The Possibility of Miracles

En 2015, plus d'un million de personnes s'est pressé pour se recueillir, pour prier ou pour simplement passer devant un ancien drap de lin : le linceul (ou suaire) de Turin. La raison de son pouvoir d'attraction est simple : il est réputé avoir enveloppé le cadavre de Jésus de Nazareth après sa crucifixion à Jérusalem. Et pourtant, à première vue, peu de choses se décèlent sur ce grand rectangle de plusieurs mètres de long : simplement l'image, de face et (...) de dos, d'un homme grièvement blessé. La réputation du linceul de Turin est ancienne : elle avait au moins déjà cours dans la seconde moitié du XIVème siècle, à Lirey, en Champagne. Depuis la fin du XIXème siècle et la première photographie du linceul, la controverse est devenue extrêmement forte. Le spectre des spécialistes qui se penchent, hier comme aujourd'hui, sur cet objet est très large : des théologiens aux physiciens nucléaires, des historiens de l'antiquité aux chimistes en passant par les médecins légistes. Ce livre présente avec rigueur un état consolidé et à jour de nos connaissances sur le linceul de Turin. Il évalue ensuite méthodiquement les différentes hypothèses de formation de l'image. (shrink)

This study is a new look at the question of how God can act upon the world, and whether the world can affect God, examining contemporary work on the metaphysics of causation and laws of nature, and current work in the theory of knowledge and mysticism. It has been traditional to address such questions by appealing to God’s omnipotence and omniscience, but this book claims that this is useless unless it can be shown how these two powers "work." Instead of (...) treating the familiar problems associated with omnipotence and omniscience, this book asks directly whether, and how, causal interactions between God and His world could occur: both between God and the physical world and between God and other minds, as well as between the world and God. Fales examines current thinking about the very nature of causation, laws of nature, and agency. (shrink)

Some philosophers deny that science can investigate the supernatural - specifically, the nature and actions of God. If a divine being is atemporal, then, indeed, this seems plausible - but only, I shall argue, because such a being could not causally interact with anything. Here I discuss in detail two major attempts, those of Stump and Kretzmann, and of Leftow, to make sense of theophysical causation on the supposition that God is eternal. These views are carefully worked out, and their (...) failures are instructive for any attempt to reconcileeternality with causal efficacy. I conclude by arguing that if knowledge of God is possible, in virtue of His effects upon the world, then it is science that must play the preeminent role in producing that knowledge. (shrink)

Debates about the metaphysical compatibility between miracles and natural laws often appear to prejudge the issue by either adopting or rejecting a strong physicalist thesis . The operative component of physicalism is a causal closure principle: that every caused event is a physically caused event. If physicalism and this strong causal closure principle are accepted, then supernatural interventions are ruled out tout court , while rejecting physicalism gives miracles metaphysical carte blanche. This paper argues for a more moderate version of (...) physicalism that respects important physicalist intuitions about causal closure while allowing for miracles' logical possibility. A recent proposal for a specific mechanism for the production of miracles is criticized and rejected. In its place, two separate mechanisms are proposed that do conform to a more moderate physicalism, and their potential and limitations are explored. (shrink)

If the laws of nature are metaphysically necessary, then it appears that miracles are metaphysically impossible. Yet Locke accepts both Essentialism, which takes the laws to be metaphysically necessary, and the possibility of miracles. I argue that the apparent conflict here can be resolved if the laws are by themselves insufficient for guaranteeing the outcome of a particular event. This suggests that, on Locke’s view, the laws of nature entail how an object would behave absent divine intervention. While other views (...) of laws also make miracles counterfactually dependent on God’s will, I show how this view is consistent with the Essentialist commitment to the view that the laws are metaphysically necessary. Further, I argue Locke’s view is a relatively attractive version of Essentialism, in part, because it allows for the possibility of miracles. (shrink)