How do we know the degree of imagination involved in knowing a reality? This is essentially an epistemological question. This essay discusses first the role of imagination in Polanyi’s epistemology since it is used here as the basis of integrative reality. The essay then discusses the degree of imagination involved in three types of integrative reality that are found respectively in technology, science, and humanities. It concludes with a discussion on the role of imagination in education.

Das weit uber die Zeit seiner Abfassung und uber die Grenzen seines Entstehungslandes hinaus unter dem Namen "Qabusname" bekannte, literarisch wie kulturgeschichtlich bedeutsame Werk heisst wortlich "Buch der Ratschlage," persisch "nasihat-name." Sein Verfasser Kej Kawus wurde um 1021/22 n.Chr. geboren und genoss die fur die persischen Furstensohne seit Jahrhunderten vorgeschriebene Erziehung, bei der eine Synthese von ritterlichen und geistigen, vornehmlich religiosen Tugenden angestrebt wurde. Es handelt sich um eines der interessantesten und eigenartigsten Erzeugnisse der mittelalterlichen iranischen Literatur. Mit Recht werden (...) der intime Ton des Werks und die reizvolle Schlichtheit der hubschen Anekdoten sowie die auf Schmuck verzichtende Einfachheit der Erzahlkunst geruhmt. Die vorliegende Ubersetzung des "Qabusname" ist die erste in deutscher Sprache, die nach dem persischen Original vorgenommen wurde. Die einzige fruhere deutsche Ubersetzung des Orientalisten H. F. von Diez erfolgte aus dem Turkischen und wurde 1811 veroffentlicht. Schon Goethe beschaftigte sich bei seiner Begegnung mit dem klassischen Schrifttum der Perser unter der Fuhrung H. F. von Diez eindringlich mit dem Qabusname. Der Beziehung des Dichters zu diesem so bedeutsamen Stuck der persischen Literatur ist daher ein besonderes Kapitel gewidmet. (shrink)

Marxist critique of the Advaita school of Hindu philosophy as propounded by Śaṅkarācārya; contributed articles by E.M.S. Namboodiripad and others from Kerala; includes counter views.

This article presents a Kuyperian critique of ideological uniformity and political integralism in Europe and Indonesia. The background of Kuyper’s articulation of the principle of sphere sovereignty was his struggle with the liberals, the French Revolution, and the German idea and application of state sovereignty. Kuyper struggled with the liberals because he rejected ideological uniformity. He struggled with the ideals of the French Revolution because he rejected popular sovereignty and, later on, political integralism. Kuyper’s rejection of ideological uniformity and political (...) integralism resulted in the articulation of the principle of sphere sovereignty. Such uniformity and integralism also characterized Suharto’s leadership in twentieth-century Indonesia, especially his doctrine of Pancasila as the only basis for the state and civil society and his ideology of the integralist state of Indonesia. I criticize those doctrines from the perspective of Kuyper’s principle of sphere sovereignty. (shrink)

Articles on Sikh philosophy, tradition, and history.

We explore how one might respond emotionally to the eternal recurrence. Zarathustra himself serves as our central case study. First we clarify the idea of eternal recurrence and its role in Nietzsche’s philosophy, explaining why the eternal recurrence has the emotional consequences Nietzsche describes when he first introduces the idea in The Gay Science. Then we describe Zarathustra’s emotional journey from horror at the eternal recurrence to loving it, in the sections from “On Great Events” to “The Seven Seals, or: (...) The Yes and Amen Song.”. (shrink)

A common assumption in the selection of nonhuman animal subjects for research and the approval of research is that, if the risks of a procedure are too great for humans, and if there is a so-called scientific necessity, then it is permissible to use nonhuman animal subjects. I reject the common assumption as neglecting the central ethical issue of the permissibility of using nonhuman animal subjects and as being inconsistent with the principle of justice used in human subjects research ethics. (...) This principle requires that certain classes of individuals not be subjected to a disproportionate share of the burdens or risks of research. I argue for an extension of this principle to nonhuman animal research and show that a prima facie violation of the principle occurs because nonhuman animals bear an overwhelmingly disproportionate share of the risks of research without sufficient justification or reciprocal benefit. (shrink)