The purpose of the study is to reveal the essential content of the digital environment for the provision of medical services. The article discusses various scientific approaches to the formation and development of the digital health care environment. Scientific novelty lies in the substantiation of the definition of a digital environment for the provision of medical services, which will allow developing a scientific and methodological approach to designing a digital ecosystem for the development of the regional economy based on increasing (...) the level of health preservation of citizens. As a result, the strategic directions for the development of the digital environment for the provision of medical services were identified, reflecting the global trends in the development of digital health. (shrink)

Zagadochnyĭ starik.--T︠S︡iolkovskiĭ v Peterburge.

This article discusses Vladimir Vasil’evich Veidle, a philosopher and scholar of cultural study of the Silver Age and a brilliant expert on Alexander Pushkin’s works. The focus is on th...

This book contains 86 essays and papers by the Russian sculptor and hermeneutic philosopher Vladimir Zimmerling (1931-2017) addressed the issues in aesthetics, ethics and cultural history. The apparatus includes the introductory article, the commentary, the name and the subject indexes prepared by the book editor, Anton Zimmerling. The appendix contains 70 pictures of Vladimir Zimmerling's sculptures. Vladimir Zimmerling's conception is build on the combination of the empiricism principle with the elements of hermeneutics and metalinguistic criticism. His essays (...) and papers focus on the foundations of aesthetics and ethics. Vladimir Zimmerling was one of the pioneers of the analytic approach to the poetics of Ossip Mandelstam with his paper "Промер" ["The Measurement"], (1974-1975) devoted to 10 difficult Mandelstam's poems including "Грифельная Ода", "Слепая ласточка бросается к ногам", "Я слово позабыл, что я хотел сказать". (shrink)

The subject of this study is the participants in artificial sociality (humans and artificial intelligence (AI) tools) and communication between them. The first section analyses (using Luhmann’s methodology) communication as the basis of sociality. The second section shows how AI tools became social technologies in the framework of artificial sociality. The third section describes experimental communication between authors and AI tools (the case of ChatGPT). For the first time in the Baltic countries, the authors examined sociological, humanitarian, natural and technological (...) aspects of the functioning AI tools, which participate in creation of a new social reality for human society – artificial sociality. (shrink)

Recently, psychologists have explored moral concepts including obligation, blame, and ability. While little empirical work has studied the relationships among these concepts, philosophers have widely assumed such a relationship in the principle that “ought” implies “can,” which states that if someone ought to do something, then they must be able to do it. The cognitive underpinnings of these concepts are tested in the three experiments reported here. In Experiment 1, most participants judge that an agent ought to keep a promise (...) that he is unable to keep, but only when he is to blame for the inability. Experiment 2 shows that such “ought” judgments correlate with judgments of blame, rather than with judgments of the agent’s ability. Experiment 3 replicates these findings for moral “ought” judgments and finds that they do not hold for nonmoral “ought” judgments, such as what someone ought to do to fulfill their desires. These results together show that folk moral judgments do not conform to a widely assumed philosophical principle that “ought” implies “can.” Instead, judgments of blame play a modulatory role in some judgments of obligation. (shrink)

The subject of this research is the historical evolution of the three world religions – Buddhism, Christianity, and Islam. The author analyzed the development of these religions based on the model of religious cycle, which in his opinion, is common to the majority of historical religions, in other words, religious systems created after the invention of writing. In accordance with the author’s concept, each of the aforementioned religion has gone through six stages of development: initial, orthodox, classical, reformist, critical, and (...) post-critical; as well as two types of crises – structural and system. The three methods are used in the course of this study: historical, comparative, and method of ascension from abstract to concrete. The main conclusion of the conducted research consists in the statement on the functional identity of historical development of Buddhism, Christianity, and Islam regardless of their doctrine of ritual practice. Author’s special contribution is defined by formulation of the abstract model of religious cycle that he applies to the evolution of the aforementioned religions. (shrink)

This article defends the view that liars need not intend to deceive. I present common objections to this view in detail and then propose a case of a liar who can lie but who cannot deceive in any relevant sense. I then modify this case to get a situation in which this person lies intending to tell his hearer the truth and he does this by way of getting the hearer to recognize his intention to tell the truth by lying. (...) This case, and further cases that I develop from it, demonstrate that lying without the intention to deceive is possible. (shrink)

We conducted two experiments to determine whether common folk think that so-called _tell-tale sign_ bald-faced lies are intended to deceive—since they have not been tested before. These lies involve tell-tale signs (e.g. blushing) that show that the speaker is lying. Our study was designed to avoid problems earlier studies raise (these studies focus on a kind of bald-faced lie in which supposedly everyone knows that what the speaker says is false). Our main hypothesis was that the participants will think that (...) the protagonists from our examples lied without intending to deceive, and the results of our surveys confirmed this hypothesis: most of our participants rated tell-tale sign lies as lies not intended to deceive. Therefore, our analysis suggests that common folk think that some lies are not intended to deceive. (shrink)

In this article ‡ we show how the universe of HST, Hrbaček set theory admits a system of subuniverses which keep the Replacement, model Power set and Choice, and also keep as much of Saturation as it is necessary. This gives sufficient tools to develop the most complicated topics in nonstandard analysis, such as Loeb measures.

This paper refines the received analysis of deceptive lies. This is done by assessing some cases of lies that are supposedly not intended to deceive and by arguing that they actually involve sophisticated strategies of intentional deception. These lies, that is, merely seem not to be intended to deceive and this is because our received analysis of deceptive lies is insufficiently sophisticated. We need to add these strategies to our analysis of deceptive lying. The argument ends by presenting this refined (...) analysis. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThe psychological and philosophical literature exploring the role of social influence in moral judgments suggests that conformity in moral judgments is common and, in many cases, seems to b...

In their paper published in 2017 in Philosophical Psychology, Ronja Rutschmann and Alex Wiegmann introduce a novel kind of lies, the indifferent lies. According to them, these lies are not intended to deceive simply because the liars do not care whether their audience is going to believe them or not. It seems as if indifferent lies avoid the objections raised against other kinds of lies supposedly not intended to deceive. I argue that this is not correct. Indifferent lies, too, are (...) either intended to deceive or are not lies at all, since they do not involve genuine assertions. (shrink)

A satisfactory analysis of human deception must rule out cases where it is a mistake or an accident that person B was misled by person A's behavior. Therefore, most scholars think that deceivers must intend to deceive. This article argues that there is a better solution: rather than appealing to the deceiver's intentions, we should appeal to the function of their behavior. After all, animals and plants engage in deception, and most of them are not capable of forming intentions. Accordingly, (...) certain human behavior is deceptive if and only if its function is to mislead. This solves our problem because if the function of A's behavior was to mislead, B's ending up misled was not an accident or a mere mistake even if A did not intend to deceive B. (shrink)