7 found
Order:
See also
Nathan Rockwood
Brigham Young University
  1.  25
    Hume on Laws and Miracles.Nathan Rockwood - forthcoming - American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly.
    Hume famously argues that the laws of nature provide us with decisive reason to believe that any testimony of a miracle is false. In this paper, I argue that the laws of nature, as such, give us no reason at all to believe that the testimony of a miracle is false. I first argue that Hume’s proof is unsuccessful if we assume the Humean view of laws, and then I argue that Hume’s proof is unsuccessful even if we assume the (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  2.  5
    Review of Jacovides's Image of the World.Nathan Rockwood - 2018 - Locke Studies 18.
  3.  13
    Lockean Essentialism and the Possibility of Miracles.Nathan Rockwood - 2018 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 56 (2):293-310.
    If the laws of nature are metaphysically necessary, then it appears that miracles are metaphysically impossible. Yet Locke accepts both Essentialism, which takes the laws to be metaphysically necessary, and the possibility of miracles. I argue that the apparent conflict here can be resolved if the laws are by themselves insufficient for guaranteeing the outcome of a particular event. This suggests that, on Locke’s view, the laws of nature entail how an object would behave absent divine intervention. While other views (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  4.  71
    Is Sensitive Knowledge 'Knowledge'?Nathan Rockwood - 2013 - Locke Studies 13:15-30.
    In this paper I argue that Locke takes sensitive knowledge (i.e. knowledge from sensation) to be genuine knowledge that material objects exist. Samuel Rickless has recently argued that, for Locke, sensitive knowledge is merely an “assurance”, or a highly probable judgment that falls short of certainty. In reply, I show that Locke sometimes uses “assurance” to describe certain knowledge, and so the use of the term “assurance” to describe sensitive knowledge does not entail that it is less than certain. Further, (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  5.  25
    Foreknowledge Without Determinism.Nathan Rockwood - forthcoming - Sophia:1-11.
    A number of philosophers and theologians have argued that if God has knowledge of future human actions then human agents cannot be free. This argument rests on the assumption that, since God is essentially omniscient, God cannot be wrong about what human agents will do. It is this assumption that I challenge in this paper. My aim is to develop an interpretation of God’s essential omniscience according to which God can be wrong even though God never is wrong. If this (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  6.  71
    Locke on Knowledge of Existence.Nathan Rockwood - 2016 - Locke Studies 16:41-68.
    The standard objection to Locke’s epistemology is that his conception of knowledge inevitably leads to skepticism about external objects. One reason for this complaint is that Locke defines knowledge as the perception of a relation between ideas, but perceiving relations between ideas does not seem like the kind of thing that can give us knowledge that tables and chairs exist. Thus Locke’s general definition of knowledge seems to be woefully inadequate for explaining knowledge of external objects. However, this interpretation and (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  7. Locke on Empirical Knowledge.Nathan Rockwood - forthcoming - History of Philosophy Quarterly.
    This paper explores two related issues concerning Locke’s account of epistemic justification for empirical knowledge. One issue concerns the degree of justification needed for empirical knowledge. Commentators almost universally take Locke to hold a fallibilist account of justification, whereas I argue that Locke accepts infallibilism. A second issue concerns the nature of justification. Many (though not all) commentators take Locke to have a thoroughly internalist conception of justification for empirical knowledge, whereas I argue that he has a (partly) externalist conception (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography