Claude Clerselier leitor da dúvida de René Descartes Resumo: Claude Clerselier foi amigo, correspondente, tradutor e editor de René Descartes, de quem publicou os três volumes da correspondência (Cartas do senhor Descartes), O homem e O mundo. Sua atividade de editor e tradutor foi sempre animada por um duplo desígnio : divulgar a filosofia de Descartes, construindo e veiculando, entretanto, a imagem mais ortodoxa possível do filósofo. Essa imagem de Cleserlier « vulgarizador » da filosofia de Descartes, que sempre o (...) fez o fiel discípulo que se esforça para não se distanciar do mestre cujos méritos celebra, merece em nossa opinião um aprofundamento. Uma análise atenta do Prefácio a’O homem mostra incontestavelmente que Clerselier não se limita a difundir e defender a filosofia cartesiana, mas também que dela é um intérprete escrupuloso. A passagem desse Prefácio no qual Clerserlier discute certos temas, centrais, da metafísica cartesiana, nos parece, com efeito, sugerir uma abordagem completamente diferente daquela de seu mestre. Palavras-chave: Descartes; Clerserlier; Correspondência; O homem; O mundo. Claude Clerselier, reader of the doubt of René Descartes Abstract: Claude Clerselier was a friend, correspondent, translator, and editor of René Descartes. He published three volumes of correspondence of Descartes (The Correspondence of René Descartes), Treatise of Man, and The World. His activity as editor and translator was always inspired by a dual purpose: disseminate the philosophy of Descartes, though through building and conveying the most orthodox image possible of the philosopher. This image of Clerselier as “popularizer” of Descartes’ philosophy, that always portrayed him as the faithful disciple who strives to never distance himself from the master whose merits he honors, is, in our opinion, worthy of deeper analysis. Close attention to the Preface of the Treatise of Man undeniably shows that Clerselier did not limit himself to disseminating and defending Cartesian philosophy but that he is also its scrupulous interpreter. The passage of this Preface in which Clerselier discusses determined themes central to Cartesian metaphysics effectively appears to suggest a completely different approach to that of his master. Keywords: Descartes; Clerselier; Correspondence; Treatise of Man; The World. Claude Clerselier lecteur du doute de René Descartes Résumé: Claude Clerselier fut ami, correspondant, traducteur et éditeur de René Descartes, dont il publia les trois volumes de la correspondance (Lettres de Monsieur Descartes), l’Homme et le Monde. Son activité d’éditeur et traducteur fut toujours animée d’un double dessein : divulguer la philosophie de Descartes tout en construisant et véhiculant, du philosophe, l’image la plus orthodoxe possible. Cette image de Clerselier ‘vulgarisateur’ de la philosophie de Descartes, qui a toujours fait de Clerselier le fidèle disciple qui se garde de s’éloigner de la doctrine du maître dont il célèbre les mérites, mérite à notre avis d’un approfondissement. Une analyse attentive de la Préface à l’Homme montre incontestablement que Clerselier ne se limite pas à diffuser et à défendre la philosophie cartésienne mais qu’il en est aussi un interprète scrupuleux. Le passage de cette Préface dans lequel Clerselier discute certains thèmes, centraux, de la métaphysique cartésienne, nous semble en effet suggérer une approche complètement différente de celle de son maître. Mots-clé: Descartes; Clerserlier; Correspondance; L'homme; Le Monde. (shrink)

In his Lectures on the History of Philosophy, Hegel develops a subtle analysis of Megarian paradoxes: the Liar, the Veiled Man and the Sorites. In this paper, we focus on Hegel's interpretation of...

Stratified properties such as ‘happy unhappiness’, ‘ungrounded ground’, ‘fortunate misfortune’, and evidently ‘true falsity’ may generate dialetheias (true contradictions). The aim of the article is to show that if this is the case, then we will have a special, conjunctive, kind of dialetheia: a true state description of the form ‘Fa and not Fa’ (for some property F and object a), wherein the two conjuncts, separately taken, are to be held untrue. The particular focus of the article is on happy (...) unhappiness: people suffering from (or enjoying) happy unhappiness (if there is some situation or state of mind of this kind) cannot be truly said ‘happy’ or ‘unhappy’, but we can say they are both. In the first section three cases of conjunctive stratification are presented; in the second section the logic of stratified contradictions is explored. The last section focuses on eudemonistic ascriptions: stated that a is happy to be unhappy (or unhappy to be happy), should we say a is happy? unhappy? both? neither? (shrink)

1. The label conjunctive paraconsistency has been adopted to mean a consequence relation whereby ‘p and not p’ does not imply ‘p’ and ‘not p’ separately, so that Simplification in case of contradic...

In 1993, Agostini and Proffitt showed that perceptual belongingness causes simultaneous lightness contrast to be seen in configurations in which the inducing elements are not adjacent to the target. The aim of the present research was to measure the strength of belongingness in determining the contrast phenomenon when the numbers of the inducing and induced elements and their relative positions are manipulated in Agostini-and-Proffitt-type configurations. In the first experiment, by using a forced choice paradigm, naïve observers indicated which (...) gray disks arranged to form the letter T in two rows appeared lighter/darker. In the second experiment, expert observers performed two nulling tasks: 1) the lightness of gray disk was adjusted until it was perceived equal to that of gray target aligned with white/black inducers; 2) the lightness of target organized with white/black inducers was adjusted to match the target organized with black/ white inducers. We found that also when there are few inducers, perceptual belongingness causes the contrast effect to propagate spatially on all the induced elements. Spatial position does not influence the induction effect. Low-level theories cannot account for these phenomena, but higher-level processes must be factored in to explain them. (shrink)

This volume contains essays that examine infinity in early modern philosophy. The essays not only consider the ways that key figures viewed the concept. They also detail how these different beliefs about infinity influenced major philosophical systems throughout the era. These domains include mathematics, metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, science, and theology. Coverage begins with an introduction that outlines the overall importance of infinity to early modern philosophy. It then moves from a general background of infinity up through Kant. Readers will learn (...) about the place of infinity in the writings of key early modern thinkers. The contributors profile the work of Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, and Kant. Debates over infinity significantly influenced philosophical discussion regarding the human condition and the extent and limits of human knowledge. Questions about the infinity of space, for instance, helped lead to the introduction of a heliocentric solar system as well as the discovery of calculus. This volume offers readers an insightful look into all this and more. It provides a broad perspective that will help advance the present state of knowledge on this important but often overlooked topic. (shrink)

Suppose a person blushes iff what she says is false and she says: ‘I am blushing’. If she blushes, she doesn’t, and if she doesn’t, she does. This Blushing Liar is a new paradox, similar in some respects to the Pinocchio Paradox : Pinocchio’s nose grows iff he says some falsity, and he says: ‘my nose is growing’. Both paradoxes involve physical properties, and both, supposedly, confirm the existence of metaphysical dialetheias. In the paper, we note first that while PP (...) relies on the rather implausible scenario of a wooden puppet whose nose grows iff he is lying, so it is debunked by the objection of fictionality, BL is more plausible. Many people in our world blush, and it is not difficult to imagine someone whose saying is causally related to blushing in a similar way. A second question is whether blushing can be directly connected to falsity, without deliberate conscience, on the part of the speaker, of saying a false statement. So we explore the consequences of intending ‘I am blushing’ as a ‘lie’, in the strict meaning of the term, and we claim there is no substantial difference, but for the fact that the paradoxical effect is even more plausible. Third, we check whether BL and PP do really release metaphysical dialetheias, and we argue they do not: they lack the fundamental requisite of Liar-like contradictions, i.e. the stratification of properties. (shrink)

A new idea of ‘contradictory Christology’ has been recently advanced by JC Beall (The contradictory Christ. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2021a). This paper does not enter the debate whether Christ double nature instantiates a contradiction or does not. It aims to point out a possible view about the Christological problem similar to Beall’s view but more focused on the metaphysical consequences of admitting a treatment of the Christological paradox in dialetheic terms, as a case of ‘true contradiction’. In Beall’s account, (...) the glut-theoretic approach can improve the conception of logic presupposed in theological discussions, giving new suggestions for the development of an updated ‘logic of Christology’. I move in the other direction, exploring whether the philosophical reflection on Christology could give new insights for paraconsistency and the study of inconsistencies in general. More specifically, I claim that the idea of the unity of contradictories in Christ’s being both divine and human may give some support to the idea of conjunctive paraconsistency, whereby true conjunctions of contradictories do not admit of Simplification. After an introduction which presents the main argument, I summarize the theory of conjunctivism in paraconsistency, then I focus on the (pseudo) Athanasian Creed, wherein the two natures – one person principle is defended against monophysism. (shrink)

Abstract – In this paper I reconstruct the nature, origins and survivals of the divide between ‘analytic’ and ‘continental’ tradition—the famous dualism which affected the development of philosophy in the second half of the XX century. I also present a theory of it, stressing that its intra-philosophical causes are to be found in the mutual resistance between critical (transcendental) and semantic (logical) approaches in philosophy. I conclude by noting that good philosophers (more or less knowingly) are and have always been (...) sensitive to the transcendental and logical aspects of the philosophical work. (shrink)

This paper advances a version of the theory whereby logic had deep origins in democracy, by re-reading Gorgias’ Encomium of Helen. Democracy, ‘the government by debate’, called political (and scientific) attention to the inferential abilities of citizens and to politicians’ ability of taking advantage of them. Sophists, in particular, discovered that people’s inferences follow constant repeatable forms, that these forms have impact on choices and decisions concerning public good, and then by dominating them you dominate politics in democracy. With the (...) Encomium Gorgias launched these ideas, so laying the ground for Aristotle’s science of deduction. (shrink)

In virtue of Fitch-Church proof, also known as the knowability paradox, we are able to prove that if everything is knowable, then everything is known. I present two ‘onto-theological’ versions of the proof, one concerning collective omniscience and another concerning omnificence. I claim these arguments suggest new ways of exploring the intersection between logical and ontological givens that is a grounding theme of religious thought. What is more, they are good examples of what I call semi-paradoxes: apparently sound arguments whose (...) conclusion is not properly unacceptable, but simply arguable. (shrink)

This article is a preliminary presentation of conjunctive paraconsistency, the claim that there might be non-explosive true contradictions, but contradictory propositions cannot be considered separately true. In case of true ‘p and not p’, the conjuncts must be held untrue, Simplification fails. The conjunctive approach is dual to non-adjunctive conceptions of inconsistency, informed by the idea that there might be cases in which a proposition is true and its negation is true too, but the conjunction is untrue, Adjunction fails. While (...) non-adjunctivism is a well-known option, the other view is not so much studied nowadays, but it was not unknown in the tradition, and there are some positive suggestions, in recent literature, that the position is plausible and deserves to be developed. The article compares conjunctivism, non-adjunctivism and dialetheism, then focuses on some possible justifications, costs and benefits of the conjunctive view. (shrink)

The central thesis of JC Beall’s paraconsistent Christology is that Christ, being human and divine, is a contradictory being, and a rational Christology can accept it, since logic nowadays does not exclude the possibility of true contradictions. In this paper, I move from Beall’s theory and I present an alternative view. I quote seven statements of the so-called ‘Athanasian Creed’ which synthesizes the results of conciliar Christology. The aim of the Creed is to combat monophysitism by stressing the duplicity and (...) unity of Christ: two (incompatible) natures inseparably joined in only one person. I note that the two-in-one principle, so intended, may be seen as an ancestor of what has been called ‘conjunctive paraconsistency’, whereby there could be true contradictions but contradictories cannot be separately true. I specifically oppose this view to Beall’s idea of Christ’s human divinity (or divine humanity) as a glut, showing that in the conjunctive account, true contradictions do not require any overlapping or joint ascription of truth and falsity. (shrink)

My discussion addresses the differences between analytic and continental philosophy concerning the use of logic and exact reasoning in philosophical practice. These differences are mainly examined in the light of the controversial dominance of Hegel's concept of logic in twentieth-century continental philosophy. The inquiry is developed in two parts. In the first, I indicate some aspects of the analytic -continental divide, pointing to the role that the topic 'logic and philosophy' plays in it. In the second part, I give a (...) short account of the views of logic which are typical of the three main trends of continental philosophy. I also suggest how, with the aid of some typical analytical devices, some continental 'anti-logical' attitudes may be corrected, on their own terms. (shrink)

In a recent paper by Casasanto and Pitt (2019), the authors addressed a debate regarding the role of order and magnitude in SNARC and SNARC‐like effects. Their position is that all these effects can be explained by order, while magnitude could only account for a subset of evidence. Although we agree that order can probably explain the majority of these effects, in this commentary we argue that magnitude is still relevant, since there is evidence that cannot be explained based on (...) ordinality alone. We argue that SNARC‐like effects can occur for magnitudes not clearly characterized by overlearned ordinality and that magnitude can prevail on order, when the two are pitted against each other. Finally, we propose that different interpretations of the role of order and magnitude depend on the interaction of stimulus properties and task demands. (shrink)

Der interdisziplinär angelegte Band hat zum Ziel, das Thema der Mystik aus literatur-wissenschaftlicher, philosophisch-interkultureller und theologisch-interreligiöser Perspektive zu beleuchten. Dabei geht es insbesondere um eine epochenübergreifende Auseinandersetzung mit der Frage nach dem Verhältnis von Mystik und Literatur vom Mittelalter bis in die Gegenwart. Innerhalb dieses weitgespannten Bogens soll der systematische Perspektiven eröffnenden Begegnung zwischen Literaturwissenschaft, Theologie und Philosophie besonderes Gewicht zukommen.

The focus of this article is the notion of alethic rights, the rights related to truth. The concept of truth grounds many norms and customary and official rules, but there is no clear and shared idea about its power to generate specific rights. The juridical and political archetype called ‘the right to truth’ is still subject of controversies, and there are doubts about its being a real ‘right,’ to be protected by positive (new) norms. In the article the problem is (...) explored in truth-theoretical perspective: can philosophy support the idea of truth as a source of rights? Can an updated and well-developed theory of truth be proposed, to help activists and theorists concerned with the need for truth of individuals and communities? I present six alethic rights, corresponding to six different aspects of the human need for truth, then I specifically focus on the truth theory that can justify the hypothesis. (shrink)

In diesem Beitrag wird dem Zeitbezug von pädagogischen Konzeptionen des guten Lebens – im Spannungsfeld von Individualität und Sozialität, Pädagogik und Politik, Bestimmtheit und Unbestimmtheit – exemplarisch anhand pädagogischer Programmatiken einerseits und philosophischer Referenzen andererseits nachgegangen. Diese pädagogischen Deutungen und damit die Pädagogisierung des,guten‘ oder,richtigen‘ Lebens werden in einer bildungsphilosophischen Sichtweise und unter Bezug auf ihre deutschsprachigen Vertreter*innen einer eingehenden Betrachtung unterzogen: So scheint die Pädagogik in Theorie und Praxis einerseits auf eine klare normative Zielperspektive im Sinne einer Vorstellung vom (...) guten menschlichen Leben angewiesen zu sein, die auch für die Zukunft Geltung beanspruchen kann. Anderseits scheint die Offenheit der Zukunft, von der aus sich die Notwendigkeit einer Pädagogik allererst rechtfertigen lässt, in diesem Prozess bedacht und bewahrt werden zu müssen, um Heranwachsenden eine eigenverantwortliche Gestaltung ihrer Welt in Relation zu anderen zu ermöglichen. Letzteres scheint nun aber gerade gegen eine Überformung pädagogischer Kerngedanken durch gegenwartsbezogene starre Vorstellungen eines guten Lebens zu sprechen. Mit dem Aufzeigen dieses Dilemmas und der Analyse verschiedener Lösungsansätze vor dem aktuellen Hintergrund der Ungewissheit gesellschaftlicher Transformationsprozesse möchte der Text einen allgemeinpädagogischen Beitrag zur philosophischen Diskussion um das (kollektiv) gute Leben leisten. (shrink)