛιροτονία τῶν νόμων”, 70–124, Canevaro contested my arguments and restated his view that the document must be a late forgery. This article is my response to Canevaro’s article. (shrink)

John Rawls' bog En teori om retfærdighed er blandt de absolut vigtigste værker i det 20. århundredes politiske filosofi. Det udkom første gang i 1971 og markerede et brud med en udbredt skepsis over for normative politiske teorier, det vil sige teorier, om hvorledes samfundet bør være indrettet. Med en sofistikeret version af klassisk kontraktteori argumenterer Rawls for en socialliberal vision om retfærdighed, hvor enhver sikres en frihed, der er forenelig med alles tilsvarende frihed, hvor de økonomisk dårligst stillede skal (...) stilles bedst muligt. I nærværende antologi diskuterer en række forskere vigtige temaer i såvel det nævnte hovedværk, som hans øvrige forfatterskab. Bidragene introducerer derved ikke blot til Rawls' politiske filosofi, men også til diskussioner, der står helt centralt i nyere politisk teori såsom vores forhold til fremtidige generationer, civil ulydighed og global retfærdighed. (shrink)

In this paper, I am interested in the conception of toleration that can be gleaned from the political and theological texts of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. I argue that Leibniz did not defend a notion of toleration comparable to a standard modern conception. The modern conception is very often traced back to a constellation of writers contemporary with Leibniz including Locke, Bayle, and Spinoza. It involves an inclusive embrace of diversity, religious and otherwise, and an affirmation of toleration as a fundamental (...) value in and by itself, intrinsically linked to an equally fundamental imperative of freedom of expression allowing such diversity to flourish publicly. Leibniz, however, understood toleration as a political tool to be employed in order to facilitate the reunion of the Christian churches; he did not consider it a constitutive value, or a value in and by itself, but rather saw it as a means to an end; he did not establish any intrinsic link between toleration and freedom of expression but promoted moderate forms of censorship. Most importantly, however, while clearly seeing it as something positive, he also detected deep ambiguities in the concept from which we have much to learn in our own assessment of modern toleration. (shrink)

Dans cet article, nous analysons les textes de G. W. Leibniz qui portent sur la censure et la liberté d’expression, notamment par rapport aux auteurs qu’il qualifie de « libertins » ou d’« athées ». Nous explorons le dispositif théorique qu’il propose pour déterminer les limites justes entre la censure et la liberté de pensée ; dispositif qui permet, dans chaque cas, de choisir entre la réfutation savante et la suppression autoritaire des textes estimés pernicieux pour la morale ou la (...) piété.In this article, I analyze G. W. Leibniz’s position on censorship and liberty of expression, in particular in relationship to the authors that he qualifies as « libertine » or « atheist ». I explore the theoretical framework he proposes to establish the just limits between censorship and liberty of thought and which allows, in each case, to choose between erudite refutation and authoritative suppression in relation to texts considered dangerous for morality or piety. (shrink)

In this chapter, I explore this complex and somewhat neglected tradition of the early modern common notion. I focus on three thinkers, two of them innatist in some sense, one of them not; all (mostly) products of the English context; all arguably part of the background for Locke’s critique of common notions and innate ideas in the first book of the Essay; and all related to each other in various and complicated ways. They are: Edward Herbert of Cherbury (1582–1648), Kenelm (...) Digby (1603–1665), and Nathaniel Culverwell (1619–1651). I show how they deployed three different theories of common notions that we can describe, respectively, as gnoseological, rhetorical, and allegorical. (shrink)

The theory of the separation of powers between a legislature, an executive and a judiciary is still the foundation of modern representative democracy. It was developed by Montesquieu and came to replace the older theory of the mixed constitution which goes back to Plato, Aristotle and Polybios: there are three types of constitution: monarchy, oligarchy and democracy; when institutions from each of the three types are mixed, an interplay between the institutions emerges that affects all functions of state: legislation, implementation (...) of laws and jurisdiction. Today Montesquieu's separation of powers is riddled with so many exceptions that it is an obstacle rather than a help to understand the structure of modern democracy. The mixed constitution deserves to be revived as a corrective to the prevailing view that Western states are pure democracies and that democracy is rule by the people. (shrink)

Gennem filosofiske refleksioner og litterære analyser af danske og udenlanske forfattere diskuteres sammenhængen mellem begreberne tomhedsfølelse og ondskab.

While the field of semiotics has been active since it was started by Peirce, it appears like the last decade has been especially productive with a number of important new concepts being developed within the biosemiotics community. The novel concept of the Semiotic scaffold by Hoffmeyer is an important addition that offers insight into the hardware requirements for bio-semiosis. As any type of semiosis must be dependent upon Semiotic scaffolds, I recently argued that the process of semiosis has to be (...) divided into two separate processes of sign establishment and sign interpretation, and that misalignment between the two processes result in faulty sign interpretation and over-signification. Such faulty signs were forbidden in the sign classification system of Peirce, so I defined them as forbidden signs. Here I present an analysis of the forbidden sign categories with examples from Occult semiotics. I also show that biological semiosis offers examples of forbidden signs, where the faulty interpretation of signs may lead to decimation of whole evolutionary lines of organisms. A new concept of Evolutionary memory which is applicable to both human and biological semiosis is explained as the combination of two processes; one leading to diversity generation within semiotic scaffolds followed by a second process of decimation of faulty signs during selection in specific learning environments. The analysis suggests that forbidden signs are always used as early stages in the iterative sign establishment process during semiosis. (shrink)

In Politikos Plato draws a picture of the true statesman, a picture that has baffled several of the scholars who have analysed the dialogue, because it appears to be very abstract and remote from what we know about the development of the political organization of the poleis in the Archaic and Classical periods. In this article I argue that there is a clear historical background to the person whom Plato calls a statesman, viz., the famous legislators of the Archaic period, (...) in particular Lykourgos, Charondas, Zaleukos and Solon. My argument proceeds in two parts: first a survey of Plato's general description of the statesman and second a sketch of the historical prototype of Plato's statesman. (shrink)