During the last decade several authors (Kaufman, Casti, Kampis) have published scientific monographs as well as popular science books heralding the emergence of a new paradigm of science - the science of complexity, which promisses unification of natural sciences. This paper attempts to analyse the meaning of the concept of complexity in both everyday language and the framework of self-organizing systems theory. The paper consists of four parts. The first part discusses the main tenets of the alleged new paradigm and (...) typical criticisms it encounters. The second part articulates the formal correctness and material adequacy conditions, that the definition of „complexity” should satisfy. The third part discusses meanings of the concept: from opposition simplicity-complexity prevalent in everyday language to self-organizing triad: perfect order-complexity-complete chaos. It also lists and critically discussed potential candidates for an adequate definition. The reasons explaining why none of the presented approaches is succesful are subsequently discussed. The conclusions analyse plausible reasons for such a state of affairs. (shrink)

In the paper some consequence operations generated by ukasiewicz's matrices are examined.

This paper, which in its subject matter goes back to works on strongly nite logics , is concerned with the following problems: Let Cn1; Cn2 be two strongly nite logics over the same propositional language. Is the supremum of Cn1 and Cn2 also a strongly nite operation? Is any nite matrix axiomatizable by a nite set of standard rules? The rst question can be found in [9] . The second conjec- ture was formulated by Wolfgang Rautenberg, but investigations into this (...) problem had been carried out earlier in works of many logicians . Moreover, Stephen Bloom [1] posed a conjecture stronger than that: the consequence de- termined by a nite matrix is nitely based, i.e. it is the consequence generated by a nite set of standard rules. This hypothesis was, however, disproved by Andrzej Wronski [10] . In the present paper it is shown that neither nor holds true. The negative answer to can be viewed as a generalization of the result given by Andrzej Wronski [10]. (shrink)

This is an expository paper on the problem of independent axiomatization of any set of sentences. This subject was investigated in 50's and 60's, and was abandoned later on, though not all fundamental questions were settled then. Besides, some papers written at that time are hardly available today and there are mistakes and misunderstandings there. We would like to get back to that unfinished business to clarify the subject matter, correct mistakes and answer questions left open by others. We shall (...) deal with results of many authors. However, they will be exposed in a different manner, with complete proofs and, often, with refinements and supplements. Some questions will be brought up to date and related to other questions in logic. New results and questions will also be added. Stress will be laid on constructive aspects; that is, we will examine the problem of the possibility of independent axiomatization as well as algebraic means by use of which independent sets of axioms can be given. (shrink)

Successful social functioning requires quick and accurate processing of emotion and generation of appropriate reactions. In typical individuals, these skills are supported by embodied processing, recruiting central and peripheral mechanisms. However, emotional processing is atypical in individuals with autism spectrum disorder (ASD). Individuals with ASD show deficits in recognition of briefly presented emotional expressions. They tend to recognize expressions using rule-based, rather than template, strategies. Individuals with ASD also do not spontaneously and quickly mimic emotional expressions, unless the task encourages (...) engagement. When processing emotional scenes, ASD individuals show atypical basic motivational responses, despite intact ability to verbally determine stimulus valence. We discuss how these findings highlight the contribution of both embodied and disembodied mechanisms to typical and atypical emotional functioning. (shrink)

In this paper I first briefly outline the difficulty of maintaining a realistic interpretation of religious discourse in the context of religious pluralism. Then I present two attempts to reconcile religious realism and pluralism. The first is John Hick’s proposal, the second the 'internalist pluralism' developed by Victoria Harrison on the basis of Putnam's internal realism. I point out the weaknesses of these theories. Finally, I outline my own proposal, based on a slightly different interpretation of internal realism than Harrison’s (...) internalist pluralism, namely by using the pragmatic aspects of Putnam's thought. He argues that pragmatic-realistic pluralism avoids the weaknesses of Hick’s and Harrison’s conceptions while at the same time sharing their strengths. (shrink)

The paper revises the biographical data about Michel Foucault’s stay in Poland in 1958-1959. The main inspiration comes from the recent very well documented literary reportage book by Remigiusz Ryziński, Foucault in Warsaw. Ryziński’s aim is to present the data and tell the story, not to analyse the data within the context of Foucault’s work. This paper fulfills this demand by giving additional hypotheses as to why Polish authorities expelled Foucault from Poland and what the relation was between communism and (...) homosexuality. The Polish experience, the paper compels, might have been inspiring for many of Foucault’s ideas in his Madness and Civilization, Discipline and Punish, and The History of Sexuality. On the other hand the author points to the fact that Foucault recognized the difference between the role of the intellectual in the West and in communist countries but did not elaborate on it. In this paper the main argument deals with the idea of sexual paranoia as decisive, which is missing in Foucault's works, although it is found in e.g. Guy Hocquenghem. (shrink)

Artykuł ma wskazywać związki filozofii Ericha Fromma z myśleniem utopijnym. Podstawowym zadaniem będzie zatem rozstrzygniecie, czy mamy do czynienia z klasyczna utopia, czy jedynie z elementami myślenia utopistycznego. Przyjmując, ze filozofia niemieckiego myśliciela wpisuje się w tradycje utopistyczna, ale klasyczna utopia nie jest, podejmuje próbę wykazania związków systemu filozoficznego Ericha Fromma z psychoanaliza Freuda, filozofia Marksa, mesjanizmem żydowskim i chrześcijańskim, które cechuje myślenie utopistyczne.

In this article we will present the Leibniz-Mycielski axiom (LM) of set theory (ZF) introduced several years ago by Jan Mycielski as an additional axiom of set theory. This new postulate formalizes the so-called Leibniz Law (LL) which states that there are no two distinct indiscernible objects. From the Ehrenfeucht-Mostowski theorem it follows that every theory which has an infinite model has a model with indiscernibles. The new LM axiom states that there are infinite models without indis-cernibles. These models are (...) called Leibnizian models of set theory. We will show that this additional axiom is equivalent to some choice principles within the axio-matic set theory. We will also indicate that this axiom is derivable from the axiom which states that all sets are ordinal definable (V=OD) within ZF. Finally, we will explain why the process of language skolemization implies the existence of indis-cernibles. In our considerations we will follow the ontological and epistemological paradigm of investigations. (shrink)

An operation on inferential rules, called H-operation, is used to minimize the axiom basis for classical logic.

It seems that nonmonotonicity of our reasoning is an obvious truth. Almost every logician not even believes, but simply knows very well that a human being thinks in a nonmonotonic way. Moreover, a nonmonotonicity of thinking seems to be a phenomenon parallel to the existence of human beings. Examples allegedly illustrating this phenomenon are not even analyzed today. They are simply quoted. Nowadays, this is a standard approach to nonmonotonicity. However, even simple analysis of those “obvious” examples shows that they (...) illustrate various problems of our thinking, among which none concerns nonmonotonicity. (shrink)

In the paper we examine the method of axiomatic rejection used to describe the set of nonvalid formulae of Aristotle's syllogistic. First we show that the condition which the system of syllogistic has to fulfil to be ompletely axiomatised, is identical to the condition for any first order theory to be used as a logic program. Than we study the connection between models used or refutation in a first order theory and rejected axioms for that theory. We show that any (...) formula of syllogistic enriched with classical connectives is decidable using models in the domain with three members. (shrink)

By pure calculus of names we mean a quantifier-free theory, based on the classical propositional calculus, which defines predicates known from Aristotle’s syllogistic and Leśniewski’s Ontology. For a large fragment of the theory decision procedures, defined by a combination of simple syntactic operations and models in two-membered domains, can be used. We compare the system which employs `ε’ as the only specific term with the system enriched with functors of Syllogistic. In the former, we do not need an empty name (...) in the model, so we are able to construct a 3-valued matrix, while for the latter, for which an empty name is necessary, the respective matrices are 4-valued. (shrink)

The paper is a continuation of A deductive-reductive form oflogic: general theory and intuitionistic case and considers the problem of definability of modal operators on the intuitionistic base. Contrary tothe classical case, it seems that the fact whether the connective is Heyting’sor Brouwerian is essential for the intuitionistic logic. The connective of possibility has the classical interpretation, i.e. w |= ✸α iff ∃t, if it is defined on the base of the logicwith Brouwerian connective of coimplication.

On the base of the classical logic the connectives of necessity and possibility have the equivalent positions in this sense that each of them is definable by the other one. The consequence of this fact is the possibility to define of the both modalities using the connective of identity. Thus, the connective of propositional identity defining the congruence of the propositional language has become the base of the reconstruction of necessity operator in some modal systems. Already in 1957 Greniewski [9] (...) obtained system S5 on the base of the propositional calculus with identity. Next, Cresswell [3], [4] reconstructed S4 and S5 in a similar way. Systematic investigations of this problem were undertaken by Suszko within the broader frame of SCI programme [16], [17], [18]. The connections between modal connectives and the connective of identity settle some philosophical sense of both modalities. Something is necessary, if it is identical with a logical truth. If something is different from the negation of some logical truth, it is possible. It is however, the “ontological” characteristics typical for modalities defined on the base of the classical logic. The settling of similar connections between intuitionistic identity and intuitionistic modalities uncover the philosophical sense of the “epistemic” necessity and possibility. Unfortunately, the symmetry between the classical and intuitionistic case is not entire. The acceptance of both equalities: = ¬ ¬ and = ¬ ¬, in the intuitionistic logic yields the classical versions of both modalities . Thus, there is a problem with defining the connective of intuitionistic possibility by the connective of identity. In Sections 2 and 3 two “partial” solutions of the mentioned problem are presented. They are “partial” because the connective of possibility has undesirable properties. The second solution yields the strengthening of the necessity connective, too. The main aim of this paper is obtained in Section 5, where a definition of the intuitionistic possibility is given. This definition uses the new connective of nonidentity, presented in Section 4. The new approach bases on the idea that some connectives like implication, negation, identity, necessity are “Heyting's” ones. The case of possibility is different. Together with coimplication, weak negation, and nonidentity, possibility belongs to the so-called “Brouwerian” connectives. The connectives of the first kind have such property that in Kripke's style semantics their interpretations in each point of this semantics are related to the interpretations in next points. In the case of the “Brouwerian” connectives the interpretations in each point depend on the interpretations in previous points. In this sense, “Heyting's” connectives are interpreted from the point of view of the future, while the interpretations of the “Brouwerian” connectives are from the point of view of the past. The relations between nonidentity and possibility connectives allow to say that in temporal semantics something is possible in the moment a, if before a there was such moment b in which it was different from the contradiction. Thus, “something is possible” does not mean that it held once in the past. A broader philosophical remarks about the nature of intuitionistic possibility are contained in two Comments in the last Section. (shrink)

There are many arguments that so-called pluralistic theologies of religions face difficulties in being sufficiently pluralistic. In order to meet such an objection, a pluralist offers different solutions. I argue that the range of plausible possibilities for a pluralist is strongly constrained by philosophical arguments which one can develop out of the philosophy of Hilary Putnam. In the first part of this paper, I sketch out three important strands of the Putnamian thought I consider worth defending. Given such presuppositions, I (...) formulate two constraints on pluralistic theology of religions. In the last section of my paper, I briefly point out which of the particular standpoints, often labelled as “pluralistic theology of religions,” have problems with meeting formulated constraints, and which of the “pluralists” seem to be in accordance with them. (shrink)

Visions of reality and supernatural powers accompanied man closely throughout his pre-history and recorded history. The role of the higher religions in the history of human civilization is outlined in an appealing theory developed by Arnold J. Toynbee. Toynbee sees the need for a synthesis of today’s higher religions, a synthesis which should take effect in a trans-rationalistic spirit. The author of the article notes that, although there can be no greatness without the awareness of participating in greatness, uniting Europe (...) is making no effort to build a modern metaphysical awareness to support its ambitious plan. (shrink)