In the current paper, we re-examine how abstract argumentation can be formulated in terms of labellings, and how the resulting theory can be applied in the field of modal logic. In particular, we are able to express the (complete) extensions of an argumentation framework as models of a set of modal logic formulas that represents the argumentation framework. Using this approach, it becomes possible to define the grounded extension in terms of modal logic entailment.

In this paper, we prove the correspondence between complete extensions in abstract argumentation and 3-valued stable models in logic programming. This result is in line with earlier work of [6] that identified the correspondence between the grounded extension in abstract argumentation and the well-founded model in logic programming, as well as between the stable extensions in abstract argumentation and the stable models in logic programming.

This paper provides equational semantics for Dung's argumentation networks. The network nodes get numerical values in [0,1], and are supposed to satisfy certain equations. The solutions to these equations correspond to the ?extensions? of the network. This approach is very general and includes the Caminada labelling as a special case, as well as many other so-called network extensions, support systems, higher level attacks, Boolean networks, dependence on time, and much more. The equational approach has its conceptual roots in the (...) nineteenth century following the algebraic equational approach to logic by George Boole, Louis Couturat, and Ernst Schroeder. (shrink)

Given an argumentation network we associate with it a modal formula representing the 'logical content' of the network. We show a one-to-one correspondence between all possible complete Caminada labellings of the network and all possible models of the formula.

This paper studies general numerical networks with support and attack. Our starting point is argumentation networks with the Caminada labelling of three values 1=in, 0=out and ½=undecided. This is generalised to arbitrary values in [01], which enables us to compare with other numerical networks such as predator?prey ecological networks, flow networks, logical modal networks and more. This new point of view allows us to see the place of argumentation networks in the overall landscape of networks and import and export (...) ideas to and from argumentation networks. We make a special effort to make clear how general concepts in general networks relate to the special case of argumentation networks. We pay special attention to the handling of loops and to the special features of numerical support. We find surprising connections with the Dempster?Shafer rule and with the cross-ratio in projective geometry. This paper is an expansion of our 2005 paper and so we also consider higher level features such as numerical attacks on attacks, and propagation of numerical values.We conclude with a brief view of temporal numerical argumentation and with a detailed comparison with related papers published since 2005. (shrink)

Given an argumentation network we associate with it a modal formula representing the ‘logical content’ of the network. We show a one-to-one correspondence between all possible complete Caminada labellings of the network and all possible models of the formula.

This collection addresses a post-WWII shift in the hierarchy of scientific explanations, where the highest goal moves from reductionism towards some ...

Dieses Buch bietet die erste systematische Interpretation von Husserls Ideen für eine reine Phänomenologie und phänomenologische Philosophie anhand der neuen kritischen Edition von Ideen II. Es ermöglicht eine phänomenologische Auslegung des allgemein-metaphysischen Problems, wie physische, mentale und soziale Tatsachen zusammenhängen. Das Buch diskutiert und interpretiert detailliert einige von Husserls zentralen Konzeptionen und zeigt die Konsequenzen seines Denkansatzes und seiner Theorieentwicklung. Natur und Gemeingeist sind Husserl zufolge die Grundbegriffe der naturalistischen und der personalistischen Einstellungen und dienen als Leitfaden der Unterscheidung zwischen (...) Natur- und Geisteswissenschaften. In der kritischen Auseinandersetzung mit diesem wissenschaftstheoretischen Dualismus führt Husserl den Habitus-Begriff methodisch ein, um das Verhältnis von Natur- und Sozialontologie aus der konkreten Erfahrung heraus phänomenologisch neu zu deuten, womit der spätere, anti-dualistische Weg der Lebensweltphänomenologie vorbereitet wird. In Husserls Studien zur Regionalontologie des Gemeingeistes rückt das konkrete Subjekt in den Vordergrund der Intentionalitätsanalyse, indem die sinntragenden Elemente der Inaktualitität auf Habitualisierungsprozesse und die Intersubjektivität auf Sozialisierungsstufen zurückgeführt werden. Dank der durch den Habitus-Begriff ermöglichten klaren Unterscheidung zwischen konstituierender Aktualität und konstitutiver Relevanz des inaktuellen Horizonts kann Husserls Philosophie des Geistes als individualistisch und holistisch zugleich gelten. Dieser ontologischen Position entspricht auch Husserls sozialepistemologische Ansicht, dass sich Wissenschaften erst im Rahmen idealisierter Sozialstrukturen entfalten können. Durch diese idealisierenden Operationen wird die Konstitution der Objektivität möglich, welche die Wissenschaften anstreben. Deren Rationalität ist deshalb in ihren konkreten und idealisierten Sozialitätsstufen und Habitualitäten zu befragen. (shrink)

Dieses Buch bietet die erste systematische Interpretation von Husserls Ideen für eine reine Phänomenologie und phänomenologische Philosophie anhand der neuen kritischen Edition von Ideen II. Es ermöglicht eine phänomenologische Auslegung des allgemein-metaphysischen Problems, wie physische, mentale und soziale Tatsachen zusammenhängen. Das Buch diskutiert und interpretiert detailliert einige von Husserls zentralen Konzeptionen und zeigt die Konsequenzen seines Denkansatzes und seiner Theorieentwicklung. Natur und Gemeingeist sind Husserl zufolge die Grundbegriffe der naturalistischen und der personalistischen Einstellungen und dienen als Leitfaden der Unterscheidung zwischen (...) Natur- und Geisteswissenschaften. In der kritischen Auseinandersetzung mit diesem wissenschaftstheoretischen Dualismus führt Husserl den Habitus-Begriff methodisch ein, um das Verhältnis von Natur- und Sozialontologie aus der konkreten Erfahrung heraus phänomenologisch neu zu deuten, womit der spätere, anti-dualistische Weg der Lebensweltphänomenologie vorbereitet wird. In Husserls Studien zur Regionalontologie des Gemeingeistes rückt das konkrete Subjekt in den Vordergrund der Intentionalitätsanalyse, indem die sinntragenden Elemente der Inaktualitität auf Habitualisierungsprozesse und die Intersubjektivität auf Sozialisierungsstufen zurückgeführt werden. Dank der durch den Habitus-Begriff ermöglichten klaren Unterscheidung zwischen konstituierender Aktualität und konstitutiver Relevanz des inaktuellen Horizonts kann Husserls Philosophie des Geistes als individualistisch und holistisch zugleich gelten. Dieser ontologischen Position entspricht auch Husserls sozialepistemologische Ansicht, dass sich Wissenschaften erst im Rahmen idealisierter Sozialstrukturen entfalten können. Durch diese idealisierenden Operationen wird die Konstitution der Objektivität möglich, welche die Wissenschaften anstreben. Deren Rationalität ist deshalb in ihren konkreten und idealisierten Sozialitätsstufen und Habitualitäten zu befragen. (shrink)

For the theorists of crisis, the revolutionary state comes into existence through violence, and due to its inability to provide an authoritative katechon (restrainer) against internal and external violence, it perpetuates violence until it self-destructs. Writing during extreme economic depression and growing social and political violence, the crisis theorists––Joseph de Maistre, Juan Donoso Cortés, and Carl Schmitt––each sought to blame the chaos of their time upon the Janus-faced postrevolutionary ideals of liberalism and socialism by urging a return to pre-revolutionary moral (...) and religious values. They are united by three counterrevolutionary principles, all of which are purported to remedy revolutionary violence: traditional constitutional fidelity, the philosophy of the decision, and opposition to bourgeois liberalism. This essay is followed by the first complete English translation and publication of Donoso’s letter of October 24, 1851, which contains Donoso’s only reference to the “discussing class,” a political entity later popularized by Schmitt in his 1922 work Political Theology. (shrink)

Edith Stein claims that communal experiences are not reducible to the collection of individual experiences directed to the same object or upon the same content. Based on this intuition she gives a phenomenological description of the intentional structure that is proper to communal experiences regarding to their content, mode, and subject. While expanding on her attempts to reassess Husserl’s description of intentionality in an original social-ontological framework, I will stress her precious distinction between individual consciousness and communal stream of experience. (...) I will argue that, if Stein defines the being of the community through its the communal stream of experience, the latter has to be interpreted through Husserl’s teleological concept of ideal multiplicity of experiences. Discussing Stein’s account both against the background of the methodology of Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology and contextualizing it within the social-ontological struggle that took place in Germany during the Great War, I will focus on her description of we-intentionality and aim to unearth its phenomenological core as well as its methodological limits. (shrink)

In this paper, I offer an analysis of the thought experiment “Two worlds for one ego” in which Husserl imagines an ego that lives two alternated lives. The thought experiment is designed to question the apodicticity of the world’s singularity. If the ego of the thought experiment is a fully concrete social subject, then the world’s singularity proves to be apodictic. If we were to, conversely, conduct the same experiment with an abstract ego, then the counter‑scenario of a doubling of (...) the world would be tenable if and only if this subject was the sole subject of both worlds. This means, in turn, that a more concrete phenomenological conduction of the experiment demonstrates the limits of methodological solipsism. The paper is tripartite. Firstly, I set out the experiment’s terminological terrain and discuss the systematic questions addressed as well as the phenomenological methods involved. In a second step, I analyse Husserl’s conduction of the thought experiment. Finally, I discuss some of the experiment’s possible applications to anthropology. (shrink)

In this document, we describe the concepts of ideal semantics and stage semantics for abstract argumentation in terms of argument labellings. The difference between the traditional extensions approach and the labelling approach is that where the former only identifies the sets of accepted arguments, the latter also identifies the rejected arguments as well as the arguments that are neither accepted nor rejected. So far, the labellings approach has been successfully applied to complete, grounded, preferred, stable and semi-stable semantics, as well (...) as to the concept of admissibility. In the current paper, we continue this line of research by showing that ideal semantics and stage semantics can also be described in terms of argument labellings. (shrink)

In this paper, I contend that the core intuition that resides at the basis of Scheler’s metaethics is expressed through the formal axiological distinction between things, goods, and values. I pursue a twofold aim: 1) to show that Scheler implicitly operates within Husserl’s concept of ‘unitary foundation’ when describing how values inhere within goods; 2) to compare Scheler’s metaethical argument concerning the independence of a world of goods with Hare’s ‘indiscernibility argument’. Scheler’s reversal of Hare’s argument confronts us with the (...) formal-ontological difference between the analytic account of supervenience and the phenomenological account of unitary foundation. My argument is based on the formalization of the second type of unitary foundation that Husserl outlines in his Third Logical Investigation. The second type of unitary foundation is usually conflated with the first type of unitary foundation, as a result of the gross mistakes found in Findlay’s English. (shrink)

Some theories of goodness are descriptively rich: they have much to say about what makes things good. Neo-Aristotelian accounts, for instance, detail the various features that make a human being, a dog, a bee good relative to facts about those forms of life. Famously, such theories of relative goodness tend to be comparatively poor: they have little or nothing to say about what makes one kind of being better than another kind. Other theories of goodness—those that take there to be (...) absolute goodness—are comparatively rich: they offer grounds for judging some types of things better than others because they have more absolute goodness. Moorean accounts, for example, can tell us that humans and human experiences are superior to bees and blades of grass. But such theories tend to be descriptively poor: they struggle to tell us in virtue of what this is so. In this essay we motivate and flesh out a view that splits the difference between accounts of goodness as relative and accounts of goodness as absolute. Such a view holds promise only if the mechanics of this kind of metaphysics of goodness can be worked out. Here we present a view on which the paradigm for absolute goodness is God and the paradigm for each kind of relative goodness is a divine idea. (shrink)

With a phenomenological reassessment of Ricœur’s early ethics, I expound on the role played by evaluation in shaping intentions in the course of action. Ricœur’s early ethics can be considered an “...

After a brief introduction to the history of the Husserl Archives I focus on the methodological specificities in studying Husserl’s work on the basis of his manuscripts and of his archives. In a second step I expound on the effects that the current shift from an analogous to a hybrid analogous and digital archives is producing in the self-understanding of the practices of our institution. Particularly, developing digital technology means that the Husserl Archives are entering a new phase in respect (...) to how archival and editorial impulses will affect the presentation of Husserl’s writings. Finally, I offer some perspectives about how the planned virtual platform, which will give direct access to his manuscripts, is designed to promote a new understanding of Husserl’s specific process of philosophical writing, of his unique wording of thoughts. (shrink)

This article aims to examine sociality’s multipolar and intentional structure beyond an inter-subjectivist perspective; beyond the view that the social world consists of only subjects and their interaction. The article is divided into four sections. First, I present Benoist’s critique of mainstream inter-subjectivist accounts of phenomenology. Second, I introduce Husserl’s concept of Gemeingeist and provide a preliminary definition of it as a “substrate of habits.” Third, I focus on the sociological and ontological sources of Benoist’s critique, specifically Descombes’ reassessment of (...) Hartmann’s distinction between objective and objectified mind. Finally, I revise my preliminary Husserlian definition of “common mind” drawing both from the distinction between objective and objectified mind and Benoist’s account of habituation as a two-sided correlative phenomenon. Although he often tends to phrase his account in intersubjectivist terms, Husserl’s phenomenology offers valuable tools to address the multipolar structure of sociality, which does not only consist of subjects in their interactions, but foremost, in the way the human mind is embedded in institutions and extended in a range of objects that bear social meaning and that guide and bind human life to an extent that is unique among social animals. (shrink)

Since 1900, debates about the justification of punishment have also been debates about the cause of crime. In the early twentieth century, the rehabilitative ideal of punishment viewed mental illness and dysfunction in individuals as the cause of crime. Starting in the 1970s, retributivism identified the immorality of human agents as the source of crime, which dovetailed well with the “tough-on-crime” political milieu of the 1980s and 1990s that produced mass incarceration. After surveying these historical trends, Wirts argues for a (...) social critical view that crime is best understood as a product of an unjust society, not faulty human beings. This view should take the lessons learned by the critiques of rehabilitation, however, and resist the tendency to reduce human beings to recipients of social services. (shrink)

In the current paper we re-examine the concepts of attack semantics and collective attacks in abstract argumentation, and examine how these concepts interact with each other. For this, we systematically map the space of possibilities. Starting with standard argumentation frameworks (which consist of a directed graph with nodes and arrows) we briefly state both node semantics and arrow semantics (the latter a.k.a. attack semantics) in both their extensions-based form and labellings-based form. We then proceed with SETAFs (which consist of a (...) directed hypergraph of nodes and arrows, to take into account the notion of collective attacks) and state both node semantics and arrow semantics, in both their extensions-based and labellings-based form. We then show equivalence between the extensions-based and labellings-based form, for node semantics and arrow semantics of AFs, as well as for node semantics and arrow semantics of SETAFs. Moreover, we show equivalence between node semantics and arrow semantics for AFs, and equivalence between node semantics and arrow semantics for SETAFs (with the notable exception of semi-stable). We also provide a novel way of converting a SETAF to an AF such that semantics are preserved, without the use of any “meta arguments”. Although the main part of our work is on the level of abstract argumentation, we do provide an application of our theory on the instantiated level. More specifically, we show that the classical characterisation of Assumption-Based Argumentation (ABA) can be seen as an instantiation based on a SETAF, whereas the contemporary characterisation of ABA can be seen as an instantiation based on a standard AF. Our theory of how to convert a SETAF to an AF can then be used to account for both the similarities and the differences between the classical and contemporary characterisations of ABA. Most prominently, our theory is able to explain the semantic mismatch for semi-stable semantics that arises in the ABA instantiation process. (shrink)

Much like admissibility is the key concept underlying preferred semantics, strong admissibility is the key concept underlying grounded semantics, as membership of a strongly admissible set is sufficient to show membership of the grounded extension. As such, strongly admissible sets and labellings can be used as an explanation of membership of the grounded extension, as is for instance done in some of the proof procedures for grounded semantics. In the current paper, we present two polynomial algorithms for constructing relatively small (...) strongly admissible labellings, with associated min–max numberings, for a particular argument. These labellings can be used as relatively small explanations for the argument’s membership of the grounded extension. Although our algorithms are not guaranteed to yield an absolute minimal strongly admissible labelling for the argument (as doing so would have implied an exponential complexity), our best performing algorithm yields results that are only marginally larger. Moreover, the runtime of this algorithm is an order of magnitude smaller than that of the existing approach for computing an absolute minimal strongly admissible labelling for a particular argument. As such, we believe that our algorithms can be of practical value in situations where the aim is to construct a minimal or near-minimal strongly admissible labelling in a time-efficient way. (shrink)

In their descriptions of the life dynamics of tendencies as “blind but oriented,” both Scheler and Husserl outline an alternative model of intentionality to Brentano’s conception of mental reference to determinate objects or meanings. In my reading, their phenomenological consideration of tendential structures will reveal tendency as an essential moment of intentionality. A horizon of indeterminacy turns out to be constitutive of every intentional act as a tendency toward or away from something. This paper develops as follows: First, I will (...) present Max Scheler’s nuanced differentiation of tendential life and the systematic horizon of his model of blind but oriented tendency, which seeks to offer an alternative to the mechanism/teleology dichotomy. Second, I will present Jocelyn Benoist’s framing of the same question in the opposition between blind drives and consciousness. Benoist’s radical critique of the interpretation of intentionality as a tendency condenses in his clear assertion that drives cannot be intentional because they are constitutively blind. Benoist accuses Edmund Husserl of nothing less than murdering intentionality through phenomenological vivisection, i.e., by extinguishing in reflection the tension inherent in conative intention and watering down the concept of intentionality to such an extent that it also includes cognitive acts. I will therefore turn my attention to the alleged culprit. I will show that Husserl’s broad concept of intentionality is not only negatively justified by the possibility of transforming tendencies into a consciousness of their implicit object, but rather positively justified by the directed dynamics of both passive and active forms of intentionality. In the conclusion I will show how Husserl’s constitutive analyses move along lines akin to Scheler’s insights and call for a revision of overly static interpretations of the phenomenological concepts of intentionality and teleology. (shrink)

Donald Davidson has made enormous contributions to the philosophy of action, epistemology, semantics and philosophy of mind and today is recognized as one of the most important analytical philosophers of the late twentieth century. _Donald Davidson: Truth, Meaning and Knowledge_ addresses * Davidson's writings on epistemology and theory of language with their implications of ontology and philosophy of mind * the central issue of whether truth is the ultimate goal of enquiry, challenged by contributions from Richard Rorty and Paul Horwich (...) * Davidson's approach to semantics and applied linguistics as addressed by Kirk Ludwig, Gabriel Segal, Peter Pagin, Stephen Neale, Herman Cappelen and Ernie Lepore and Reinaldo Elugardo * Davidson's advances in the philosophy of mind in relation to the views of Williard V. Quine, John McDowell and Peter F. Strawson, in essays by Roger Gibson and Anita Avramides. (shrink)

The connection between logic programming and formal argumentation has been studied starting from the landmark 1995 paper of Dung. Subsequent work has identified a standard translation from logic programs to argumentation frameworks, under which pairwise correspondences hold between various logic programming semantics and various formal argumentation semantics. This includes the correspondence between 3-valued stable and complete semantics, between well-founded and grounded semantics and between 2-valued stable and stable semantics. In the current paper, we show that the existing translation is able (...) to yield the additional correspondence between ideal semantics for logic programming and ideal semantics for formal argumentation. We also show that correspondence does not hold between eager semantics for logic programming and eager semantics for formal argumentation, at least when translating from logic programming to formal argumentation. Overall, the current work should be seen as completing the analysis of correspondences between mainstream admissibility-based argumentation semantics and their logic programming counterparts. (shrink)

The topic of professionalism has dominated the content of major academic medicine publications during the past decade and continues to do so. The message of this current wave of professionalism is that medical educators need to be more attentive to the moral sensibilities of trainees, to their interpersonal and affective dimensions, and to their social conscience, all to the end of skilled, humanistic physicians. Urgent calls to address professionalism from such groups as the Association of American Medical Colleges, the American (...) Board of Internal Medicine, and the Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education, among others. In fact, at the 2004 annual meeting of the AAMC six separate presentations addressed professionalism with such titles as "Evaluating Humanism and Professionalism," Professionalism: Expectation, Education, Evaluation," or "Toward Assessing Professional Behaviors of Medical Students through Peer Observations". Professionalism, then, has become part of the current academic medicine parlance, used by administrators, clinical faculty, residency programs, and professional organizations with an expectation of shared meanings and goals. All of these stakeholders focus on what has become a consistent list of attributes deemed to be the essence of professionalism, which usually include variations on altruism, duty, excellence, honor and integrity, accountability, and respect. In fact, most of the scholarly work to date has been listing, describing, decrying, and measuring/evaluating it. In this collection of essays, we don’t argue with these attributes. Instead, we ask questions of the discourse from which they arise, how the specialized language of academic medicine disciplines has defined, organized, contained, and made seemingly immutable a group of attitudes, values, and behaviors subsumed under the label "professional" or "professionalism." This collection aims to be a critical text, one that questions the profession’s beliefs about the nature of its work and how such beliefs are enacted in medical education, particularly as they fuel the professionalism discourse. In addition, we will scrutinize how the discourse is enacted in both the formal and hidden curriculum, and in the larger medical environment. (shrink)

In this paper, I contend that the core intuition that resides at the basis of Scheler’s metaethics is expressed through the formal axiological distinction between things, goods, and values. I pursue a twofold aim: 1) to show that Scheler implicitly operates within Husserl’s concept of ‘unitary foundation’ when describing how values inhere within goods; 2) to compare Scheler’s metaethical argument concerning the independence of a world of goods with Hare’s ‘indiscernibility argument’. Scheler’s reversal of Hare’s argument confronts us with the (...) formal-ontological difference between the analytic account of supervenience and the phenomenological account of unitary foundation. My argument is based on the formalization of the second type of unitary foundation that Husserl outlines in his Third Logical Investigation. The second type of unitary foundation is usually conflated with the first type of unitary foundation, as a result of the gross mistakes found in Findlay’s English. (shrink)

In much of the current academic and public discussion, conspiracy theories are portrayed as a negative phenomenon, linked to misinformation, mistrust in experts and institutions, and political propaganda. Rather surprisingly, however, philosophers working on this topic have been reluctant to incorporate a negatively evaluative aspect when either analyzing or engineering the concept conspiracy theory. In this paper, we present empirical data on the nature of the concept conspiracy theory from five studies designed to test the existence, prevalence and exact form (...) of an evaluative dimension to the ordinary concept conspiracy theory. These results reveal that, while there is a descriptive concept of conspiracy theory, the predominant use of conspiracy theory is deeply evaluative, encoding information about epistemic deficiency and often also derogatory and disparaging information. On the basis of these results, we present a new strategy for engineering conspiracy theory to promote theoretical investigations and institutional discussions of this phenomenon. We argue for engineering conspiracy theory to encode an epistemic evaluation, and to introduce a descriptive expression—such as ‘conspiratorial explanation’—to refer to the purely descriptive concept conspiracy theory. (shrink)